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**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

A. C. HARTH


A DISSERTATION

in

Political Science

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2003



Supervisor of Dissertation



Graduate Group Chairperson

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Anthony Christian Harth

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Michelle Ivester Harth,
who read every page more than once, provided invaluable substantive and editorial
suggestions, and worked hard for the last decade to support my work and our family,

and

to our two children, Julia Tydings Harth and Jacob Brantley Harth,
who help us keep our priorities straight and who make it all worthwhile.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Following up the dedication, I want to thank not just my wife and children but also our entire family for their support and love. I am the person I am today primarily because of them and, quite simply, could not have completed this project without them.

I also want to thank my adviser and the supervisor of this dissertation, Avery Goldstein. At every step, Avery was helpful and supportive. So, too, have Karl von Vorys and Walter McDougall played formative roles in my education and training and influenced this project and me in ways that go far beyond reading a dissertation. I also appreciate the assistance of Henry Teune, Ed Mansfield, Marc Trachtenberg, Dan Deudney, John Ikenberry, Fritz Kratochwil, Fred Frey, Steve Fish, Alvin Rubinstein, Chong-Sik Lee, Ian Lustick, and Lawrence Klein. Earlier studies under Zbigniew Brzezinski and Dimitri Simes, as well as Pete Beckman and Derek Linton, also influenced this work.

During the last year, I benefited enormously from working with Ernest May and from presenting parts of the dissertation at Harvard University and at Dartmouth College. I appreciate the feedback from these two audiences, especially the suggestions from Iain Johnston, Colin Dueck, Ben Fordham, Allan Stam, William Wohlforth, Andrew Stigler, Chris Wohlforth, and Daryl Press.

Finally, I want to thank the librarians at Van Pelt (Penn), Widener (Harvard), and Ohrstrom (St. Paul's School) for their bibliographic assistance and both Adrian Gaty and Richard Bennet for their assistance with the final product. Of course, I alone am accountable for any shortcomings.

Abstract

GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY: FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

A. C. Harth

Avery Goldstein, Chair

States pursue different grand strategies at different times with different degrees of success. Why? Why select one grand strategy (an integrated, multidimensional approach to security) and not another? Why not deal with all threats in the same manner? And why, once selected, do some strategies succeed and provide security (i.e., territorial integrity, political independence, economic viability, environmental sustainability, and social cohesion) while others fail? As part of a larger effort to reintroduce the natural world to security studies, this dissertation analyzes the relative causal influence of geopolitics (encompassing geographic features as modified by technological advances). Adopting an ecological perspective and focusing primarily on policy formulation and functionality (inputs and outcomes), I advance two lines of argument: perceptual and operational. First, decision-makers consider geopolitical circumstances when crafting grand strategies: thoughts about location, distance, interaction capacity, and connectedness – captured in mental maps – help shape strategic preferences and policies. Second, once selected, these security strategies must be played out on that same field – the material context. Strategies with high landscape fitness have a higher probability of success; unsuitable strategies tend toward dysfunction and crashes. Using process tracing in a structured, focused comparison of crucial cases, I test this argument against the historical experience of the United States. Evaluated against three of the most prominent grand strategies adopted by the United States over the last two centuries – (1) non-entanglement, or hiding, with the Monroe Doctrine; (2) containment, or balancing, with the Truman Doctrine; and (3) enlargement, or binding, with the Clinton Doctrine – this argument stands up well. Abundant discursive and cartographic evidence indicate profound cognitive and causal connections between geopolitics and grand strategies. While other factors also matter, geopolitics is critical to explaining variation both across and within these cases. The implications of this study are important, the approach widely applicable. No less than the outcome and the nature of the game are at stake, as developments in communication, transportation, and destruction dramatically increase interaction capacity and fundamentally alter the emergent landscape. States that fail to recognize these changes and adjust their strategies accordingly do so at their own peril.

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**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Chapter 1: Introduction – The Problem and Argument

In his famous Farewell Address, George Washington strongly argued against tying American peace and prosperity to the fate of Europe. While commerce was to be encouraged, political ties were dangerous and permanent alliances to be avoided. The rationale behind Washington's exhortations was straightforward: "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?"¹ With the pronouncement of James Monroe's Seventh Annual Message in 1823, the United States officially announced its intention to pursue this "different course" and practice what amounted to an aversive strategy toward the other great powers. While particular policies and corollaries came and went, the essential logic and vision of the Monroe Doctrine – dubbed by some, "isolationism" – served as the foundation of American national security policy for more than a century.²

¹ Cited in Thomas P. Brockway, ed., *Basic Documents in United States Foreign Policy* (D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957), p. 19.

² In fact, the logic was so compelling and the position so appealing that many Americans still reflect nostalgically on the era, with some even calling for a return to such a position. See, for example, Pat Buchanan, "America First – and Second, and Third," *National Interest*, No. 19 (Spring 1990); Eric Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton University Press, 1995); and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997). For a critical perspective on the accepted "wisdom" concerning American "isolationism" and a compelling argument that what the United States practiced can be better termed "unilateralism," see Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997), particularly Chapter 2 of the "Old Testament." At the same time, as discussed below in Chapter 3, there is no mistaking the general aversive tendencies and preferences for non-entanglement with the other great powers for roughly the first century of the United States.

The subsequent strategy of “containment” espoused by the Truman administration involves a fundamentally different approach to security but appears no less grounded in geography.³ Instead of avoiding threats and hiding from Russia, the United States now sought to meet the threat and balance Russian power.⁴ As practiced in its various forms for over forty years, the thrust of American security policy during the Cold War focused on preventing Soviet domination of the Eurasian “heartland” and

For an introduction to the Monroe Doctrine and its formulation, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., “The Monroe Doctrine: Palladium of American Foreign Policy,” Ch. 1 in Cecil Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Louisiana State University Press, 1982); W. C. Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, I,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1902) and “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October 1902); W. A. McCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine* (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1923); John Bach McMaster, *The Origin, Meaning, and Application of the Monroe Doctrine* (Henry Altemus, 1896); Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (Peter Smith, 1965[1927]) and *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Little, Brown, and Co. 1946); Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Harvard University Press, 1975); Harry Ammon, “The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision?” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1981); Frank Donovan, *Mr. Monroe’s Message: The Story of the Monroe Doctrine* (Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1963); W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine* (G. E. Stechert and Co., 1924).

³ For an introduction to the strategy and its formulation, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford University Press, 1982); Cecil Crabb, “The Truman Doctrine: Cold War and the Containment Strategy,” Chapter 3 in Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*; Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (Viking Press, 1955); Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton University Press, 1985); Richard Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1977); and Walter McDougall, “Containment,” Chapter 7 in *Promised Land, Crusader State*.

⁴ Some analysts argue that United States was more concerned with preponderance and dominating or eliminating the Soviet threat than balancing or containing it. As discussed below in Chapter 5, this argument may have merit, especially with the pronouncement of NSC-68 in 1950; prior to that, especially during 1946-1947, the concern of top policy-makers, like George Kennan, was simply keeping the Russians in check and not allowing them to expand at will. Nevertheless, what matters for the moment is that the United States adopted and practiced a different type of security strategy than it had in the nineteenth century. For more on the difference between the two eras, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 13 (Spring 1993). For two examples of the argument that the United States sought more than a balance of power, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford University Press, 1991); and Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Cornell University Press, 2000).

its "rimlands."⁵ Aid and advisors were provided, treaties signed, alliances formed, and wars fought in the name of containing the expansion of communism around the globe. According to Geoffrey Sloan, this entire foreign policy orientation was firmly rooted in geopolitical theory.⁶ At the very least, most of the major presidential foreign policy doctrines promulgated during this period had clear geographic direction: Eisenhower on the Middle East, Johnson on Southeast Asia, Nixon on East Asia, and Carter on the Persian Gulf.⁷

Even the much maligned Clinton administration, oft criticized for wanting principles or strategic direction,⁸ seems to have based its strategic approach to national security on an assessment of geography and technology. Its formally articulated doctrine of "engagement and enlargement" advocated integrating potential threats like Russia and China in an effort to deepen and broaden "the world's free community of

⁵ Donald W. Meinig, "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 1956). As he clearly states: "Indeed, the American postwar foreign policy of 'containment' and the existent pattern of alliances is in general an implementation, whether conscious or unconscious I cannot say, of Spykman's theory of the critical nature of the rimland" (p. 555). For more on these two central geopolitical concepts, see Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History," *Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23 (1904); and Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1944).

⁶ As Sloan puts it: "In the conduct of policy there existed a conjunction between the geopolitical theories of Mahan, Lea, and Mackinder and the perceptions and actions of policy-makers" (p. 145). It is important to note, however, that Sloan's analysis is more concerned with how ideas and theories (as opposed to the material world per se) influenced American security policy. For more, see G. R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (Wheatshaf Books, 1988).

⁷ For a comprehensive discussion on doctrines in American foreign policy, one which provides not only rich description but also part of the conceptual and methodological framework for this study, see Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*.

⁸ For a sampling of this type of criticism, see Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January/February 1995); William G. Hyland, "A Mediocre Record," *Foreign Policy*, No. 101 (Winter 1995/96); Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996); John McCain, "Imagery or Purpose? The Choice in November," *Foreign Policy*, No. 103 (Summer 1996); and Charles William Maynes, "Bottom-Up Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 104 (Fall 1996).

market democracies.”⁹ Central to this mission were the recognition and utilization of the technological advances that speed global communication and transportation. As distances shrink, expanding interaction potential offers new opportunities and increased responsibilities for American foreign policy. As the official statement phrases it: “In a more integrated and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests – political, military, and economic – without active engagement in world affairs. While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments.”¹⁰

American statesmen are by no means the only ones conscious of such situational factors. Many are the security policies that seem grounded in environmental features. Consider, for example, the different approaches to the problems of peace taken by Metternich and Castlereagh after the Napoleonic Wars.¹¹ Located in the heart of Europe and surrounded by potential threats, Metternich had little choice but to deal actively and intensively with Austria’s neighbors. Their problems would inevitably spill over borders and affect the empire. The only viable approach to security was to forestall conflicts before they began and to bring the other powers into a workable system of peace that would constrain their behavior. In contrast, with the English Channel serving as a moat between the British Isles and Europe, Castlereagh had far more breathing space than his continental colleague. This insularity allowed Britain to

⁹ For the initial statement of this policy, see Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” address at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

¹⁰ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (February 1995), p. 33.

¹¹ The following analysis of the Concert of Europe draws directly on Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957).

pursue a more detached policy of balancing threats after they had arisen.¹² For both statesmen, the geographic positions of their states helped shape strategic decisions about how to pursue security.

Consider as well the foreign policies of Germany and Japan in the 1930s that led to World War II. German policy was intricately bound up in geopolitical theory, especially in the ideas of Ratzel and Haushofer.¹³ The Nazis made no effort to conceal their quest for autarky and *Lebensraum* or their desire to dominate the panregion of Eurafica.¹⁴ Similarly, driven by their want of natural resources, the Japanese engaged in a comparable quest for autarky and dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, ultimately resulting in the establishment of the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere.”¹⁵ In both of these cases, great power security policies were clearly based on geopolitical rationales.

¹² For more on the influence of geopolitics on British policy, see Daniel Deudney, “‘Greater Britain’ or ‘Greater Synthesis’? Seeley, Mackinder, and Wells on Britain in the Twentieth Century” (University of Pennsylvania, August 1995).

¹³ Robert Strausz-Hupe, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1942). As he clearly states, “There is no reason to believe that Hitler consulted Haushofer when making his momentous decisions. He did not need to. *Geopolitik is Nazi foreign policy*” (p. 79, emphasis in original).

¹⁴ For a more elaborate discussion of these concepts and the relationship between geopolitics and German foreign policies, see Derwent Whittlesey, “Haushofer: The Geopoliticians,” in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1971).

¹⁵ For an excellent account of Japanese policies during this period, see Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War, The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Cornell University Press, 1987).

More recently, numerous events around the world have reaffirmed a role for geography in shaping the foreign policy of “great powers.”¹⁶ notwithstanding claims to the contrary.¹⁷ America has reasserted its hemispheric role in a more economic form – NAFTA – and continues to insist on its need to be able to fight two regional wars simultaneously because of its unique geographic position.¹⁸ Germany’s contemporary security policy has a decidedly regional orientation as well, focusing primarily on European economic and political integration and using multilateral engagement to secure markets and resources.¹⁹ In Russia, officials continue to talk of maintaining their great power status and traditional Eurasian sphere of influence, especially in the “near

¹⁶ My focus in this project is clearly on great powers, the most important (but not the only) actors in international relations, although the analysis could be applicable to other states and actors. By great powers, I mean states that have extra-regional interests and the capacity to pursue and protect them. While John Mearsheimer offers an even more restrictive definition, I remain unconvinced of the utility of measuring “greatness” with all-out conventional war-fighting capability. Instead, interests and power point in the right direction, with a view here toward Waltz’s notion of functional (un)differentiation and toward assuming an essential equivalence of capabilities (discussed more below). See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W. W. Norton and Co., 2001) and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley, 1979).

¹⁷ Most arguments about the obsolescence of geography are posited by economists who emphasize increasing interdependence, the globalization of production, inter-firm networks, etc. For some interesting, if not entirely persuasive, examples of this line of thinking, see Stephen J. Kobrin, “Beyond Geography: Inter-Firm Networks and the Structural Integration of the Global Economy,” unpublished paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (November 1993); Kenichi Ohmae, “Managing in a Borderless World,” *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1989; and Robert Reich, “Who is Us?” *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1990, and “Who is Them,” *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1991. For a concise and effective counter-argument also presented by an economist, see Paul R. Krugman, “A Global Economy Is Not the Wave of the Future,” *Financial Executive*, March/April 1992. For an equally poignant rebuttal based more on politics and strategy, see Colin Gray, “The Continued Primacy of Geography,” *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring 1996).

¹⁸ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, pp. 8-9. For a poignant critique of this two-war doctrine and of current defense policy more generally, see Lawrence J. Korb, “An Overstuffed Military,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995).

¹⁹ Wolfgang F. Schlor, *German Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper 277 (Brassey’s/IISS, 1993). For more on German foreign policy, also see Timothy Garten Ash, “Germany’s Choice,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994) and Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, Supplement 1 (April 1996).

abroad.”²⁰ More concretely, moves in the Caucasus, a determination to play a role in the Balkans, and an expressed interest in moving closer to both Europe and Asia all illustrate the influence of geography on Russian foreign policy.²¹ Farther east, Japan continues to extend a web of commercial ties (based on aid, trade, and investment) throughout the Asia-Pacific region, bringing to mind a new Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere, albeit a far more peaceful and potentially positive-sum arrangement.²² It also has made relations with oil producing countries a priority, and continues to develop a modern naval capability to ensure the free flow of oil, even in the absence of U.S. protection.²³ Chinese leaders, too, have been developing their naval capabilities, as well as staking claims to traditional boundaries and contested territories (especially in their western territories and southeastern maritime areas), vowing, as Mao

²⁰ As former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov declared in one of his first news conferences: “Russia was and remains a great power. Her foreign policy should correspond to that status.” Cited in Alessandra Stanley, “Russia’s New Foreign Minister Sets a More Assertive Tone,” *New York Times*, January 13, 1996, A3. For a more in-depth discussion of this perspective, see Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994).

²¹ For a particularly relevant and powerful argument about geopolitics and Russian foreign policy, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Asia Interior: The Geopolitical Pull on Russia,” *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 1994). For a more general overview, see Dimitri Simes, “The Return of Russian History,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/February 1994).

²² For a more detailed description of Japanese foreign policy, see A. C. Harth, “The Yoshida Doctrine: Japan’s Postwar Grand Strategy” (University of Pennsylvania, 2003). Also see Reinhard Drifte, *Japan’s Foreign Policy* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990); Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (AEI Press, 1992); and Edward J. Lincoln, *Japan’s New Global Role* (Brookings Institution, 1993).

²³ For an informative, but somewhat dated discussion of the oil issue in particular, see Yuan-li Wu, *Japan’s Search for Oil: A Case Study on Economic Nationalism and National Security* (Hoover Institution, 1977).

did more than once, to take back what was wrongfully taken from them in their time of weakness.²⁴

What do these developments in great power security policies have in common? All are shaped by geographic concerns. And for a field focused on the critical issues of war and peace, international relations has few subjects rivaling and none surpassing the importance of understanding how and why great powers pursue security the way they do. While the Cold War may be over, the basic game of international relations is not.²⁵ Great powers still exist and find themselves in a largely competitive, anarchic environment.²⁶ Is the context changing? Certainly, but the game goes on in this

²⁴ See Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993); Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994); and David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994). For a balanced assessment and skeptical interpretation about the potential problems associated with China's development, see Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98). For more on how geography might ameliorate some of the potential problems, see Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).

²⁵ Thus far, arguments about the "end of history" and the "clash of civilizations" have fallen flat, providing fine fodder for intellectual debate but little guidance for understanding the emergent era. For the original statements of these arguments, see Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989) and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993). Far more persuasive and useful are those accounts that concentrate on the contentious dynamic between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the post-Cold War world. For examples of this type of characterization, see Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991); and Benjamin Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1992).

²⁶ This argument is made persuasively by Kenneth N. Waltz in "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993).

modified context.²⁷ Some analysts even suggest that this emergent era may be more competitive and potentially troublesome than the past.²⁸ While that proposition is debatable, the fact that great powers still seek to protect and promote their own interests is less contestable.²⁹ Where these interests and efforts collide, conflict may result. And when one considers the apocalyptic potential of great power conflict,³⁰ identifying the roots of these contending security policies becomes a more pressing and necessary endeavor.

²⁷ Perhaps the most fundamental change concerns the shifting media of competition, particularly from the military realm to economics. For more on this reorientation of the game, see Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce," *The National Interest* (Summer 1990); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald A. Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds., *Powernomics: Economics and Strategy After the Cold War* (Madison Books, 1991); Jeffrey Garten, *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy* (Times Books, 1992); Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America* (William Morrow and Co., 1992); and Wayne Sandholtz, et al., *The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

²⁸ See, for example, Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94) and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990). For a contrasting perspective on Europe, for instance, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91). Ultimately, our ability to predict the future is severely limited by a multitude of insurmountable obstacles, although some regional differentiation seems appropriate (e.g., Western Europe may be more stable than East Asia, the Middle East, or Africa). On both of these points see Robert Jervis, "Will the Future of World Politics Resemble the Past," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92).

²⁹ See Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); and Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 2000), especially Chapters 7 and 8.

³⁰ While the risk of great power conflict may not be great and may even be declining, the consequences of nuclear warfare remain horrific. Concerning the former argument, see Joseph S. Nye, "Conflicts After the Cold War," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996). For more on how nuclear weapons might contribute to the reduction of such risks, see Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century*; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell University Press, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Reality," *APSR*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990) and "More May be Better," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (W.W. Norton, 1995). For but a hint of what such a conflict fought with nuclear weapons might entail, see John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (Bantam Books, 1975).

To summarize, then, the historical record reveals that the United States has practiced at least three different approaches to security over the preceding two centuries. Similar variation and patterns of strategic behavior are evident in the historical experience of at least some of the other great powers. What accounts for this variation? Why not pursue security the same way? As discussed at length below, most interesting is the question of why the same state, with the same domestic culture and structure, operating in the same basic international structure, would pursue various security strategies toward other great powers that possess essentially equivalent capabilities. To answer this question, I turn to geopolitics.

Geopolitics – A Primer

Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, numerous observers and analysts sought to explain and predict state behavior (and international relations more generally) largely in terms of geographic variables.³¹ Size, location, topography, climate, fertility, and resources were among the most important variables identified and analyzed.³² Much foreign policy behavior was attributed to such environmental factors.³³ Perhaps the greatest attraction of such geographic variables lay in their unchanging nature. As one of America's most noteworthy geopolitical thinkers, Nicholas Spykman, explains, geography is "the most fundamentally conditioning factor in the formulation of national policy because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and ministers go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed."³⁴ Moreover, "because the geographic characteristics of states are relatively unchanging and unchangeable, the geographic demands of those states will remain the same for centuries, and because the

³¹ For a review of this literature, including some pre-modern writings, see Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1960); and William Fox, "Geopolitics and International Relations," Chapter 1 in *On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear*, edited by Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).

³² Of course, definitions and prioritization of factors differed across studies. Alfred Thayer Mahan, for example, identifies seven key factors – location, physical configuration, territory, resources, population, national character, and type of government – in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Dover, 1987[1894]). (Note that the last two have little to do with geography per se.) Another geopolitical pioneer, Ellen Churchill Semple identifies six key factors that influence "national history and development": climate, soil, relief, location, river highways, and boundaries – in *Influences of Geographic Environment* (Henry Holt and Co., 1911). Nicholas Spykman narrows the list to five: size, resources, location, topography, and climate – in "Geography and Foreign Policy, I" *APSR*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1938).

³³ For a captivating recent attempt to employ such factors as explanatory variables in international relations, see Daniel Deudney, "Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse" (University of Pennsylvania, 1993), recently published in Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew, eds., *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (State University of New York Press, 1999).

³⁴ Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," p. 29. Others make a similar argument. See, for example, Strausz-Hupe, *Geopolitics*, Ch. 1, esp. p. 8.

world has not yet reached that happy state where the wants of no man conflict with those of another, those demands will cause frictions.”³⁵ In short, geographic features influence state policies that often conflict and can lead to war.

As important as these geographic features have been, most astute analysts recognized that they were mediated by two sets of forces: (1) technology and (2) human cognition. First, technology certainly affects, and sometimes alters in fundamental ways, the influence of geographic features.³⁶ Communication and transportation advances, for example, have greatly reduced the power of distance to impede the movement of people, goods, and ideas.³⁷ Irrigation systems, shelters, and central air and heat all moderate the effects of climate. Manmade materials and more efficient tools have gone far in decreasing human dependence on natural resources. And the advent of nuclear weapons, deliverable by aircraft or inter-continental ballistic missiles, has rendered virtually all societies totally vulnerable to attack (if not annihilation) – making them modern-day Hapsburgs, as Michael Mandelbaum puts it.³⁸ The bottom line is that technologies – especially communication, transportation, and destruction –

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Harold Sprout, “Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective,” *World Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (January 1963). The examples that follow are drawn from Sprout’s analysis.

³⁷ Ibid. Also see Albert Wohlstetter, “Illusions of Distance,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1968).

³⁸ Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution*. For more on the nuclear “revolution” and its implications, see Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton University Press, 1965); Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; and Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century*.

clearly and directly affect the influence of geographic variables on human behavioral patterns.³⁹

Not only does technology mediate the effects of geography, but both are perceived and acted upon by human agents. The influence of environmental factors on the formation of foreign policies, as the Sprouts argued years ago, is primarily indirect.⁴⁰ Before being translated into policy, such ecological features must first pass through the prism that is the human mind (as well as through state institutions and bureaucratic procedures). Because of this critical intermediary stage, much room is afforded for misperception, misinterpretation, and misjudgment regarding the central features of the environment and the most appropriate policies.⁴¹ Recognizing the importance of this stage, some analysts have focused their attention here, examining cognition, psychology, and the construction of strategic preferences and policies.⁴² But, the tendency of the environment to exert its influence on people, as well as on states,

³⁹ These three technological dimensions stand out as among the most important in the analysis of international relations, particularly according to such materialists as Harold Sprout, Robert Gilpin, and Daniel Deudney. Gilpin clearly identifies these three and offers a useful discussion of their roles in *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 2.

⁴⁰ Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton University Press, 1965). Actually, the Sprouts identify two distinct sets of environmental effects: (1) subjective – the psycho-milieu – whereby these features condition an individual's perceptions, values, attitudes, interests, decisions, etc.; and (2) objective – the operational milieu – in that certain features, regardless of people's perceptions of them, may constrain and limit performance and outcomes. For the study at hand, with its concentration on foreign policy formation, the former is far more germane. To the extent one seeks to explain strategic success and failure, the latter needs to be considered as well.

⁴¹ In this respect, parallels can be drawn with the perception and misperception of power. For a useful discussion of these problems, see the work of William Curti Wohlforth, especially "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1987) and *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 1993). For more on the related psychological processes, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁴² Alan Henrikson provides a particularly interesting and relevant approach, one that plays a central role in my analysis, focusing on the influence of "mental maps" on American foreign policy decision-making. See Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

regardless of the accuracy of their perceptions of it, ultimately limits the applicability of this type of analysis and suggests the need to offer a complementary operational analysis.⁴³

This influence of the environment as a causal variable is the central concern of the study at hand. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain the explanatory power of geopolitics,⁴⁴ particularly as it pertains to the formation of grand strategy. Although ripe with potential utility, the field has long been dormant,⁴⁵ forsaken for more structural and cultural studies on both the domestic and international levels.⁴⁶ This is particularly true for the analysis of grand strategy – a core concept in the field, a topic of considerable recent debate, and the proposed dependent variable.

⁴³ Sprouts, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*. As they explain, “Limitations on performance, accomplishment, outcome, or operational result may not – often do not – derive from or depend upon the environed individual’s perception or other psychological behavior. In many instances, environmental limitations on outcome or performance may be effective even though the limiting factors were not perceived and reacted to in the process of reaching a decision and initiating a course of action” (p. 11). For the purposes of this study, however, I will focus primarily on the first half of the causal chain – on the formulation of grand strategy, not on its execution (or lack thereof).

⁴⁴ Here, the term “geopolitics” encompasses both geographic and technological features. While numerous definitions have been offered, Ladis Kristof offers perhaps the clearest: “Geopolitics is the study of political phenomena (1) in their spatial relationship and (2) in their relationship with, dependence upon, and influence on, earth as well as on all those cultural factors which constitute the subject matter of human geography (anthropogeography) broadly defined. In other words, geopolitics is what the word itself suggests etymologically: geographical politics, that is politics and not geography – politics geographically interpreted or analyzed for its geographical content” – in “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics,” p. 34. With the exception of the “cultural factors,” this definition will be employed throughout this study. As discussed below, culture, like any other variable is better analyzed on its own terms, not folded into a messy, multi-variable amalgamation – at least not at this point.

⁴⁵ Part of this, no doubt, stems from the identification of geopolitics with the expansionist policies of the 1930s, particularly of the Nazis. But, as Strausz-Hupe points out, “it should not be assumed . . . that this perverted use, destructive to world peace as it [was], necessarily invalidates all geopolitical theories; anthropology is no less a science for having served as a vehicle for racism” – in Strausz-Hupe, *Geopolitics*, p. 140.

⁴⁶ Consider, for example, that in the last two years at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, a total of only seven papers have addressed the topic at all – measured by searching for the terms “geopolitics” or “geopolitical” in the abstracts available in the online database at www.apsanet.org.

Definition of Grand Strategy

While there is some disagreement in emphasis, most analysts and theorists consider grand strategy to be a type of security policy. The most common usage focuses on states, although occasionally regional references are made. Liddell Hart, the military strategist who originally coined the term, focused on the military role of this “higher strategy,” which “is to coordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.”⁴⁷ But, according to Hart, “fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will.”⁴⁸ In this sense, a successful grand strategy depends not only on “a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means,” but “looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.”⁴⁹

Since Hart's formulation, numerous analysts have offered their own definitions of grand strategy. In his analyses of both Roman and Soviet grand strategy, Edward Luttwak, for example, talks of “systems of security” and the need for “strategic statecraft.”⁵⁰ Focusing on the policies and practices these two empires employed for

⁴⁷ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (Faber and Faber, 1961), pp. 335-336.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁵⁰ See Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third* (Johns Hopkins, 1976) and *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (St. Martin's, 1983).

their preservation and protection, Luttwak emphasizes political goals and primarily military, political, and psychological means (e.g., direct force, propaganda, diplomacy, bureaucracy, infrastructure, etc.). Based on a “whole complex of ideas and traditions” that are held, in particular, by the ruling elite, these security systems – or grand strategies – vary with time and place, the perceived needs of the state, and the prevailing world-view and self-image of the leadership.⁵¹

In the same vein, John Lewis Gaddis considers strategy to be an “angle of vision” that incorporates diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military perspectives.⁵² More specifically, it is “the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources.”⁵³ Gaddis, building on the work of Alexander George, stresses the centrality of “certain ‘strategic’ or ‘geopolitical’ codes, assumptions about . . . interests in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses”⁵⁴ The acceptance of these codes by a country's leadership produces a shared perspective, or common conceptual framework, that forms the psychological foundation of a grand strategy.

Similarly, Helmut Schmidt, in *A Grand Strategy for the West*, defines grand strategy as a “unifying concept” that integrates foreign policy, economic policy, and military strategy.⁵⁵ As he puts it: “all three must operate in the end within one and the same framework. . . . The goals that any nation, or group of nations, sets for itself must

⁵¹ Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 2.

⁵² Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. viii.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. ix.

⁵⁵ Helmut Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World* (Yale University, 1985), p. 6.

be consistent over all the three fields.”⁵⁶ Two editors of an anthology of American strategy in the post-Cold War era stress the same three dimensions when they point out that one of “the central questions for U.S. grand strategy” has always been: “What combination of economic, diplomatic, and military instruments should be used to protect and advance those [American] interests?”⁵⁷

Considering this need for inclusion and coordination, former ambassador David Abshire compares the formation of grand strategy to art: “Just as the artist must take into account form, color, tone, texture, design, and technique, the strategist must incorporate the diverse dimensions of statecraft into his design.”⁵⁸ As he explains: “Today more than ever, security is both military and economic, and the two must be interrelated in a grand strategy.”⁵⁹ Given the nature of contemporary international relations, however, this is not enough for an effective grand strategy: “It must embrace political and diplomatic, technological, and even cultural and moral factors. It must be a comprehensive way to deal with all the elements of national power, matching ends with means, relating them to commitments and diplomacy, and ensuring that they work in harmony.”⁶⁰ At the heart of this whole issue is a relatively simple concept – a multidimensional problem requires a multidimensional solution.

In his work on *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, historian Paul Kennedy expresses a similar view:

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁵⁷ Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *America's Strategy in a Changing World* (MIT Press, 1992), p. ix.

⁵⁸ David M. Abshire, *Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy* (Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 165-168.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best 'interests.' Such an endeavor is full of imponderables and unforeseen 'frictions.' It is not a mathematical science in the Jominian sense, but an art in the Clausewitzian sense – and a difficult art at that, since it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to advance (or retard) the primary aim.⁶¹

The artistic nature of such a comprehensive approach poses considerable challenges to policy-makers and analysts alike. As Kennedy explains: "Given all of the independent variables that come into play, grand strategy can never be exact or fore-ordained. It relies, rather, upon the constant and intelligent reassessment of the polity's ends and means; it relies upon wisdom and judgment"⁶² Inherently dynamic, grand strategies are constantly evolving in the minds of policy-makers. Changes in conditions require the modification of one's approach.

Barry Posen offers one of the clearest definitions of grand strategy, equating it with a broad national security policy, and emphasizes its multidimensional nature, the need for prioritization, and the importance of political control and coordination:

A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself. Ideally it includes an explanation about why the theory is expected to work. A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies to those threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies because given an anarchical international environment, the number of possible threats is great, and given the inescapable limits of a national economy, resources are scarce. Because resources are scarce, the most appropriate military means should be selected to achieve the political ends in view.⁶³

⁶¹ Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (Yale University, 1991), p. 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶³ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University, 1984), p. 13.

While perhaps the most visible, military means are but one type available to decision-makers.⁶⁴ Given recent changes in international relations, political and economic means may become even more suitable and cost-effective.⁶⁵

To summarize, grand strategies are comprehensive, integrated approaches to security.⁶⁶ They are based on a common set of assumptions; a shared conceptual framework; and a belief structure in the minds of policy-makers about how to relate means to ends, how to achieve objectives and promote interests, how to protect against

⁶⁴ This military-centrism is one of the few noticeable deficiencies in Posen's treatment of the subject. Robert Art commits a similar error in his article, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99). Contrary to their arguments, grand strategy is not military doctrine and involves more than just military means and power. By focusing solely on the military dimension, many interesting and important questions are left unanswered. Particularly problematic is the critical question regarding relative emphasis of the various means: How much will a state concentrate on economic as opposed to political or military means? If one wants to concentrate on military doctrine, fine; but this should not be equated with grand strategy per se.

⁶⁵ Edward Meade Earle made the same argument over thirty years ago in the introduction to his edited volume on *Makers of Modern Strategy*: "As war and society have become more complicated – and war, it must be remembered is an inherent part of society – strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of non-military factors, economic, psychological, moral, political and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but it is an inherent element of statecraft at all times. Only the most restricted terminology would now define strategy as the art of military command." Edward Meade Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton University Press, 1971), p. viii.

⁶⁶ Here, the term "security" includes at least five essential elements: (1) territorial integrity; (2) political independence; (3) economic viability; (4) environmental sustainability; and (5) social cohesion. While the first two are traditional and familiar indicators of security, the latter three seem increasingly important and integral components. All, however, assume the centrality of the state, both as a security provider and as a key actor in international relations.

Of course, not all analysts would agree with this framework. Many realists, for example, would argue that the last three are "fluffy" and less relevant to the hardball game of international relations. Liberals, in contrast, might suggest the opposite – namely, that the first two are vestiges of a bygone era that restrict thinking and impede progress. Far from solving security problems, their argument would go, the pursuit of such objectives exacerbates them. Only by changing modes of thinking and behavior – moving beyond such traditional objectives and conceptualizations – can "real security" be obtained.

Offering here, as I have elsewhere, a synthetic hybrid of realistic liberalism, I prefer to bridge this divide by including elements of both positions. What ultimately matters, however, is that the criteria be stated explicitly and applied systematically. For more on this larger theoretical synthesis, see A. C. Harth, "Realistic Liberalism: A Middle Way for American Grand Strategy" (Harvard University, January 2003). For examples of arguments for updating and expanding our definitions of security beyond traditional realist parameters, see Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983) and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989).

dangers and minimize threats, and generally how to confront problems and seize opportunities in the most advantageous and efficacious way. Neither conscious formulation nor clear articulation are always necessary. Grand strategies will vary from state to state, in type and degree, as well as articulation. It is conceivable that, in some instances, domestic politics may inhibit or even prohibit the development of a grand strategy.⁶⁷ What ultimately matters, however, is what exists in the minds of policy-makers and, even more importantly, how this translates into an approach to security. In their purest forms, grand strategies have three essential dimensions: (1) motivational – an identification and prioritization of interests and objectives, the ends to be pursued; (2) cognitive – an identification and prioritization of threats and opportunities; and (3) operational – the selection and employment of the most appropriate and efficient means to achieve the desired ends in the given environment. While the means available are wide-ranging and include many different types of policy options, resources, strategies, and tactics, most states tend to rely primarily on three: military, political, and economic. As Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C illustrate, each of these three elements can be broken down

⁶⁷ Indeed, as discussed below, domestic politics play an integral role in the formation of strategic policy, as many theorists contend. For two clear examples of the constraining role of domestic politics, see Arthur A. Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University, 1993); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993). For an argument that structural limitations continue to impede American efforts to formulate a coherent "national strategy," see Samuel P. Huntington, *American Military Strategy*, Institute of International Studies, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 28 (University of California, Berkeley, 1986). For examples of the opposite argument – that the United States can develop, has practiced, and does need such a strategy – see Michael D. Krause, "National Strategy Implementation: A Historical Perspective," and Terry Diebel, "National Strategy and the Continuity of National Interests," both in James C. Gaston, ed., *Grand Strategy and the Decision-Making Process* (National Defense University Press, 1992). For an interesting account of how such constraints may have actually contributed to American success in the Cold War, see Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

and scaled by degree and type.⁶⁸ Militarily, for example, a state could be pacifistic or militaristic and have a doctrine that was defensive, deterrent, or offensive. Similarly, in the political realm, a state could be isolationist or internationalist, and employ unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral means. The same type of a configuration holds in the economic realm as well: a state could be autarkic or commercial, and practice mercantilism or liberalism. Ideally, these components are coordinated and integrated into a comprehensive, yet cohesive, multidimensional state security policy.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ It also is possible to graph all three of these dimensions together, linking the X-axes, and obtain a clearer picture of the respective influence of these different dimensions and their interrelationships.

⁶⁹ Japanese security policy in the post-war era offers one example of this type of coordinated and cohesive approach. For more, see Harth, "The Yoshida Doctrine"; Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Approach to Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (April 1991); Robert Barnett, *Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security* (Pergamon and Brassey's, 1984); and J. W. Chapman, et al., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security* (St. Martin's Press, 1982).

Military Dimension of Grand Strategy




Figure 1A Military Dimension of Grand Strategy

Political Dimension of Grand Strategy




Figure 1B Political Dimension of Grand Strategy

Economic Dimension of Grand Strategy




Figure 1C Economic Dimension of Grand Strategy

Causes of Grand Strategy

While most analysts of grand strategy roughly converge on definitions, they diverge on explanations.⁷⁰ Emphasizing international structure, one of the leading paradigms in the field, neorealism, suggests that self-regarding actors in anarchic realms tend to balance power.⁷¹ Yet, in spite of trying to survive the challenges of life under anarchy, states do not pursue security identically. While clear balancing tendencies are apparent, not all states balance power or threats. Other approaches to security – what I will refer to as “grand strategies” – are evidenced by the historical record.⁷² As discussed in detail below, some states have tried to avoid threats by practicing a “hiding” strategy.⁷³ Others have tried to mitigate threats by bringing their adversaries

⁷⁰ The typologies of grand strategy (discussed in Chapter 2) fall somewhere in between, with some variation on the extremes and semantic differentiation, but general agreement on the core approaches to national security.

⁷¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Balancing involves meeting threats, trying to check them and to maintain some form of equilibrium. Generally speaking, two courses of action are possible: (1) internal, whereby a state seeks to strengthen itself through unilateral measures; and (2) external, especially allying with others to aggregate capabilities.

⁷² Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994). Dan Deudney makes a similar argument in “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in the Philadelphia System,” in *Constructing Sovereignty*, edited by Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

A typology of grand strategies, defined as a spectrum of responses to threats, is presented in the second chapter in the section on variables, and includes a more elaborate description of each of the strategies listed here. For a visual representation of this spectrum, see Figure 2C.

⁷³ Classic examples of such behavior include Ming and Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, and the early United States. As Schroeder explains, hiding “could take various forms: simply ignoring the threat or declaring neutrality in a general crisis; possibly approaching other states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee one’s safety; trying to withdraw into isolation; assuming a purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over; or, usually as a later or last resort, seeking protection from some other power or powers in exchange for diplomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part” – in “Historical Reality and Neo-realist Theory,” p. 117.

closer and mutually constraining their capabilities – more of a “binding” strategy.⁷⁴

Still other states have sought more extreme solutions to the security problematique: either by eliminating threats⁷⁵ or by accommodating them.⁷⁶

What explains this variation? Why do states approach security the way they do? Why do they adopt different types of strategies to deal with other great powers? Why not treat all perceived threats in the same manner? More specifically, what causal factors loom largest in the process of making decisions and selecting grand strategies?⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Consider, for example, the alliance network crafted by Bismarck after 1870 or how the American states came together to form the Union. For more on these cases, see, respectively, Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, edited by Klaus Knorr (University of Kansas Press, 1976); and Daniel H. Deudney, “The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States Union, circa 1787-1861,” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995).

⁷⁵ A more nuanced interpretation disaggregates “eliminate” into (1) political domination; and (2) full-blown expansion and conquest, or assimilation. The traditional practice of empires, assimilation involves deepening and strengthening ties with rivals to the point where it no longer makes sense to speak of different units – rivals are brought in and unified under larger political arrangements. Such arrangements can be of two basic types: (1) symmetrical, whereby the units voluntarily come together to form a republican union, as with binding; and (2) asymmetrical, whereby one unit forcibly integrates the others into a more hierarchical structure (e.g., Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia). Thus, the location of sovereignty is the critical difference: does it flow from the bottom-up as in the former, or from the top-down as in the latter? For more on this conceptual distinction, see Daniel Deudney, “Binding Powers and Bound States: The Logic and Geopolitics of Republican Negarchy,” Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 1996.

⁷⁶ Accommodation actually can be disaggregated into two distinct forms: (1) bandwagoning and (2) appeasement. The former involves going along with rivals, the latter giving in. Both involve making concessions to adversaries; the distinction lies in degree (and perhaps effectiveness). Postwar Japan, for example, has practiced more of a bandwagoning strategy, riding in the wake of U.S. hegemony. Prewar Britain and France, in contrast, adopted appeasement vis-à-vis Nazi Germany, making repeated concessions in to the rising menace. For more on accommodation, see Peter Karsten, “Response to Threat Perception: Accommodation as a Special Case,” in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, edited by Klaus Knorr (University of Kansas Press, 1976). For more on the Japanese case, see Harth, “The Yoshida Doctrine.”

⁷⁷ Thus, rather than focusing on consequences and on the requirements for an effective grand strategy, the emphasis here is on causation, on explaining the sources of grand strategy.

Answers to these questions vary widely.⁷⁸ The most prominent contending explanations, however, can be usefully categorized within the two primary levels of analysis in international relations: the nation-state and the international system,⁷⁹ or in Waltz's terms, the second and third image.⁸⁰

Second-image explanations of grand strategy are perhaps the most prevalent. In this vein, structural and normative dimensions of the different states themselves – including regime type, institutional capabilities, organizational structures, bureaucratic politics, political culture, economics, and public opinion – are emphasized as the

⁷⁸ A recent volume, *The Making of Strategy*, for example, identifies five factors that “have always profoundly affected the strategic process” – geography, history, culture, economics, and governmental systems (p. 23). The problem with such laundry lists, as comprehensive as they might be, is their want of theoretical utility. Nowhere are the concepts rigorously defined, operationalized, or tested. Nowhere are the factors prioritized. Nor are the systematic connections between variables explored. At the same time, to the authors' credit, their empirical research does provide rich description and also serves as a positive heuristic for studies such as this one. See Williamson Murray, et al., eds., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge University Press, 1994). Quotation from Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy.”

⁷⁹ These categories come from J. D. Singer, “The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* (October 1961).

⁸⁰ Waltz constructed the notion of “images” along three lines in response to the question of where causality for war was found – in people, states, or the system – in *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia University, 1959). While this provides an exceptionally useful theoretical framework, a more complete and functional model of international relations as a complex adaptive system can be generated by adding two levels of analysis for a total of five images: (1) people – focusing on individuals, human nature, perceptions, rationality, and other cognitive capabilities; (2) states – stressing domestic political variables like regime type, structural capabilities, and state-society relations, among others; (3) interstate structure – especially anarchy and the distribution of capabilities; (4) interaction/process – including norms, regimes, diplomatic procedures, and alliance systems; and (5) geopolitics – emphasizing geographic and technological factors. Subsequent reference to various images will be based upon this conceptual framework. For a visual representation of this model, see Appendix 1.

For a definition of and introduction to complex adaptive systems, see John H. Holland, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 121, No. 1 (Winter 1992) and *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Addison-Wesley, 1995). For more, see Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (Collier Books, 1992); Murray Gell-Mann, *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex* (W. H. Freeman, 1994); John L. Casti, *Complexification: Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of Surprise* (Harper Collins, 1994); Brian Goodwin, *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Per Bak, *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality* (Copernicus, 1996) and Mark Buchanan, *Ubiquity: The Science of History ... or Why the World is Simpler than We Think* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000).

primary causal determinants of different approaches to security.⁸¹ Katzenstein and Okawara, for example, claim that Japan's security policy is "influenced both by the structure of the state broadly conceived and the incentives it provides for policy on the one hand, and on the other by the context of social and legal norms that help define policy interests and the standards of appropriateness for specific policy choices."⁸² Deudney offers an even more parsimonious and straightforward claim – namely, that republican forms of government (characterized by popular sovereignty) prefer binding and hiding, while hier-states (with sovereignty concentrated in single figure or apparatus) prefer balancing.⁸³

Rosecrance and Stein go further – actually entitling their edited volume, "The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy" – and argue effectively for recognizing the inescapable influence of the domestic setting, especially considering the public and reflective nature of grand strategy.⁸⁴ Their central proposition is that "domestic groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints (sometimes expressed

⁸¹ For a sampling of the literature on strategic culture, one of the more popular topics, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996); Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and the collection in *International Security* – Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995); Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995); and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995).

⁸² Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 86. For more a more detailed argument along these lines, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁸³ Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns."

⁸⁴ As they explain, "Grand strategy is public policy and reflects a nation's mechanisms for arriving at social choices. Moreover, such strategies typically require the commitment, extraction, and mobilization of societal resources. That domestic, institutional, political, and economic constraints should matter should hardly be surprising." In Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy," Introduction to *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University, 1993), p. 13.

through international interdependence), historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures play an important, indeed, a pivotal role in the selection of grand strategy."⁸⁵ Moreover, given recent changes in the international environment, they argue that "such domestic forces may actually be increasing in scope and importance."⁸⁶ The fine collection of essays they present offers strong support for their claims.⁸⁷

That domestic variables matter is hardly contestable. Where else is policy made? More questionable is the treatment of domestic political factors – normative and structural alike – as exogenous, independent variables. Do these factors themselves exist in a vacuum? Did circumstances not precede them and provide pressures for their emergence and evolution? If so, what were they, and how much do they matter relative to these domestic variables? The argument presented below is that geopolitical circumstances help shape and condition these domestic variables, making them more of an intervening variable poised between the independent variable (the geopolitical foundation) and the dependent variable (grand strategies). Thus, while domestic factors certainly influence the formation of strategic policy, as well as its execution, they are not its taproot cause.

Nor are third image explanations entirely satisfying. The target of many second-image critics, these explanations of grand strategy focus on the international structure.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸⁷ See, in particular, Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy"; David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski, "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional Fitness"; and Matthew Evangelista, "Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case." Evangelista's argument and the initial model posed by Rosecrance and Stein differ from some of the other contributions in emphasizing the interplay of domestic and international factors.

especially its anarchic nature and the distribution of capabilities.⁸⁸ In these arguments, states are, for the most part, “black-boxed” and assumed to be unitary, rational actors. What matters are not domestic but systemic capabilities; not what you are, but how you stand up relative to others. The anarchic structure encourages states to fend for themselves against threats, especially those posed by other great powers.⁸⁹ The stronger the rivals (i.e., the greater their capabilities), the larger the potential threat they pose, the more they need to be balanced – the traditional realist solution to most security problems.⁹⁰

Perhaps the best example of this type of argument is Posen’s study on the inter-war military doctrine of France, Britain, and Germany.⁹¹ After elaborating the contending hypotheses of two prominent explanations of grand strategy – balance of power theory and organizational theory – and subjecting them to “fairly rigorous tests,” Posen concludes that the evidence “lends a great deal of support to balance of power theory, more so than the current widespread popularity of organization theory would lead one to expect.”⁹² As he explains, “the analysis does not show that organizational factors are unimportant, but rather that they are more often than not overridden by

⁸⁸ While dating back to Thucydides, this line of thinking has been best articulated by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics*. For other examples of structural arguments, see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁸⁹ For two critiques of this position, see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make Out of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992); and Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17 (1991).

⁹⁰ Balancing, of course, can take more than one form. As Waltz points out, states can (1) build up their own strength and/or (2) ally with others in a counter-coalition – in *Theory of International Politics*. At the same time, it is important to realize, as discussed below, that other strategic alternatives exist.

⁹¹ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 240.

constraints and incentives that lie at the level of the international political system."⁹³ As part of his study, Posen also examines (in a far less systematic way) the influence of geography and technology, in large part subsuming them under these other arguments. While he admits that both factors play a role, he remains skeptical of their explanatory power, concludes that they offer only "partial" and "weak" explanations for his cases, and then warns against explanations that "overstress the causal impact of geography."⁹⁴

A more nuanced interpretation of this realist canon has been put forth by Stephen Walt that focuses more on the perception of threat and less on the actual distribution of capabilities.⁹⁵ As Walt puts it: "states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."⁹⁶ As captivating as this argument may be, the inclusion of geographic and technological elements into such a structural framework tends to confuse the issue and impede theoretical advancement by compounding disparate categories of variables. Before subsuming geopolitical factors into one of these other explanations, would it not make sense to ascertain the explanatory power of geography and technology themselves?

⁹³ Ibid., p. 39.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 236-241, quotations from p. 239 and p. 241. Frankly, his discounting of the potential theoretical utility of this level of analysis without subjecting it to the same type of rigorous scientific inquiry leaves this reader unsatisfied. This study seeks to redress this deficiency.

⁹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987)

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

Overview and Preview

Numerous geographers, historians, economists, and even architects have been pursuing interesting questions about the location/position, composition, and representation of political and economic actors,⁹⁷ with three recognizable schools emerging in the literature – classical, political-economic, and critical.⁹⁸ With some notable exceptions,⁹⁹ most political scientists appear reticent to reengage in geopolitical analysis and, instead, focus on domestic and international causes of foreign and security policies, both structural and normative, including regime type, strategic culture, domestic constraints, norms, power, and threat, as well as the decision-makers

⁹⁷ For an example of each of these, see, respectively, Virginie Mamadouh, "Reclaiming Geopolitics: Geographers Strike Back," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1999); Alan K. Henrikson, "Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2002); Ricardo Hausmann, "Prisoners of Geography," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 122 (2001); and William J. Mitchell, *City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn* (MIT Press, 1995).

⁹⁸ See John Agnew, *Political Geography: A Reader* (Arnold, 1997). These three schools correspond largely to the realist, liberal, constructivist divide in current international relations theory. For an example of each, see, respectively, Saul B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World System* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System* (Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Gerard Toal, "Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society," in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy* (Frank Cass, 1999). For two interesting critical interpretations of geopolitics and American foreign policy, see Gerard Toal and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (March 1992); and Simon Dalby, "American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics," *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1990).

⁹⁹ See, for example, Colin Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geography," *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1996); Daniel Deudney, "Geopolitics and Change," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Westview Press, 1997) and "Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts," *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1997). Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99); Ross, "The Geography of the Peace"; Daniel J. Elazar, "Political Science, Geography, and the Spatial Dimension of Politics," *Political Geography*, Vol. 18 (1999); Steven L. Spiegel, "Traditional Space vs. Cyberspace: The Changing Role of Geography in Current International Politics," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 2000); Michael Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May/June 2001); and Gray and Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy*.

themselves.¹⁰⁰ While such factors contribute to the making of strategy,¹⁰¹ interact to produce emergent outcomes in international relations,¹⁰² and are important causes, they are insufficient, at least in terms of explaining the range of security policies practiced by the United States over the last two centuries.

Missing from this complex picture is the material foundation. Often alluded to, rarely discussed in depth, and virtually never systematically analyzed,¹⁰³ geopolitical factors typically are subsumed into other theoretical frameworks. This implicit incorporation and integration of geopolitical forces into other levels of analysis impedes progress in the field, clouding our understanding of the relative influence of different causes. While grappling with the interaction between causes found at different levels of analysis is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of “reality,” the

¹⁰⁰ For a recent example of each one of these, see, respectively, G. John Ikenberry, “Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint,” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Cornell University Press, 2002); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton University Press, 1997); Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton University Press 2000); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Cornell University Press, 1996); William Wohlforth “U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World” in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*; Stephen M. Walt “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*; and Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001).

¹⁰¹ Cf. Murray et al., eds., *The Making of Strategy*; Kaufman, “A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy”; Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Cornell University Press, 1994); Josef Joffe, “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton University Press, 1996); Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s End: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1998); and Colin Dueck, “Culture, Realism, and American Grand Strategy: The Case of Containment” (Harvard University, December 2002).

¹⁰² Cf. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-93); Steven R. Mann, “Chaos, Criticality, and Strategic Thought,” in *Essays on Strategy*, Volume IX, edited by Thomas C. Gill (National Defense University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997); and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁰³ Deudney’s work is an exception here and, along with the work of the Sprouts and Alan Henrikson, provides much of the theoretical inspiration for the current project.

accumulation of scientific knowledge requires clear categories of well-defined variables.¹⁰⁴ Only by isolating variables can one hope to determine their relative causal importance.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the current study focuses on geopolitics and its causal effects on grand strategies. In assessing the utility of a geopolitical approach to grand strategy analysis, I address four central questions. First, what role do geopolitical factors play in shaping grand strategy? Second, to what extent do geographic and technological variables influence the selection of the ends and means of security policy? Third, how do geopolitical influences affect the selection of ends and means?¹⁰⁶ Fourth, in what direction does the geopolitics influence the selection of grand strategy and its constituent elements – particularly the ends and means of national security policies?

This project provides answers to these questions and aims to improve our understanding of the nature, types, and causes of grand strategy. It entails a systematic inquiry that draws inferences about the causes of grand strategy and the role of geopolitics based on an examination of key episodes in American history. To establish the necessary analytical framework for this empirical effort, the next two chapters detail

¹⁰⁴ Martin Landau, *Political Theory and Political Science* (Macmillan Company, 1972), especially Ch. 8, "The Due Process of Inquiry."

¹⁰⁵ It is also important to realize that one cannot *fully* understand the nature of the whole by breaking it down into its constituent parts and their interaction. The specification and categorization of particular causes and distinct levels of analysis fundamentally misconstrues the essential interconnectedness and interdependence that characterizes "reality." And, as Stephen Hawking points out, "if everything in the universe depends on everything else in a fundamental way, it might be impossible to get close to a full solution by investigating parts of the problem in isolation" – in *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (Bantam, 1988) p. 11.

¹⁰⁶ In researching this last question, room will be afforded for some comparative analysis weighing the relative importance of various factors, as geopolitics certainly holds no monopoly on causality. Nor is that the claim advanced below. The issue is neither if geopolitics alone is determinative nor if it is the most important factor. Instead, the questions are, as stated above, does it matter, how much, through what process, and in what way – all important in their own right.

the theories and methodology behind the current project, including a listing of testable hypotheses (Chapter 2) and criteria for evaluation and falsification (Chapter 3).

Examining both policy formulation and policy effectiveness (inputs and outcomes), I advance two lines of argument – perceptual and functional – around two sets of hypotheses. First, decision-makers consider the material context when selecting the ends and means of security, identifying and prioritizing threats and opportunities, and crafting grand strategies. Thoughts about location, distance, interaction capacity, and connectedness – captured in “mental maps”¹⁰⁷ – accompany other considerations and help condition and shape grand strategic choices. Second, once selected, these grand strategies must be played out – in iterated interaction with other agents, strategies, capabilities, and factors – on the material field, or landscape, that is history’s stage. If the strategy fits the environment, then it will have, *ceteris paribus*, a higher probability of success; if it does not fit, then it is more likely to fail or be dysfunctional. In other words, “landscape fitness”¹⁰⁸ relates directly to operational effectiveness, even if other

¹⁰⁷ As noted above, Alan Henrikson uses this term (originally coined by two geographers, Peter Gould and Rodney White) in his work on the history of American foreign relations. Henrikson’s definition captures the essential elements and will be employed here: “Mental map will be taken to mean an ordered but continually adapting structure of the mind – alternatively conceivable as a process – by reference to which a person acquires, codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in thought or in action, information about his or her large scale geographic environment, in part or in its entirety” – from Henrikson, “Mental Maps,” p.177.

In this respect, mental maps also can be considered a type of intervening variable, poised between the geopolitical environment and grand strategies that are shaped by the extant geopolitical circumstances as interpreted through contemporary cultural and linguistic lenses. For more on their nature and roles, see Henrikson, “Mental Maps”; and Peter Gould and Rodney White, *Mental Maps*, Second Edition (Routledge, 1986).

¹⁰⁸ This term derives from the notion of “fitness landscapes,” which comes from a biologist, Sewall Wright, by way of a physicist, Per Bak. Originally put forward in a 1952 article on “shifting balance theory,” the notion was initially designed to capture the relationship between various traits and their ability to survive and reproduce. As Bak explains, “fitness, when viewed as a function of the many dimensional trait-space with each dimension representing a trait, forms a rough landscape” – in Per Bak, *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality* (Copernicus, 1996), pp. 118-119.

variables also contribute to outcomes. From this perspective, the material world influences both the formation of grand strategies and their relative efficacy, thus playing an essential role on “two levels” of the game.¹⁰⁹

With the analytical foundation established, I turn to the empirical evidence – three of the closest examples of grand strategy in American history: (1) non-entanglement as hiding under the Monroe Doctrine; (2) containment as balancing under the Truman Doctrine; and (3) engagement and enlargement as binding under the Clinton Doctrine. A careful examination of these three cases reveals an important and hitherto largely neglected role for geopolitics, especially in grand strategy formulation. In this “step,” its influence was felt primarily indirectly, mediated through decision-makers’

While it is conceivable to formally model such landscapes, my use of the concept is primarily metaphorical. Here, I employ the term to capture how well a particular trait – a selected strategy – fits a given environment and enables the practicing actor to protect and promote its interests. In this respect, it makes more sense to reverse the two words and speak of “landscape fitness,” or how well a given strategy fits a given landscape. Beyond this strategic suitability, additional traits that might contribute to an actor’s fitness landscape include size, shape, location, resources, population, regime type, culture, etc. Moreover, perhaps as important as the strategic suitability for a given environment is the strategic flexibility and adaptability to meet the changing circumstances that might emerge over time.

In terms of using metaphors before models, I find comfort in the view that “perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor there would never have been any algebra” – from Max Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 242.

¹⁰⁹ Here, I refer to Bob Putnam’s “two-level” game, which nicely captures the essential and necessary dynamics that take place on and between the domestic and international levels to yield policies and outcomes. A similarly bifurcated analytical structure is suggested by Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. For more on what they call the “two-step” or “two-stage” method and its potential utility for rescuing realism from dissolution, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), especially pp. 50-55. For Putnam’s original argument, see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988).

For an application of this type of framework to American grand strategy, one that nicely highlights the limited, but complementary explanatory power of systemic and domestic theories for both the Washington Treaty System and NATO, see Kaufman, “A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy.” As Kaufman explains: “a good theory of international politics and a sound US grand strategy must integrate domestic and structural levels of analysis.... My theoretical approach envisages the dynamics of international politics as a two level interaction in which systemic imperatives and the characteristics of the key states in the system affect each other reciprocally” (p. 699).

perceptions of their connectedness to others – their sense of “imagined distance.”¹¹⁰ As foundational as geopolitical factors may have been, they were not the only sources of these American doctrines; in addition to a host of idiosyncratic variables associated with the people involved, domestic and international factors (both structural and normative) also played a role. But, in these cases, selected partially in order to control for the two primary “variables” of the most prominent alternatives, geopolitics is essential to explaining the variation in American grand strategies.¹¹¹ By attempting to hold reasonably constant both domestic structure (by examining only the experience of the American government) and international structure (by examining only America’s relations with other “great powers” in the same anarchic realm), some other factor that

¹¹⁰ This notion of “imagined distance,” is drawn, in part, from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition (Verso, 1991). Incorporating the term “imagined” helps highlight the centrality of perceptions, as this sense of connectedness arises and exists primarily in people’s heads. Based primarily on an imperfect and subjective assessment of interaction capacity, it seems, by most counts, to be a useful aggregated proxy and, perhaps, the critical piece on the formative side of the grand strategic puzzle, especially to the extent that (A) grand strategies are psychological constructs that exist in the minds of decision-makers; and (B) these constructs not only contain a belief structure about the ends and means of security – the motivational and operational dimensions -- but also a cognitive dimension that identifies and prioritizes threats and opportunities. A sense of place and time (i.e., spatio-temporal location) influences how people view the world and how they behave. In this respect, language, identity, norms, and values all work together, along with other cognitive constraints, to filter incoming information about one’s environment that, in turn, helps shape interests, identity, and policies. In this complex picture, the causal arrows thus flow both ways. As discussed below, “imagined distance” can be conceived and classified along the same lines as the proximity dimension of interaction capacity: namely, remote, connected, and close.

For a more elaborate discussion of different types of distance – physical, attributional, topographic, and gravitational – and their influence on foreign policy, see Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy.” Most of my analysis concentrates on the first two: physical and attributional, which seem to be heading in opposite directions in terms of their relative importance.

¹¹¹ As discussed below, two of the primary contending theories – structural realism and structural liberalism – each can explain one or two historical cases, but not all three. This inability of either theory to successfully and completely explain the three closest examples of grand strategy in American history opens the door for geopolitical theory to demonstrate greater applicability and utility – explanatory power – for American strategic doctrines. Moreover, because of this misfit for these contending theories, we need not derive the same type of detailed hypotheses to test them, as we will for geopolitics – which successfully explains all three cases.

actually varied must explain why the United States choose to hide in the 1820s, to balance in the 1940s, and to bind in the 1990s. Enter geopolitics.

While geography itself may have changed only little,¹¹² the monumental technological advances of the last two hundred years have profoundly changed the effects of that same geography. The argument developed below is that American policy-makers have, for the most part, grasped the significance of these technological advances and have seen themselves as increasingly connected to rest of the world. More specifically, the perception of an increasing interaction capacity afforded by advances in communication and transportation technologies – to say nothing of advances in destructive and information-processing capacity – has encouraged American decision-makers to shift their grand strategic orientations over time from hiding, to balancing, to binding. Chapters on each of these historical cases, arranged chronologically – Monroe (Chapter 4), Truman (Chapter 5), and Clinton (Chapter 6) – offer ample documentary evidence of policy-makers thinking geopolitically and of them

¹¹² Of course, the geography of the United States has changed since its founding. Particularly significant are the increase in size and the expansion across the continent to the Pacific Ocean. As important as these changes may be, the most relevant feature for this study is the evolving sense of connectedness or closeness to other states, which is more a product of changes in technology in the American case than of changes in geography per se (with the possible exception of the United States becoming more of a Pacific power). This is particularly true given the assumption, discussed below, that the United States has enjoyed an “essential equivalence” of capabilities with the other great powers over the last two centuries, even though most analysts would agree that it has progressed from its relatively weaker status in 1820 to a relatively stronger status today. For more on the role of geography over the course of American history, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1920) and *The Significance of Sections in American History* (Peter Smith, 1959); Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (Houghton Mifflin, 1903); and the series by D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 1, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800* (Yale University Press, 1986), *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 2, *Continental America, 1800-1867* (Yale University Press, 1993), and *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 3, *Transcontinental America, 1850-1915* (Yale University Press, 1998).

explicitly considering distance and connectedness as significant factors. A five-step analytical approach will be applied to each case, with the chapters similarly structured: first, I analyze the geopolitical context and classify the independent variable, interaction capacity; second, I analyze the original doctrinal pronouncement and classify the dependent variable, the type of grand strategy; third, I analyze the connections between these two variables, emphasizing the relationship between mental maps and imagined distance, on one hand, and strategic preferences, on the other; fourth, I briefly analyze landscape fitness and operational effectiveness and assess my more general functional hypotheses; and fifth, I summarize the findings and draw conclusions about the role of geopolitics and its relative explanatory power. This final dimension is the focus of the Conclusion (Chapter 7), which pulls the cases together and offers larger conclusions about grand strategy, geopolitics, and the relationship between them, as well as some suggestions for further research.

**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Part I: The Analytical Framework

Chapter 2: Theory – Geopolitics and Grand Strategy

The first task in any scientific study is to establish the analytic foundation, the theoretical and methodological framework that will guide and structure the empirical research. The initial step of that process involves the stating of assumptions, first about theories, laws, and the nature of political science and then about this study in particular. The next step is to identify, define, and operationalize variables – here, geopolitics and grand strategy. The third step is to hypothesize relationships between them, essentially elaborating a coherent body of geopolitical theory. These three steps constitute the majority of this chapter, with Chapter 3 offering additional steps, including a discussion of research methods, hypothesis testing, case selection, data analysis, and criteria for falsification. Before turning our attention to such methodological issues, let us first address theoretical concerns and lay the conceptual foundation for our study.

Science, Laws, Theories, and Politics

Science is not only "a commitment to explore and attempt to understand a given segment of empirical reality,"¹ but also involves the systematic modification and accumulation of general laws and theories through observation, study, and testing. Laws are generalized statements of observed facts, of how nature and people behave, that establish and describe relations between variables, variables being concepts or notions with different values.² Theories are created to explain these observations and why such associations exist. They simplify complex subjects and make them easier to understand. To simplify, they need to focus on one phenomenon and explain why it arises. This requires the identification of clear categories of well-conceived independent and dependent variables and hypothesized relations between them.³

Theories, however, need not mirror nor even describe "reality." In fact, explanatory power often increases by moving away from "reality," rather than moving closer to it.⁴ Adam Smith's theory of the market, for example, clearly lacks descriptive realism but is nevertheless both elegant and powerful. Beyond not necessarily reflecting "reality," theories face two further limitations. First, by categorizing and isolating variables, some elements are necessarily left out. Second, theories cast at one level of analysis cannot necessarily explain phenomena at another level. Different

¹ Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen Genco, "Clocks, Clouds, and the Study of Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Sage, 1990), p. 50.

² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 1. Much of the following discussion of theory is based on Waltz's formulation presented in Ch. 1, "Laws and Theories."

³ Martin Landau, *Political Science and Political Theory: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry* (MacMillan, 1972), Ch. 1.

⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 7.

theories explain different phenomena and different phenomena require different theories. In physics, for instance, while Newtonian physics works well for most everyday situations, Einstein's theory of general relativity is needed to explain situations with high velocities or strong gravitational fields and quantum mechanics is required to explain the behavior of the very small. Similarly, in economics, separate theories are required to explain the behavior of the firm and the market. The need for different theories at different levels of analysis is no less true for politics than physics and economics. At this point, an all-encompassing grand theory remains out of our grasp. Until such a theory is revealed and effectively applied (if that day ever comes), theorists must continue to operate within certain limitations – the most important being that no one theory can explain it all.

Moreover, neither theories nor laws can be conclusively proven to be absolutely true. The bottom line, as Jackman notes, is that “causation can never be empirically demonstrated.”⁵ This is because every falsifiable option cannot be tested. As Popper pointed out, theories cannot be confirmed, only not falsified.⁶ In addition, persistent problems of definition, measurement, and evaluation of variables prevent perfect precision, making uncertainty pervasive and unavoidable.⁷ Establishing probabilities.

⁵ Robert W. Jackman. "Cross-National Statistical Research," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1985), p. 172.

⁶ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Basic Books, 1959). We can, however, find confirmatory evidence, that which supports and strengthens our theories – but does not prove them.

⁷ Contrary to many political scientists' mistaken clock-like images of the physical universe, physicists have long recognized its inherent uncertainty. See, for example, Werner Heisenberg's discussion of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics – which includes uncertainty, complementarity, probability, and the disturbance of the system being observed by the observer – in *Physics and Philosophy* (Harper and Row, 1959).

patterns, and regularities is the best scientists can do.⁸ This is even more true for the social sciences than for the natural and physical sciences. Many social scientists point to the more prominent role that accidents, chance, and fortune play in human affairs.⁹ Almond and Genco, for example, conclude that because political regularities are "embedded in history and involve recurrent 'passings-through' of large numbers of human memories, learning processes, human goal-seeking impulses, and choices among alternatives," they are relatively "soft" and less amenable to rigorous and conclusive scientific analysis.¹⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar point in arguing that because "in political life *fortuna*, the ... goddess of unpredictability, has never been dethroned" and because "we cannot ever identify a determinate set of factors which constitute the initial conditions for the production of some outcome in conformity with law-like regularity," the best we can do is to establish "de facto generalizations" and "Machiavellian maxims, rather than Hobbesian laws."¹¹ Likewise, Harry Eckstein emphasizes the difficulty of theorizing in "a realm where multicausality and multivariation operate to such an extent that necessary – or favorable – but insufficient

⁸ While perfect certainty is impossible, probability can be established to such a high degree that the statistical deviation becomes insignificant. While recognizing these limitations, scientists can still effectively employ such high probabilities as the basis of workable assumptions. In fact, we have no other choice.

⁹ For one of the best accounts in international relations, see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁰ Almond and Genco, "Clocks, Clouds and the Study of Politics," p. 36. Emphasizing the role of Karl Popper's "plastic rather than cast iron control," they write: "The implication of these complexities of human and social reality is that the explanatory strategy of the hard sciences has only a limited application to the social sciences.... A simple search for regularities and lawful relationships among variables...will not explain social outcomes, but only some of the conditions affecting those outcomes" (p. 36).

¹¹ Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in *Against the Self-Images of the Age* (Schocken, 1971) pp. 270, 274, 276, and 273 respectively.

conditions of phenomena are perhaps all we can ever hope to find."¹² Ultimately, the sheer number of variables and their intricate, web-like interrelationships make social and political behavior so complex that they are often more difficult to explain – to say nothing about predict – than phenomena in the natural and physical sciences.¹³

This does not mean, however, that social and political behavior cannot be analyzed using a scientific method. Simply because causation cannot be proven with one hundred percent certainty does not mean that meaningful and powerful correlations and connections cannot be found – they can and have. The question is: are we better off trying to apply the scientific method and obtaining such generalizations (as imperfect as they may be) or should we resign ourselves to naked historicism and have no generalizations at all? Here, I agree with Eckstein: while our objective as scientists remains the explanation of behavior in terms of general laws,¹⁴ the best way to get there is still the "heaping up of tested theoretical findings," especially those "middle-range" explanations – between nomothetic and idiographic approaches – that balance rigor and richness.¹⁵

To be clear, the selection of theory should be pragmatic, not ideological. In the theoretical realm, there are no absolutes, no right or wrong theories – they are only more or less useful, more or less explanatory. No one theoretical approach is

¹² Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (University of California, 1992), p. 109.

¹³ This web-like interrelationship between variables is one of the most problematic aspects of social science theorizing and research. Exactly how, for instance, does one define the border between state and society? For a provocative, if not helpful answer, see Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *APSR*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (March 1991).

¹⁴ Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 4.

¹⁵ Eckstein, *Regarding Politics*, quotations from p. 112 and p. 109, respectively.

appropriate for all analysis. Different topics warrant different theoretical approaches. The choice of theory and, more specifically, of hypothesized independent variable(s) depends upon both the dependent variable that is being explained and the purpose of the analysis. Thus, in the simplest terms, the most fruitful theoretical bases for effective political analysis are contingent upon the subject of and reason for the study.

We must recognize from the outset that no theory based on one variable can offer a total causal explanation of social or political behavior. When only one independent variable is analyzed, the picture inevitably will be incomplete. This is because "most phenomena seem to reflect the interaction of both individual-level and structural-level factors."¹⁶ As Inglehart explains: "In the real world, one is almost never at either extreme; outcomes reflect both internal orientations and external constraints. Culture, economic, and political factors are all likely to play a role."¹⁷ Thus, focusing one variable or level of analysis will necessarily slight other important variables. Unicausal explanations are simply inadequate for most social and political phenomena. Moreover, as discussed above, theories at one level of analysis are often inappropriate or incapable of explaining phenomena at another level. To get the complete picture and a full explanation, more than one independent variable and one level of analysis are required: one must examine numerous variables at different levels of analysis (as well as their interaction) including individuals; the state, society, and political culture; the international structure; and even international norms.¹⁸

¹⁶ Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*, p. 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 18.

¹⁸ Here, again, see Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*.

Often, however, not only are many variables involved, but different theoretical approaches will be capable of explaining the same outcome. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, both balance of power theory and geopolitical theory can be used to explain why the United States balanced the Soviet Union after World War II. Which is right? For that matter, which is better? Because there is no monopoly on the "truth," different theories can and often do offer conflicting interpretations of the same behavior or outcome. In attempting to explain phenomena as complex as political and social behavior, it is impossible to say with any degree of accuracy that one theory is right and another wrong. They can, however, be more or less rigorous and judged more or less powerful. The best way to determine which theory has more explanatory power is to pit contending theories and hypotheses against each other in crucial cases and tough tests. This is particularly true if the analyst's purpose is to build theory and accumulate valid generalizations.¹⁹ Nevertheless, given the relative underdevelopment of geopolitical

¹⁹ This type of multi-theory comparison is an even better way of testing theories than the customary practice of deducing hypotheses -- "empirical statements" -- from a single theory and testing them in a variety of cases, as we are doing here. By explicitly and directly pitting theories against each other one cannot only evaluate the credibility of a particular theory, but can weigh the respective advantages of contending theories and determine which has more explanatory power, thus further advancing our scientific understanding of the phenomena under investigation. Kenneth Waltz's seminal work on the causes of war and Barry Posen's study of military doctrine offer outstanding examples of this type of approach. For more see, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University, 1959) and Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University, 1984).

theory, we will focus, in this initial study, expressly on developing and testing it, not pitting it against the alternatives.²⁰

Beyond the nature of the topic of analysis, the purpose of the analysis also factors into the selection of the most appropriate theoretical approach. An analysis designed to build theories and advance science will not require the same type of approach as an analysis designed to inform policy-making. In the former, two theories might be compared against each other as suggested above, while the latter might require a more intensive and comprehensive examination and evaluation of all the potential causes on different levels of analysis. In other words, some types of analysis require more rigor, some more richness. No one standard fits. Because of this, pragmatism, not dogma, should be the scientist's guide to theory, as well as to methodology (discussed in Chapter 3). Only by taking appropriate theoretical and methodological approaches can political scientists produce fruitful analyses.

²⁰ As discussed below, the two primary contending alternatives – structural realism and structural liberalism – each can explain one or two of our historical cases, but not all three. This inability of either theory to successfully and completely explain the three closest examples of grand strategy in American history opens the door for geopolitical theory to demonstrate greater applicability and utility – explanatory power – for American strategic doctrines. Moreover, because of this misfit for these contending theories, I do not derive the same type of detailed hypotheses to test them as I do for geopolitics, which successfully explains all three cases.

Theoretical Assumptions

Proceeding from such a perspective on the nature of theory and political science, let us now turn to the more specific assumptions and theories that underlie the study at hand. In attempting to come to terms with the role that geopolitics plays in shaping great power grand strategies, four fundamental assumptions are made that must be explicitly stated and recognized from the outset. The first assumption is that a material world exists apart from human perception of it and serves, at the least, as the medium in which people and states act. While this may seem obvious and the statement unnecessary, the experience of physicists, especially at the subatomic level, suggests otherwise. While the nature of the universe is still debated,²¹ the central role of the observer in research is not. As Heisenberg and others have pointed out, there are limits to our knowledge about the universe because of the inevitable interference we create when we observe it.²² At current levels of understanding, with certainty limited and absolutes out of the question, scientists must be content with probabilities and relative perceptions. In other words, we can only partially grasp the totality of reality through our restricted perceptions of it. Regardless of effort, complete detachment and perfect predictability are physical impossibilities. This is no less true for the issue at hand.²³

²¹ For an interesting and readable account of one of the latest ideas about our universe, see Brian Greene, *The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory* (Vintage Books, 2000).

²² See Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (Harper and Row, 1958).

²³ For a sophisticated and informative discussion of some of these issues as they pertain to geopolitics, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton University Press, 1965). For a more recent discussion of the difficulties associated with theorizing for the field as a whole, see John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

Not only are our conclusions limited in specificity and applicability, but also, for practicality, we must pretend that a material world exists independently of our observations and that it is capable of exerting some type of influence on state behavior.

The second assumption flows from the first. For the purpose of this analysis, states are the primary units under consideration – not people, bureaucracies, government agencies, etc. While certainly not the only actor participating in the arena of global politics (noteworthy as well are multinational corporations, international organizations, transnational movements, sub-national groups, and individuals), states remain the central and dominant, if not the most powerful, political unit on the planet.²⁴ To be clear, the focus here is more on states than nations per se. Furthermore, states are assumed, for the purpose of this analysis, to be unitary and rational actors. Underlying such a Realist, but unrealistic, assumption is an attempt to try to control for different types of states, to minimize the impact of different cultures, institutions, and structures. Yes, by “black-boxing” states, we do move away from reality; but, as Waltz points out, explanatory power often is gained by such movement.²⁵ Moreover, much research already has been completed on the various domestic sources of grand strategy. To check these findings is not our purpose. Rather, the object at hand is to determine how much influence the aforementioned material world has upon the approach to security that states adopt.

²⁴ For more on the contested role of the state, see Hedley Bull, “The State’s Positive Role in World Politics,” *Daedalus*, No. 108 (Fall 1979); and James N. Rosenau, “The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change?” in James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State* (Sage Publications, 1989).

²⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

The third assumption, also based in the Realist tradition, logically follows the second. Because states are considered rational actors, they should pursue security in one form or another. Here, some structural influence is unavoidable; struggling in an essentially anarchic arena, states are left to fend for themselves. With no higher authority to turn to, the environment is one of self-help. To survive and succeed, states must strive to protect and promote their own interests, as no one else will.²⁶ In this regard, perhaps the most pressing threats confronting states are those posed by rival great powers. A repeating pattern of hegemonic struggle, involving the rise and fall of great powers, challenges any state's comfort with its place in history.²⁷ To avoid placing one's country in history's ashbin, rivals and potential rivals must be watched carefully and addressed accordingly. In short, I assume that states exist, that they are affected by the material world, and that they pursue security in various forms.

The fourth and final assumption naturally follows the third. These various approaches to security are assumed to be identifiable, measurable, and categorical. As noted above, while grand strategies per se may not always be explicitly stated, all states

²⁶ As Spykman explains, "The international community is without government, without a central authority to preserve law and order, and it does not guarantee the member states either their territorial integrity, their political independence, or their rights under international law. States exist, therefore, primarily in terms of their own strength or that of their protector states and, if they wish to maintain their independence, they must make the preservation or improvement of their power position the principal objective of foreign policy. Nations which renounce the power struggle and deliberately choose impotence will cease to influence international relations for evil or for good and risk eventual absorption by more powerful neighbors." Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1942).

²⁷ For more on such cyclical patterns in world politics, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (University of Washington Press, 1987); and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (Random House, 1987).

seek to protect and promote their interests in some fashion.²⁸ The two key questions under consideration here are, how and why. In other words, while a state might not issue a public statement asserting a particular orientation, its selection of means, in particular, should be readily detectable. Even purposeful deception should not interfere with a determined analyst's characterization of a state's approach as military, political, or economic. More care, however, will be required to discriminate among different types of these approaches (e.g., offensive or defensive, internationalist or isolationist, liberal or mercantile, etc.). Difficulty, however, is not impossibility. Careful coding and explicit justification of categorization can go far in mitigating the difficulties and disadvantages associated with such qualitative analysis.²⁹ Assuming both the material world and these grand strategies exist and are measurable, the next step is to break them down, defining terms and specifying clear categories of both independent and dependent variables, so that we might better understand the relationship between them.

²⁸ It should be noted that the focus here is expressly on grand strategies as policy approaches to security in peacetime, not as prescriptions for victory in armed conflict. While some causal factors are undoubtedly shared, military doctrines designed to fight and win wars per se are different beasts altogether, driven by tactical as well as strategic concerns.


²⁹ On this point, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

The Independent Variable: The Geopolitical Environment


What exactly is the “geopolitical environment” and how does it exert its influence? Harold and Margaret Sprout address these questions directly in their seminal work, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*.³⁰ They argue convincingly that the material world, what they call “ecology,” influences human affairs in two fundamental, but different ways: (1) perceptual and (2) functional. (Figure 2A.)

Two Levels of Geopolitical Influence

1. *PERCEPTUAL (formation)*



2. *OPERATIONAL (function)*



Based on a conceptualization offered by Harold and Margaret Sprout in *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Greenwood Press, 1979) and Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988)

Figure 2A

³⁰ Sprouts, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*.

First, the environment is perceived by people, integrated into cognitive frameworks, and then acted upon. This they refer to as the “psycho-milieu.” In this way, and this way alone, can the environment be said to cause policy choices or influence decisions.³¹ The second way the environment exerts its influence occurs regardless of people’s perceptions of it. In such instances, the material world – here referred to as the “operational milieu” – is the field upon which the game is played. If the strategy adopted (for whatever reasons) is ill-suited for a given environment, performance will be unfavorable or dysfunctional. In this way, the environment constrains outcomes. In more scientific terms, in the first instance, the “psycho-milieu” functions as an independent variable, modified by the perceptions and cognition of decision-makers (the intervening variable), which helps shape the dependent variable – different strategies to deal with threats. In the second instance, the “operational milieu” serves as an intervening variable, mediating the different strategies adopted (here, the independent variable), and shaping their relative efficacy (the dependent variable).³² In

³¹ For more on this line of argument, see Joseph Sonnenfeld, “The Geopolitical Environment as a Perceptual Environment,” *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 69 (October 1970); and Alan K. Henrikson, “Mental Maps,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

³² Consider two sports analogies. First, imagine the San Francisco 49ers playing the Green Bay Packers in Lambeau Field in Wisconsin. The 49ers are renowned for their quick strike, passing attack – the West Coast offense. While such a strategy might work on a beautiful, clear, calm day at Candlestick Park (now 3-Com), the 49ers are likely to experience difficulty passing in the horrible weather in Green Bay. More specifically, as gale-force winds and torrential rains reap havoc on the field, turning the “tundra” into muddy mush, receivers will slip, patterns will fail, and passes will fall incomplete. If the 49ers persist in playing by such a strategy in such unfavorable conditions, they surely will lose (regardless of how well the strategy might work at home or in more hospitable climes).

A similar situation confronts tennis players. Court surface shapes play, or at least it should. Grass and hard courts, for example, are faster, and “demand” that one serve and volley. Clay, in contrast, kicks the ball higher and slows down the pace. Baseline rallies, not serve and volley, characterize the games of the clay masters.

the former, the causal relationship is more determinative, in the latter, more functional. The first concerns why certain policies are adopted, the second whether or not these policies will work.

While the Sprouts put this framework forward decades ago, theorizing about either of these roles remains woefully deficient. In fact, while often addressed and occasionally discussed in depth, the influence of geopolitics suffers from a serious want of systematic analysis. In an exception to this pattern, Dan Deudney has suggested “bringing nature back in,” usefully operationalized some of the most important geopolitical variables, and hypothesized about some functional relationships between material contexts and different strategies.³³ Deudney’s work focuses primarily on the operational-milieu, in particular on the problems arising for states when their strategies no longer fit a given landscape, as well as on implications for systemic organization. While part of this larger effort to reintroduce this “natural” dimension into the study of international relations and foreign policy, this study differs from Deudney’s work by concentrating on the first part of the Sprout’s model – the psycho-milieu. To be clear, my principal concern here is on the first leg of a longer and more complex causal chain: examining how perceptions of the material world – particularly conceptions of

In both instances, however, the environment only suggests efficacious strategies – it does not dictate their adoption or employment. But, in these instances, as well as in international relations, those who pursue strategies that are inappropriate for a given environment, which do not fit the landscape, are likely to bear the costs of failure.

³³ See, respectively, “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse,” (University of Pennsylvania, 1993); “Binding Powers and Bound States: The Logic and Geopolitics of Republican Negarchy,” Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 1996; and “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in the Philadelphia System,” in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *Constructing Sovereignty* (Cambridge University Press, 1996). For more on these arguments, see his “Geopolitics and Change,” in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Westview Press, 1997); and “Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000).

“imagined distance” – influence grand strategic preferences and get translated into national security policy.

Thus, in the broadest terms, the independent variable in this study is the material environment, what the Sprouts referred to as “ecology,” and what may be more appropriately termed the “geopolitical foundation.” As suggested above, this geopolitical foundation is comprised of two subcategories of variables: geography and technology. While these, in turn, can be broken down further,³⁴ they also can be usefully aggregated into a larger notion of “interaction capacity.”³⁵ Based on a ratio of technology to geography, this aggregate reflects the ability to move people, goods, ideas, and weapons over time and space.³⁶ With geopolitical factors identified as the independent variables, interaction capacity can thus be conceived of not only as an aggregated proxy but also as an intervening variable – part of a potential “fourth image” of international relations – shaped by underlying geographic and technological features.

³⁴ One could, for example, adopt scaleable measures of specific features. Geographically, these might include three central variables: (1) location, ranging from insular to continental; (2) size, ranging from small to enormous; and (3) resources, including food, energy, and raw materials, and ranging from poor to rich. Similarly, in terms of technology, one could examine the three most prominent dimensions: (1) communication, ranging from primitive to advanced (based on range, speed, and capacity); (2) transportation, along the same spectrum; and (3) destruction, emphasizing lethality, and ranging from minimal to apocalyptic. Two additional sets of technological variables might also be worthy of consideration: (1) production, especially in terms of capacity, and also ranging from primitive to advanced; and (2) defense, ranging from non-existent to complete.

³⁵ Deudney, “Binding Powers and Bound States.” While Deudney credits the identification of interaction capacity as an important variable to Barry Buzan, numerous scholars have suggested considering some comparable measure. Nye, for example, suggests including the notion of “process” and Ruggie “dynamic density.” All seem to be addressing the same type of fourth-image phenomena. For more on these arguments, see Barry Buzan, “Rethinking System and Structure,” in Barry Buzan et al., *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (January 1988); and John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia University Press, 1986).

³⁶ Deudney, “Binding Powers and Bound States.”

Generally speaking, advances in communication and transportation technologies modify the effects of distance and topography by increasing interaction capacity.³⁷ So, too, do advances in destructive potential alter the strategic environment, but in a different way. In particular, advances in weaponry may directly and dramatically affect the strategic balance between offense, defense, and deterrence as well as the preference ordering among military and non-military means.³⁸ Because of this, it makes sense to break interaction capacity into two parts: violent and non-violent. Both dimensions share constituent properties and can be conceptualized along the same spectrum. Deudney has usefully operationalized interaction capacity as possessing two basic elements: proximity and density.³⁹ Plotted along the X-axis is proximity, determined by dividing the velocity of destruction, goods, people, and ideas by the size of the territory or distance.⁴⁰ Along the Y-axis is density, determined by dividing the volume of destruction, commerce, travel, and communication by the size of the territory or population.⁴¹ As Figure 2B illustrates, variations in proximity and density can be

³⁷ As Gilpin explains: "Significant increases in the efficiency of transportation and communication have profound implications for the exercise of military power, the nature of political organization, and the pattern of economic activities. Technological innovations in transportation and communication reduce costs and thereby increase the net benefits of undertaking changes in the international system" – in *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 56.

³⁸ See Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, pp. 59-66.

³⁹ Deudney, "Binding Powers and Bound States."

⁴⁰ Velocity, here, can be thought of as the inverse of time, with minutes, hours, days, weeks, and months the primary units of measure pulled together in a four-tiered scale of time-to-travel: remote, distant, close, and immediate.

⁴¹ The measure of destructive density, for example, can be derived by dividing the total destructive capacity of the threatening country's arsenal by the total population or square mileage of the targeted country in terms of percent coverage. The same holds for the communication and transportation sectors – e.g., percent of population covered or mile-tons per population, respectively.

combined to form a four-tiered spectrum of interaction capacity: weak, moderate, strong, and intense.⁴²

Interaction Capacity

| | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| DENSITY | Extreme | | | <i>Intense</i> | |
| | High | | <i>Strong</i> | | |
| | Medium | | <i>Moderate</i> | | |
| | Low | <i>Weak</i> | | | |
| | | Remote | Connected | Close | Immediate |
| | | PROXIMITY | | | |

Based on an operationalization proposed by Daniel Deudney in "Binding Powers, Bound States: The Logic and Geopolitics of Republican Negarchy," Paper prepared for presentation at the annual APSA meeting, San Francisco, California, August 1996, and more recently published in "Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts," *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000)

Figure 2B

⁴² While it is conceivable for further technological advances to increase both proximity and density to immediate and extreme levels (particularly in the destructive and communicative realms), we are not yet at that point. Moving large amounts of goods and people over distance still takes significant time. For this reason, we will confine our employed matrix to the first three tiers – weak, moderate, and strong – and leave the analysis of “intense” interaction capacity to a future study when technological developments (especially in transportation) make this level more applicable.

From there, combining the violent and non-violent dimensions yields a more valid and useful representation of the more complex and multidimensional nature of interaction capacity.⁴³ In particular, this richer picture helps capture the different elements of grand strategies and their relative emphasis by taking into account a greater range of technological variation, as sectors might not advance synchronously. As discussed below, this combined graph is, therefore, employed in illustrating the hypothesized correlation between the different degrees of interaction capacity with the dependent variable – grand strategic choices.

⁴³ In his recent works, Deudney focuses almost exclusively on violent interaction capacity, neglecting the role for other, non-destructive technologies. As discussed below, this more restrictive interpretation leads to a mischaracterization of current interaction capacity and, perhaps, to premature suggestions for associated political restructuring. Destructive potential is an essential element of interaction capacity – perhaps even the most important – but, just like the military dimension in the definition of grand strategy, it is not sufficient, especially given recent technological advances in communication, transportation, and information-processing, all of which are discussed at greater length in the chapters below. For more on Deudney's interpretation, see "Geopolitics and Change" and "Regrounding Realism."

The Dependent Variable: Grand Strategies

While the potential combinations of their various elements – motivational, cognitive, and operational – are vast, all grand strategies respond to the same driving question: what is the most efficacious way to deal with threats? Defined above as multidimensional, comprehensive approaches to security, grand strategies are principally concerned with reducing or minimizing threats. For great powers, like the United States, one of the central challenges is how to deal with other great powers – particularly those viewed as potential threats.⁴⁴ As Figure 2C illustrates, most grand strategies can be usefully conceptualized and categorized along a spectrum with a range of types: appeasement, bandwagoning, hiding, balancing, binding, dominating, and eliminating.⁴⁵ While each employs a different combination of ends and means, all are concerned primarily with how to address threats posed to national security.

⁴⁴ The anarchic arena and high levels of absolute capabilities make most great powers latent threats which other actors at least need to consider if not address. Of course, other factors can contribute to the level of threat perceived, including regime type, ideology, and interaction capacity. For more, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁴⁵ The middle group – hiding, balancing, binding, and dominating – correspond largely to the four major “visions” of grand strategy – Neo-Isolationism, Selective Engagement, Cooperative Security, and Primacy – examined by Posen and Ross as current options for the United States. Given the theoretical orientation of this study and our need to define and categorize foreign policies practiced by the United States in the past, it makes more sense for us to derive our terminology from the generic underlying nature of these strategies (i.e., how they deal with threats), not from their current political shape or form. For more on the contemporary versions in the American debate, their strengths and weakness and their proponents and critics, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97).

Grand Strategy Types




Figure 2C

Of course, not every analyst would agree with this categorization. Numerous other typologies of grand strategy have been offered. Iain Johnston, for example, focuses on three types – accommodationist, defensive, and offensive – in his exploration of Chinese grand strategy.⁴⁶ Paul Schroeder, in contrast, identifies four – hiding, transcending, bandwagoning, and balancing – in his study of European diplomatic history.⁴⁷ Deudney adopts two of these, hiding and balancing, and adds a third, binding, for a “fuller spectrum of foreign policy practices”⁴⁸ – one that will be adopted for this study.

⁴⁶ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁴⁷ Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994).

⁴⁸ Deudney, “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in the Philadelphia System,” p. 48.

In terms of responding to threats posed by rivals, however, one can imagine at least two other options, at the extremes of the spectrum: to accommodate threats or to eliminate them. At the same time, the former – which can be disaggregated into “appeasement” (giving in to threats) and “bandwagoning” (going along with them) – runs counter to the assumption that states are rational security seekers. While “strategic surrender” can be a viable military option in the face of inevitable defeat and bandwagoning may occasionally make sense for second or third rank powers,⁴⁹ a strategy for giving up or quitting the game should hardly be equated with a viable approach to playing and winning it. This is particularly true for great powers, the principals of the current study. Far more plausible and compelling is the latter alternative – eliminating a threat through domination or assimilation.⁵⁰ Including these might provide for an even more comprehensive typology of how great powers deal with threats, but not necessarily of how they deal with other great powers (especially those armed with nuclear weapons), again, the principal concern of this study. Assuming an essential equivalence of capabilities among great powers (discussed at length below), these more extreme approaches to threats are less applicable and, consequently, better left to subsequent studies. For my current analysis of great power relations with other

⁴⁹ For a discussion of strategic surrender, see Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford University Press, 1958). For an argument that weak states may tend toward balancing more than bandwagoning, see Eric J. Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon?” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992).

⁵⁰ Picking up where binding leaves off, dominating and assimilating strategies seek to deepen and strengthen ties with rivals to the point where it no longer makes sense to speak of different units – rivals are brought in and unified under a larger political arrangement. The threat is not only met, but eliminated, never to arise again. Traditionally practiced by empires, this type of approach is also referred to as “primacy” and “hegemony,” as well as “asymmetrical binding” by Deudney. It is likely to include expansionist objectives, with the state seeking to enlarge or spread its influence at the direct expense of the rival. All opportunities to advance will be seized and all available means employed. It has a clear offensive and expansionist bent, not only in the military realm, which will be primary, but in the political and economic areas as well.

great powers, only three types of grand strategy – hiding, balancing, and binding – fit with my assumptions. Let us examine each of these strategies in more detail, with an eye to identifying those characteristics that will facilitate categorization of different strategic policies.

Hiding involves trying to avoid one's rivals and attempting to stay away from threats.⁵¹ The objective of this ostrich-like approach is to steer clear of problems and entanglements in order to minimize the risks and costs associated with involvement.⁵² Ends are narrowly defined, typically along minimal security lines, like territorial defense. From this perspective, threats are numerous and everywhere; opportunities, in contrast, are hard to identify abroad and typically more plentiful at home. The means most associated with this option include a defensive or deterrent military doctrine,⁵³ neutrality and nonintervention in the political realm, and protectionism and autarky in the economic sphere.

Balancing shares an inherent conservatism with hiding, as states seek to contain rivals, to keep them the same, and to perpetuate the status quo. But, instead of ignoring

⁵¹ As Schroeder explains, "This could take various forms: simply ignoring the threat or declaring neutrality in a general crisis; possibly approaching other states on one or both sides of a quarrel to get them to guarantee one's safety; trying to withdraw into isolation; assuming a purely defensive position in the hope that the storm would blow over; or, usually as a later or last resort, seeking protection from some other power or powers in exchange for diplomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part" – in "Historical Reality and Neo-realist Theory," p. 117.

⁵² Not all advocates of this type of strategy offer simple-minded isolationism. For two interesting and well-thought out approaches, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton University Press, 1995) and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997).

For more on current isolationist sentiments in the United States, see William Schneider, "The New Isolationism." For an example of such an argument, see Pat Buchanan, "America First – and Second, and Third," *The National Interest*, No. 19 (Spring 1990).

⁵³ Here, degree is indeterminate, although a pacifistic posture would seem more likely than militarism.

the moves of the other players, as in hiding, states here try to check them, to maintain some form of equilibrium.⁵⁴ The ends of a balancing strategy, thus, are likely to be more ambitious than hiding's minimalist aversion, but remain limited and selective – concerned especially with preventing other powers from expanding or from inflicting damage.⁵⁵ Threats are likely to be prominent, often posed by another great power in transition, with some opportunities available to work with others to address such threats.⁵⁶ Typically, states pursuing a balancing strategy will possess some military dimension to their policy, although it may be defensive or deterrent. In the political realm, as well, balancing requires more activity and engagement than hiding, with states more involved with other states and, perhaps, with international institutions. Economically, degree is indeterminate, but some form of bifurcation is likely (i.e., free trade for allies and mercantilism for rivals).⁵⁷

Binding goes one step further. Rather than avoiding rivals or trying to hold them down, this strategy seeks to bring them closer, to strengthen the bonds between

⁵⁴ For two classic discussions of "balancing," see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1985), especially pp. 187-221; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," Ch. 6 in *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 102-128.

⁵⁵ For a clear example of such strategic thinking as it pertains to the Middle East, written by former policy-makers, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May/June 1997). For an alternative, but related argument offered by a Clinton administration official more closely identified with another strategy, see Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994).

For two other examples of this type of balancing strategy, see Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991); and Steven van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990).

⁵⁶ There are, as Kenneth Waltz notes, two primary avenues available for balancing: (1) internal, whereby a state increases its own strength through intensive means; and (2) external, whereby a state increases its power vis-à-vis a rival by tapping the strength of others and pooling resources – in *Theory of International Politics*.

⁵⁷ For more on this line of argument – namely, that trade will "follow the flag" because of associated security externalities – see Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

states in order to empower collective action and to constrain destructive potential.⁵⁸ More inclusive in orientation, this strategy is likely to encompass broader ends and an extended sense of identity. Interests may even be shared with other powers. Unlike hiding and balancing, binding strategies are more optimistic, tending to emphasize opportunities more than threats, and seek to capitalize on opportunities to reduce threats through mutual constraints.⁵⁹ States practicing a binding strategy are likely to rely more on political and economic means than on military might per se.⁶⁰ Politically, a high degree of engagement should be accompanied by the increasing adoption of multilateral means. Economically, commercialism should flourish as trading states adopt more liberal policies designed to maximize positive sum arrangements, reduce transaction costs, and build bridges with rivals. What military dimension exists should be low-profile and deterrent or defensive in orientation.

⁵⁸ Basing his formulation on Schroeder's earlier notion of *pacta de contrahendo*, Deudney defines binding as a "foreign policy practice of establishing links between the units that reduce their autonomy vis-à-vis one another," of creating "pacts aimed not to aggregate capability to balance adversaries, but to tie a potential adversary into a relationship of friendship to reduce possible conflict and predatory behavior" – in "Binding Sovereigns," p. 49. Schroeder's omission of this category in his later work is puzzling and regrettable, but readily remedied. For his initial statement, see Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University of Kansas Press, 1976).

⁵⁹ For an example of this type of argument, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991). For an interesting counter-argument, see Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1991).

⁶⁰ As John Ikenberry explains, "Rather than responding to a potential strategic rival by organizing a counter-balancing alliance against it, the threatening state is invited to participate in a joint security association or alliance. By binding to each other, surprises are reduced and expectations of stable future relations dampen the security dilemmas that trigger worst-case preparations, arms races, and dangerous strategic rivalry. Also, by creating institutional connections among potential rivals, channels of communication are established that provide opportunities to influence actively the other's evolving security policy." G. John Ikenberry, "New Grand Strategy Uses Lofty and Material Desires," *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 1998, p. M2, also available through Lexis-Nexis.

To summarize, I define the dependent variable as three primary types of great power grand strategies – hiding, balancing, and binding – conceived along a larger spectrum of potential responses to threats, each with its own array of motivational, cognitive, and operational characteristics. Given this typology of grand strategies and the operationalization of geopolitics offered above, the next step is to hypothesize relationships between these two sets of variables and to offer some preliminary responses to the questions posed above.

Geopolitical Hypotheses: Connections between Variables

For this study, I generate and test hypotheses on two levels: (1) metatheoretical and (2) variable specific. The metatheoretical hypotheses address the three general questions – existential, quantitative, and procedural – about the causal role of geopolitics posed above: Does it matter? How much? And in what way? First, in response to the existential question, I hypothesize that geopolitics does matter. Like Mark Twain's death or the end of American hegemony, the alleged obsolescence of geography is greatly exaggerated and prematurely anticipated.⁶¹ Thus, rather than offering an obituary, I hypothesize that geographic and technological features are considered in the policy-making process and affect strategic choices. Such consideration of geopolitical factors can be implicit or explicit. Regardless, the geopolitical environment helps shape policy-makers' views of the world, their identification of interests, their assessment of threats and opportunities, and their selection of means.

In this way, the environment presents opportunities as well as constraints, empowers as well as limits, but does not directly determine particular choices or policies. In other words, it conditions more than it dictates.⁶² Its causal role, however,

⁶¹ For a convincing argument that geopolitics remains a central factor in international relations, see Colin Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geography," *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring 1996); and "Inescapable Geography," in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy* (Frank Cass, 1999).

The analogy is drawn from Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985).

⁶² Perhaps the most elaborate discussion of this conditioning role of the environment, and its relationship to different scientific approaches (particularly to determinism, possibilism, and probabilism), is offered by the Sprouts in *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*.

is profound.⁶³ Spatially bound, humans are incapable of totally freeing themselves from geopolitical influences. We tend to operate with a sense of place, an understanding about our location and connections, which provides a context for making decisions and processing new information.⁶⁴ In fact, it is hypothesized that geopolitics exerts an often under-appreciated influence as it affects so many other features, including regime type, political culture, and even interstate structure, as well as interaction capacity. Thus, in response to the second question, concerning significance, I hypothesize that geopolitics is foundational; it serves as the underlying “deep structure,” an antecedent cause that largely shapes the world in and with which people and states must interact.⁶⁵

Third, and finally, in response to the procedural question, I hypothesize that geopolitics exerts its influence on grand strategy formulation indirectly – it must first be

⁶³ Here, it is possible to specify a graded range (0-4) of responses to the question about how much geopolitics, or any other factor, matters: (0) negligible – no discernible influence or consideration; (1) marginal – it was considered but was neither decisive nor critical; (2) important – it did matter and was considered among other key variables; (3) critical – it was considered and was decisive, with no other factor more important or more capable of offering a better explanation; and (4) determinative – not only was it the most important factor, it was the only factor seriously considered and alone could have caused the outcome. In terms of this range, I hypothesize that geopolitics was at least important and perhaps critical – at least in terms of explaining the variation in American grand strategies across and within the following cases – but not determinative per se, as other factors influence both the formation and the functionality of grand strategies.

⁶⁴ The essential notion here is of a “mental map,” which is shaped by the extant geopolitical circumstances as interpreted through contemporary cultural and linguistic lenses. As discussed below, I hypothesize that such maps serve as an intervening variable between my independent and dependent variables – as a pivotal cognitive and causal link between geopolitics and grand strategies. For more about their nature, construction, and role, see Peter Gould and Rodney White, *Mental Maps*, Second Edition (Routledge, 1986); and Alan K. Henrikson, “Mental Maps,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁶⁵ This notion of “deep structure,” like much of the conceptual framework offered here, is drawn from Deudney’s work, especially from “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse,” Unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania (1993).

perceived (or misperceived) and then acted upon by policy-makers.⁶⁶ It makes no sense to speak of the geopolitical environment “causing” a particular grand strategy per se.⁶⁷ Instead, policy-makers’ perceptions of geographic and technological features, captured by the notion of “mental maps,” help condition and constrain their grand strategic choices. Such maps may be composed of a variety of features, including a perceived sense of connectedness to others – what I term “imagined distance.”⁶⁸ In other words, when identifying interests, threats to those interests, and the best ways to protect and promote those interests in the face of those threats, policy-makers consider the geopolitical context and try to formulate policies accordingly. Of course, such perceptions and analysis of the environment are not always entirely accurate, nor shared

⁶⁶ Here, again, it is important to bear in mind the Sprouts’ distinction between the psycho-milieu and the operational-milieu. Given the current study’s focus on policy formulation, the former is clearly more relevant. However, if the question were what factors contributed to the success or failure of certain grand strategies, then the latter could be critical and exert a more direct influence.

⁶⁷ As the Sprouts point out, “such factors can be perceived, reacted to, and taken into account by the individual or individuals under consideration. In this way, and in this way only.... environmental factors can be said to ‘influence,’ or to ‘condition,’ or to otherwise ‘affect’ human values and preferences, moods and attitudes, choices and decisions” – in *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*, p. 11.

Gould and White echo this point and also note the limiting and differentiating role that perceptual filters can play in this process: “Human behavior is affected only by that portion of the environment that is actually perceived.... Our views of the world, and about people and places in it, are formed from a highly filtered set of impressions, and our images are strongly affected by the information we receive through our filters” – in *Mental Maps*, p. 28.

⁶⁸ As noted in the Introduction, this notion of “imagined distance” is drawn, in part, from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition (Verso, 1991). Incorporating the term “imagined” helps highlight the centrality of perceptions, as this sense of connectedness arises and exists primarily in people’s heads. Based primarily on an imperfect and subjective assessment of interaction capacity, it seems, by most counts, to be a useful aggregated proxy – perhaps the critical variable at hand. It can be conceived along the same lines as the proximity dimension of interaction capacity: namely, distant, proximate, and close. For more, see Chapter 1, fn. 109.

by all principals.⁶⁹ Indeed, the same geopolitical features can be interpreted differently by different policy-makers, or even by the same policy-maker at different times. While clear cut evidence about policy-makers' perceptions of the environment and associated "mental maps" may be challenging to obtain, assessing the accuracy of these perceptions and their relative influence in the decision-making process – the critical dynamic between the fifth and first images – is one of the central objectives of this project.

The second set of formative hypotheses is variable specific, hence considerably easier to test. Logically related to the hypotheses above, these, too, posit correlation and causation between geopolitics and grand strategies. These differ, however, in emphasizing the direction of geopolitical influence, not just its amount and nature. In particular, it is hypothesized that geographic and technological factors (the independent variable) help determine interaction capacity (the intervening variable) which, in turn, must be perceived and acted upon by policy-makers (another intervening variable) operating in a domestic environment (a third intervening variable) as they craft grand strategies (the dependent variable). To speak in terms of images, the fifth shapes the fourth, which is mediated by the first and the second.

⁶⁹ As the Sprouts explain, "habituation to values, taboos, working rules, and other norms prevailing in a social group – government agency, political community, or the like – may condition individuals to be more alert and responsive to certain features of the milieu than to others. An individual's role and the norms implicit in it may likewise condition the kinds of responses he makes to what he perceives. ... In any specific instance, the behavior of the individual may or may not conform to the norm. The odds for conformity may be strong, but in the final test it is the individual, not his milieu, that determines what will be perceived and how it will be reacted to" – in *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*, p. 133.

This passage highlights the mediating role of the policy-makers themselves, the influence of other structural and cultural factors on these policy-makers, and the causal complexity associated with such decision-making.

Hypothesized Relationship between Variables

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| INTERACTION CAPACITY | Strong | | | X |
| | Moderate | | X | |
| | Weak | X | | |
| | | Hide | Balance | Bind |
| | | GRAND STRATEGIES | | |

Figure 2D

As illustrated in Figure 2D, the specific relationship between interaction capacity and grand strategy is hypothesized as direct (not unmediated) and largely functional: the greater the interaction capacity, the greater the pressure toward integration.⁷⁰ Less capability limits the options available to decision-makers: one can only do so much without the ability to communicate, trade, or fight with others. Thus, if interaction capacity is weak, then avoidance should be the strategy of choice; if it is

⁷⁰ A qualification on the use of “functionalism” is in order. The hypothesis is inspired less by visions of transnationalism and a “working peace system” than by the inescapable “common sense insight that the capacity of actors or units to interact with one another has profound implications for security.” In this respect, I am posing more of a materialist argument à la Deudney than a functionalist argument à la Mitrany. Two interesting applications of the former include “Nuclear Realism and Republicanism” and “The Natural Republic of Europe: The Geopolitics of a Balancer State System,” both unpublished papers, University of Pennsylvania. For more on Mitrany’s version of functionalism, see David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (Martin Robertson and Co., 1975). Quotation from Deudney, “Binding Powers, Bound States,” 11-3.

moderate, then balancing is more likely; and if it is strong, then binding is expected.⁷¹

As noted above, however, this relationship is conditional, not determinative. Increased capability opens more options but does not dictate strategic choices. Other factors – domestic and international, structural and normative – certainly can come into play and influence decisions in other directions. Nevertheless, for the sake of focusing attention on the relative explanatory power of geopolitics, a direct correlation between interaction capacity and grand strategies is hypothesized – this should facilitate observation and coding.⁷²

In terms of hypotheses about the specific constituent elements of grand strategies – motivational, cognitive, and operational – we can derive three more propositions to test. First, in terms of the motivational element, interests and ends should expand in direct relationship to the amount of interaction capacity – as that capacity grows, interests should expand as well.⁷³ Second, in terms of the cognitive dimension, geopolitical theory would hypothesize an emphasis on proximity, or

⁷¹ Noteworthy as well is the logical continuation of this thinking, whereby an intense interaction capacity, characterized by immediate proximity and extreme density, would generate pressures toward integration or assimilation. As technological advances continue to shrink distance, not only do strategic options like hiding and balancing become less suitable, but also eventually, it may cease to make sense to think of ourselves as spatially differentiated or to maintain separate systems of political organization.

⁷² While the hypothesized relationship between the level of interaction capacity and grand strategies is direct, the relationship between the intervening variable of “imagined distance” and grand strategies should be inverse – with “remoteness” encouraging hiding, “connectedness” balancing, and “closeness” binding.

⁷³ Gould and White, among others, suggest that there may be a “falling off” of interests, as well as knowledge and emotional attachments, over distance. In fact, the empirical evidence they offer suggests that “people’s interest falls off with roughly the square root of the distance” – in *Mental Maps*, p. 23. Power laws, ubiquitous in nature, appear here as well.

At the same time, technological advances have mitigated some of the effects of such distance and have encouraged the extension and expansion of interests beyond traditionally narrow, territorially-bound definitions. As Albert Wohlstetter writes, “From the standpoint of economic and strategic interests, one important result of improvements in communications and transport will be to increase the geographical extent of interests....” Indeed, Wohlstetter asserts, “cultural interests have never fallen off directly with distance.” Quotations from “Illusions of Distance,” p. 248 and p. 247, respectively.

closeness, for both threats and opportunities. Those states (and other actors) that are closest, that are perceived as possessing the strongest force projection capability, not necessarily just the greatest absolute strength, matter most and will be the target of the grand strategy.⁷⁴ Moreover, the closer they are perceived to be, the greater the pressure for first balancing and then binding.⁷⁵ Third, in terms of the operational dimension, choices about the overall preference of means as well as differing approaches within the different areas also are influenced by geopolitics. Again, thinking functionally, a direct relationship is hypothesized between increased interaction capacity and non-military means, particularly after reaching a point of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Political and economic activity both should increase with technological advances.⁷⁶ Militarily, we would hypothesize a non-monotonic relationship (the only one we expect to see) between increasing interaction capacity and the defense-offense-deterrence spectrum, with advances in communication, transportation, and destruction technologies

⁷⁴ Stephen Walt identifies this as his principal hypothesis about “geographic proximity” and offers empirical evidence from alliance formation in the Middle East to support this claim. See Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, particularly Chapters 1 and 6.

⁷⁵ Here, I diverge from Walt and head toward Deudney. As noted above, there are at least three types of grand strategic options available, not just the balancing and bandwagoning that Walt offers. Moreover, Walt’s argument that “states have been far more sensitive to threats from proximate power than from aggregate power” and that “these threats almost always promote balancing rather than bandwagoning behavior” (p. 158), fails to capture the complete array of strategic alternatives and the driving pressure toward binding generated by key technological advances.

Thus, while closer threats may, indeed, be more threatening, they are only likely to be balanced to a point. Here, we need to move beyond Walt’s argument: certain technological advances may shrink distances to such an extent that balancing becomes counterproductive, the adversary too close to effectively hold off. In such instances – a situation of strong, or intense, interaction capacity and of perceived closeness or immediacy, national security decision-makers are likely to be drawn toward more fit and functional integrative strategic alternatives like binding or assimilation – or so I hypothesize.

⁷⁶ Wohlstetter makes a similar argument about the expanded number and range of contacts. See Wohlstetter, “Illusions of Distance.”

initially favoring the offense,⁷⁷ but ultimately reaching a point of diminishing returns and favoring the emergence of a deterrent posture.⁷⁸

While this project concentrates on explaining policy formulation, I also test two conceptually linked, general hypotheses about the relationship between landscape fitness and operational effectiveness. In particular, I hypothesize that high levels of fitness will contribute to high levels of security; the inverse also should hold – namely, the lower its level of fitness, the less likely a strategy is to succeed.⁷⁹ For the sake of tractability and optimizing this project’s value-added, I will not delve too deeply into this functional puzzle. Instead, I concentrate most of my research and analysis on the formative side, which poses interesting and important puzzles unto itself. Nevertheless, following in the footsteps of the Sprouts, I include these two basic functional hypotheses in order to emphasize (A) the difference between the psycho-milieu and the

⁷⁷ George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (Wiley, 1977).

⁷⁸ This is part of the “nuclear revolution” argument put forward initially by Bernard Brodie and more recently by political scientists like Michael Mandelbaum, Robert Jervis, and Avery Goldstein. The basic idea is that destructive potential can only progress so far and fast before it becomes less usable. Facing an adversary armed with numerous survivable and deliverable nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, for example, even a quasi-rational actor must question the efficacy of using any means that could lead to a military clash. Hence, because of their unprecedented destructive capacity and speed and the current infeasibility of adequate defensive measures, nuclear weapons in the hands of two states tend to balance themselves out through deterrence or mutual self-restraint. For more on the strategic and political implications of nuclear weapons, see Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton University Press, 1965); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell University Press, 1989); and Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 2000).

⁷⁹ These general propositions are derived largely from Deudney’s work on “structural-functional security materialism,” which addresses the functionality of both strategies and structures in far greater detail. He identifies eight factors, for example, that could contribute to whether, in the face of material change, existing approaches “persist, crash, lag in adjustment, or adjust,” including, in his terms, (1) inheritance diversity, (2) embeddedness, (3) militarization, (4) democratization, (5) learning and innovation capacity, (6) social memory capacity, (7) distinctiveness, and (8) dysfunction acuity. See Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change,” especially pp. 108-117, with the list of potential factors on p. 112. For more, see Deudney, “Binding Powers, Bound States.”

operational-milieu, (B) the complementarity of their respective influences at different steps along the causal chain, and (C) the importance of both sets of influences at these different stages on the other principal phenomena under study – grand strategies.

Summary of Geopolitical Hypotheses

Formative

Metatheoretical

1. *Existential* – Geopolitics does matter and is considered
2. *Significance* – Important/Critical, Foundational
3. *Procedural* – Indirect Influence, Filtered by perceptions,
Mediated by Mental Maps

Variable-Specific

4. *Grand Strategy Type* – Varies by interaction capacity
Weak-Hide, Moderate-Balance, Strong-Bind
5. *Motivational* – Selective Interests, Varies by distance
Increased interaction capacity extends interests
6. *Cognitive* – Focus on closest states
Connectedness increases threats and opportunities
7. *Operational* – Preferred means varies by era
Increased interaction capacity eventually favors
non-military (or less destructive) means
8. *Military* – Increased interaction capacity favors offense
But, only up to a point, then favors deterrence
9. *Political* – Increased interaction capacity promotes
internationalism and multilateralism
10. *Economic* – Increased interaction capacity encourages
commercialism and liberalism

Functional

11. *Positive* – Landscape fitness increases chance of success,
Suitable strategies more likely to provide security
12. *Negative* – Ill-fitting strategies less likely to succeed,
Unsuitable strategies more likely to crash

Figure 2E Summary of Geopolitical Hypotheses

Theoretical Summary and Conclusions

In summary, the basic proposition advanced here is that geopolitics influences both the formation and the functionality of grand strategies. The summary table provided in Figure 2E highlights the broad range of potential geopolitical effects and lists the twelve hypotheses about the relationship between geopolitics and grand strategy that I test in the three empirical chapters below. To be clear, the focus of this study is on geopolitics and its underdeveloped causal role, not on the well-traveled alternative arguments. It may well be that causes found on these other levels of analysis, in domestic and international politics especially, are the critical or determinative factors of national security policy. It may be necessary to consider other causes as well, like decision-makers' personalities or international norms, to obtain a more complete picture of the process. It may also be that all of these allegedly alternative arguments represent complementary approaches to the same topic, exposing different facets of the "truth," which, when taken together, offer a more comprehensive and accurate account.⁸⁰ For the complete picture, what may be required is not the proliferation of independent variables on multiple levels of analysis but the incorporation of these different variables and levels into a truly systemic model of

⁸⁰ Of course, this suggests drifting from theoretical explanation, with its emphasis on simplification and parsimony, toward empirical description, with its concern for accuracy and rich detail. As suggested above and discussed in more detail below, I strive for balance between these two extremes, for what Eckstein calls "middle-range" explanations. See Eckstein, *Regarding Politics*, p. 109.

international relations as a complex adaptive system.⁸¹ Before drawing such conclusions, however, let us first try to isolate the relative causal role played by geopolitics and see how much the material environment itself can explain grand strategies. As the next step in this process, let us examine the methodology of this study and the research and analytical methods that I use to ascertain this causal role.

⁸¹ My use of the term “systemic” here emphasizes the nonlinear dynamics that result from iterated interaction of multiple adaptive agents and the structures they generate. This understanding of systems derives from a multitude of works, including Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, Revised Edition (George Braziller, 1968); and David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Prentice Hall, 1965). It also incorporates my understanding of complex adaptive systems and self-organized criticality. For introductions to these two concepts, see John Holland, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 121, No. 1 (Winter 1992); and Per Bak and Kan Chen, “Self-Organized Criticality,” *Scientific American* (January 1991). For more on this emergent paradigm, see Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (Collier Books, 1992); John Holland, *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Addison-Wesley, 1995); Murray Gell-Mann, *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex* (W. H. Freeman, 1994); Stuart A. Kauffman, “Antichaos and Adaptation,” *Scientific American* (August 1991) and *At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity* (Oxford University Press, 1995); John L. Casti, *Complexification: Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of Surprise* (Harper Collins, 1994); Brian Goodwin, *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Per Bak, *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality* (Copernicus, 1996); and Mark Buchanan, *Ubiquity: The Science of History ... or Why the World is Simpler than We Think* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000). For application of this type of thinking to economics, see Didier Sornette, *Why Stock Markets Crash: Critical Events in Complex Financial Systems* (Princeton University Press, 2002); and Brian Arthur, “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy,” *Scientific American* (February 1990) and “Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality,” *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May 1994). For an early application of this type of thinking to political science, see John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton University Press, 1974). For more recent applications of this emergent paradigm to international relations, see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-93); Steven R. Mann, “Chaos, Criticality, and Strategic Thought,” in *Essays on Strategy*, Volume IX, edited by Thomas C. Gill (National Defense University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997); and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton University Press, 1997) and “Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles,” *APSR*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (March 2003).

**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Part I: The Analytical Framework

Chapter 3: Methodology – Research and Analysis

With the theoretical framework now established, let us turn our attention toward the research and analytical methods that I use to draw conclusions about the role of geopolitics and the explanatory power of geopolitical theory. This chapter, like the last, first opens with a general discussion of principles and then introduces some specific guidelines and approaches for this study. As with any scientific study, it is important to explicitly and clearly provide all of the necessary information about the analysis to maximize both the validity and the reliability of our findings.¹

At the heart of this current project is the desire to effectively combine international relations theory with diplomatic history, ideally merging them in this instance into a genre that may be best described as “grand strategic analysis.” The basic idea is to operate first like a political scientist, adopting theories and specifying hypotheses, and then like a diplomatic historian, sifting through the empirical evidence

¹ Validity concerns whether or not one is actually measuring what is intended, whether the findings are accurate, reflect “reality,” and capture the essence of the topic. Reliability, in contrast, concerns consistency in measurement, whether or not another researcher, analyzing the same materials and conducting the same process, would come to the same conclusions.

Underlying my pursuit of these two objectives and underpinning my approach to the current topic is the notion of “intellectual honesty.” As Rogers Smith explains, “Research should ... not be evaluated chiefly by whether its methods most closely approximate the best method in some other scientific endeavor. We should ask instead whether its methods have been honestly pursued and presented and whether they really enable us to make better founded statements about politically important matters than we could do otherwise” – in “Should We Make Political Science More of a Science or More about Politics?” *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 200-201.

to test our hypotheses and see which theories actually fit (or best explain) the record. In this sense, we will need to recognize but traverse traditional disciplinary lines between political science and history. As others have noted, the two disciplines, both of which involve description and explanation, are complementary and readily integrated.² Guided by the light of theory, we need to explore the descriptive richness of the historical record and to tap the bounty of empirical evidence available that provides insights about how and why American decision-makers adopted different grand strategies. As this study shows, such an integrated approach makes sense and bears fruit for the analysis of both grand strategy in particular and international relations more generally.

To be clear, the emphasis here is on explaining grand strategy with geopolitics, not theorizing about other levels of analysis or other phenomena, nor simply offering a descriptive narrative of the American historical experience with national security doctrines. My principal purpose is to advance thinking about both geopolitics and grand strategy, with a particular focus on exploring the connections between these two important variables, especially as they concern doctrinal formulation. More specifically, there are three separate, yet interrelated purposes of this analysis: (1) to conduct a plausibility probe to ascertain the utility of continuing to study geopolitics as a level of analysis in international relations; (2) to test specific geopolitical hypotheses.

² See, for example, the collection of essays in the Symposium on History and Theory published in *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), especially the following: Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries"; Jack Levy, "Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations"; Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Brothers Under the Skin: History and International Relations"; Paul Schroeder, "History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit"; and John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground."

observable implications of theory, derived in the different dimensions of grand strategy: and (3) to generate more hypotheses, especially concerning geopolitics and grand strategy, that could be tested in subsequent studies. Like the fields from which they are derived, these purposes complement one another and can be accomplished following the methodological principles and practices described below. In addition to establishing the principles and methods that guide my research and analysis, this chapter also includes a brief description of the historical cases I examine and concludes with a list of criteria for falsification, those findings that might lead us to reject or modify my geopolitical theory and hypotheses. Before getting ahead of ourselves, let us start with a basic discussion of methodology.

Methodological Assumptions

It must be recognized from the outset that the selection and evaluation of research methods, as with theories and levels-of-analysis, are a matter not of absolutes but of relative applicability and effectiveness. Every research method has its own strengths and weaknesses. All face hurdles with reliability and validity. The applicability and effectiveness of different methods are contingent upon both the nature of the topic and the purpose of the study. In short, no one particular method is most fruitful for all types of political analysis. Instead, as Almond and Genco point out: "in 'good' science, methods are fit to the subject matter rather than the subject matter being truncated or distorted in order to fit it to a preordained notion of 'scientific method.'"³ An analysis of why developing states are relatively weak, for example, will not require the same method as an analysis of the attitudes of the Turkish peasantry. The former may be best accomplished using case studies as Joel Migdal does,⁴ the latter survey research as Fred Frey did.⁵ The point is that "one must choose an approach that is appropriate to the subject matter."⁶ As Robert Jackman clearly states: "None of this

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen Genco, "Clocks, Clouds, and the Study of Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Sage, 1990), p. 50.

⁴ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State-Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁵ Frederick W. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (Fall 1963). For more on the methodology, see Frey, "Cross-Cultural Survey Research in Political Science," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (Free Press, 1970).

⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 13.

suggests that one procedure is inherently preferable to the other – instead, the choice depends on the substantive problem at hand."⁷

At present, case studies are probably the most widely used and fruitful approach of the many available for political analysis.⁸ Experimentation is simply too difficult and costly, establishing effective control all but impossible. Survey research and content analysis also are potentially useful but face limitations and validity challenges.

Unobtrusive measures and direct observation are other alternatives and can be effective; but, these can be subsumed within the case-study framework, as can statistical analysis.

While not always applicable, and while facing serious difficulties of definition,

operationalization, measurement, and evaluation, statistical analysis can and should be

used (where appropriate) to support these other methods. Contrary to what some

political scientists might think, these methods are not mutually exclusive, but

⁷ Robert W. Jackman, "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1985), p. 175.

⁸ Harry Eckstein argues that case studies are the most useful method and are "valuable at all stages of theory building" (p.119) – in Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (University of California, 1992). Arend Lijphart seems to agree and offers a similar typology in "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *APSR*, Vol. 65 (September 1971) and "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July 1975). Fred Frey suggests that there are, generally speaking, four types of case studies: (1) non-scientific (Eckstein's "configurative-idiographic" and Lijphart's "atheoretical"); (2) applied (Eckstein's "disciplined-configurative" and Lijphart's "interpretative"); (3) hypothesis-generating (Eckstein's "heuristic"); and (4) hypothesis-testing (including Eckstein's "plausibility probe" and "crucial case" and Lijphart's "theory-confirming," "theory-infirmiting," and "deviant"). The last two are clearly the most important for building theory and advancing science, and will be employed herein. As discussed below, case studies, like other methods, also have their limits, which should be explicitly recognized and addressed – most importantly, by using multiple methods and comparative analysis.

fundamentally compatible and "genuinely complementary."⁹ Because of this, as well as because of the fundamental problems of reliability and validity that plague all research methods, the most effective approach will necessarily involve a variety of methods in a quest for convergent and discriminate validation. In other words, not only can the employment of different methods help overcome the shortcomings of individual methods, but it also can help validate theory by offering more substantive proof of the relationship between variables if all indicators point in the same direction and by increasing the probability that only the specific variable being examined is being measured. Simply stated, rather than limiting their options, analysts should use all means available. As Landau puts it: "If there are methods that allow us to gain a systematic knowledge of the field under scrutiny, it is a self-defeating strategy not to use them."¹⁰ This holds for all scientific research, not just for political science or this study. Moreover, given the assumption so aptly expressed by Karl Deutsch that "truth lies at the convergence of independent streams of evidence,"¹¹ a multi-method approach provides the most fruitful basis of political analysis.

⁹ Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (Free Press, 1979) p. 61. Jackman makes the same point in "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics." Even Lijphart admits that "there is no clear dividing line" (p. 684) between the two, that they are in fact two aspects of the same type of "comparative method" distinguished primarily by the number of cases analyzed. See Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."

¹⁰ Martin Landau, *Political Science and Political Theory: Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry* (MacMillan, 1972), p. 8.

¹¹ Cited in Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 12.

Strategy for Testing Hypotheses and Selecting Cases

On what basis, then, should this particular inquiry proceed? What is the best way to probe the plausibility of geopolitics, to test my hypotheses, and to explore the connections between geopolitics and grand strategy? The most promising tact employs “process-tracing”¹² and integrates multiple research methods into a “structured, focused comparison” along the lines suggested by Alexander George and others.¹³ By systematically examining the causes of different types of grand strategies in their specific historical contexts, applying the same set of standardized concepts and questions across cases, one should start to gain an appreciation for the causal role played by geopolitics and its profound influence on grand strategy and national security.¹⁴

¹² Generally speaking, this involves working backwards along the causal chain from the dependent variable through the intervening variables to the independent variables. In the current context, this could allow examination of causes and consequences alike. For more on this approach, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Vol. 2 (1985).

¹³ The essence of this method is to combine history and political science, descriptive richness and theoretical rigor. “To this end,” as George explains, “some features of the historian’s methodology for intensive, detailed explanation of a single case are combined with aspects of the political scientist’s conceptions of the requirements for theory and his procedures for scientific investigation.” In Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (Free Press, 1979), p. 61.

¹⁴ One of the potential advantages of this approach is the room it affords for comparative analysis of different causal factors. If not geopolitics, then what were policy-makers considering? What other factors determined or shaped outcomes? By tracing the process of policy formation and implementation, not only can individual factors be assessed, but their interrelationship and evolution over time also can be analyzed, providing a potentially more sophisticated and nuanced interpretation of the causes and consequences of grand strategy.

The methodological principles guiding this approach and our selection of cases are reasonably straightforward.¹⁵ First, other factors should be held as constant as possible. Ideally, we should vary only the independent variable – the geopolitical foundation, operationalized as interaction capacity – while holding other factors constant and examine the change in the dependent variable – the grand strategies adopted, operationalized as pronounced foreign policy doctrines. The international structure lends itself reasonably well to this demand: the ordering principle remains essentially anarchic.¹⁶ Holding the distribution of capabilities constant is more challenging, particularly in the face of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of other states, especially China; nevertheless, by focusing on great power relations with other great powers an essential equivalence of capabilities can be assumed and relative

¹⁵ They also derive largely from Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994). For critiques of this book and the authors' response, see *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (June 1995), especially the following articles: James A. Caporaso, "Research Design, Falsification, and the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide"; David Collier, "Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers"; and Sidney Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science."

¹⁶ The environment still is essentially one of "self-help," with no capable, higher authority to which states can turn to resolve their disputes, regardless of their interpretative tendencies. Waltz and other Neorealists continue to make this point convincingly in the face of on-going criticism. For an example of the type of constructivist criticism this view has faced, see Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46 (1992). For an example of Waltz's position, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Relations," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993).

power differentials assumed away.¹⁷ In terms of domestic features, or unit-level characteristics, the best way to hold these constant is by examining a single state. If the same state pursues different grand strategies, then other factors must be operating: a relative constant – international or domestic, normative or structural – cannot explain variation. While this risks limiting the applicability of our conclusions to a single state, the advantage of being able to discount variation in grand strategies because of relative constancy in domestic features outweighs this potential limitation.¹⁸ While additional

¹⁷ So, too, can functional (un)differentiation, the third element of Waltz's definition of "structure," be essentially assumed away. While the specific "balance of power" among states might not be entirely equal, most neorealists suggest that this is a unit-level characteristic. Far more important for structural analysis is the number of actors whose relations generate the structure – the number of "great powers." Just as all states can be assumed to be functionally similar, so, too, can all "great powers" be assumed to be of roughly equal power. If the international structure has remained essentially the same, then it cannot explain the variation in American national security policies toward other great powers described below. While it is possible to argue that the distribution of capabilities has varied over the last two centuries, from multipolarity in the nineteenth to bipolarity in the twentieth, neorealism still faces the problem of explaining variation in our two more recent cases, both of which ostensibly took place under bipolarity, as least as defined by Waltz. More compelling might be the argument that the current structure is now unipolar, which generates a different set of pressures and constraints on states. Even then, as I discuss at greater length in Chapters 6 and 7, neorealism faces a fundamental limitation in explaining two of the three cases – Monroe and Clinton – as neither hiding nor binding occupy a significant place in most realist or neorealist literature. For an exception to this rule, see Daniel Deudney, "Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts," *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000). For more on Waltz's definition of structure, see *Theory of International Politics*, especially Chapter 5; "The Emerging Structure of International Relations," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); and "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000).

¹⁸ The three primary sets of domestic features this approach holds constant are (1) regime type, (2) political culture, and (3) ideology – unless, of course, there is some type of fundamental metamorphosis. While all of these features are likely to experience some change and evolve over time, only bureaucratic and personal politics are likely to vary profoundly from one era to the next. Given our pursuit of nomothetic (not idiographic) explanations, it makes more sense to try to hold the former factors constant and not be overly concerned with some variation in the latter. For more on this distinction and the importance of seeking general laws, see Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (Wiley-Interscience, 1970).

studies of other countries would remedy this deficiency,¹⁹ a manageable first cut necessitates a limited sample. The method proposed here is not to test the hypotheses against the universe of possible cases (i.e., all of the actual grand strategies adopted by great powers over history), nor even against a representative sample of this universe, but, instead, to select interesting, informative, and useful studies according to the principles stated above.

What cases, then, should be examined? The historical experience of the United States offers a promising testing ground for this type of study. First, in terms of the independent variable, its interaction capacity with and material separation from other great powers has changed fundamentally over the last two centuries, clearly progressing from weak and isolated in the nineteenth century, to moderate and proximate in the early part of the twentieth century, to strong and close over the last fifty years.²⁰ So, too, has the dependent variable changed, with American grand strategies evolving over

¹⁹ They could be conducted along the same theoretical and methodological lines and investigate other great powers. Not only would such comparative research buttress our scientific findings, but it could also provide critical insights as to how other great powers will pursue their security and how they might be addressed most efficaciously. The first step, however, is more exploratory – determining if geopolitics matters, how much, and in what way. In this respect, as noted above, the current study will serve as a heuristic, generating useful questions and alternative hypotheses as well as exploring the relationship between geopolitics and grand strategy.

²⁰ While we may be close, we have not yet experienced intense interaction capacity, at least as I define it (both in Chapter 2 and below). While technological revolutions in communication and destruction have radically increased interaction capacity, transportation lags behind. Certainly tremendous advances have occurred, but global travel still requires hours, if not days, and sometimes weeks. In short, geography and distance still matter; even with rockets, proximity is close, not immediate. Thus, while Deudney's emphasis on violent interactive capacity may be properly classified as intense, the aggregate measure I employ places current interaction capacity as strong and growing, but with notable variation across actors. See his most recent discussion of the topic, see Deudney, "Regrounding Realism." This is one area where our work diverges. The other, more substantive departure concerns our respective foci: Deudney is primarily concerned with the functional influence of the material world – what the Sprouts term the "operational milieu" – while my principal concern, at least in this study, is the causal role of the "psycho-milieu" – policy-makers' perceptions of the material world and the relationship between those perceptions and their grand strategic preferences.

the same time frame.²¹ Initially, the U.S. sought to avoid entanglements with the “old world” and practiced a strategy of hiding vis-à-vis the European great powers, as codified in the Monroe Doctrine.²² After World War II, the United States adopted more of a balancing strategy vis-à-vis its primary rival, the Soviet Union, with the policy of containment, particularly as articulated by the Truman Doctrine and related statements.²³ Most recently, the Clinton administration offered its own doctrine of

²¹ As discussed below, the United States has practiced three types of grand strategy – hiding, balancing, and binding – which appear to correlate with the different geopolitical foundations – as hypothesized. While attempting to control for other contending explanations, I recognize the limits of such efforts and therefore purposefully select cases that with apparent co-variation between the independent and dependent variables. Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that such selection on the basis of both the dependent and independent variables makes sense when studying causation in “complex ecological political systems” because “the subject matter is extraordinarily complex: the systems under study are characterized by an immense number of unknown variables and unknown causal connections among these variables; by interactions, feedbacks, and nonlinear relationships; and by high sensitivity to small perturbations. Such complexities and uncertainties make it virtually impossible to choose cases that control for potentially confounding variables.” In this study, such selection allows me to focus more expressly on the causal linkages between variables, particularly between the geopolitical foundation and articulated presidential doctrines. For more on Homer-Dixon’s argument, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex Ecological Systems* (American Association for the Advancement of Science and University of Toronto, 1995), pp. 1-2.

²² While the causes of this strategy still are debated, most analysts and historians agree that the U.S. did, in fact, practice such a policy (involving neutralism, unilateralism, and non-intervention), at least vis-à-vis its European rivals. See, for example, Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., “The Monroe Doctrine: Palladium of American Foreign Policy,” Ch. 1 in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 13 (Spring 1993); Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, Second Edition (Prentice Hall, 1965); Thomas G. Paterson, et al., *American Foreign Policy: A History / To 1914*, Third Edition (D. C. Heath and Co., 1988); and Bradford Perkins, *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1176-1865*, Vol. 1, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1993). For more on the Monroe Doctrine per se, see Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (Peter Smith, 1965[1927]); Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Harvard University Press, 1975); Henry Ammon, *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity* (McGraw-Hill, 1971); and Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

²³ The best account of this strategy and its evolution remains, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford University, 1982). Also useful are Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., “The Truman Doctrine: Cold War and the Containment Strategy,” Ch. 3 in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*; Richard Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1977); Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (Oxford University Press, 1989); and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford University Press, 1992).

“Engagement and Enlargement” and advocated more of a binding strategy toward the other great powers, including Russia.²⁴

As discussed in detail in the chapters below, these three doctrines – Monroe, Truman, and Clinton – and their associated policy statements articulate three clearly different approaches to national security and offer some of the best examples of “grand strategy” in the American historical experience.²⁵ By tracing the causal process

For the original statement, see Truman’s speech, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” Message of the President to Congress (March 12, 1947), Reprinted in *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947). Some of the numerous related statements include George Kennan’s works, the Marshall Plan, and NSC-68 – all of which will be analyzed in depth below.

²⁴ For the initial statement of this policy, see Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Address at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, September 21, 1993), Reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39. President Clinton followed up this speech with the statement most directly associated with and responsible for this particular doctrine: “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,” Address to the UN General Assembly (New York City, September 27, 1993). Two additional speeches were offered that same week by Warren Christopher and Madeline Albright as the Clinton administration attempted, for the first time, to articulate its foreign policy vision. This approach eventually was officially codified in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (The White House, February 1995) and subsequent policy statements. For more on this line of thinking, see Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997).

²⁵ One additional type of grand strategy that the U.S. can be argued to have adopted is dominating or assimilating with “Manifest Destiny,” as well as perhaps with the new “Bush Doctrine.” This former case falls short, however, of the standard for dealing with “great powers” per se; neither the Native American nor Mexican “threats” were posed by “essentially equivalent” powers. Faced with a weaker adversary, the U.S. could afford to practice hegemonic expansionism.

More interesting is the latter possibility – the Bush Doctrine of preempting, preponderating, and prevailing. For the complete and official statement, see *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington: The White House, September 2002). This document pulls together various strands of thought and policy offered by the administration in several prominent previous statements. Among the most important are the following: President Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001; President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001; President Bush, Remarks on War Effort, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, December 11, 2001; President Bush, State of the Union Address, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002; President Bush, Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, June 1, 2002; and President Bush, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 12, 2002 – all of which are available at www.whitehouse.gov. The report was followed up in December with the release of a separate document detailing the administration’s counter-proliferation strategy: *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington: The White House, December 2002).

For a positive commentary, see John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 133 (November/December 2002). For a more critical review, see “America’s Imperial Ambition,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002). As noted in the conclusion, this new Bush doctrine represents a potentially useful case for further research.

backwards, from doctrinal articulation through immediate and proximate causes to underlying causes, we should discover, if my geopolitical hypotheses hold, differing but corresponding material foundations and mental maps: weak interaction capacity and imagined distance in Monroe's era; moderate interaction capacity and imagined connectedness in Truman's era; and strong interaction capacity and imagined closeness in Clinton's era. By disaggregating these grand strategies into their constituent elements (motivational, cognitive, and operational) and their different dimensions (military, political, and economic), I increase significantly the number of observations (N) offered by this selected sample.²⁶

Regardless of the number of confirmatory observations, however, more than correlations are required to demonstrate causation. Specific references to geopolitical factors and perceptions of connectedness should be evident in the historical record and these should be linked – ideally, explicitly, but at least implicitly – to the strategic preferences expressed in these different Presidential doctrines. In this sense, with co-variation apparent, these three cases are not designed to be tough tests for geopolitics. On the contrary, they were purposefully selected because they represent what Eckstein refers to as “crucial cases” – more specifically, “most likely” cases – as geopolitical explanations must hold here if they are to hold anywhere.²⁷ The primary objective of using such cases is to probe plausibility and assess absolute, more than relative.

²⁶ Here, I follow the example of Ian Lustick, who has suggested increasing the N by considering different “historiographies” as additional cases. See Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996). In terms of Lustick's specific suggestion concerning the use of historiography, however, I tend to adopt his “explicit triage” approach, noting differing interpretations and alternative arguments where appropriate and explaining why I have chosen not to embrace them.

²⁷ For more on these different types of case studies, see Eckstein, *Regarding Politics*, pp. 152-163.

explanatory power and theoretical utility. In other words, my aim, in this first cut, is to obtain a seat at the table for geopolitics when the discussion turns to grand strategy, not necessarily to displace other factors.²⁸

To test my formative geopolitical hypotheses and apply process-tracing in a structured, focused comparison of these three “most likely” cases, I take three separate analytical steps: first, I analyze the independent variable – geopolitics, operationalized as interaction capacity; second, I analyze the dependent variable – grand strategy, operationalized as an articulated Presidential doctrine; third, I analyze the connections between these two variables, particularly mental maps and perceptions of closeness – or, “imagined distance” – that may have encouraged American foreign policy decision-makers to adopt one type of strategy instead of another.²⁹ To test the operational hypotheses, I also follow three steps: first, I analyze the strategy’s level of landscape fitness, defined by its correspondence to the prevailing level of interaction capacity; second, I assess operational effectiveness, or strategic functionality, defined primarily by the absence of security crashes; and third, I consider, in general terms, the relationship between these two variables. For each step on each level of this process, multiple research and analytical methods should be employed – including comparative

²⁸ As Homer-Dixon notes, such relative weighting is particularly challenging when analyzing complex systems and is perhaps a misplaced objective: “Researchers must be aware of the multivariate and highly interactive nature of ecological-political systems; these characteristics often render moot questions about the weighting, or relative strength, of specific causal variables.” Homer-Dixon, *Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex Ecological Systems*, p. 10. While focusing on the absolute utility of geopolitics, I nevertheless attempt to highlight its relative role by selecting a set of cases that other contending theories have trouble explaining, including a single case (the Clinton Doctrine) that possesses internal variation that also poses challenges for explanations of change based on a relative constant.

²⁹ In these last two steps, I focus largely on the foreign policy decision-making process, examining in detail what the decision-makers were thinking and doing, and why. The approach taken is based, at least in part, on the work of Richard Snyder, et al., with less emphasis on organizational dynamics. For more on this approach, see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Free Press, 1962).

analysis among methods -- in the quest for convergent and discriminate validation. Let us examine each of these steps and the associated methods and processes that guide my research and analysis, as well as serve as the structure of the empirical chapters to follow.

Analyzing Geopolitics and Interaction Capacity

The first step in my analytical process is to examine and assess the independent variable – geopolitics. More specifically, I describe and categorize the level of interaction capacity at the time a particular grand strategy was crafted (or, doctrine pronounced). As defined in Chapter 2, this notion of interaction capacity serves as an aggregated proxy and is based on an assessment of three basic types of technology – communication, transportation, and destruction – and plotted along two axes: density and proximity. Varying combinations of density and proximity yield different levels of interaction capacity ranging from weak to moderate to strong and degrees of material separation ranging from remote to distant to close. Two principal methods, as well as comparative analysis, stand out as the most useful to ascertain these levels: unobtrusive observation and statistical analysis.³⁰

Properly targeted, both unobtrusive observation and statistical analysis can provide abundant information about the geopolitical context and “connectedness” of a particular state. One should start by assessing the geography of the state, particularly its size, location, topography, and borders, as well as perhaps climate and natural resources. A base assessment of population also can be helpful, particularly for

³⁰ Unobtrusive observation involves analysis with minimal reactive or serial effects (e.g., role selection or projection, sensitization, crystallization, etc.) – in simple terms, looking without intruding. For more on these, as well as general discussion about many of the challenges involved with empirical research, see Eugene Webb, et al., *Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences* (Rand McNally, 1966).

The type of statistical analysis suggested here, and below, arises primarily from the need to obtain objective measures of certain geographic and technological features, not to conduct sophisticated correlational analysis between variables. For the most part, the research and analytic methods employed for this study are more qualitative than quantitative. But, as King, et al., point out, both approaches are driven by the same underlying logic of scientific inference. See King, et al., *Designing Social Inquiry*.

measurements of density. Similar information should be gathered for other states, particularly the rival great powers. Most significant is the relative distances from other states, as well as any geographic and topographic obstacles between them.

As fundamental as it may be, this geographic (and demographic) context is modified by the existing levels of technology. So, the second step is to assess the level of technological development in the three critical areas of transportation, communication, and destruction, not only of the United States but of its primary rivals and potential threats. Most significant here are the types of weapons available and their means for delivery. Also noteworthy are the means available for communication and transportation between states and within them. In this regard, direct observation can and should be complemented with statistical evidence, particularly objective measurements of density and proximity, as defined in Chapter 2.

More specifically, I categorize the level of interaction capacity and the degree of connectedness between the United States and its rival great powers. As discussed above, this involves an assessment of both proximity and density and the charting of their intersection. Proximity, defined as a ratio of velocity to distance, can be categorized along a four-tier scale according to the time it takes to travel:³¹ (1) remote, measured in terms of months or years (at least over one month); (2) distant, measured in terms of days to weeks (between one week and one month); (3) close, measured in terms of hours to days (between one day and one week); and (4) immediate, measured

³¹ Regardless of whether we are talking about ideas, currency, goods, people, or weapons, the scale is essentially the same. If, however, technological development is uneven across these areas (as is typically the case), then the destructive dimension should take priority (especially in the security realm) over the non-destructive elements and be weighted more heavily in the combined assessment that generates the graph.

in terms of seconds, minutes, and hours (under one day). Density, on the other hand, represents a ratio of mass to volume, either geographically according to area or demographically according to population.³² It can be conceived along a four-tier scale according to the percent of coverage: (1) low, 0-25 percent; (2) medium, 25-50 percent; (3) high, 50-75 percent; and (4) extreme, 75-100 percent.³³ Bringing these two sets of measures together yields the four-by-four matrix of interaction capacity (illustrated in Figure 2B) and the corresponding levels of “material separation.”³⁴

Throughout this analytical process, widely accepted and readily available scientific measures of these geographic and technological features should, wherever possible, accompany more subjective and less reliable first- or second-hand

³² Here, as with proximity, there can be a range of levels as not all technologies advance at the same pace. Again, where differences arise between technologies, destructive potential should be the primary determinant of placement given our assumptions about states being rational security seekers. If differences arise between the geographic and demographic values, the latter should be more heavily weighted as rational decision-makers are more likely to be concerned about the destruction of population than of territory per se.

³³ A relatively simple way to measure destructive density, for example, is to divide the number of people in a target state into the total number of tons (or megatons) of explosives possessed by a potentially threatening state. For my purposes, the United States fills the roll of the former and other, rival great powers the role of the latter. The same kind of calculations can be made for communication (in terms of coverage per area or population) and transportation (measured by mile-tons per area or population).

Unfortunately, only communication lends itself directly to the “percent coverage” measure. For the other two dimensions, some conversions will be necessary. More specifically, for the most important destructive realm, I am concerned with the mass of deliverable destructive capacity, especially as it pertains to potential human deaths. In other words, we need to consider population density (at least in some qualitative capacity) as we move from our ratio of destructive mass to people to a figure that captures the percent of the population that could be killed by the deliverable destructive capacity of another state.

³⁴ The term itself, “material separation,” comes from Deudney. It can be most readily conceived along the same terms as proximity – namely, remote, distant, close, and immediate. As noted above, for the purpose of decision-making and the psycho-milieu (as opposed to the functionality of a particular policy in the operational milieu), however, it makes more sense to talk about “imagined distance” or “perceived connectedness” instead of actual degrees of material separation. Nevertheless, an objective assessment of the landscape itself should provide a useful comparative base and insights as to how decision-makers viewed it and how closely their perceptions (as reflected in their language) actually capture “reality.”

observations.³⁵ The idea here, as elsewhere, is to balance the respective strengths and weaknesses of the different methodologies in order to optimize validity and reliability. The same principle holds for the second analytical step – the identification, definition, description, and categorization of a particular doctrine as a type of grand strategy.

³⁵ The country data published by the World Bank, for example, is an easy starting point for both territorial and demographic figures, as well as for information about communication and transportation technologies. See, for example, *World Development Report: Knowledge for Development* (Oxford University Press, 1999), especially Tables 1 (Size of the Economy), 3 (Population and Labor Force), 8 (Land Use and Agricultural Productivity), 18 (Power and Transportation), and 19 (Communications, Information, and Science and Technology). For a compilation of some relevant data concerning the level of interaction capacity during the three different historical eras examined below, see Appendix 2.

Analyzing Grand Strategies and Security Doctrines

In attempting to analyze a country's grand strategy, the researcher will immediately be confronted with two difficulties: its psychological essence and its dynamic, multi-dimensional nature. Gathering data on the first two components of a country's grand strategy – how policy-makers view their state's interests and objectives and how they assess threats and dangers – is no easy task; this information exists largely in the minds of policy-makers and is neither readily accessible nor simple to analyze. Validity and reliability problems abound. While the determination of the third component of a grand strategy – means selected and employed – is considerably more manageable and reliable, validity becomes more questionable. Moreover, the utility of any static assessment is limited by the fact that this information is constantly evolving as policy-makers adjust their views to changes in the world around them. Beyond all of these research problems, lie serious obstacles to reliable and valid analysis. Like analyzing a work of art, or really only an image of it in the artist's head, grand strategy analysis can be highly subjective and wrought with bias, and could even be considered an art form in itself.

Nevertheless, a systematic, multi-method approach guided by a clear and precise research design and grounded on a solid theoretical base may help to minimize these problems and increase the validity, reliability, and utility of the analysis. The approach offered here has three basic elements: (1) content and discursive analysis of documents.

statements, and other recorded communication;³⁶ (2) unobtrusive behavioral analysis, particularly in terms of military, politico-diplomatic, and economic activity; and (3) a comparative analysis of the first two.³⁷ Each of the first two research methods has its respective strengths and weaknesses, especially considering the multi-dimensional nature of the topic. In most instances, the general objective is to determine a country's grand strategy by both what is said and what is done.³⁸ To this end, the content analysis will focus primarily on the motivational and cognitive elements of a grand strategy, and

³⁶ While the terms are largely interchangeable, these two forms of analysis – content and discursive – can be distinguished on the basis of methods and data – with the former more quantifiable and finite, the latter more qualitative and expansive. Both can, should, and do often employ quantitative and qualitative analysis of a sample that is appropriate for the subject under investigation. Both seek to understand actors and their behavior by analyzing what is said and unsaid; what is stated, written, or suggested; what is meant or intended; and what all this reveals.

³⁷ This method was initially elaborated in A. C. Harth, “A Method of Grand Strategy Analysis” (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1993), and first applied in my analysis of the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan’s post-World War II foreign policy of drafting the United States, in A. C. Harth, “Japan’s Grand Strategy: A Sensible and Effective Approach to National Security” (Masters Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1994). I offer an elaborate description of this method here to provide the reader with a more complete picture of the process of researching grand strategies (as opposed to how I present the evidence in the empirical chapters below) and to help advance the field methodologically.

While this study relies upon these three methods for analyzing grand strategies, it also is important to note the potential utility of survey research and interviews, of obtaining information directly from the policy-makers. But, because survey research and interviews are impossible for the first two cases, this study relies upon content and discursive analysis of comparable documents across all three cases, supplemented with behavioral and statistical analysis where possible and appropriate. While survey research might offer richer information, it is available for only one case, and even then with numerous caveats and qualifications, concerning both validity and reliability. Instead of struggling to apply different methods unevenly in different cases, I prefer to concentrate on using the same framework and tools to analyze all three cases. An abundance of readily available textual evidence exists for each case. It needs only to be investigated systematically. Of course, some comparative analysis will be necessary, regardless of other methods employed, if only to reconcile potential divergences in the content analysis. To the extent that other methods are employed, the results generated therewith should jibe with the primary findings drawn from the content analysis.

³⁸ As discussed below, this multi-step process can be applied to any country or case and is designed primarily to determine what type of grand strategy a state is practicing. This is particularly true of the behavioral analysis – which serves as a clear check on the more easily manipulated and less reliable oral and written evidence available through interviews and content analysis. Our focus, however, on a particular stated doctrine – more on what an administration said, not on what it did – will simplify our analytical task by concretizing the nebulous notion of grand strategy and by modifying slightly the application of these methods. More specifically, content analysis comes to fore with the emphasis on articulated doctrines, to be supplemented where possible and appropriate by interviews and to a lesser extent, by unobtrusive observation and statistical analysis.

the unobtrusive behavioral analysis on the operational. Potential problems of role selection and projection, as well as other potential sources of bias, in the public statements and official documents can be countered to some extent by the behavioral analysis and by sound comparative analysis. Two basic data problems must be confronted at every stage of research: (1) most of the data is provided by governments and is, therefore, likely to be less than entirely accurate; (2) most of the data is qualitative, making coding, compilation, comparison, and analysis more problematic and less reliable. Similarly, for any cross-national comparisons, the problem of equivalence must be addressed and adjustments made to account for cultural differences and to ensure internal validity.

Underlying this analytical approach is the belief that actions speak at least as loudly as words – given the nature and the stakes of the game of international relations, it would be imprudent to judge a state's grand strategy solely by what its policy-makers profess. Thus, an additional objective of employing a multi-method approach is to establish convergent and discriminate validation – these different measurements should all point in the same direction. Similarly, within each of these methods, a general rule should be – the more information and the more sources, the better. By casting a wider net, one often lands a larger catch. While some data may be biased or difficult to obtain and while it is important not to become overwhelmed with data, the overall validity of this approach is related directly to the amount of information gathered. Let us now examine the different elements in more detail.

The most accessible and reliable way to gather information about a country's grand strategy is to conduct content analysis of official statements, documents, treaties, speeches, reports, and other forms of recorded communication concerning the country's security policies.³⁹ The focus here is on what policy-makers have said about their state's grand strategy – i.e., national interests and objectives, threats posed and dangers present, and the type of policies pursued and means adopted. Ideally, both qualitative and quantitative techniques should be employed to determine the intrinsic meaning of the content (both stated and implied) and to draw inferences about the policy-makers (especially in terms of motivation and cognition) and even about the state's likely behavior: the qualitative analysis will provide rich data while the more objective quantitative analysis can validate qualitative conclusions in a reliable way. For most countries (especially the larger, "great powers"), there should be no problems of accessibility; in fact, an abundance of information is likely to exist. In general, content analysis offers a manageable, replicable, and unobtrusive method of obtaining first-hand information about a state's grand strategy.

But, it is not as simple as it may appear. The researcher immediately confronts a sampling problem. With such a wealth of information, there is considerable room for

³⁹ My approach to content analysis derives from a number of sources, including conversations with and suggestions by Fred Frey. Among the most important published sources are Alexander George, "Prediction of Political Action by Means of Propaganda Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (1956) and "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel Pool, ed., *Trends in Content Analysis* (University of Illinois Press, 1959); Ole Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Addison-Wesley, 1969); Robert C. North, et al., *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Northwestern University Press, 1963); Robert Philip Weber, *Basic Content Analysis* (Sage Publications, 1990); Stanley D. Brunn, "The Worldviews of Small States: A Content Analysis of 1995 UN Speeches," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1999); and Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Cornell University Press, 2002).

bias in the selection of materials to analyze. How many documents should be examined? What type of documents should be examined, and from what fields should they come? Should only official government statements be used, or can bureaucratic reports and articles written by former officials be included? What kind of a time frame is appropriate – how many years backward or forward does one go?

Problems of equivalence dictate a flexible sampling scheme that can be varied by country (reliability here is sacrificed for validity). In general, a purposive sample of the central government's official statements and policy papers on security affairs seems to be a logical starting point. Speeches, articles, and other statements made by top policy-makers on security affairs should be included in this purposive sample. The more extensive the information available, the more attractive some type of stratified random sample of the different types of information (i.e., military, politico-diplomatic, and economic) becomes. This necessitates establishing sample frames and making decisions as to what to include – this is unavoidable. Reliability problems can be minimized, however, by following the same general sample guidelines for each case or country. Again, over-sampling is preferred to under-sampling.

In terms of actually gathering and recording the data, both qualitative and quantitative methods have their strengths and weaknesses. While the qualitative analysis can provide richer data, it is also much more subjective and impressionistic. In particular, the researcher's bias can often lead to the problem of circularity, searching for support for the hypothesis until it is found. Moreover, the process of drawing inferences about policy-makers' motivation and cognition and trying to predict a state's

behavior from such a qualitative analysis is quite unreliable and can be considered more of an art than a science. In contrast, quantitative techniques have less subjectivity and bias and are more reliable and scientific. However, the lack of sensitivity may diminish quantitative validity as important points that are only implied or made by their absence (in terms of not stating something that otherwise would or should have been stated) can be easily missed. Individually, both techniques face serious coding problems: qualitative in terms of subjectivity and reliability, quantitative in terms of establishing applicable categories that promote validity. When the methods are employed together, as suggested here, the strengths of one compensate for the weaknesses of the other and both validity and reliability increase.

Beyond potential sampling and coding challenges, there are validity and reliability problems associated with the sources themselves. Sources must be noted and the author, date, context, purpose, etc., all factored into the analysis. Policy-makers will often cater their message to circumstance; a whole host of pressures, needs, and situations (i.e., domestic political, financial, ideological, international, etc.) can dramatically alter the content of communication from the same source at different times and in different conditions, to say nothing of different sources at different times in different conditions. Thus, a Boris Yeltsin speech seeking economic assistance from the U.S. given in Washington is not likely to have the same content as a speech in front of a hostile Russian Congress when he was fighting for his political life. Similarly, an American President up for re-election would be likely to present a different message to a national Jewish organization than he would to an Arab audience in Saudi Arabia in the

midst of an oil crisis. A defense official conferring with a close ally in a time of international crisis facing a hostile adversary seemingly bent on war is unlikely to issue the same sort of communiqué as a trade representative in that "adversary's" capital in a time of detente. One way to combat this variation and increase both validity and reliability is to analyze as many different sources as possible, focusing on the common conceptual elements and shared set of assumptions that guide a grand strategy. An additional way is to apply yet another method.

Thus far, this approach has focused exclusively on what policy-makers say is their grand strategy. As interesting and useful as this may be (particularly for the study at hand), by themselves these data are limited not only by the reliability and validity of the methods employed but by their nature and source – namely, words professed by policy-makers. To question the validity and reliability of this information is the only prudent approach to a topic in a field where deception and misinformation are probably more the rule than the exception. Moreover, given the high stakes involved, it only makes sense to attempt to validate the statements made and views ascertained in the two other methods by analyzing a state's behavior. Analyzing a variable like governmental budgetary allocations, for example, will demonstrate if a state is "putting its money where its mouth is." Thus, an unobtrusive analysis of a state's resources and policies, its possessions and practices, with the object of convergent and discriminate validation is the third step in this multi-method approach.

If the motivational and cognitive components of a grand strategy are best obtained through content analysis, the operational element seems to be most readily

identifiable through an unobtrusive behavioral analysis. Considering the relative transparency of activity compared to thoughts and rhetoric (it is more difficult, for instance, to hide an aircraft carrier than to disguise aggressive intentions), validity here should be less of a problem than reliability. As with any method, the key to ensuring reliability here is to follow a clear, precise, and replicable procedure. But, with all of the information available about a state's "behavior," the researcher will, here too, be confronted with a sampling problem and potential bias in making selections. What behavior should be included, and what left out? What type of comparisons will be made? And what time frame is appropriate?

In general, focusing on the three primary means employed by states – military, politico-diplomatic, and economic – is a sound starting place. These three fields can then be broken down into more specific categories: e.g., military – expenditures, personnel, procurement, posture, deployment, supplies, training, and exercises; politico-diplomatic – relations, alliances, organizations, and engagement; and economic – budget, trade, aid, investment, and dependency. In the model approach I have developed elsewhere, these seventeen categories can be broken down further to produce even more indices.⁴⁰ Some of these variables are more quantitative than others (i.e., military expenditures as percent of government expenditures over time versus the accomplishments of official state visits) and some more susceptible to indexing and scaling (both of which should be applied wherever possible to facilitate analysis). By examining and analyzing such a multitude of variables both over time and in

⁴⁰ See A. C. Harth, "A Method of Grand Strategy Analysis."

comparison to other countries (neighbors, rivals, and allies alike), a valid assessment of the state's behavior can be developed.

Beyond questions about sampling, this method has other potential pitfalls. Problems associated with coding, indexing, and scaling the information all need to be addressed. Moreover, as abundant and clear as the data may appear, the overall validity of this method still is limited by the validity and reliability of the available data. Most of the information, even when published by the most reputable sources, still is based primarily on governmental data – thus, presenting the same problems of biased information (in terms of role selection and projection) encountered in the content analysis. The advantage here, as noted above, is that even while governments can still hedge published data and statistics, they do not enjoy the same degree of latitude in their conduct. Many behavioral variables can be measured unobtrusively (i.e., without the government's involvement and without it affecting the data) including visits by foreign dignitaries, military purchases, economic transactions, deployment of armed forces, alliance membership, etc. The employment of the sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment available today could greatly enhance this capacity.

In the absence of such "high-tech tools," the best way to increase the validity and reliability of the data is to gather more of it and to use as many sources as possible. Also, if possible, more than one person should conduct the research. Cross referencing statistics, considering sources, and, in general, aggressively acknowledging and confronting bias is, in the absence of alternatives, still the most appropriate way to conduct research and produce data. In addition, it should be realized that while the

process of drawing inferences about a state's grand strategy from observed behavior alone is inherently unreliable and capable of leading to invalid conclusions, the expressed purpose of applying this method here is to obtain convergent and discriminate validation and to facilitate comparative analysis.

Thus, if the first two steps were essentially research methods, devoted to gathering, recording, and coding data, the final step in the analysis of grand strategies is to analyze all of this data – to compare the data generated by the different methods. The object of taking such a multi-method approach and gathering so much data is to increase the validity and reliability of such an analysis and, more specifically, to promote convergent and discriminate validation. Ultimately, these different methods should all yield similar results and point in the same direction – toward a country's grand strategy. If the content and behavioral analysis do produce convergent data, this comparative analysis is relatively easy and drawing conclusions straightforward.

If, on the other hand, the methods yield divergent data, analytical problems ensue. Which methods matter more? Which variables are most important? What are the implications for the country's grand strategy? Given the highly qualitative nature of the information gathered and the absence of an established "weighting system," this comparative analysis can become highly subjective and biased in the consideration of this conflicting information. In this way, it becomes more of an art than a science. There are, however, several general guidelines. First, as with Alexander George's propaganda analysis, the analyst must know the country fairly well and have a solid

grasp of the topic at hand⁴¹ – in this case, security affairs. Second, the analyst must determine the area of disagreement: is it within one method or between two? The greatest potential for conflicting data arises out of differences in opinions: i.e., different sources presenting contrasting statements and viewpoints at different times. As discussed earlier, this is inevitable – no state speaks with one voice (not even Hitler's Germany or Stalin's USSR). A grand strategy, however, is more an underlying conceptual framework that the policy-makers use to guide their quest for security than an explicit and unequivocal government policy statement. The analyst must consider such factors as source, time, location, context, and motivation, to get an accurate reading of the data. If research redundancy has been built in as advised, consultation of other data would be most applicable here.

If, however, the disagreement is more than rhetorical or conceptual and involves a discrepancy between the professed views of the state and its practices, between official statements and behavior, then the problem becomes more acute. Here, one would have to consider not only the area, but also the magnitude of differentiation. The larger the difference, the more gross the violation, the easier it may be to determine what is actually going on in the policy-makers' heads. If a nation claims to be non-aggressive, to be supportive of arms control and the international system, and to have a defensive military posture, and at the same time is selling ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to states of questionable stability and uncertain intent and is modernizing and enlarging its military through both internal efforts and purchases abroad (including trying to get an aircraft carrier), one would have to take note. In the situation just

⁴¹ See George, "Prediction of Political Action by Means of Propaganda Analysis."

described, China's professed position fails to carry its weight. In this instance and in others of such magnitude, prudence suggests that analysts weigh actions more heavily than words.

A more difficult situation to analyze could involve some moderate disagreement in official statements and, at the same time, slight behavioral divergence. Here, the analyst will have to wrestle with the data, examine all the variables, consider the areas and degrees of divergence, and come to a conclusion in what might be considered a most-unscientific manner – using intuition, common-sense, and sound judgment. Sometimes this is all researchers can do – and when other information does not exist, this is often better than nothing. In such a case, it is best to explain the methods, present the data, and suggest possible hypotheses for others to pursue and test. In either case – whether the data points to a grand strategy or indicates that a country does not have one – the multi-method approach prescribed here provides valid and reliable data about a country's grand strategy, and that is its purpose.

While this approach is the soundest way to ferret out a country's grand strategy, it addresses only part of our current research problem. First, for this project, I am concerned more with what a state says and less with what it does. The focus here is on explaining the initial statement of the grand strategy, the official doctrinal pronouncement, not the actual policies practiced over time or their results – on formulation and articulation, not on execution or outcomes. A wide range of factors, like bureaucratic procedures and information limitations, to say nothing of funding, no doubt influence the emergence and course of such foreign policy practices, which may

or may not be the same as those associated with making the initial statement. Similarly, international factors, like other state's policies, clearly constrain outcomes and shape the success or failure of these practices. To reiterate, my primary concern here is what is articulated and why, not what was carried out and why; execution, like outcomes and consequences, is a different problem, with its own host of causal variables, independent and intervening, which is better addressed in subsequent studies.

Thus, to make matters simpler and more manageable, I try to focus on tangible phenomena and concentrate on identifying and analyzing actual doctrinal pronouncements instead of the nebulous and potentially elusive patterns of grand strategic behavior that may or may not have been purposefully intended. Here, I follow the lead of Cecil Crabb, whose work on the "doctrines" of American foreign policy suggests that such landmark statements issued by the government are observable, measurable, and comparable.⁴² At the same time, the research need not be limited to that one statement alone. Beyond the actual Presidential address that articulates the doctrine, each of the three historical cases I have selected has an abundance of additional primary sources that help illuminate the thoughts, choices, and views of the

⁴² Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (Louisiana State University Press, 1982). As Crabb explains, these doctrines, usually produced by the White House in response to perceived crises, represent a "deeply engrained practice" in the American diplomatic experience and can be seen as a "step toward a more comprehensive and coherent foreign policy" – quotations from p. 433 and p. 403, respectively. While emphasizing the importance of domestic variables (especially public opinion and political considerations), Crabb offers valuable insights on both the Monroe and Truman cases (discussed below), as well as demonstrating the conceptual and empirical utility of these pronouncements and providing the framework for studies like this.

decision-makers.⁴³ In each instance, these include supplementary diplomatic documents, statements, and speeches on the doctrine offered by the President and his advisers, both immediately before and immediately after the official issuance. For each case, a third tier of comparable primary sources also can be found in the inaugural addresses, annual messages, and confirmation statements made by the President and his Cabinet officers. While perhaps disconnected from the doctrine itself, these three sets of statements all are found in each of our historical cases and may provide useful glimpses of the principals' thinking about the world and their place in it, as well as about the security policies they fashioned and articulated.⁴⁴ A fourth and final set of sources to compare includes all of the other speeches, memoirs, or other statements by the principals that concern either side of our causal equation – the grand strategy itself or the geopolitical environment more generally. As noted above, it is self-defeating not to use all available resources to understand what a particular administration was trying to do when it issued a particular doctrine and why.

⁴³ In this respect, content analysis of these documents should provide information about not only the dependent variable – grand strategy – but also about the links between it and the geopolitical environment, especially those mental maps and perceptions of connectedness – “imagined distance” – held by American decision-makers.

⁴⁴ Here, I follow the lead of Ernest May, who analyzed evolving definitions of “national security” in the annual messages delivered by Presidents to Congress. May’s findings concerning the last two centuries largely coincide with my analysis of these three particular episodes. For more, see Ernest R. May, “National Security in American History,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *Rethinking International Relations: Ernest R. May and the Study of World Affairs* (Imprint Publications, [1992] 1998).

Analyzing Causal Connections: Mental Maps and Imagined Distance

To find causal connections between the geopolitical environment and the articulated grand strategies one must again employ content and discursive analysis, both of the same set of central documents and the larger set of primary sources, including statements, speeches, elaborations, defenses, testimonies, briefings, and memoirs. The object here is to uncover evidence of both “mental maps” and “cognitive maps.”⁴⁵ Most important for the former are indices of spatio-temporal orientation, geographic references, and awareness of how technology is modifying distance from and connectedness to the rest of the world. For the latter, what matters is not only recognition of such factors but specific indices of cognitive and causal connections between these factors and strategic preferences. In other words, the first step involves ascertaining if and how policy-makers perceived the environment, while the second emphasizes how policy-makers translated these views into beliefs and decisions about specific policy options.

⁴⁵ The difference between these two terms is semantically slight but conceptually significant. The term “mental map,” as used by Alan Henrikson and others and as discussed in Chapter 2, signifies the visual representations of how people view the world, especially their location and spatial relationship to others. The term “cognitive map,” in contrast, as used by Robert Axelrod and others, involves people’s understanding of the causal connections between two variables – the linkage between a “causal concept” and an “effect concept.” In this case, my expectation is that the cognitive maps of policy-makers will reveal connections between their mental maps and their strategic preferences along the lines hypothesized in Chapter 2. To avoid confusion, however, I will try to limit my use of “cognitive maps”; instead, I will refer to cognitive and causal connections and to mental maps, which play a central role in the analysis below. For more on the distinction, see Alan K. Henrikson, “Mental Maps,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Robert Axelrod, “The Analysis of Cognitive Maps,” Chapter 3 in Robert Axelrod, ed., *The Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton University Press, 1976). For a useful discussion of coding of cognitive maps, see Margaret Tucker Wrightson, “The Documentary Coding Method,” Appendix 1 in Axelrod, ed., *The Structure of Decision*.

For this particular study, at least one additional research method is appropriate: cartographic analysis.⁴⁶ Such visual imagery can be illuminating, with differences particularly revealing and instructive.⁴⁷ Thus, beyond analyzing policy-makers' statements about what they did and why, I also examine the actual maps and other forms of spatial reference that they employed or that might have influenced their decisions. Consider, for example, that many world maps in the early nineteenth century actually had "two-spheres" to reflect the separation of the Old and New Worlds and may have encouraged American policy-makers to think of themselves as removed or unattached to Europe, which, in turn, may have fostered the preferences for unilateralism and non-entanglement espoused in the Monroe Doctrine. In a similar way, the common pictures of the Earth from space provide a markedly different cartographic context for Clinton administration's thinking along global lines and professing a binding strategy of engagement and enlargement. As discussed below, each case contains cartographic evidence about the decision-makers' views of the world, their place in it, and their connectedness to others. The mere existence of such evidence, however, proves neither that the decision-makers held such views nor that such views directly influenced their articulation of a particular grand strategy. Here, I

⁴⁶ Henrikson makes this suggestion in "Mental Maps." As he explains, "there is no better evidence of their [policy-makers'] unique cognitive and perceptual worlds than the actual maps they have employed" (p. 188). He also identifies content analysis as a valuable way of gathering data: "A second method for determining the way nations view themselves spatially – that is, 'reading' their mental maps – is to study the geographical content of their language. This includes the metaphors and analogies used, as well as straightforward geographical terms" (p. 189). These two methods will serve as the basis of my search for links between our independent and dependent variables.

⁴⁷ Alan K. Henrikson, "The Power and Politics of Maps," Chapter 3 in George J. Demko and William B. Wood, eds., *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century* (Westview Press, 1994). For more on the nature and role of cartographic representations of space, see Mark Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, Second Edition (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

return to content and discursive analysis of texts and search for linguistic and metaphorical clues about policy-makers' mental maps and how such views might have been considered and factored into the grand strategic decision-making process.

We are left, then, using multiple methods to draw uncertain causal inferences from incomplete information – an acceptable *modus operandi* for a field like political science. As I test my hypotheses against a selected sample of the historical record, I draw conclusions about the merits of both the metatheoretical claims and the variable-specific predictions. Correlation between variables is relatively easy to establish; in fact, the appearance of such a correlation is one of the primary reasons for the selection of these particular, “most-likely,” cases. But, the appearance of correlation by no means proves causation, especially in the mediated relationship between the underlying geopolitical circumstances – here, defined in terms of interaction capacity – and the articulated grand strategy. Indeed, throughout my “process-tracing,” I search for evidence that reveals cognitive and causal connections between the variables – ideally, statements by the principals that directly link their perceptions of the environment, especially their sense of imagined distance, to their national security policy preference(s). Causation must be shown along each link of the chain, with alternative explanations and criteria for falsification (discussed below) always in mind.

Analyzing Landscape Fitness and Operational Effectiveness

While the focus of this study is on the formation, not the execution, of grand strategy, I include some complementary research about the operational milieu and the relationship between landscape fitness and functionality.⁴⁸ As discussed in Chapter 2, this part of the argument concerns the connections between the suitability of a given strategy for a particular environment and the security that strategy provides. In this causal sequence, the independent variable is the grand strategy, the intervening variable is the geopolitical environment, and the dependent variable is security. More accurately, the operational effectiveness of the strategy adopted is at least partially contingent upon its suitability for the circumstances. The general argument is that high levels of landscape fitness will yield security; conversely, strategies with low levels of fitness will be dysfunctional and will result in security crashes. If the strategy adopted does not fit with the emergent geopolitical landscape, then one or two circumstances should arise: (1) some type of security dysfunction should appear, captured in a range of military, political, and economic indices (e.g., armed conflict and casualties, protests and condemnations, and percentage of GDP spent on defense); and/or (2) after recognizing the unsuitability of their approach, decision-makers should realign their

⁴⁸ I derive most of this functional analysis from the work of Daniel Deudney, who emphasizes this leg of the causal chain in his research and writing. For more, see Daniel H. Deudney, "Binding Powers and Bound States: The Logic and Geopolitics of Republican Negarchy," paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, 1996; "Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in the Philadelphia System," in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *Constructing Sovereignty* (Cambridge University Press, 1996); "Geopolitics and Change," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Westview Press, 1997); and "Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts," *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000).

policies to improve landscape fitness or eventually bear increased costs. If neither costs nor adjustment is evident, then the hypotheses must be revised.

To gather and analyze data and test these basic functional hypotheses, three methods are most useful: unobtrusive observation, statistical analysis, and comparative analysis. The easiest way to determine fitness levels is by first analyzing and categorizing interaction capacity and then doing the same for grand strategy (operationalized here as an articulated doctrine). Plotting these two variables on a simple graph one can ascertain the level of fitness by measuring how closely the strategy corresponds to the largely linear expectations set out in Chapter 2: namely, hiding with weak interaction capacity, balancing with moderate interaction capacity, and binding with strong interaction capacity (see Figure 2D). Deviation from this relationship would reduce geopolitical fitness and should diminish the provision of security.

In terms of measuring security, the dependent variable in this causal link, I suggested earlier, and have elsewhere elaborated, an expanded set of criteria encompassing five essential elements: (1) territorial integrity, including the protection of property, institutions, and people; (2) political independence, particularly the ability to make decisions about one's own future; (3) economic vitality, ideally combining a reasonably stable and secure environment with some growth, particularly in productivity; (4) environmental sustainability, especially so that one can enjoy "territorial integrity" over the long-haul; and (5) social cohesion, so that the nation can survive and thrive as a community of individuals along the lines the founding fathers

envisaged – namely, *E Pluribus Unum*.⁴⁹ The choice is not between Realist calls for “more guns” and Liberal calls for “more butter.” As Jacob Viner suggested half a century ago, power and plenty are not just compatible, but mutually reinforcing objectives.⁵⁰ History has demonstrated repeatedly that one cannot be sustained without the other, especially over the long-term.⁵¹ So, too, are territorial integrity and environmental sustainability compatible and reinforcing – the key distinction is the time horizon. Even social cohesion jibes with the others: it is necessary both for political independence to be meaningful and for economic vitality to be possible. Ultimately, all five factors work together and reinforce each other to provide a sound base for lasting security.

For the purposes of this study, I will focus on the most prominent measures of success or failure. Among the most accepted and readily available measures are the incidences of war or armed conflict: the number and severity of attacks against the territory, people, or interests of the United States; and the number of casualties sustained in such attacks. To help gauge cost-effectiveness, I assess defense expenditures, particularly as a percentage of the budget and GDP. Far from making the definitive statement about whether or not the three doctrines I examine succeed or fail or rigorously and exhaustively testing an elaborate set of detailed hypotheses about landscape fitness and operational effectiveness, I seek only to probe the plausibility of

⁴⁹ These criteria and the associated discussion are drawn directly from A.C. Harth, “Realistic Liberalism: A Middle Way for American Grand Strategy” (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, January 2003).

⁵⁰ Jacob Viner, “Power and Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oct. 1948).

⁵¹ See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Random House, 1987).

this second causal leg and to determine whether more theorizing and research along these lines are necessary and warranted. To be clear, this functional analysis is designed to complement, not compete with or supplant, the analysis of the formulation of these doctrines, which is the heart of this project.

Criteria for Falsification

Whenever testing hypotheses, it is important to recognize the limits of theories and the potential for arguments to fall short – to be falsified.⁵² Five easily identifiable criteria would require either rejection or modification of the geopolitical hypotheses elaborated above.⁵³ Let us briefly examine each one and bear them in mind as we proceed with the analysis of the three historical cases.

The first and most basic criterion of falsification for this argument is the absence of correlation between variables. The argument becomes suspect, to say the least, if we do not observe the hypothesized, largely linear correlation between interaction capacity and grand strategies or if, as noted above, landscape fitness does not correlate with security. If this happens, it still may be possible to salvage the theory. It is conceivable that other, more important causal factors – like domestic or international politics – might be at work or that decision-makers' perceptions of the environment might be mistaken, perhaps lagging behind a new technological advance that has transformed geographic constraints. While geopolitics still may matter, a lack of correlation should at least raise serious questions about the relative weight of the variable, as well as about the direction of causal influence.

The second criterion for falsification is outright denial or rejection of geopolitics by the policy-makers. If, for example, they say, "It did not matter, not on any level,"

⁵² For a discussion of the role of falsification in advancing scientific knowledge, see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁵³ Here, I attempt to follow the example set by Charles Tilly, who specifies a list of six such criteria in his study of development of states in Europe. See Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (Blackwell Publishers, 1990), pp. 35-36.

then the theory certainly is questionable. In such a case, it is possible that the policy-maker might be trying to hide something, to cover up some geopolitical leanings, or to purposefully emphasize some other causal factor (perhaps for political gain). It also is possible that the policy-maker will mistakenly think that the absence of tangible geopolitical evidence (e.g., a map) means that no spatial references were at work. Latent mental maps need not be made manifest to exert a powerful influence; latency does, however, encourage under appreciation.

A third and related criterion for falsification is alternative attribution. If the policy-makers all say that other factors mattered or drove them to make a decision, then we should consider revising our theory, or perhaps incorporating some of the other alleged determinants, along with our geopolitical insights, into a more comprehensive model of decision-making and international relations. Alternative attribution by itself, however, does not require rejection of the theory.

A fourth and, again, related criterion for falsification is the lack of references to geopolitics in the historical record. If decision-makers never mention terms like distance or location or demonstrably think in terms of time and space, then too should we consider revising our theories and/or incorporating others. The absence of such geopolitical references, however, is not to say that such factors were not considered, either explicitly or implicitly, only that they were not mentioned in texts selected for analysis. Like alternative attribution, a lack of references certainly would weaken but not condemn geopolitical theory. Nevertheless, the argument would be stronger and

more compelling if the principals actually referred to such geopolitical features, concepts, or notions.

It is possible that such references could be made, but not along the lines hypothesized above. Any type of alternative conceptualization, where geopolitical features are considered but along different lines, is a fifth criterion of falsification. One of the central arguments here, for example, is that closeness may encourage binding more than balancing; if decision-makers were thinking about geopolitics but drew different conclusions and selected different policy options, then, again, modification of the hypotheses would be in order.

Ultimately, the three historical cases below provide ample documentary evidence that decision-makers were thinking in geopolitical terms and along the lines hypothesized above. The evidence gathered offers strong support for both sets of geopolitical hypotheses – formative and operational – and suggests that most analysis of grand strategy has overlooked an important causal variable. The following three empirical chapters speak loudly and clearly to this point. With the necessary analytical foundations established, my hypotheses and methods articulated, let us now turn to this empirical evidence and see what the historical record reveals.

**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Part II: The Empirical Evidence

Chapter 4: The 1820s, Remoteness, Hiding, and the Monroe Doctrine

From its founding through the early part of the nineteenth century, the United States practiced a foreign policy that was largely shaped by a prevailing sense of separateness and remoteness held by most policy-makers. While most of these individuals also were aware of the relative weakness of the United States vis-à-vis the European great powers¹ and the inherent socio-political differences between the republican “new world” and the autocratic “old world,” these views and other sentiments co-existed and intermingled in the minds of the decision-makers with a set of distinctive and influential mental maps. While slightly varied according to individual views, education, exposure, and experience, these mental maps and the geographic conceptions upon which they were based were largely shared by the majority of

¹ The principal great powers at this point were England, Russia, France, and Spain. As discussed above, the definition of great powers employed here emphasizes not only size and resources, but also extra-regional interests. That these four European powers had such interests is clear. Less obvious but still defensible is the claim that the United States belongs in this same club. Most convincing are the interests of the United States beyond its own immediate neighborhood, especially the Pacific Northwest and South America – both now considered “regional,” but then not nearly as close, especially when one considers transportation and communication times, as discussed below. If we use Mearsheimer’s definition, the United States also fits, given the fact that it had recently held its own with the greatest power of the era – England – in two major conventional wars. For more, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W. W. Norton and Co., 2001).

American policy-makers. All of the principals² were aware of the geographic distance separating the Americas from Europe (and even more from Asia) and believed that the United States existed in a different part of the world, often described in other hemispheric or quarterly terms.

The basic argument elaborated below starts from this isolated material base and flows through this shared perception of distance – a sense of remoteness – in the minds of decision-makers who, in turn, conceived and constructed foreign policies and issued statements and documents that took these geopolitical circumstances into account. More specifically, when President James Monroe issued his now famous doctrinal pronouncement as part of his seventh state of the Union speech on December 2, 1823, the general foreign policy orientation he suggested derived directly from his and his lieutenants' beliefs about not only what was required but also what they could get away with. Sure, they might have been numerically inferior to the other powers – all the more reason to accept the clear British offer to cooperate, or bandwagon, as expressed in the diplomatic exchanges between Canning and Rush. But, they also were separated by a vast and expansive ocean that took weeks if not months to cross. This was clearly the logic captured in Washington's famous question, "Why forego the advantages of such a peculiar situation?"

² Ernest May identifies four principal makers of foreign policy during this period: President Monroe, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of War James C. Calhoun, and Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford. Also involved, but more peripherally, were two influential members of Congress: Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson, and the other two cabinet members, Attorney General William Wirt and Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard. For a useful introduction to the major principals, their backgrounds and views, see Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Harvard University Press, 1975), Chapter 2, pp. 12-64. For more on the two most significant actors – Monroe and Adams – see W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, Reprint (G. E. Stechart, [1898] 1924), Chapter 3, pp. 28-44; Harry Ammon, *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity* (McGraw Hill, 1971); and Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (Knopf, 1965).

When President Monroe articulated the principles behind his basic hiding strategy – including unilateralism, neutralism, and non-entanglement, as well as defensive minimalism – that guided American foreign policy for nearly a century, he did so on the firm conviction that we could get away with such a posture. From his perspective, the Europeans were too far removed and detached, as well as preoccupied with their own troubles and rivalries at home, to meddle excessively in American affairs. Instead, the United States should capitalize on its advantageous position, as well as on its short-term coincidence of interest with the British, and declare itself a non-player in the European game and the American hemisphere off-limits for European players, as least as far as territory and politics were concerned. Economically, of course, the United States would continue to practice an opportunistic policy, seeking trade and investment wherever there were perceived potential payoffs.

For the most part, Monroe and his colleagues were correct. The hiding strategy they articulated and practiced vis-à-vis the other great powers provided a reasonable degree of security for nearly a century. But, with technological advances in destruction, transportation, and communication, interaction capacity and American connectedness grew far beyond these initially correct, early American estimates. With such advances, our material separation shrunk from remote to proximate, with significant connections emerging between the United States and the affairs of both Europe and Asia. The resulting gap between the evolving and shrinking level of material separation and the sticky and outdated mental maps generated dysfunctional security policies in the early part of the twentieth century, culminating in the two world wars.

Before jumping too far ahead, however, we need to more closely examine the roots of these policies and illuminate the complex causal chain that initially gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine. The primary purpose of this chapter, like the other two empirical case-studies, is to test the geopolitical hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2 against the historical record – in particular, in crucial cases where tracing the causal process backward from varied strategies must reveal a correspondingly divergent range of mental maps and material foundation, or my geopolitical hypotheses will require modification. While some attention will be given to and limited conclusions drawn about levels of landscape fitness and strategic functionality, the central objective of this chapter and its parent project is to ascertain the relative influence of geopolitics on the formation of grand strategy. In this case, like the other two, I will proceed by investigating first the objective environment, the level of interaction capacity, and the degree of material separation. After describing and classifying this environment, I then will examine the doctrine articulated by President Monroe in 1823, with a particular view to identifying the various strategic elements and orientations that could enable us to determine whether or not this doctrine should be considered a “grand strategy” and, if so, how it should be classified. As suggested above, the evidence suggests that the Monroe Doctrine, as a “combined system of policy,” can be considered a grand strategy that emphasized threat aversion, or hiding, not bandwagoning, balancing, binding, or dominating. With the independent and dependent variables identified, described, and classified, the third section looks beyond the apparent correlation between these variables and seeks to uncover the complex causal linkages that allow the perceptions of

the material environment to be translated into strategic preferences and articulated policies. The focus here is on illuminating the mental maps and discursive conventions that capture how American decision-makers viewed the world and their place in it and, then, how this shaped their foreign policy preferences. The fourth section offers limited conclusions about the degree of landscape fitness and the resulting operational effectiveness of this grand strategy. The fifth section offers a brief summary and some conclusions about the evidence in this case and my geopolitical hypotheses. Let us begin, however, with an examination of the underlying material environment – the geopolitical foundation of American national security.

The Independent Variable: Interaction Capacity and Material Separation

The geopolitical situation of the United States in the early nineteenth century was fundamentally different than that of the 1940s, the 1990s, or today. Roughly half the size of the current territory and facing primarily eastward across the Atlantic Ocean, the early United States possessed only a limited capacity to interact with the European great powers. An enormous moat – the Atlantic Ocean – separated the United States from Europe. In an age of “sail and muscle,”³ crossing such an expanse was arduous and time consuming. Nor were the prevailing destructive capabilities that impressive. Most weapons of the era possessed very limited lethality and range. As explained below, the combination of these factors – of geographic remoteness and rudimentary technologies – yields what can be best characterized as weak interaction capacity. Let us examine more closely the different technological elements comprising interaction capacity during this early modern era.

At this point, communication and transportation were inextricably linked, with the former entirely dependent upon the latter.⁴ Both endeavors were limited directly by the large distances between the United States and the other great powers. Roughly 4,000 miles of ocean separates America from Europe. Germany and Russia are even farther away. Before the advent of steam-powered vessels, the only way to cross the Atlantic was by sailing. With most ships averaging 3 or 4 knots, the average one-way

³ This classification comes from Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (Basic Books, 1993).

⁴ Cf. Deudney, “Global Geopolitics.”

trip across the Atlantic took more than a month, typically about 6 weeks.⁵ Cargo, including people and mail, was limited by the small size of the ships and the need for large stores of provisions for the long trip. In other words, both communication and transportation between the United States and the European great powers were slow and hard going.⁶

Ships also were the primary vehicle for the transportation of destructive capacity, carrying an array of cannons, muskets, rifles, and even simple rockets.⁷ All told, however, the lethality, range, and density of this slow moving destructive capacity were relatively limited and considerably smaller than those of subsequent eras. The predominant explosive compound, blackpowder (also called gunpowder), for example, released only 800 calories per gram (compared with 1600 per gram of TNT and

⁵ While the paddle-steamer *Savannah* crossed the Atlantic in 1818, it was jointly powered by sail and steam. Even then, the trip took 27 days. Not until the 1830s did ships traveling under steam alone cross the Atlantic; with their speed averaging 8-9 knots, they managed to cut the travel time roughly in half. In the 1850s, clipper ships further cut the time with their nearly double speed (sometimes as much as 20 knots). From Peter Kemp, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ships and Seafaring* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1980).

⁶ Consider, for comparative purposes, that only two million net tons of shipping entered and cleared American ports in 1823 (compared to nearly 200 million tons in 1947 and to over one billion tons in 1993). Data from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975) and US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years, all available online @www.census.gov).

⁷ Much of the general information presented in this case and the other two about interaction capacity, technological developments, and prevalent modes of transportation, communication, and destruction derives from multiple sources, including Daniel H. Deudney, "Global Geopolitics: A Reconstruction, Evaluation, and Interpretation of Materialist World Order Theories of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1989); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Knopf, 1993); Trevor Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1980); Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*, Revised and Expanded Edition (Free Press, 1991); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since 1000 AD* (University of Chicago Press, 1982); David Harding, ed., *Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD* (St. Martin's Press, 1980); and Bryan Bunch and Alexander Hellemans, eds., *The Timetables of Technology* (Simon and Schuster, 1993); and the works of Walter McDougall, especially, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (Basic Books, 1985) and *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (Basic Books, 1993).

approximately 22 billion per gram of uranium).⁸ Cannons, rockets, and artillery were the most lethal weapons of the age, and none of them possessed extensive range or threatened to destroy a large area.⁹ According to one index of theoretical lethality (based on range, rate of fire, accuracy, reliability, radius of damage, number of targets per strike, vulnerability, etc.), the weapons of this early modern era (with their 10^3 maximum) were several orders of magnitude below those of the 1940s (in the 10^6 -range) which, in turn, were several orders of magnitude below those of the 1990s (more than 10^8).¹⁰

In summary, the location of the United States, situated thousands of miles across the North Atlantic Ocean, and the low levels of technological development resulted in a high degree of material separation. Without technologies to bridge this vast chasm, the European and American continents were not close – they were, at the very least, physically distant.¹¹ Moreover, according to the operationalization offered above, this combination of low density and low proximity yields an interaction capacity that can be

⁸ The gunpowder figure comes from the abstract of an article by August Darapsky, "The Salts of Hydronitric Acid as Explosives" (University of Heidelberg, 1907), provided by Judith Miller at the Chemistry Library of the University of Pennsylvania. The comparable figures for TNT and uranium come from Kosta Tsipis, *Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age* (Simon and Schuster, 1983).

⁹ According to the Sprouts, these weapons, while representing major advances from previous eras, had a maximum range of 1-3 miles and a "killing area" of 4-28 square miles. Contrast this with the 5 mile range and the 78 square miles killing area for the breech loading rifle-gun or, more dramatically, the bombers of World War II with their range of thousands of miles and their killing area of millions of square miles. See Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 253.

¹⁰ See Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*, pp. 286-313.

¹¹ They also were distant in other aspects as well, most notably in terms of their systems of government. Depending upon how one views the North Atlantic, with its potentially treacherous passage, one might even add topographical distance to these more obvious claims of physical and attributional distance, as well as perhaps gravitational distance from the central core of world politics at this time – Europe. For more on these different types of distance and their effects on foreign policy, see Henrikson, "Distance and Foreign Policy."

best characterized as weak.¹² With the independent variable thus classified, let us now turn our attention to the dependent variable – the foreign policy doctrine articulated by President Monroe in 1823 – and then to the links between the two.

¹² In Deudney's terms, these correspond to thin and distant, which also yield weak interactive capacity. As noted above, however, density is better captured with the terms low, medium, high, and extreme than by absent, thin, thick, and saturated – which, while rich and descriptive, can be misleading and fall short of accurately reflecting the physical properties of density per se, particularly mass per volume, or the quantity of destructive capacity per given area. Thin and thick, for example, concern distance rather than density.

The Dependent Variable: Doctrinal Pronouncement and Strategic Orientation

It was in this weak interactive setting that President Monroe set forth his now famous doctrine.¹³ This doctrine, announced on December 2, 1823 to a joint session of Congress in the context of Monroe's seventh State of the Union speech,¹⁴ addressed potential threats posed by all four great powers: (1) Spain, in its potential reconquest of its increasingly independent colonies in the Western hemisphere; (2) France, as a potential supporter or instigator of Spain; (3) Russia, not only in its support of France and Spain, but also in its quest for territory in the Pacific Northwest, particularly as expressed in several imperial pronouncements; and (4) Britain, as the state which had fought not one but two recent wars against the United States and as the state that still

¹³ The following description and explanation of the Monroe Doctrine derives from the analysis of primary sources (including relevant state papers, writings, and memoirs) and a number of secondary sources, including the following: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "The Monroe Doctrine: Palladium of American Foreign Policy," Ch. 1 in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*; W. C. Ford, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, I," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July 1902) and "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October 1902); Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece," *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 13 (Spring 1993); W. A. McCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1923); John Bach McMaster, *The Origin, Meaning, and Application of the Monroe Doctrine* (Henry Altemus, 1896); Bradford Perkins, *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1176-1865*, Vol. 1, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gale W. McGee, "The Monroe Doctrine – A Stopgap Measure," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (September 1951); Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (Peter Smith, 1965[1927]) and *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Little, Brown, and Co. 1946); Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Harvard University Press, 1975); Harry Ammon, "The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision?" *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1981) and *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity* (McGraw-Hill, 1971); Frank Donovan, *Mr. Monroe's Message: The Story of the Monroe Doctrine* (Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1963); W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine* (G. E. Stechert and Co., 1924); William R. Shepherd, "The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 1924); Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); and Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin, 1997), especially Chapters 2 and 3.

¹⁴ While available in many forms and sources, all of the citations from Monroe's actual address to Congress come from President James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 207-220, hereafter referred to as Monroe, Seventh Annual Message.

could inflict the greatest damage on the fledgling republic. More concretely, the immediate catalyst was a proposal from the British Foreign Minister Canning conveyed secretly to Ambassador Rush of the United States for a coordinated approach between England and the United States against the revanchist imperial tendencies of the continental great powers, especially toward South America.¹⁵ Rather than issue separate, private statements concerning each of these four states and their respective challenges, the administration – particularly Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams – took the unprecedented and deft diplomatic steps of announcing an integrated and cohesive approach to foreign policy to a domestic audience and issuing a corresponding set of diplomatic dispatches that together formed what has become known as the Monroe Doctrine.

Taken on its own terms, this doctrine, what Adams referred to as a “combined system of policy,” involved two basic principles.¹⁶ First, the United States would

¹⁵ More specifically, Canning proposed that the United States and Great Britain offer a joint declaration of their adherence to a set of five principles. For more on Canning’s motivation, see Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World* (Frank Cass and Co., 1966), especially pp. 110-113. For the complete set of correspondence, including Rush’s memos to Adams and Monroe, see W. C. Ford, *John Quincy Adams: His Connection with the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1902), Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January 1902.

¹⁶ Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, p. 179. Also cited in Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, I,” p. 693. There still is some debate among scholars concerning the number of different points raised in Monroe’s address. Among the many elements suggested are non-interference, neutrality, unilateralism, isolationism, non-colonization, non-transfer of colonies, aversion, commercial opportunism, and “many independence.” Patterson, for example, identifies three essential elements: (1) non-colonization, especially versus Russia in the Pacific Northwest; (2) “hands-off” the New World, especially directed at France and Spain; and (3) abstention, or US non-involvement in European affairs. Walter LeFeber offers a similar, three-tiered categorization, as does Samuel Flagg Bemis.

refrain from involvement, interference, and entanglement in the affairs of Europe, including its colonies. Referring to the United States as only “anxious and interested spectators” of European affairs, Monroe clearly declares our interest in avoiding foreign entanglements, on both sides of the Atlantic. “In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves,” he states, “we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.”¹⁷ He goes further, proclaiming, “with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere,” including a promise of “neutrality” toward any potential conflicts between Spain and her former colonies.¹⁸ He later reaffirms the basic, unchanging tenets of America’s approach to Europe:

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.¹⁹

McDougall, in contrast, considers the “doctrine” to be more of an assertion, complementing our other early traditions of “exceptionalism” and “unilateralism,” directed primarily at the British, of an “American System,” also comprising three basic elements: “no new colonization, no transfer of existing colonies, and no reimposition of colonial rule.” At the same time, however, McDougall recognizes the two-pronged essence of the approach suggested by Monroe, directed against both American entanglement abroad and European intervention in the Americas. As he writes, “If the United States was to nurture its independence and Liberty at home, it must steer clear of Europe’s wars and ambitions and preserve its freedom of action. Hence the dicta of Washington and Jefferson against entangling alliances. But to refuse to ‘go over to Europe’ was not enough; the United States must also see to it that European powers did not ‘come over to America.’” McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 71 and p. 59, respectively.

¹⁷ Monroe, Seventh Annual Message.

¹⁸ Ibid. As Monroe states toward the end of his address, “In the war between those new Governments [in South America] and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.” Noteworthy is this last caveat, allowing for possible American involvement if circumstances were to change. In other words, the United States was not bound in perpetuity to isolationism and non-intervention.

¹⁹ Ibid.

The other side of this non-entanglement with European affairs was the expectation that the Europeans would behave similarly toward American affairs. What constituted “American affairs,” of course, was not exactly clear, and differed according to where one stood. From the vantage point of the United States, all occurrences in the Western hemisphere were considered “American affairs.” Most Europeans thought such grandiose claims nonsensical and were determined to retain ties, if only in terms of preferential commercial arrangements, to its former colonies. Nevertheless, the second basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine was that the United States would not look favorably upon any further European colonization or interference in the Western hemisphere. At two different parts of the address, Monroe hits this principle hard, once in the beginning, in the midst of his discussion of relations with Russia, and then again, toward the end, as part of his grand finale.²⁰ In his first cut, Monroe notes that “the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”²¹ Toward the end of his address, Monroe brings this principle (or set of principles) to the fore in several clear and related statements:

²⁰ In fact, the subject had been broached earlier that summer in diplomatic correspondence between Adams and Rush, concerning Anglo-Russo-American relations and the “Northwest Coast of America.” In his letter, Adams offers a clear early statement of this element of the doctrine: “... the American continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization.” Adams to Rush, No. 70, July 22, 1823, in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, Vol. V, p. 447.

²¹ Monroe, Seventh Annual Message. One noteworthy aspect of this formulation and the rejection of Canning’s proposal for a joint declaration against any future colonization was the potential left open for American imperial activity, reluctant as American policy-makers may be to admit such thoughts, to say nothing of act on them. Both Jefferson and Madison, in their correspondence with Monroe, note the potential allure of Cuba, among other locales for future consideration.

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

...with the [South American] Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.²²

Ultimately, these amounted to a unilateral declaration by the United States that the American continents were to be considered “off limits” to any new European interference, what Dexter Perkins refers to as a “hands-off” policy.²³

These two primary principles – of American non-entanglement with Europe and of European non-intervention and non-colonization in the Americas – are the twin pillars of the Monroe Doctrine. While largely ignored and not identified as a “doctrine” per se for decades,²⁴ this address certainly ranks among “the most significant of all American state papers.”²⁵ Even recognizing its ambiguity and the ample room for multiple interpretations,²⁶ the Doctrine, taken on its own terms, also can be seen as an attempt at articulating a grand strategy, although none of the participants ever used this specific term. They did, however, think and speak in grand strategic language and envision fashioning a coordinated set of policies to deal with the array of issues and

²² Ibid.

²³ Perkins, *Hands-Off*. For more a more detailed discussion of this non-colonization policy, including its genesis and earlier statements, see Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, especially Chapter 1.

²⁴ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 58.

²⁵ Perkins, *Hands-Off*, p. 28; also cited in Crabb, “The Monroe Doctrine,” p. 10. Crabb later refers to it as “the most influential doctrine in the nation’s diplomatic experience” (p. 24).

²⁶ For a sampling of interpretations and applications, see Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, and Perkins, *Hands Off*.

threats they perceived at home and abroad. In the actual address, for example, President Monroe speaks of the need for “a just estimate of our resources, revenue, and progress in every kind of improvement connected with the national prosperity and public defense” and for the formation and adherence to “a national policy extending its fostering care and protection to all the great interests of our Union.”²⁷ What could be more grand strategic than assessing the ends and means of security and trying to construct a “national policy” to protect and promote American interests?

In recollecting the debate leading up to the speech, Adams is even more direct in his language, noting the need for an integrated and coordinated approach to the pressing foreign threats of the era, a sentiment that the President apparently shared:

I remained with the President, and observed to him that the answer to be given to Baron Tuvill, the instructions to Mr. Rush relative to the proposals of Mr. Canning, those to Mr. Middleton at St. Petersburg, and those to the Minister who must be sent to France, must all be *parts of a combined system of policy and adapted to each other*; in which he fully concurred.²⁸

Recognizing the intent and content of these policy statements, other analysts have properly characterized them and the Doctrine itself as a type of integrated strategy for security or defense, although, again, none has used the specific term “grand strategy.” James Morton Callahan, for example, refers to the Monroe Doctrine as a “doctrine of national defense.”²⁹ While identifying the different elements encompassed by this doctrine – including two spheres, intervention, colonization, and political system – Albert Bushnell Hart echoes this view and also characterizes it essentially as a

²⁷ Monroe, Seventh Annual Message.

²⁸ John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs*, edited by Charles Francis Adams (Lippincott and Co., 1875), Vol. VI, p. 179. (Emphasis added.)

²⁹ Cited in Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 351.

defensive doctrine, what he calls a “doctrine of protection of the United States.”³⁰ As he explains, “No greater mistake could be made than to look upon the Monroe Doctrine as due only to dangers to the Latin-American peoples.... The Monroe Doctrine can be understood only as a statement of a right of self-protection against action by foreign powers. The main purpose of the Doctrine was *to prevent disturbances* to our institutions, and *to minimize dangers* to the United States.”³¹ Crabb offers a similar assessment, emphasizing that the Doctrine “consisted of several interrelated diplomatic principles. Moreover, it was comprehensive, covering both America’s approach to European problems and Europe’s behavior in the New World”³² – the twin pillars identified above.

The bottom line was that Monroe, Adams, and company were not simply making some isolated rhetorical statement or a blind stab at a particular policy problem; they were trying to articulate an integrated and coherent response to the multifaceted challenges they perceived. Consider, for example, how Adams characterizes the draft of his response to Tully, presented to the Cabinet on November 25:

The paper itself was *drawn to correspond exactly* with a paragraph of the President’s message which he had read me yesterday, and which was entirely comfortable to the *system of policy* which I earnestly recommended for this emergency. It was also intended as a firm, spirited, and yet conciliatory answer to all the communications lately received from the Russian government, and at the same time, an unequivocal answer to the proposals made by Canning to Mr. Rush. It

³⁰ Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 69-76, quotation from p. 75.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75. (Emphasis added.)

³² Crabb, “The Monroe Doctrine,” p. 24.

was meant also to me eventually an exposition of the principles of this government, and a brief development of its political system as henceforth to be maintained.³³

Less significant at present is whether the principals accurately perceived this “emergency” and the threats associated therewith³⁴ or whether they had the naval capacity to enforce their policies.³⁵ The fact is that they carefully and purposefully

³³ Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, pp. 199-200. He continues this passage with a summation of this document, the larger Doctrine, and its basic principles: “essentially republican – maintaining its own independence, and respecting that of others; essentially pacific – studiously avoiding all involvement in the combinations of European politics, cultivating peace and friendship with the most absolute monarchies, highly appreciating and anxiously desirous of retaining that of Emperor Alexander, but declaring that, having recognized the independence of the South American States, we could not see with indifference any attempt by European powers by forcible interposition either to restore the Spanish dominion on the American Continents or to introduce monarchial principles into those countries, or to transfer any portion of the ancient or present American possessions of Spain to any other European power” (p. 200).

³⁴ It appears that most of the principals genuinely perceived a threat from Europe and more important, the need for the United States to act. Consider, for example, Adams’s characterization of Monroe in November as full of “despair” and “despondency” after hearing about the turn of events in Spain: “I find him altogether unsettled in his own mind as to the answer to be given to Mr. Canning’s proposals, and alarmed, far beyond anything I could have conceived possible, with the fear that the Holy Alliance are about to restore immediately all South America to Spain.” Calhoun, he asserts, was “perfectly moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Alliance, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to the Spanish dominion.” Adams, for his part, seems altogether unimpressed by this prospect, especially over the longer term: “I no more believe that the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent than that the Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean.” Nevertheless, all seemed to agree that some type of response or policy statement was necessary. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, pp.185-186.

³⁵ In fact, the objective numbers decidedly favored the Europeans. In 1815, for example, the British had 214 ships-of-the-line, the French 80, Russia 40, and Spain 25. The United States deployed its first ship-of-the-line, *Columbus*, the following year. By 1823, with an American naval program allegedly underway and Britain cutting dramatically its forces, the number of British ships-of-the-line still outnumbered those of the United States by roughly 10:1. The numbers of military personnel were even more skewed, considering the hundreds of thousands in the continental European armies and the mere 11,000 in the United States. In spite of this objective asymmetry, the perception, or myth, in the United States was that we had stood up to the “mistress of the seas” twice already, had more than held our own, and could do so again if necessary. The continental powers, for their part, faced insurmountable logistical obstacles in wielding effective pressure – namely, the Atlantic – especially if the British and their naval forces were either non-involved or resisting such efforts. In any event, the critical point here, as with threats and distance, is that subjective assessments matter most for policy formulation – perceptions, not the reality – largely because of their intimate connections with the cognitive dimension and larger psychological essence of grand strategy. The data come from Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (Random House, 1987); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Ashfield Press, 1976); Harold Spout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton University Press, 1946); and Fletcher Pratt, *The Compact History of the United States Navy*, New and Revised Edition (Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1962).

considered their circumstances, weighed various options,³⁶ and constructed and promulgated a related set of defensive principles and policies to address these perceived threats – this is exactly what grand strategy is all about. Moreover, while there was some debate and disagreement on the different courses open to the United States, a general consensus emerged among the principals about how to proceed. As Dexter Perkins explains, this is what gave the Doctrine its force:

For the Monroe Doctrine derives its power and authority neither from the name of Monroe, nor the labors of Adams, nor from the utterances of any other. Its power lies in the fact that it expressed what many men, great and humble, had thought, were thinking then, and were to think in the future. The ideas which it set forth were in the air. True or false, they were the views to which the common thought of America might respond.³⁷

To the extent that the decision-makers shared beliefs and expectations about the best way to approach security, about the ends and means of policy, and tried to fashion a coordinated and cohesive set of policies to address these threats, the Doctrine represents a grand strategy. While such a determination is unnecessary for the present argument, which focuses primarily on the articulated doctrine itself and its constituent elements, a shared and integrated strategic orientation is evident.

³⁶ Among the options considered, most prominent and alluring was the alternative of accepting Canning's proposal for a joint declaration and bandwagoning with the British. This is the path realism and neorealism would suggest given the relative weakness of the United States and the relative strength of the British, especially in terms of force projection capabilities. Monroe initially appeared inclined to accept the offer, as did some of the other principals, like Calhoun and Southard, as well as Jefferson and Madison, both of whom Monroe wrote requesting advice. Driving this propensity to bandwagon was the obvious power of England, the nation that could most harm the United States. As discussed below, this factor, while important was not significant enough to determine policy – a clear rebuke to realist and neorealist expectations. Instead, for reasons elaborated below, especially the perceptions of separateness and remoteness, American policy-makers chose to go their own way and pursue more of a hiding strategy. Interestingly enough, for domestic reasons – political, economic, and cultural – only lip service was paid to the possibility of internal balancing, of building up the United States to the point where it could legitimately defend itself.

For more on the thinking of the principals, see May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. See also the actual correspondence between Monroe and his Virginian predecessors in MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*.

³⁷ Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 103.

What type of orientation was it? How did the administration decide to deal with the threats they perceived? Their approach was neither balancing nor binding, neither assimilating nor accommodating. Most emphatically, it was not bandwagoning, as realists and neorealists might expect. Noting that the President “was averse to any course which should have the appearance of taking a position subordinate to that of Great Britain,” Adams makes it clear that the United States should “decline the overture of Great Britain.” As he put it, “It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.” According to Adams’s account, “this idea was acquiesced in on all accounts.”³⁸ While he also speaks of taking a “stand against the Holy Alliance,” such a stand was to be rhetorical and principled, not material or practical, and certainly not a committed policy of engagement or containment. No official assistance would be forthcoming from the United States to either Greek democrats or South American republics. If making a statement could help dissuade the European powers from further meddling in the Western hemisphere, this would be a welcome outcome; but, this was not the principal purpose, nor would it be supported by military action. The primary objective of the United States was to avoid conflicts with the European great powers on both sides of the Atlantic. The issuance of a statement and establishment of a claim of greater interests and rights – by virtue of proximity, as well as our regime type and recognition of independence – to the events in the Western hemisphere was but a secondary purpose of the Monroe Doctrine.

³⁸ Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, pp. 178-179.

More specifically, in terms of the substance of the message and of the associated statements and policies, the grand strategic approach articulated and adopted by the Monroe administration represented an aversive approach to threats and problems. Rather than try to balance the European powers or bandwagon with the British after their open invitation to do so, the Monroe administration decided to issue its own declaration – a combined response to the British, Russians, French, and Spanish – and to continue trying to minimize potentially conflictual interaction with these great powers – or, as Monroe phrased it in his first Inaugural Address, “to stand aloof from the contest”³⁹ – in both the Eastern and Western hemispheres. Such a unilateral course of non-entanglement (practiced in all but the commercial realms) can be best categorized as a type of hiding strategy, one that seeks to avoid threats, not to appease, confront, constrain, dominate, or eliminate them.

While some of the elements and causes of this strategy still are debated, most analysts and historians agree that the United States did, in fact, practice such an aversive policy, if not isolationism per se.⁴⁰ If we disaggregate the constituent dimensions of grand strategy, as suggested in Chapter 3, we find even more support for such a categorization and increase our N for hypothesis testing in the process. More specifically, in each of the three dimensions – motivational, cognitive, and operational –

³⁹ James Monroe, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817, in *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington to John F. Kennedy* (United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 29-36.

⁴⁰ As McDougall points out, this term, while widely used, does not arise until the 1890s and is a bit of a misnomer. He makes a convincing argument that the United States practiced unilateralism more than isolationism, but still sought “to minimize its exposure through a policy of abstention” (p. 44). See McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, Chapter 2.

the strategy appears very much like hiding, with significant geopolitical undercurrents and overtones.

In terms of motivation and the ends to be pursued, the interests of the United States clearly were limited, both absolutely and geographically, focusing on a minimalist and defensive set of objectives, including protecting territory, citizens, and commerce. In principle, the United States also sought to protect “our hemisphere” from further European incursions and to promote republican government, or the “American system.” As noted above, Monroe, Adams, and company purposefully refused to act in concert with the British, at least in part to leave open opportunities for further expansion.⁴¹ In this way, American policy-makers sought to limit others, but not themselves. But, far more important than this peripheral interest in potential avenues for territorial and political expansion was their primary concern with protecting a minimalist set of national interests and avoiding problems and threats.⁴²

⁴¹ As Jefferson confessed to Monroe, “I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which ever could be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being.” Jefferson, Personal correspondence to Monroe, October 24, 1823, cited in MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 71.

⁴² Clearly identifying such expansion as a “second interest,” Jefferson writes to Monroe, “I would have no hesitation abandoning my first wish [acquiring Cuba] to future chances, and accepting its independence, with peace and the friendship of England, rather than its association, at the expense of war and her enmity.” Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

Cognitively, as pointed out above, the primary threats identified were autocratic and reactionary continental European powers, especially the members of the Holy Alliance. Most pressing was the perceived threat posed by the restored monarchy in Spain, supported by France and Russia, toward its former possessions in the Americas. All of the principals also appeared to recognize the strength and potential threat posed by the British; but, they seemed less worried about England than about the Holy Alliance, especially after the former's withdrawal from the latter, as well as because of its more conservative ideology (conveyed in the Canning overture and, later, in the Polignac memorandum) and its distinct geopolitical identity as an off-shore, balancing maritime power. In more general terms, the most pressing threats were abroad, across the ocean in the "old world," or "Eastern hemisphere," but were limited by distance in their capacity to negatively affect American interests. The greatest opportunities, in contrast, were closer to home, in the "new world," or "Western hemisphere." While also considering power, regime type, and ideology, policy-makers' perceptions of both

As discussed below, the only exception to this aversive orientation was in commerce, where the United States, like other powers, great and small alike, sought to maximize its economic welfare through mercantilist practices. As important as such interests in commercial expansion may have been, they were identified by most of the principals as secondary to the objective of avoiding conflicts with the great powers, especially Britain. For more on the economic influences on American foreign policy, see the work of William Appleman Williams, including *The Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1750-1955*; *The Contours of American History* (World Publishing Co., 1961); *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (Random House, 1969); and *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Second Revised and Enlarged Edition (Dell Publishing Co., 1972). For a rebuttal to this type of economic determinism and a more nuanced argument about the sources of the Monroe Doctrine, one that admits that commercial interests mattered, but argues that so did an array of other variables – including personalities, politics, and geography – see the work of Dexter Perkins, particularly, *The Monroe Doctrine and Hands-Off*. At one point, alluding to the "preponderantly political character" of the policy debates at the time, Perkins notes that even with vested and growing commercial interests at work "in the background" and perhaps contributing "very materially" to different policies of the administration, "these facts would be a slender foundation on which to base an 'economic interpretation' of the Monroe Doctrine. And they are offset by many others." Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 80-81.

threats and opportunities were colored by their sense of distance from and connectedness to different regions and actors.

Finally, in terms of the operational dimension, non-military means were clearly most favored, with a preference, repeatedly stated, to resolve disputes through “amicable negotiation.” Further disaggregating this operational dimension into the three primary realms of grand strategy – military, political, and economic – expands our N, offers even more evidence for this categorization, and reveals additional geopolitical influences. In terms of these three dimensions, the Monroe Doctrine involved defensive minimalism, unilateral non-entanglement, and commercial opportunism – at least vis-à-vis its European rivals. Of these three, only the economic dimension fails to jibe with the definition of a hiding strategy offered in Chapter 2.

The military dimension, while addressed in rhetoric, was largely neglected in practice and clearly the weakest arm of the strategy. Despite all the talk of “progress,” building more forts, roads, and canals, and developing America’s defensive capacity in Monroe’s address and subsequent statements, little funding was made available and only a few improvements made. In 1823, the United States was a relatively weak power – essentially equivalent, perhaps, but a long way from its preponderant status today. The Navy, for example, could deal with pirates, but could not hope to withstand a unified assault by the Holy Alliance or a concentrated attack by the British admiralty. In short, the military approach of the Monroe administration was minimalist, the orientation defensive. While pointing out in his address that some additional forts had recently been completed, for instance, Monroe admits that they still lacked the cannon

and carriages necessary to defend them. Organization and discipline in the Regular Army were among the other military highlights he lists; unfortunately, the same claims of success could not be made concerning the militias, or capital stock.⁴³ Apparently preoccupied with economic and political considerations, among other factors, most policy-makers were reluctant to spend too much or act like the militaristic and autocratic Europeans they were castigating. At no point did the United States threaten to meet or defeat its adversaries, or even to take the battle to them. Instead, the United States would try to protect its territory, citizens, and commerce against foreign infringements, but no more. Such a posture of defensive minimalism fits perfectly with a hiding grand strategy.

Politically, the picture was much the same – with grandiose rhetoric but little in the way of practical commitments. With the Neutrality Proclamation of 1794, the United States had committed itself to stay out of European conflicts. Why get involved with someone else’s problems, especially when they were so strong, so different, and so far away? Entangling alliances were, as Washington and Jefferson both warned, to be avoided except in dire emergencies, and then adopted only for brief, expedient purposes. While stating America’s interest in resolving disputes through “amicable negotiation,” and emphasizing the political arm of grand strategy, Monroe’s address suggests only limited political engagement, and even then with restrained rhetoric and an emphasis on unilateralism and bilateralism. Greece and South America, for example, both received mention and wishes of good luck in their republican journeys –

⁴³ Monroe, Seventh Annual Message.

as Adams phrased it, “in general terms, pledging nothing”⁴⁴ – but no substantive offers of support were tendered, either in 1823 or immediately thereafter. Even a broad and principled rhetorical defense of Republicanism, suggested by Adams in his initial draft of a response to Baron Tuvill, was omitted from the President’s address and from the final communiqué read to the Baron for fear of unnecessarily antagonizing the same potential adversaries who had been lecturing the United States about “political systems.”

Only in the economic realm, where the pursuit of profits was deemed acceptable both at home and abroad, did the administration’s practices come close to matching its rhetoric. In fact, some analysts have suggested that such commercial interests, condoned and encouraged by every administration since our founding, helped drive American policy-makers to reject the British offer, particularly in order to retain the possibility of not only commercially interacting with the South American states but perhaps also incorporating various parts of the hemisphere (like Cuba, Puerto Rico, Texas, California, etc.) into our growing continental empire.⁴⁵ Since its inception, the United States had practiced commercial opportunism, taking advantage of profitable circumstances wherever possible. While there were occasional nods in the direction of

⁴⁴ Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 198.

⁴⁵ See, for example, the work of William Appleman Williams, including *The Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1750-1955*; *The Contours of American History* (World Publishing Co., 1961); *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (Random House, 1969); and *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Second Revised and Enlarged Edition (Dell Publishing Co., 1972). For a rebuttal to this type of economic revisionism and a more nuanced argument about the sources of the Monroe Doctrine, one that admits that commercial interests mattered, but argues that so did an array of other variables – including personalities, politics, and geography – see the work of Dexter Perkins, particularly, *The Monroe Doctrine and Hands-Off*. At one point, referring to the “preponderantly political character” of the policy debates at the time, Perkins notes that even with vested and growing commercial interests at work “in the background” and perhaps contributing “very materially” to different the policies of the administration, “these facts would be a slender foundation on which to base an ‘economic interpretation’ of the Monroe Doctrine. And they are offset by many others.” Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 80-81.

free trade, most economic practices involved some degree of mercantile activity, especially protecting and promoting infant industries in strategic sectors from international competition, which was the *modus operandi* of most states during this era.¹⁶ So, in terms of the policy grid offered earlier, commercial activity was high and the orientation mixed – a policy combination that continues for the most part through the current era, free trade rhetoric notwithstanding.

In summary, this combination of defensive minimalism, unilateral non-entanglement, and, to a lesser extent, commercial opportunism, as the three branches of grand strategy during the Monroe administration, supports the claim that the Doctrine was, by and large, a type of hiding strategy, at least *vis-à-vis* the great European powers. The same is true of the next, higher level of variables – the motivational, cognitive, and operational dimensions. In each of these areas – the narrow definition of national interests and security, the perception of distant threats and close opportunities, and the preference for non-military means – additional support is offered for the classification of the Monroe Doctrine as a hiding strategy. Thus classified, let us now turn our attention to the relationship between this strategy and the underlying geopolitical environment.

¹⁶ For more on these mercantile principles and practices, see Edward Meade Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Causal Connections: Mental Maps and Imagined Distance

Given this categorization of the Monroe Doctrine as a hiding strategy and the previous classification of the interaction capacity as weak, a correlation appears between the independent and dependent variables as hypothesized. In fact, correlations appear in every dimension save the commercial, where the United States practiced a more intense and unrelenting policy of engagement, despite great distances and limited interaction capacity. While intellectually interesting, this one outlier is less relevant to the project at hand than the overwhelming tendency in the other realms to practice non-engagement and more of a hiding strategy. For the other six dependent variables (the grand strategy itself; the motivational, cognitive, and operational elements; and the military and political dimensions), a clear correlation is evident with the low level of interaction capacity, thus offering support for my variable-specific geopolitical hypotheses.

Correlations are one thing, however; what about causation? In this case, abundant evidence supports the hypothesis that the principals considered geopolitical factors during the decision-making process and did so along the lines hypothesized. More specifically, both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the central doctrinal documents and associated state papers suggests that geopolitical factors, particularly policy-makers' perceptions of connectedness, not only were considered, but also were among the most important contributing causes of the specific formulation of the Monroe

Doctrine.⁴⁷ Imagined distance thus served as an intervening variable poised between the independent variable, the objective reality of the material world, and the dependent variable, the identification of strategic preferences and articulation of particular defensive policies. Additional support for this significant but mediated influence of geopolitics is found in the prevailing discourse among the principals – before, during, and after the decision-making process associated with the Doctrine⁴⁸ – as well as in the cartography of the era. Let us examine in more detail how the policy-makers thought about the environment and how they translated this into strategic policy.

The principals – especially Monroe and Adams – certainly were aware of the unique position of the United States, its distance from Europe, and its proximity to South America, or at least to the Caribbean and Central America. Explicit references to such circumstances are found in every major document associated with this doctrine, with multiple references in most. In the actual statement, Monroe’s Seventh Annual Message, for example, 25 of 185 sentences (14%) and 8 of 50 paragraphs (16%) deal

⁴⁷ Working forward chronologically, the most important sources of this Doctrine include the following: Adams’s communication with Tuyll, Rush, and Middleton in July; Rush’s communication with Adams and Monroe in early October; Monroe’s communications with Jefferson and Madison in late October; Adams’s communication to Tuyll on November 15; Adams’s communication to Tuyll and Rush in late November; and Monroe’s actual address on December 2. These are available in a variety of sources, including Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*, Vol. VI; and Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine,” I and II; and Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II.

⁴⁸ As discussed in Chapter 3, the primary difference between content analysis and discursive analysis concerns, in conventional usage, quantitative versus qualitative analysis, respectively, although one can conduct both with either. Among the most important additional sources for this discursive analysis are the papers, writings, and memoirs of the principals, especially Monroe and Adams, found in Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*; Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*; Ford, ed., *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*; Monroe, *The Autobiography of James Monroe*; and Adams, *Memoirs*.

directly and primarily with geopolitical features.⁴⁹ The dozens of geographical references in this address range from names of states, bodies of water, and features (e.g., coast, frontier, climate, boundary, etc.) to more revealing language concerning the location and position of the United States, particularly relative to the “European powers” on “that side of the Atlantic” and to “our southern brethren” in “this hemisphere.”⁵⁰

Other documents reveal similar awareness with varying levels of references according to subject and audience. Consider, for example, the official instructions Adams sent to Middleton and Rush on July 22 concerning the “Northwest Coast of America,” two important state papers, which, along with an interview conducted with Tuyll on July 17, were important preliminary elements of the “larger system of policy” crafted by Adams and Monroe.⁵¹ Beyond laying the groundwork for the later doctrinal pronouncements, these statements were laden with geographical references. Of the fifty sentences and twenty-two paragraphs in the Middleton memo, for instance, roughly one quarter of each directly address geographical subjects, including scores of references to names (e.g., Pacific, Asiatic, etc.); features (e.g., islands, rivers, harbors, bays, creeks, etc.); and bearings (e.g., north, south, east, and west), as well as to “continuity of

⁴⁹ This is to be contrasted with 49 of 185 sentences (27%) and 20 of 50 paragraphs (40%) about power; 15 sentences (8%) and 6 paragraphs (12%) about norms; 8 sentences (4%) and 2 paragraphs (4%) about domestic politics and regime type; and only 4 sentences (2%) and 1 paragraph (2%) about ideology, in particular, about Greece. Monroe, *Seventh Annual Message*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ For more on the importance of these statements, especially as they pertain to the non-colonization principle, see Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 11-19. For the complete texts, see *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, Vol. V.

possessions,” “territorial claim,” “boundary line,” and “water communications.”⁵² Most significant is the repeated reference to the “continent of North America” and to the “Northwest Coast of America.”⁵³ Adams not only denies “erroneous” Russian claims and asserts America’s “unquestionable” rights over the coast (primarily between the 42nd and the 49th parallel, and ideally up to the 55th degree of north latitude) on the basis of acquisition, discovery, and contiguity, but also clearly reveals an entrenched mental map of the United States that extends across the continent and connects the eastern and western parts via a river network: “This territory is to the United States of an importance which no possession in North America can be of to any European nation, not only as it is but the continuity of their possessions from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, but as it offers their inhabitants the means of establishing water communications from the one to the other.”⁵⁴

The related set of instructions Adams sent to Rush on that same day offers even more powerful evidence of geographic awareness and concern, as well as an early statement of the non-colonization principle and hints of “manifest destiny.”⁵⁵ Similarly focusing on the “present condition of the Northwest Coast of this Continent,” the structure of this letter is dominated by geographic references, with roughly half of the

⁵² Adams to Middleton, No. 16, Instructions, July 22, 1823, in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, Vol. V.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ In terms of the former, Adams clearly states: “the American continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization.” In terms of the latter, consider the following phraseology: “It is not imaginable that, in the present condition of the world, any European nation should entertain the project of settling a colony on the Northwest Coast of America. That the United States should form establishments there, with views of absolute territorial rights and inland communications, is not only to be expected, but is pointed out by the finger of nature....” Adams to Rush, No. 70, July 22, 1823, *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, Vol. V, pp. 446-448.

sentences and paragraphs directly concerning geopolitics. As above, references included names, features, and bearings. Again, Adams talks specifically about “boundaries” and “borders,” makes several explicit references to “adjoining” and “adjacent” lands and seas, and, most importantly, expressly notes the “distance,” in terms of miles, separating different territories.⁵⁶

Although not as extensive, a similar pattern of using geographic language and references is evident in the later state papers that complete the “system of policy.” Consider, for instance, Adams’s response to Tully, entitled *Observations on the Communications Recently Received from the Minister of Russia*, dated November 27. Roughly one fifth of the paragraphs of this critical text are dedicated to geopolitics, including references to the “new World,” to the “Powers of Europe,” and, repeatedly, to the “American hemisphere.” While considerations of regime type also factor prominently into this address (and even more so into its first draft), Adams and the Cabinet were not only aware of their geographic surroundings and their connectedness to others, but, as discussed below, defined and differentiated America’s position, interests, and policies in starkly geographic terms.⁵⁷

Although varying in number according to the audience, purpose, and subject of a particular statement, all of the other state papers associated with the Monroe Doctrine contain similar geographic references. Quantitative content analysis of the central documents reveals clearly that the policy-makers in this case were aware of geopolitical features. The question is not whether they were thinking about geopolitics, but how.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ For the text of this document and a thorough discussion of its evolution, see Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, I.”

More specifically, in what terms were they thinking about their position and what influence did this have on their policy choices? How did they perceive their location and connectedness to others? Moreover, to what extent did these “mental maps” accurately reflect the actual degree of material separation? Finally, how were these mental maps then translated into strategic preferences and policy statements? Is there evidence linking the two sides of this causal chain? In this case, there is, and plenty of it. The abundant evidence suggests that the decision-makers were acutely aware of the high degree of material separation and the weakness of interaction capacity, as were their predecessors, and formulated their foreign policies accordingly. More specifically, rich cartographic and textual evidence reveals tangible and mental maps that clearly and accurately reflect the relatively remote geographic position of the United States vis-à-vis its primary European rivals and the beliefs of American policy-makers that, because of this location, it was possible and appropriate for the United States to pursue an aversive grand strategy.⁵⁸

One of the most obvious indications of causal connections involves the “doctrine of the two spheres,” the “American system,” and the “dictum of Abstention,” initially put forward by Adams and others in the 1790s, embraced by most American policy-makers in the early nineteenth century, and underpinning the Monroe Doctrine.⁵⁹ Emphasizing the differences between the two “systems,” Adams and others believed

⁵⁸ That it may also have been “desirable” may be the product of this situational variable intermingling with other international and domestic factors, particularly the expected costs of confronting the Europeans in their own game and the regime type and political culture of the United States. The argument here is not that geopolitical landscape alone determined or drove the Americans to hide, only that it made such a course of action possible and palatable in the near term.

⁵⁹ For more on these and the related notion of the “American system,” see Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 364-366; and McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, Chapter 3.

that the Old World and the New World “should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible,” and that European monarchies had practices which might be suitable for that “quarter of the world,” while the new American republics were set apart from such travails, free to practice a different approach to foreign relations, one of “abstaining” from participation in European politics, which reflected both our position and our constitution.⁶⁰

Of course, this perception of American separateness and distance from Europe arose long before the Monroe administration. In his famous and influential pamphlet, *Common Sense*, published in January 1776, Thomas Paine eloquently and forcefully pointed out the differences and distance between the “old world” and the “new world” and, considering these, the need to break away.⁶¹ In his analysis, two geopolitical facts loomed large and conditioned America’s relations with Great Britain: size and distance. Capturing the essence of Henrikson’s notion of gravitational distance,⁶² Paine argues that the enormous size differential in America’s favor made continued subordination untenable and, ultimately, made separate systems and spheres of interest necessary:

Small islands not capable of protecting themselves are the proper objects for government to take under their care; but there is something absurd, in supposing a Continent to be perpetually governed by an island. In no instance hath nature made the satellite larger than its primary planet; and as England and America, with respect to each other, reverse the common order of nature, it is evident that they belong to separate systems. England to Europe; America to itself.⁶³

⁶⁰ Quotations from Adams to Middleton, July 5, 1820, in Ford, ed., *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, Vol. VII, pp. 50-51. As inaccurate as a strict interpretation of the doctrine of “two spheres” might have been – considering, for example, continued European colonies in the Western hemisphere – it still represented a central theme of the address and the associated policies and corresponded roughly with prevailing conceptions and general circumstances. For more on this last line of argument, see Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 70-71.

⁶¹ Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, January 10, 1776, in Marvin Meyers et al., eds., *Sources of the American Republic: A Documentary History of Politics, Society, and Thought* (Scott, Foresman and Co., 1967), pp. 131-135.

⁶² See Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy.”

⁶³ Paine, *Common Sense*, p. 134.

Beyond this remarkable elaboration of size differential and core-periphery relations.

Paine lays out in equally clear terms the fundamental problem of physical distance – an early version of the loss-of-strength gradient – for statesmen on both sides of the

Atlantic:

As to government matters, 'tis not in the power of Britain to do this continent justice: the business of it will soon be too weighty and intricate to be managed with any tolerable degree of convenience, by a power so distant from us, and so very ignorant of us. To always be running three or four thousand miles with a tale or petition, waiting four or five months for an answer, which, when obtained, requires five or six more to explain it, will in a few years be looked upon as folly and childishness. There was a time when it was proper, and a proper time for it to cease.

At the time of his writing, communication and transportation technologies could not easily overcome the space between England and America; Paine is not only aware of this distance, but expresses it clearly in terms of both miles and travel times.

Conceiving this vast distance as a sign from higher powers against connections, Paine sees the two entities as destined to be separate and argues, "'tis time to part."⁶⁴ The practical policy implications of these circumstances were "the doctrine of separation and independence," the avoidance of "partial connections" with any parts of Europe, and, most importantly, the need "to steer clear of European contentions."⁶⁵

A decade later, in Federalist No. 11, Alexander Hamilton clearly called for a separate "American system" and for the states to unite and assume their "natural" position of leadership within this system.⁶⁶ Describing the world as "divided into four parts" – Europe, Africa, Asia, and America – Hamilton emphasizes "all the tempting

⁶⁴ As he writes, "Everything that is right or reasonable pleads for separation.... Even the distance at which the Almighty hath placed England and America is a strong and natural proof that the authority of one over the other, was never the design of Heaven." *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

⁶⁶ *The Federalist Papers* (Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 84-91.

advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach.”⁶⁷ He specifically refers to “our position,” to the need to manage “the connection between the old world and the new world” and, more than once, to our “situation” – one “so favorable” that it “enables us” and “invites us” to “aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs.” The geopolitical perspective and possibilistic logic are clear. While policy choices still were open, not dictated, America was distant from Europe and situated in the Western hemisphere; given this location and the state of technological and capital development, the principal concerns and relative advantage of the United States lay close to home. Most important, according to Hamilton, were the economic interests and opportunities that lay at our fingertips; the Union, from this perspective, should capitalize on its geographic advantages with a policy of “active commerce” protected by a new federal navy.⁶⁸

This understanding of America’s separateness was widely held, reiterated by numerous thinkers and policy-makers, and formed the cognitive framework for many statements and policies of the early American government. Consider, for example, the rationale for avoiding political ties and foreign entanglements offered by George Washington (and drafted at least in part by Hamilton) in his famous Farewell Address of 1796:

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 90 and 87, respectively.

⁶⁸ In calling for this naval capability, Hamilton appears to hold no illusions about competing for naval primacy with the Europeans, especially in other parts of the world. Instead, his ends are more limited, in terms of capital and geography, focusing on the construction of a small force that could serve as “off-shore balancer.” As he explains, “There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more particularly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies.” Federalist No. 11, in Ibid., p. 87.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very *remote* relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics....

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance;...when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation....

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice.⁶⁹

Beyond the geopolitical language here, the underlying logic is clear as well. America already was removed from Europe: why go to any lengths to jeopardize our security, spend our capital, and embroil ourselves in distant affairs when we have so much here at home and such a great gulf separating us? As McDougall puts it: “Their geopolitical position was so favorable that only they themselves could foul it up.”⁷⁰ Instead of blundering into European problems, Washington and Hamilton argued, the Union should adopt a “respectable defensive posture” and “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”⁷¹

This logic, put into practice with such policies as the Neutrality Proclamation of 1794, was pervasive in the early nineteenth century. It was embraced by most American policy-makers, including Thomas Jefferson, who was one of Monroe’s closest confidants. In his Inaugural Address, Jefferson reiterated themes similar to Washington. Referring to the United States as “this distant and peaceful shore.” Jefferson was keenly aware of the separation between America and Europe and actively

⁶⁹ Cited in Thomas P. Brockway, ed., *Basic Documents in United States Foreign Policy* (D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957), p. 19. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁰ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, p. 42.

⁷¹ Washington, Farewell Address, p. 19.

sought to fashion United States foreign relations in order to capitalize on this position: “Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe,” the United States should pursue “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”⁷² Even more direct and compelling is Jefferson’s language concerning South America and Mexico, as expressed in a letter to Alexander Humboldt dated December 6, 1813:

But in whatever governments they [the South Americans] end they will be American governments, no longer to be involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe. The European nations constitute a *separate division of the globe; their localities make them part of a distinct system; they have a set of interests of their own* in which it is our business never to engage ourselves. It must have *its separate system of interests*, which must not be subordinated to those of Europe. *The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent*, should so far avail it that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the *wide oceans which separate us from them*. And it will be so.⁷³

This type of explicit reference to geopolitical factors supports directly my hypotheses about the influence of geopolitics on the formation of grand strategy. Moreover, the specific terms employed – including separate, distinct, and insulated – and imagery of divisions of the globe, broken into quarters, and the inability of the “sparks of war” to traverse the “wide oceans” clearly reveal perceptions of remoteness, distance, and relative isolation. We were not, in Jefferson’s conceptualization, close or even connected to Europe. Moreover, this imagined distance contributed to different sets of

⁷² Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, in *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington to John F. Kennedy* (United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 13-16.

⁷³ Cited in MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 33-34. (Emphasis added.)

interests and identities, which even more profoundly “separate us from them.” Just the opposite, allegedly, held intra-American relations.⁷⁴

As significant and telling as such views might seem, they were not unique.⁷⁵ Common at the time was the usage of terms like “that side of the Atlantic” and “the American continents.” Even more customary was the practice of describing and mapping the earth in “quarters” or “hemispheres.” In fact, most maps of the era present two distinct hemispheres narrowly joined by a thin passage near the equator in the Atlantic; many are actually broken into two separate maps; and some are even presented in four quarters. (See Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D for illustrations of the first two types.)

⁷⁴ It is important to note here the fundamental difference and disconnect between policy-makers’ perceptions of the environment and the underlying, objective reality – that which they perceive. In the instance at hand, this perception of greater closeness and connectedness with the Americas was based on a rudimentary and incomplete understanding of the geographic circumstances. More correctly, it failed to take into account the full range of geographic variables – including winds – and the prevailing technologies – namely, sailing vessels. Thus, while the mileage south may have been less than to Europe, the fastest routes to South America actually involved sailing the Westerlies north of the equator across to the Canary Islands and then riding the trade winds back across the Southern Atlantic. This point would bear as well on any attempted enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in South America. Far from being able to remain aloof from Europe and its troubles, enforcement of the doctrine would require the United States to sail across the Atlantic and engage the Europeans on their side of the Atlantic, before they could make that same trip southwest on the trade winds. In this respect, as Spykman notes, “geography played an amusing trick on the distinguished statesman [Monroe] who solemnly incorporated in one pronouncement our determination to defend the Western hemisphere and our intention to stay out of Europe.” Of course, Monroe and company never actually claimed to be defenders of the hemisphere, only to have a higher level of interest than Europe. The example and quotation come from Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, pp. 72-73.

⁷⁵ As a fellow Virginian, former President, and confidant of Monroe, Jefferson’s views were, however, more important than most. In fact, his opinion, along with Madison’s, on the Canning proposal was requested by and provided to Monroe in correspondence in late October. In his letter, dated October 24, Jefferson reiterates this American system, or two spheres, argument, with a degree of clarity and force, especially concerning the medium and context, that might have swayed Monroe’s views, if, in fact, they ever differed. In doing so, he also lays down the two basic precepts of the doctrine described above: “Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.” Cited in MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 70.




Figure 4A Mathew Carey, "A Map of the World from the Best Authorities" (US, 1815)
 Source: <http://lweb2.loc.gov>




Figure 4B "Map of the Globe," *Boston School Atlas* (US, 1830)
 Source: <http://maps.library.umass.edu>



Figure 4C

William Faden, "Western Hemisphere/New World" (UK, 1786)

Source: <http://memory.loc.gov>



Figure 4D William Faden, "Eastern Hemisphere/Old World" (UK, 1786)
Source: <http://memory.loc.gov>



Figure 4E Fielding Lucas, Jr., "Western Hemisphere" (US, 1823)
Source: www.davidrumsey.com



Figure 4F

Fielding Lucas, Jr., "Eastern Hemisphere" (US, 1823)
Source: www.davidrumsey.com

Consider, for example, the 58 world maps dated between 1800 and 1823 held in the United States Library of Congress.⁷⁶ Of these, 53 percent are hemispheric and an additional 10 percent are quartered. Moreover, the hemispheric maps often identified the two sides from the European perspective with the Americas on the left labeled as the “Western hemisphere” or the “New World” and Europe, Asia, and Africa on the right labeled as the “Eastern Hemisphere” or the “Old World.” A similar Eurocentrism influenced the naming of some of the features, including the Atlantic Ocean, which some maps, including one pair published in the United States in 1823 (reproduced as Figures 4E and 4F), referred to as the “Western Ocean.” Powerful, indeed, is the influence of conventional ideas and language if a cartographer and publisher standing on the Atlantic seaboard of the Americas, looking due East, continue to refer to that body of water as the “Western Ocean.” Here, as with the greater perceived closeness to South America,⁷⁷ we see the power of perceptions of the environment in the formulation of policies, in juxtaposition to the greater power of the objective environment in the operational sphere. In other words, how policy-makers view the world around them influences their strategic preferences and selection of policies more than the way that world actually may be; but, if and when those policies are put into practice, the perceptual environment recedes and the operational environment comes to the fore, serving as a testing ground, a stage on which strategies must be played out.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Reviewed in the Geography and Map Reading Room, Library of Congress, Madison Building, Washington, DC, November 27 and 29, 2003.

⁷⁷ See fn. 73.

⁷⁸ This is the essence of my bifurcated causal argument, initially put forward by the Sprouts, which is strongly supported by the evidence in this case. For more on this theoretical framework, see my exposition in Chapter 2 and the Sprouts, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*.

Monroe, Adams, and company were keenly aware of these discursive and cartographic conventions, their language imbued with such imagery.⁷⁹




Figure 4G

Mitchell's Map, 1775

Source: www.usm.maine.edu/~maps/mitchell/full1.jpeg

⁷⁹ Thus far, I have found only one reference to a specific map in any of their writings during this time. In his *Memoirs*, Adams refers in June 1823 to "Mitchell's Map" and the need to find a mutually agreeable map to serve as the basis for the resolution of the "Northern boundary" dispute with the British. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, pp. 148 and 156-157, respectively. For a reproduction of Mitchell's Map, see Figure 4G.

According to Walter McDougall, another important map of the era was Mellish's map of the "Southern Section of the United States" (1816), which was used by Adams and the Spanish Minister, Luis de Onis, in their negotiation of the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. For a reproduction of this map, see Figure 4H.




Figure 4H Mellish's Map of "Southern Section of the United States" (1816)
Source: www.libs.uga.edu/darchive/hargrett/maps/1816m4.jpg

In Monroe's first Inaugural Address in 1817, for example, he speaks of "the highly favored condition of our country"; argues that "never did a government commence under auspices so favorable"; and expressly connects geography and security, noting how "our distance from Europe...may form some security against these [European] dangers."⁸⁰ In another passage, he points to situational "circumstances" and geographic "considerations" – particularly location, climate, and natural resources – as principal contributors to the country's well being. Emphasizing "our peculiar felicity." Monroe

⁸⁰ James Monroe, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817, in *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington to John F. Kennedy* (United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 29-36.

concludes that “no country was ever happier with respect to its domain.”⁸¹ At the same time he sees some degree of protection provided by distance in the international realm, he also notes the potential role for technological developments in the domestic realm, like building of canals and roads, to “shorten distances, and, by making each part more accessible to and dependent on the other, we shall bind the Union more closely together.”⁸² In other words, the insularity provided by the Atlantic offered America the opportunity to pursue a different approach to international relations – to avoid entanglements and avert threats, to hide, at least militarily – while the increasing interaction capacity at home encouraged a deepening and broadening of ties and connections and more of a binding strategy – a subject to which we will return in Chapter 6.

Subsequent statements by Monroe and his administration offer much of the same imagery. His Annual Messages, as State of the Unions were then called, for example, contain numerous references to geographic features and clearly distinguish between the vast distance between Europe and America, on one hand, and the increasing connections in the domestic arena. When referring to American “interest” in the emerging circumstances between Spain and its former colonies in his first Message, for example, Monroe considers it only “natural that our citizens should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors.”⁸³ In his Second Annual Message, Monroe picks

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 31.

⁸² Ibid., p. 33.

⁸³ James Monroe, First Annual Message, December 2, 1817, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 11-20. This address and the other seven, plus both Inaugural Addresses, also are available online in the Presidential section of The American Revolution HTML Project at <http://odur.lct.rug.nl/~usa/P/index.htm>.

up a similar theme of geography and security when talking about problems with the indigenous population in the southeast, noting how only “an imaginary line which separates Florida from the United States” and how “their proximity to us enable them to perpetrate” a range of “outrageous” and “illegal” behaviors.⁸⁴ Certainly thinking in geopolitical terms, Monroe, in his Third Annual Message, offers a statement on Spain’s troubled imperial relationship with its former colonies that echoes Jefferson’s earlier views and reflects clearly a classic loss-of-strength gradient perspective: “The distance of the colonies from the parent country and the great extent of their population and resources gave them advantages which it was anticipated at a very early period would be difficult for Spain to surmount.”⁸⁵ In another Address, his sixth, he again hits geopolitical themes, repeatedly referring to “this hemisphere,” emphasizing “the peculiar felicity of our situation,” and arguing, “distant as we are from the troubled scene [Europe]... we might reasonably presume that we should not be molested by them.”⁸⁶ Here, a clear connection between geography and perceptions of threat is evident.

Essentially similar geopolitical themes, logic, and language animate his Seventh Annual Message, the actual doctrinal pronouncement, given on December 2, 1823. In

Lost again, however, is the geopolitical reality that we were closer to Europe, in terms of travel time, than we were to South America. What matters most, though, in the formative stage is not geography or technology as it exists as much as how it is perceived or imagined.

⁸⁴ James Monroe, Second Annual Message, November 16, 1818, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 39-47.

⁸⁵ James Monroe, Third Annual Message, December 7, 1819, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 54-62.

⁸⁶ James Monroe, Sixth Annual Message, December 3, 1822, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 185-195.

this statement, we find not just geographic references but obvious and direct connections between perceptions of distance and strategic interests and preferences – in particular, between a sense of separation from Europe and an aversive approach to the great powers and between a sense of closeness, however misunderstood, and a claim of greater interests within the hemisphere. In this sense, Monroe offered a forceful differentiation of America’s interests and policies that was based at least in part on the geopolitical separation, or physical distance, as well as on political similarity, or attributional distance, both of which pointed in the same direction.⁸⁷ First, consider, his characterization of America’s relations with Europe:

Of events in *that quarter of the globe*, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on *that side of the Atlantic*. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do....⁸⁸

The sense of distance and separateness is palpable and directly contributes to a differentiated identity – of that side of the Atlantic and this side, of their quarter and our hemisphere, and of them versus us. This stands in stark contrast to Monroe’s description of intra-American affairs, which is teeming with references to connections and closeness. As he clearly states: “With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.”⁸⁹ Such differentiation was to be expected. To Monroe, Adams, and their contemporaries, as well as in hindsight, this was simply a

⁸⁷ For more on these different notions of distance, see Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy.”

⁸⁸ Monroe, Seventh Annual Message.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

matter of recognizing reality and stating the obvious. As Monroe put it: “in regard to those continents [Europe and South America] circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.” In his elaboration of these differences and his comparison of events in Europe and those concerning “our southern brethren,” Monroe specifically emphasizes “their distance from each other” and characterizes the position of the United States vis-à-vis Europe as “most remote,” as opposed to “more immediately connected” vis-à-vis South America.⁹⁰ The two different policy approaches announced in this doctrine – trying to avoid European problems and trying to keep them away from us – clearly flow from geopolitical thinking and from this imagined distance from Europe and connectedness to South America.

Subsequent statements by Monroe reveal the depth of these views. In a letter to Jefferson, written shortly after the address, Monroe confides, that he regards “the cause of that country [South America] as essentially our own.”⁹¹ In January, he offered more of the same logic and language in a report on the Navy transmitted to the House of Representatives: “Situated as we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with its affairs,”⁹² American security and grand strategy could be based largely on geopolitical foundations. Our location thousands of miles from the European powers provided an exit option, a buffer zone, and the luxury of not having to play the game of European power politics. Nevertheless, Monroe argued, prudence dictated the construction of an “adequate naval force” for two basic purposes: “the first, to prevent

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Monroe to Jefferson, December 4, 1823, in Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*, p. 342.

⁹² James Monroe, Report to the House of Representatives of the United States, January 30, 1824, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 222-225.

war so long as that may be practicable; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable.”⁹³ Later that year, he reiterated the same elementary geopolitical arguments concerning the avoidance of European travails in his eighth and final Annual Message: “Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, can not affect us.”⁹⁴ Just the opposite was true for South America: “But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns ... without affecting us.”⁹⁵

The President was not the only Cabinet member to hold or express such views. John Quincy Adams, his Secretary of State, the author or co-author of many of the

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ James Monroe, Eighth Annual Message, December 7, 1824, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 248-264.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

doctrinal statements, shared and stated many similar sentiments.⁹⁶ Consider, for example, the language and logic of the official response he relayed to Baron Tuyll on November 27.⁹⁷ With 20 percent of his paragraphs emphasizing geopolitical themes, second only to regime type, Adams certainly was thinking along the same lines as Monroe. He clearly differentiated the “Powers” and “Affairs” of Europe from the “New World,” what he repeatedly refers to as the “American Hemisphere.”⁹⁸ Our policies toward Europe, Adams assures Tuyll, remain unchanged: the United States has practiced neutrality and “studiously kept themselves aloof. They have not sought...to disturb the peace, or to intermeddle with the policy of any part of Europe.”⁹⁹ Given our

⁹⁶ Less important for grand strategic purposes is who actually authored which document or who deserves credit for which part of the doctrine. In this case, it appears that most of the principals came to agree with Adams’s views, if only by “the force of their reason,” but, more importantly, all seemed to share an underlying belief structure about the location and position of the United States vis-à-vis Europe and South America that directly influenced their choice of and comfort with the aversive strategy put forward by Monroe in his doctrinal address. As Bemis writes, “It was a native national product. No one person was its author. It grew out of a half-century of American independence and republican success... It embodied the experience of American diplomacy from the time of George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, to that of James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and John Quincy Adams. It crystallized the instinctive aversion of American popular sovereignty to European monarchy, colonization, and imperialism.” Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, p. 407. As noted above, Dwight Perkins offers a similar take on joint authorship and a deep-rooted, shared conceptual framework. See Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine*, Chapter 3, especially pp. 95-103. For an account that emphasizes the authorship of Adams, see Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine,” I and II. For a rebuttal and one that emphasizes the role of Monroe, see MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*. For examples of accounts emphasizing other specific contributions, see Thomas Davis, Jr., “Carlos de Alvear and James Monroe: New Light on the Origin of the Monroe Doctrine,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1943); T. R. Schellenberg, “Jeffersonian Origins of the Monroe Doctrine,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1934); Laura Bornholdt, “The Abbe de Pradt and the Monroe Doctrine,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 1944); and Charles Lyon Chandler, “The Pan American Origin of the Monroe Doctrine,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 1914).

⁹⁷ Adams to Tuyll, Observations on the Communication recently received from the Minister of Russia, November 27, 1823, in Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II.”

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

distance, such an aversive policy made perfect sense.¹⁰⁰ But, the situation concerning the “South-American Nations” was perceived to be fundamentally different – “relations the more important to the interests of the United States, as the whole of those emancipated Regions are situated in their own Hemisphere, and as the most extensive, populous, and powerful of the new Nations are in their immediate vicinity; and one of them bordering upon the Territories of this Union.”¹⁰¹ All that is missing here is Monroe’s quip about it being “obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.”¹⁰²

Even more pointed and powerful references and causal linkages are evident in Adams’s final communications with Rush concerning the official response to Canning’s proposal.¹⁰³ First, the two worlds were clearly separate: on one hand, he refers to a multitude of specifically “European” terms, including Allies, Sovereigns, Alliance, Congress, Politics, potentates, principles and interests, and community; and, on the

¹⁰⁰ As Adams confides in his memoirs, “Empires, kingdoms, principalities, had been overthrown, revolutionized, and counter-revolutionized, and we had looked on safe in our distance beyond an intervening ocean, and avowing a total forbearance to interfere in any of the combinations of European politics.” Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 195. Note the successive clauses (the second and third) concerning “distance” and “forbearance” – a strong indication of at least conceptual if not causal linkage.

¹⁰¹ Adams to Tuyl, Observations on the Communication recently received from the Minister of Russia, November 27, 1823, in Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II.”

¹⁰² Monroe, Seventh Annual Message. Also missing is any explicit reference to the “natural” inclination or destiny of the United States to expand in the Western hemisphere, especially considering size and location. In one passage in his *Memoirs*, Adams claims “our proper dominion to be the continent of North America,” and argues that “it is a physical, moral, and political absurdity that such fragments of territory [the European colonies in the hemisphere], with sovereigns at fifteen hundred [sic] miles beyond the sea ... should exist permanently contiguous to a great powerful and rapidly-growing nation.” Given that it was “unavoidable that the remainder of the continent should ultimately be ours,” he reasoned to himself in 1819, the United States should pursue and state as much: “until Europe shall find it a settled geographic element that the United States and North America are identical, any effort on our part to reason the world out of a belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy.” Such ideas appear to have borne fruit in succeeding administrations. Passage from Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. IV, pp. 438-439, cited in Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, p. 367.

¹⁰³ Adams to Rush, No. 77, November 29, 1823, in Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II.”

other hand, he talks about “American” interests, Nations, Affairs, and Continents.¹⁰⁴

From this perspective, the two systems were disconnected and had little in common; significant degrees of both physical and attributional distance separated them. In a passage elucidating the different policy implications that flowed from this thinking, Adams highlights the causal connections between such geopolitical conceptions and strategic preferences:

The observations of Mr. Canning in reply to your remark, that the policy of the United States has hitherto been, entirely distinct and separate from all interference in the complications of European Politics, have great weight, and the considerations involved in them, had already been subjects of much deliberation among ourselves. As a member of the European community Great Britain has relations with all of the other powers of Europe, which the United States have not, and with which it is their unaltered determination, not to interfere. But American Affairs, whether or the Northern or the Southern Continent can henceforth not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the Rights and Interests of the United States themselves, that they cannot be left at the disposal of the European Powers animated and directed exclusively by European principles and interests.¹⁰⁵

Here, Adams admits unambiguously to Rush that such geopolitical factors – particularly, separation from Europe and connectedness to South America – have been considered in the decision-making process and have directly influenced American policy along the lines hypothesized.

Considering such widespread and entrenched views, it is hardly puzzling why the United States opted for a hiding strategy vis-à-vis the European great powers. We had our quarter (or hemisphere), let the Europeans have theirs.¹⁰⁶ The doctrinal statement, associated papers, and related discourse all provide unmistakable evidence

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Or, as Adams phrased it to Canning concerning the Western hemisphere, “Keep what is yours but leave the rest of the Continent to us.” Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. 5, p. 252, also cited in Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, p. 367.

that policy-makers considered geopolitical factors when formulating this system of policy and that their perceptions of distance and connectedness fundamentally shaped the contours of the Monroe Doctrine. In this case, such perceptions of the environment directly shaped American security policy and guided the selection of ends and means.

This is not to suggest that geopolitical circumstances or imagined distances were the only considerations. Other factors certainly mattered.¹⁰⁷ The principal catalysts and targets of the Doctrine, for example, were the perceived threats posed by the powerful European monarchies. Thus, while cognizant of America's geopolitical circumstances, Adams, Monroe, and the other principals also were aware both of America's relative vulnerability, especially to the "preponderance of Great Britain at sea,"¹⁰⁸ and of an array of domestic political pressures – electoral, normative, structural, and economic. Many of them believed that the United States, while capable of holding its own if necessary, might be better off, in material terms, by bandwagoning on British naval power.¹⁰⁹ They purposefully couched the speech and associated statements in softer

¹⁰⁷ Ernest May, for example, focuses on the importance of domestic politics and private interests, especially electoral considerations. Arguing that that "the Monroe Doctrine was actually a by-product of an election campaign," he writes, "the whole process was governed by domestic politics. The positions of the policy-makers were determined less by conviction than by ambition." For more on this second- and first-image argument, see May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. Quotations from p. x. For a third-image critique of this proposition that emphasizes a "national decision" based on "fear of international political developments," see Ammon, "The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision?" For a counter-rebuttal, see May's response following Ammon.

¹⁰⁸ Monroe uses this phrase when describing his diplomatic responsibilities while serving in England. See *The Autobiography of James Monroe*, edited and with an introduction by Stuart Gerry Brown (Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 186.

¹⁰⁹ In fact, Calhoun, Madison, and Jefferson all raised the argument for accepting Canning's proposal because of the relative strength of the proposer – particularly the perception that Great Britain was the one power that could most damage (if not defeat) the United States. Initially, even Monroe seemed so inclined. As he wrote to Jefferson in October, "my own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British government." Monroe to Jefferson, October 17, 1823, in Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*, pp. 324-325. For more on Calhoun's position, see Adams's account in his *Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 177. For more on the views of Madison and Jefferson, see their October correspondence with Monroe, cited in MacCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*.

terms, omitting potentially offensive paragraphs about differences between republican and autocratic regimes, toned down statements of support for Greece, and directed the central address toward a domestic audience to further soften the blow.¹¹⁰ All of this jibed nicely with a hiding strategy and the principle objective, as Adams put it, of being “specially careful to avoid anything which may be construed as hostility toward the allies.”¹¹¹

In addition to such international considerations, domestic politics also played an important part in the policy-makers’ calculations, especially with Monroe thinking about his legacy and with several of the other principals considering how these decisions might play out in the next year’s election.¹¹² So, too, did idiosyncratic characteristics of the principals themselves play a role, from varying levels of first-hand knowledge of the European powers to philosophical leanings in support of emerging republics.¹¹³ But, no one cause alone – not power differentials, threat perceptions, domestic constraints, or personal ambitions – offers a sufficient explanation of the Monroe Doctrine and the other two cases examined below. In this case, as in the other two, a larger, more “analytically eclectic” perspective is necessary to grasp the full

¹¹⁰ Ford, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, II.”

¹¹¹ Adams, *Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 198.

¹¹² As Ernest May explains, “In the instance of the Monroe Doctrine, the positions adopted by American policy-makers seem to me to be best explained as functions of their domestic ambitions – Monroe’s, to leave the presidency without being followed by recrimination and to be succeeded by someone who would not repudiate his policies; Adams’s, Calhoun’s, and Clay’s, to become President; Jefferson’s, Gallatin’s, and perhaps Madison’s, to see Crawford succeed.... The processes producing the foreign policy decisions are better understood as bargaining encounters among men with different perspectives and ambitions than as debates about the merits of different policies. And the outcomes are most explicable as ones that equilibrated the competing or conflicting interests of men with differing political assets.” May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 255.

¹¹³ In his analysis of the formulation of the doctrine, Hart, for instance, argues for the importance of “character of the leading statesmen” and their “lively national spirit.” Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 56-57. For more on the personalities and positions of the principals, see May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*, Chapter 2.

picture.¹¹⁴ As Monroe himself clearly states, “many important considerations are involved in this proposition.”¹¹⁵ Ultimately, a wide range of necessary factors, found on multiple levels of analysis, contributed to the decision to adopt a hiding strategy – with imagined distance among the most important.

The complex causal chain in this case can be simplified along the following lines. First, an anarchic international arena generated a self-help environment that drove policy-makers with bounded rationality and incomplete information in the United States to think about protecting themselves, their state, and their perceived interests against potential threats and worst-case scenarios. The turn of events first in France and then in Spain combined with several public Russian proclamations about the advantages and strength of authoritarian systems generated a sense of fear and hostility in American policy-makers vis-à-vis the Holy Alliance. While debating how to address this potential

¹¹⁴ While their research focuses on current East Asian security, Katzenstein and Okawara make a compelling argument that seems to hold here as well: “The complex links between power, interest, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms – that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.” While such an approach can complicate theory testing and development, it ultimately may be necessary to understand the actual dynamics of human behavior and international relations. One interesting integrative possibility is posed by the emergent paradigm of chaos and complexity. All of this notwithstanding, I will, in the project at hand, remain focused on the development and testing of a “set of well-constructed first-order theories,” merely noting the multitude of other contributing factors and the need to avoid the rush to what John Ruggie refers to as “mono-causal mania.” For more on this last point, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), especially pp. 50-51. For the argument for “analytical eclecticism,” see Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism.” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), quotation from page 154.

¹¹⁵ Monroe to Jefferson, October 17, 1823, in Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*, pp. 324. Considering a wide-range of factors is precisely how Monroe described his own decision-making approach while serving as a diplomat in France: “He [Monroe] viewed affairs before him in their true light, as he did the causes which produced them. He resolved to take no step without due consideration of all circumstances entitled to attention, and the best information respecting them which those best acquainted with them, and in whom he most confided, could give him.” Monroe, *The Autobiography of James Monroe*, p. 61. Leaving aside for the moment potential problems of bias, the important facts remain that the policy-makers were sensitive to a variety of considerations, none of which alone “caused” the Monroe Doctrine.

threat, the Monroe administration was catalyzed into action by Canning's proposal to Rush in August of 1823. They did not accept Canning's proposal for a concerted approach or bandwagon on British naval power. Nor did they seek external or internal means to balance these perceived threats. Instead, contrary to realist and neorealist expectations, they pursued an aversive approach to security, seeking to minimize problems and avoid threats, to protect a limited set of interests against distant threats with unilateral rhetoric and "amicable negotiation." To be sure, a significant array of domestic constraints helped shape this approach, including presidential ambitions by several participants that discouraged them from siding too openly with the British; economic limitations imposed by a still young and developing, largely agrarian former colony; and a pacific, republican political culture emphasizing independence and exceptionalism that warned against investing too much power in a strong central government and against acting like the monarchical powers that posed the alleged threat.¹¹⁶

All of these considerations helped shape and constrain the options available for American policy-makers in the 1820s. But, a similar set of domestic constraints was present in the 1940s, including a more powerful and pervasive sense of war-weariness.

¹¹⁶ So, too, is it possible that international norms helped shape the Doctrine, especially those concerning neutrality, republicanism, anti-colonialism, and even "self-determination." Temperley makes this last claim, pointing to Reddaway's interpretation of some of Adams's remarks. See Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World* (Frank Cass and Co., 1966), pp. 126-127. For the original reference, see Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 78-79.

The bottom line is that a broad array of potential causes can be identified – all of which are likely to matter to some degree, but none of which alone can adequately explain the variation in American grand strategies over the last two centuries. Even the geopolitical theory successfully tested here does not make such a bold claim. While parsimony can be alluring, reality is messy: complex phenomena often defy unicausal (if not simple) explanations.

as it was in the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s. But, in these three instances, when policy-makers faced comparable domestic constraints – political, economic, and cultural – the strategic preferences and policies of the United States toward other the potential threats posed by other great powers varied. In each of the later cases, as in the 1820s, domestic constraints also were at work, mostly pulling the United States back from engagement in all realms save the commercial, where many interests – individual, corporate, regional, and class – stood to gain more through trade and investment. Only in the 1820s, though, did the United States adopt a hiding policy. If similar domestic circumstances – structural or normative – cannot account for varied strategies against essentially equivalent threats, then some other factor must be at work. Enter geopolitics.

The decisive factor in the 1820s that permitted a hiding strategy and shaped American security policies was *imagined distance*. Policy-makers accurately perceived the Atlantic Ocean as affording the United States options other than bandwagoning or balancing. They were far enough removed from the great powers of Europe to avoid most problems and practice an aversive approach to security – to “remain aloof from the contest,” as Monroe put it. As discussed immediately below, such a course of action fit well the geopolitical landscape of the 1820s and resonated favorably in the prevailing domestic context. In this instance, though, the selection of a hiding doctrine was overdetermined, driven by both geopolitical and domestic circumstances. While limiting the conclusions we can draw about geopolitics from this case alone, the same type of overdetermination, or multi-level causality, also is evident in the more recent

cases analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. Unfortunately for strict uncausal realists and liberals alike, these two other cases rule out determinative causal roles for international and domestic variables alike, as relative constants cannot explain variation. While America's power certainly increases over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and while domestic circumstances evolve over the same period, both remain constant enough that predictions about them influencing the pattern of change in American grand strategy over the last two centuries fall short. While they may be necessary elements, they are not sufficient – at least not by themselves. Only when geopolitical circumstances – more specifically, perceptions of distance and connectedness – are taken into account can one sufficiently explain the range of strategic doctrines promulgated by the Monroe, Truman, and Clinton administrations.

Landscape Fitness and Operational Effectiveness

In terms of the second set of hypotheses, the strategy and environment were well aligned, at least initially; accordingly, this fitness should have generated security. Unilateral, non-entanglement policies based on accurate perceptions of geopolitical remoteness vis-a-vis the great powers did seem to work reasonably well over the course of the nineteenth century. From the War of 1812 until the Spanish-American War in 1898, there were no major conflicts with any of the European powers, although the Mexican, Civil, and “Indian” Wars kept American policy-makers engaged with more “immediately connected” circumstances.¹¹⁷ To some extent, this latter focus on “continental affairs,” also seems to be a product of geopolitics, as decision-makers, influenced by geographic contiguity and the development of the telegraph and railroad, identified themselves and defined their interests more in “continental” terms, a view

¹¹⁷ Even considering the Spanish-American War, the costs of these nineteenth century “foreign” engagements – which does not include the Civil War, which falls out of the scope of this particular study of foreign policy because of its singular domestic orientation – while considerable, seem manageable in comparison to America’s twentieth-century international conflicts. For the United States, the two wars against Mexico and Spain, for example, resulted in fewer than 22,000 casualties (a little over 2,100 battle deaths) and cost less than 500 million dollars. The two World Wars, by comparison, cost the United States over 300 billion dollars and more than 1,000,000 casualties (including over 340,000 battle deaths). While significant and potential signs of dysfunction, these nineteenth-century foreign wars do not represent the same degree of obvious crash epitomized by the World Wars and the Great Depression. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1800s, the fitness of American non-engagement in the military and political realms is eroding and the era of possible abstinence drawing to a close. Cost figures are in current dollars and reflect defense and security expenditures from the year the war began to one year beyond the end of the conflict. The casualty statistics come from the U.S. Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (available at www.fedstats.gov) and the economic figures from the Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975), p. 1140.

which was given public expression with the expansionist doctrine of “Manifest Destiny.”¹¹⁸

As interaction capacity evolved from weak to moderate with the development of ships powered by steam instead of sails, the telegraph, and high explosives,¹¹⁹ policy-makers failed to adjust American strategy. The “isolationist impulse” continued to run deep (again revealing the importance of perceptions vis-à-vis reality in policy formulation) and drive strategic decisions well into the first half of the twentieth century, when the advent of airplanes and radios had put the finishing touches on an already bygone era.¹²⁰ The resulting discrepancy between grand strategy (hiding) and interaction capacity (moderate) produced profound security dysfunction and a series of cataclysms and shocks, including the sinking of the *Lusitania*, World War I, the stock

¹¹⁸ Some analysts might even consider this an assimilative grand strategy. It was not, however, directed at a rival great power (even considering Mexico to the south and Britain to the north). Native Americans, even if considered en masse, also fall short of such a classification. Rather than a grand strategy directed at a rival great power, Manifest Destiny – or “manifest design” as Thomas Hietala calls it – represented an expansionist impulse to fill a perceived power vacuum and seems to have been strongly motivated by “a sense of mission.” To the extent that one considers it more of a strategy than a “mood” (as Walter McDougall refers to it), it does correspond roughly with my geopolitical hypotheses. More specifically, interaction capacity on the continent was far higher than that over oceans, especially with the development of the telegraph and the railroad. Because of this greater interactive capacity on the continent, and other factors, the US was drawn toward more assimilative policies. Perhaps future research could provide more insights here and help round out the spectrum of grand strategies practiced by the United States. In the meantime, for more on the subject, see McDougall, “Expansionism, or Manifest Destiny (so called),” Chapter 4 in *Promised Land, Crusader State*; Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Cornell University Press, 1985); and Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 1963).

¹¹⁹ This list comes directly from Deudney, “Global Geopolitics.”

¹²⁰ The term “isolationist impulse” comes from Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse* (Collier, 1961). Adler, however, is by no means the only analyst who identifies such a propensity. Fred Greene, for instance, also emphasizes the strength and depth of isolationism in his study of early twentieth century American doctrine. See Fred Greene, “The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (January 1961).

market crash, the Great Depression, Pearl Harbor, and World War II.¹²¹ Only when the US practiced the more suitable policy of balancing (during the wars and after) was security obtained.

While limited and only suggestive, this functional analysis nevertheless points in a confirming direction for the geopolitical argument. Not only does geopolitics influence the formation of the Monroe Doctrine, but it also affects its functionality. High levels of landscape fitness in the nineteenth century help contribute to security and prosperity for the developing United States. But, as technologies develop and increase interaction capacity, policy-makers are reluctant to part with their outdated mental maps and absorb the near-term costs associated with strategic adjustment. By failing to modify American strategy to better fit the emergent landscape, policy-makers contributed directly to ill-fitting, dysfunctional policies that were, in the long term, far more costly and ineffective.

¹²¹ Deudney makes a similar point, arguing that Carr's "twenty years' crisis" was a clear sign of dysfunction. See Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," p. 69. Rather than start in 1919, however, it makes more sense to recognize the obvious insecurity generated during the war. One way or the other, it is indisputable that a crash occurred. Beyond the extraordinary human and economic costs of the wars themselves (with over a million casualties and nearly a trillion dollars worth of associated expenses for the United States alone), consider as well the impact of the stock market crash and Great Depression, both of which directly affected the economic welfare and security of the country. For the original reference in Deudney, see Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Harper and Row, 1964). The casualty statistics come from the U.S. Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (available at www.fedstats.gov) and the economic figures from the Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975), p. 1140.

Conclusion: Geopolitics and the Monroe Doctrine

In this case, then, we initially see physical remoteness and weak interaction capacity fueling a view among American policy-makers that the United States was removed from the rest of the world, particularly from the great powers of Europe, the largest potential threats. Distinguished not only by its republican form of government and liberal ideals, the United States was physically separated from Europe by a vast distance that took weeks to traverse. Recognizing this material separation, as well as the strength of the Europeans, American policy-makers adopted a grand strategy of non-entanglement that suited the landscape well. Articulated as a foreign policy doctrine in Monroe's Seventh Annual Message and related state papers, this hiding strategy initially made sense and provided security, as hypothesized, until the circumstances changed. Then, blind adherence to this "isolationist" perspective caused disjuncture and dysfunction. Given America's increasing size and power and its far-flung interests, it was naïve to think that United States could forever avoid the great powers. We were going to be engaged whether we recognized our connections and crafted suitable policies or not.

This case, then, offers strong support for geopolitical hypotheses on both sides of the causal chain. First, there is a clear correlation between low levels of interaction capacity and an aversive approach to security, between remoteness and hiding. Moreover, there is abundant discursive evidence linking the two in a tight-knit but non-exclusive causal relationship. Most significantly, the discourse policy-makers employed in the principal foreign policy statements and documents associated with the

Monroe Doctrine is laden with geopolitical terminology and imagery and conveys mental maps emphasizing American remoteness from potential European threats. Monroe, Adams, and company were clearly thinking of the United States as separate from Europe. This sense of imagined distance shaped their strategic preferences and directly influenced their prioritization of the ends and means of security policy. If they had considered the fate of the United States as connected to Europe as they allegedly perceived it to be to South America, then they would not have adopted the policy they did. In such a case, with no place to hide, they probably would have accepted Canning's proposal, as many were already so inclined, and taken their chances bandwagoning with British.¹²² But, the distance provided by the Atlantic and the rudimentary level of technological development in transportation and destruction afforded American policy-makers the option of pursuing a different approach. Sure, they issued some rhetoric about building up respectable and adequate military forces to protect the United States, its people, its liberty, its system, and its neutral rights, but offered no concerted effort to meet potential threats nor serious attempts, other than a statement of principles, to constrain them. Instead, all of the dimensions of the Monroe Doctrine, save the economic, reflect clearly this type of hiding strategy.¹²³ In the economic realm, the United States was more active, pursuing a strategy of commercial opportunism, as it has for most of its history. Nevertheless, each of the other elements

¹²² Of course, there would have been domestic and international political costs for such a tact, which some of the principals, particularly Adams, might not have been willing to risk. Moreover, it is uncertain how long the window to cooperate with Great Britain would have remained open, especially after the signing of the Polignac memorandum.

¹²³ As noted above, in the economic realm the United States was more active, pursuing a policy of commercial opportunism, with very little regard for physical or attributional distance. Striking is the consistency with which this policy has been pursued over the last two centuries in the face of markedly different material substructures.

and dimensions correlate with the underlying material base and offer confirming evidence for my geopolitical hypotheses.

To conclude, then, this case offers strong support for a geopolitical explanation of grand strategy. More specifically, all three metatheoretical hypotheses – concerning existence, significance, and procedure – are confirmed, as are six of seven variable-specific hypotheses. In this case, geopolitics mattered and mattered significantly. An essential cause of the Monroe Doctrine, it was the foundational determinant of which approach to security the United States could and ultimately did pursue in the early nineteenth century. Its influence in the formative phase, while profound, was mediated by human agents, acting within the confines of domestic and international political structures and norms, and their limited understanding of the environment. Here, as in the two more recent cases analyzed below, policy-makers' perceptions of connectedness to different actors and regions – their sense of imagined distance – shaped strategic preferences and policies as articulated in doctrinal pronouncements. In the operational phase as well, geopolitical hypotheses hold up, with high levels of fitness initially yielding measurable security, both of which deteriorate over time with advances in technology that increase interaction capacity. The resulting misfit between a hiding strategy and moderate interactive capacity yielded lower levels of security, culminating in a series of crashes and crises in the early twentieth century. Let us now turn our attention how the United States approached security after these episodes, particularly with the Truman Doctrine and its balancing strategy of containment.

**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Part II: The Empirical Evidence

Chapter 5: The 1940s, Connectedness, Balancing, and the Truman Doctrine

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, American foreign policy was in flux. Uncertainty was pervasive as policy-makers in the United States had a host of postwar policy options.¹ While Anglo-American relations seemed solid enough, less clear was the nature of the postwar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. On one hand, hopes were high for potential cooperation between the former allies, whether in informal or formal channels and whether comprising the Big Three, the Big Four (including China), or the Big Five (including France). At the same time, war-weariness and a Republican Congress checked this initial optimism. So, too, did the powerful and painful lessons drawn from the failed approaches to security during the interwar period. With the abject failure of liberalism, isolationism, and

¹ John Ikenberry suggests that there were six competing “grand designs” for postwar order, each with their own advocates: (1) “global governance” (Wendell Wilkie, Emery Reeves, Cord Meyer, Harris Wofford); (2) an “open trading system” (Cordell Hull, Hebert Feis); (3) Atlantic Union (Clarence Streit, Walter Lippmann, Forest Davis); (4) geopolitical balancing (Nicholas John Spykman, William T. R. Fox, Robert Strausz-Hupe); (5) unification of Western Europe as a “third force” (George Kennan, John Foster Dulles, John McCloy); and (6) Western alliance aimed at balancing Russia (Charles Bohlen, John Hickerson). Deborah Welch Larson identifies a similarly lengthy list of options, pertaining more specifically to U.S.-Soviet relations: (1) “gentlemen’s agreement” for spheres of influence; (2) all-out competition, especially for alliance with reunified Germany; (3) regional division; (4) limited competition with some cooperation; (5) “zero-sum” game; and (6) war. While many of these two sets of options represent overlapping and compatible courses of action, perhaps artificially divided for the purpose of analytical clarity, the point remains that there was a wide range of possibilities before American decision-makers, with no one course of action predetermined. For more on these two different sets, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 175-185; and Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 328-329.

appeasement to protect the United States from experiencing the tremendous costs of the two World Wars and the Great Depression, realism had come to the fore and into its own.² Inherently concerned with Russia – because of its pivotal location, the nature of its current regime, and its recent heavy-handed behavior in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – but reluctant to over-commit resources or political capital, the Truman administration straddled the fence for a while, at least in terms of its public policy pronouncements.³

Then, late in the afternoon on Friday, February 21, 1947, H. M. Sichel, the First Secretary of the British Embassy arrived with two diplomatic notes, notifying the United States that as of the end of March, Great Britain would no longer be able to continue its financial support for Greece and Turkey.⁴ Immediately recognizing the

² For a more elaborate discussion of this shift and its influence on international relations, see Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Harper and Row, 1964).

³ Melvyn Leffler makes a convincing case that the administration, in private, already was embracing a strategy of containment by this time, commencing with an Office of Strategic Services memo in May 1945, which expressly advocated “developing a balance to Russia.” See Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 60-61. Daniel Yergin makes a similar case, arguing that the basic, anti-communist “interpretative framework that would govern American policy well into the 1970s” was established and operational by August 1945. See Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), pp. 233-235.

⁴ For the text of these messages, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, Vol. V, pp. 32-37 – hereafter referred to as *FRUS*.

For an insider’s account of the decision-making process and dynamics of this critical period, from the delivery of the notes on February 21 through the President’s doctrinal address on March 12 up until the Marshall Plan speech on June 5, see Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (Viking Press, 1955). Also insightful are the following first-hand accounts: Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (W. W. Norton, 1969); Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (Random House, 1991); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1967); Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volumes I and II, (Doubleday and Co., 1955 and 1956); Walter Millis, with E. S. Duffield, *The Forrestal Diaries* (Viking Press, 1951); Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (W.W. Norton and Co., 1973); and Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Reardon, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision – A Memoir* (Grove Weidenfeld, 1989).

geopolitical significance of these countries and that region of the world, as well as the prevalence of instability there and the power of the United States to affect outcomes, the Truman administration plunged into a rapid decision-making and speech-writing process and formulated a strategic approach to deal with both the Greek and Turkish question and the “much wider situation” that the President Truman introduced in a special message to a joint session of Congress on March 12.⁵

As discussed below, this doctrinal pronouncement, combined with a set of related policies and a series of reports, statements, testimonies, and speeches, represented a shift to a grand strategy of balancing – what is often referred to as

Also illuminating are some of the other written works of the principals, including Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (Harper and Row Publishers, 1980); Margaret Truman, ed., *Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private Writings of Harry S. Truman* (Warner Books, 1989); and several works by George Kennan, including *American Diplomacy*, Expanded Edition (University of Chicago Press, 1984), *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1977), *The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age*, Expanded, Updated Edition (Pantheon Books, 1983), and *Sketches from a Life* (Pantheon Books, 1989).

In addition to extensive resources provided in *Foreign Relations of the United States* and *Department of State Bulletin*, three other useful compilations of primary sources include: Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-47* (National Defense University Press, 1991); Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (Columbia University Press, 1978); and Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (Harper and Row Publishers, 1966).

⁵ As elaborated below, one of the interesting aspects of this process was the absence of any serious debate about how the United States should substantively proceed. Once Truman ousted the outspoken Henry Wallace from his cabinet post the previous fall, there was virtual unanimity within the administration about the need to take a firmer line with the Soviet Union. While there was some discussion about the proper venue, the organization of the speech, and the scope of the commitment, there were no option papers circulated, nor substantive alternatives considered. From the time the President learned about the British notes in a phone conversation with then-Acting Secretary of State Acheson, he just wanted to see drafts of the speech, indicating that he already had made his decision. By this point, as Clark Clifford later relates, everyone was on board, waiting for the right time to announce the shift in American policy. While the line had been hardening over the previous year or more, domestic issues inhibited the administration’s willingness to undertake a major foreign policy change. With the arrival of the British notes, however, the time was ripe and an opportunity presented. For more, see Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, especially Ch. 8. Acheson offers a similar account, also indicating comparable fertility and limited decision-making per se. On Sunday, February 23, only two days after the delivery of the notes, he recalls, “Henderson asked me if we were still working on papers bearing on the making of a decision or the executing of one. I said the latter; under the circumstances there could be only one decision.” Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 218.

“containment.”⁶ Directed primarily at the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, this strategic approach was based not only on apprehension about Soviet power, regime type, and ideology, but also on explicit consideration of geopolitical factors and ideas. Most significant were technological developments in communication, transportation, and destruction that dramatically reduced material separation and increased interaction capacity, rendering obsolete any type of aversive strategy. The experience of the 1930s had shown most American policy-makers that the security of the United States was

⁶ It also is commonly associated with the President who introduced it and referred to as the “Truman Doctrine.” While there still is some debate about whether or not the doctrine, as articulated by the President actually represented a grand strategy, that the doctrinal statement was made, that a policy direction pronounced, and that the foreign policy behavior of the United States was adjusted accordingly are incontrovertible. Thus, as we explore these policy shifts as representing “grand strategic” adaptation, the basis of this analysis remains the tangible doctrinal address made by the President and the associated policies and statements that were officially declared or adopted.

Innumerable secondary sources are available on the Truman Doctrine and the strategy of containment. Among the most useful that have helped shape my understanding are the following: John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947* (Columbia University Press, 1972) and *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar United States National Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1982); Thomas G. Patterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1979); Warren I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Vol. 4, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991* (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Cecil Crabb, “The Truman Doctrine: Cold War and the Containment Strategy,” Ch. 3 in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 13 (Spring 1993); Robert H. Ferrell, *George C. Marshall*, Vol. XV of *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, edited by Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis (Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1966) and *Harry S. Truman: A Life* (University of Missouri Press, 1994); Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson*, Vol. XVI of *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, edited by Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis (Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1972); Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984*, 5th edition (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Richard Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1977); Walter A. McDougall, “Containment,” Ch. 7 in *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997); David Mayers, “Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan’s Views, 1947-1948,” *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1986); Robert I. Messer, “Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1977); Benjamin O. Fordham, “Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998); Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 2000); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made – Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, and McCloy* (Simon and Schuster, 1986); Larson, *Origins of Containment*; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*; and Melvin Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (April 1984) and *A Preponderance of Power*.

connected, at least indirectly, to that of Europe and Asia. In this instance, the perception of the formidable and growing military might of a totalitarian and communist Russia, particularly its ability to project force across Eurasia and against “free peoples” all over the world, encouraged American policy-makers to adopt a strategy of engagement and containment, including such endeavors as the Marshall Plan and NATO. Based on explicit consideration of the material environment and the prevailing conditions, this new approach to Soviet Russia was promulgated in a series of statements, reports, and policies and officially inaugurated with the President’s “all-out” speech on March 12, 1947.⁷ Taken together, these statements and documents – starting in September 1946 with Kennan’s Long Telegram and the Clifford-Elsey Report, including Kennan’s famous “X” article in 1947, and culminating in a series of National Security Council documents issued in 1948 and 1950 – clearly advocate meeting the Soviet threat and containing the expansion of Soviet communism and, thus, as discussed at length below, represent a grand strategy of balancing.

As with the Monroe Doctrine, sensitivity to environmental conditions helped produce a grand strategy that fit well the immediate post-war environment. As hypothesized, this high degree of landscape fitness initially yielded successful outcomes. But as technology evolved over time – especially with jet aircraft, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction – the level of interaction capacity increased

⁷ This was the characterization of George Elsey, one the President’s naval assistants, who worked in the Map Room and helped draft an influential internal report, discussed at length below, with Clark Clifford during 1946. For more, see Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 275-302. Both Elsey and Kennan expressed some concerns about the timing, direction, and scope of the doctrine, which was considered and, ultimately, encouraged a more forceful and specific annunciation, both by the President and by Acheson, in his testimony before Congress. See Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, pp. 133-134, as well as the actual Message and testimony in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947).

dramatically and rendered problematic the balancing approach of containment. While not denying a role for other variables on either leg of the causal chain, the evidence in this case illustrates the powerful influence of geopolitics on American national security policy, shaping its form and constraining its functionality.

This chapter follows a similar organizational layout to preceding analysis of the Monroe Doctrine. First, I describe and categorize the independent variable – interaction capacity – which, in this case, was moderate, and growing. Second, I analyze and classify the dependent variable – Truman’s doctrinal address and the associated policies. Careful examination of the administration’s discourse and efforts reveals a pattern of behavior toward the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union that can be best characterized as a balancing grand strategy. With independent and dependent variables so defined and appearing to correlate, the third section investigates the conceptual and causal linkages between them. In this instance, a vivid and deepening sense of connectedness is found in the language of the principals – all of whom, at the very least, seem to recognize the futility of hiding, the obsolescence of isolationism, and the need for American engagement. The fourth section briefly analyzes the levels of landscape fitness and operational functionality, finding more correlations and confirmatory evidence for my geopolitical hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the case and overall assessment of the evidence and the hypotheses.

The Independent Variable: Interaction Capacity and Material Separation

The Truman Doctrine arose in the thick of the Industrial Age and at the dawn of the Nuclear Era.⁸ Moving well beyond the gains provided by the steam engine, railroad, and telegraph of the nineteenth century, this period was characterized by systems, internal combustion, electronic communication, airplanes, rockets, high explosives, and atomic weapons.⁹ Across the board, technological advances in communication, transportation, and destruction were changing the face of the planet, dramatically reducing the effects of distance and revolutionizing interaction capacity. The net result was a clear leap forward from high levels of material separation and weak

⁸ As discussed above, historical eras can be categorized and divided along different lines. Deudney identifies four major eras: (1) pre-modern (to 1500); (2) early modern (1500-1890); (3) global (1890-1945); and (4) late global (1945-present). Van Creveld offers a similar typology based on destructive technology: (1) age of tools (to 1500); (2) age of machines (1500-1830); (3) age of systems (1830-1945); and (4) age of automation (1945-present). In his study of warfare, Dupuy reduced it to three: (1) age of muscle (2000 BC-1500); (2) age of gunpowder (1400-1815); and (3) age of technological change (1800-present). In various works, McDougall has identified at least four eras: (1) sail and muscle (c.1565-1850); (2) steam and rails (c.1850-1905); (3) internal combustion (c.1905-1950); and (4) the space age (c.1960-present). Two additional prominent candidates for separate or overlapping classification are the "nuclear age" (1945-present) and the "information age" (1990s-present).

For more on these different schemes and their constituent elements, see Daniel H. Deudney, "Global Geopolitics: A Reconstruction, Evaluation, and Interpretation of Materialist World Order Theories of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1989); Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*, Revised and Expanded Edition (Free Press, 1991); Trevor Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1980); and Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (Basic Books, 1993) and *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (Basic Books, 1985).

⁹ Much of the general information presented in this case and the other two about interaction capacity, technological developments, and prevalent modes of transportation, communication, and destruction derives from multiple sources, including Daniel H. Deudney, "Global Geopolitics"; van Creveld, *Technology and War*; Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*; McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth* and *A Political History of the Space Age*; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Knopf, 1993); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since 1000 AD* (University of Chicago Press, 1982); David Harding, ed., *Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD* (St. Martin's Press, 1980); and Bryan Bunch and Alexander Hellemans, eds., *The Timetables of Technology* (Simon and Schuster, 1993).

interaction capacity between the United States and the other great powers in the early nineteenth century to more “moderate” levels of both in the mid-twentieth century.¹⁰

With the advent of radios, telephones, and televisions, communication and transportation diverged for the first time, with both expanding tremendously, but the former far more rapidly. In 1901, the Atlantic Ocean was finally bridged by a radio transmission, with the first voice broadcast in 1904. In 1915, the first trans-Atlantic radio-telephone conversation was held. This was followed in 1926 by the development of television, as well as radio-photo transmission across the Atlantic.¹¹ Now electronic messages and images could be sent and received around the world and processed in a matter of seconds or minutes.

Technological advances also enormously affected the field of transportation. Internal combustion engines in ships and planes cut distances dramatically with their speed. Instead of averaging three or four knots, warships could now travel over thirty, cutting the cross-Atlantic time from over a month to three or four days.¹² Airplanes, traveling at hundreds of knots, cut it to less than one day. And, while still in an early developmental stage and with limited range, rockets traveling at thousands of knots were starting to cut time and distance even further.¹³

¹⁰ This classification is according to the operationalization offered in Chapter 2. The effects of atomic weapons were, of course, not “moderate” by any stretch of the imagination, nor were the firestorms created by incendiary bombing. Nevertheless, when considering both the proximity and density of destructive technologies, especially the relatively few atomic weapons and the still rudimentary delivery systems, the interaction capacity of the 1940s is best categorized as moderate, not weak or strong.

¹¹ Bunch and Hellemans, eds., *The Timetables of Technology*.

¹² Peter Kemp, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ships and Seafaring* (Crown Publishers, 1980).

¹³ For more on the evolution of rockets and missiles, see McDougall, *A Political History of the Space Age*; David Baker, *The Rocket* (Crown Publishers, 1978); and Kosta Tsipis, *Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age* (Simon and Schuster, 1983).

Add to these advances in communication and transportation the profound increases in destructive capacity, and the picture of the emergent landscape becomes even clearer. By this point, high explosives, like TNT, had replaced gunpowder as the conventional destructive force of choice, yielding twice as much energy per mass – with 1,600 calories per gram released for TNT versus 800 for gunpowder.¹⁴ The speed, range, and accuracy of delivery systems – including rifled artillery, aerial bombing, and rockets – also had improved markedly, driving the proximity, density, and lethality of destructive interaction capacity decidedly upward.¹⁵ According to Trevor Dupuy’s index of theoretical lethality, for example, the weapons of this era were several orders of magnitude greater than those of the early nineteenth century – jumping from thousands to millions.¹⁶

When combined, these three sets of technological advances signify a clear shift in the level of interaction capacity from weak in the 1820s to moderate in 1947. Technology, however, was not the only element of geopolitics to change. While the physical geography of the planet remained largely the same,¹⁷ the size and shape of the

¹⁴ Tsipis, *Arsenal*. The gunpowder figure comes from the abstract of an article by August Darapsky, “The Salts of Hydronitric Acid as Explosives” (University of Heidelberg, 1907), found by Judith Miller at the Chemistry Library of the University of Pennsylvania.

¹⁵ For more, see the Table 8.1 in Harold and Margaret Spout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Van Nostrand and Co., 1962), p. 253.

¹⁶ Considering a wide range of factors (e.g., range, rate of fire, accuracy, reliability, radius of damage, number of targets per strike, vulnerability, etc.), the weapons of this early modern era (with their 10^3 maximum) were several orders of magnitude below those of the 1940s (in the 10^6 -range) which, in turn, were several orders of magnitude below those of the 1990s (more than 10^8). See Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*, pp. 286-313.

¹⁷ Two notable exceptions, illustrating the power of people and policy to change the environment and the potential for causal arrows to flow both ways, are the Suez and Panama canals, completed in 1869 and 1914, respectively.

United States had changed significantly.¹⁸ No longer solely an Atlantic and Caribbean power, the United States now also faced west across the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, it had far-flung overseas possessions, including Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines, as well as a host of smaller islands in the Pacific.¹⁹ While the application of communication and transportation advances lagged in the Pacific relative to the Atlantic, for a variety of reasons, physical and attributional distance among them,²⁰ the objective reality was that the United States in 1947 was both an Atlantic and a Pacific power connected to the Eurasian landmass by moderate interaction capacity.

¹⁸ For more on the evolution of the geography of the United States, see the works of Donald W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 1, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800* (Yale University Press, 1986), *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 2, *Continental America, 1800-1867* (Yale University Press, 1993), and *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 3, *Transcontinental America, 1850-1915* (Yale University Press, 1998). For the classic statements on the role of geography and its evolution over the course of American history, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1920) and *The Significance of Sections in American History* (Peter Smith, 1959); and Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (Houghton Mifflin, 1903).

¹⁹ For a full accounting of this Pacific expansion and its implications across the region, see McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise*.

²⁰ These terms come from Alan Henrikson and are explained in Chapter 2. For more, see Alan K. Henrikson, "Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4. For more on the cultural divide between the United States and East Asia, see the works of Akira Iriye, including *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967); *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Harvard University Press, 1981); and "Culture and International History," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

The Dependent Variable: Doctrinal Pronouncement and Strategic Orientation

In this emergent geopolitical context, the Truman administration wrestled with how to deal with the problem thrust upon them by the British and posed by an increasingly threatening USSR. With the British delivery of the aides-memoires, a “turning point” had been reached.²¹ The United States had to decide how to deal the postwar situation, particularly with the security problem presented by a strong, authoritarian, and revisionist Soviet Union. One option, which might have been popular with William Taft, the isolationist wing of the Republican Congress, and a war-weary public was reversion to more of a hiding strategy – to largely ignore both the regional and the global situation, to let Greece and Turkey fall if they must, and to allow Russia to do what it wanted in its own “sphere of influence.”²² Another option, advocated by people like Henry Wallace, was to continue to try to work with the Russians in bilateral and multilateral fora, including the still developing United Nations – more of a binding strategy.²³ A third option was for the United States to step up, to support Greece and Turkey, and to take a stand against the expansion of Soviet communism – a strategy of

²¹ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 106.

²² While not embracing neo-isolationism per se, Marc Trachtenberg offers a comprehensive account of the “spheres of influence” approach, particularly as it applied to the German question, in *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton University Press, 1999).

²³ For an example of this line of thinking, see Henry A. Wallace, “The Path to Peace with Russia,” *New Republic*, Vol. 115 (1946), reproduced in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy: Documents and Essays*, Vol. II: *Since 1914* (D.C. Heath and Co., 1978), pp. 284-289.

balancing.²⁴ A fourth option was to go beyond supporting the Greeks and the Turks and meeting the Soviet threat and, instead, to mount a campaign to reduce and ultimately eliminate the Russian threat by rolling back its influence and overwhelming it with American preponderance.²⁵

In 1947, these four different types of grand strategy – hiding, binding, balancing, and dominating – all were at least conceivable, if not militarily, economically, politically, and culturally viable.²⁶ The records and accounts of the decision-making process between the delivery of the British notes and President Truman’s doctrinal pronouncement to Congress, however, suggest that only two options were considered

²⁴ The path ultimately taken, this was recommended by most of the principals from 1946 forward. For a dissenting account, one that suggests a greater variety of views within the administration, see Larson, *Origins of Containment*. More compelling, however, is the argument put forward by the participants, like Jones, Clifford, Acheson, and Truman, and by Yergin, Leffler, and Gaddis, that the administration gravitated toward this option, in broad form, early, easily, and virtually without exception. For more see, Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*; Clifford, *Counsel to the President*; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*; Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*; and Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*.

²⁵ While some of the later NSC documents (20/1, 20/4, and 68) suggest a more concerted effort to “reduce the power and influence of Moscow,” most of the plans and reports produced during the immediate postwar period hesitated to talk about roll back options or eliminating the threat entirely. In fact, many statements suggest that, even in a time of war, occupation and complete regime change were neither viable nor desirable options. Instead, as Kennan and the NSC documents attest, the best the United States could hope for was a gradual reduction and “mellowing” of Soviet power and influence. For more, see the collection in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*. This official line notwithstanding, some Generals, like Leslie Groves (in 1946) and Orvil Anderson (in 1950), as well as George Kenney, Curtis LeMay, and Nathan Twining, at least raised questions about the possibility of preventive war. For more, see Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,” Chapter 3 in *History and Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1991). For an example of a later argument for roll back, see James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?* (J. Day, 1953).

²⁶ Offering a neo-classical interpretation of this period of “strategic adjustment,” Colin Dueck emphasizes a layered explanation, capturing both domestic culture and international structure, and presents an interesting set of counterfactuals about why the alternative paths – which he identifies as neo-isolationism, spheres of influence, and rollback – were not chosen. Colin Dueck, “Culture, Realism, and American Grand Strategy: The Case of Containment,” paper presented at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 2, 2002.

and only one seriously.²⁷ Regardless of Congressional leanings and economic considerations, not one of the principals involved advocated returning to the failed policies of the 1930s, either aversion or appeasement.²⁸ Nor did any of them publicly support the rollback posture. Within the administration, only Wallace had made a strong case for continuing to try to work closely with the Russians, a position which not only had been refuted by the administration's resident experts – like Harriman, Bohlen, and Kennan – but also publicly repudiated by the President when he fired Wallace in

²⁷ In a report deliberated and approved by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on February 26, the Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, appointed by Acheson and chaired by Henderson, described the options in stark terms: "The Department [of State] considers that this Government has only this choice: (a) either to accept the general responsibility implied in the British memoranda or (b) to face the consequences of a widespread collapse of resistance to Soviet pressure throughout the Near and Middle East and large parts of Western Europe not yet under Soviet domination or the adverse consequences, from the standpoint of United States interests, of a possible new British deal with the Russians." *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. V, p. 53.

Placing a premium on solving problems instead of wrestling with them, Marshall phrased the choice more succinctly in the pivotal meeting with the Congressional leadership on February 27, 1947: "The choice is between acting with energy or losing by default." Cited in Ferrell, *George C. Marshall*, p. 79.

Acheson offered the same essential choice to the House of Representatives on March 20: "The crisis in Greece and Turkey confronts us with only two alternatives. We can either grant aid to those countries or we can deny that aid. There is no possibility of putting the responsibility for extending the aid for which Greece has asked from the United States on some other nation or upon the United Nations." Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Statement made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 20, 1947, Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947), p. 836.

²⁸ As John Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Nations at the State Department, phrased it in an internal memo on February 17, 1947: "Actions of the Soviet Government in the field of Foreign Affairs leave us no alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions.... It seems clear that there can be no question of 'deals or arrangements' with the USSR. That method was tried once with Hitler and the lessons of that effort are fresh in our minds. One cannot appease a powerful country intent on aggression. If the lessons we learned from efforts to deal with Hitler mean anything, concessions to the Soviet Union would simply whet their appetite for more." *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 715-716.

A year earlier, when wrestling with potential problems with Russia in Manchuria, Forrestal drew a similar analogy from America's experience with Japan in the 1930s, warning against starting down "a long road of appeasement." See Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 140-141. Throughout his service during this period, Forrestal, in clear juxtaposition to Wallace, consistently gave voice to the argument for taking a strong stand against Russia and for maintaining preparedness for war. Cf., Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, p. 110 and p. 130.

September 1946.²⁹ There was, instead, a remarkable consensus among the principals from the beginning about both the need to act and how to act.³⁰ From Truman's perspective, "there was no opposition to what had to be done."³¹

Over the course of 1946, the administration had become increasingly frustrated with what it viewed as Soviet intransigence, recalcitrance, and belligerence.³² Their behavior in various fora and sectors, aggravated by repeated cycles of the security dilemma,³³ made cooperation appear decreasingly likely or desirable. Since the end of the war, Russo-American relations had been caught in a downward spiral, with little of substance to break a degenerative process of threat perception fueling reactive policies which, in turn, fueled greater threat perceptions and more reactive policies. Everyone in

²⁹ For Truman's account of the Wallace situation, see *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 555-560. Earlier in the year, President Truman had privately repudiated such a course, when he called Byrnes into his office after the Moscow Conference and told him, among other things, that he was "tired of babying the Soviets." Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 551-552. For more on Byrnes's views and the evolution of his position, see James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (Harper and Brothers, 1947) and *All in One Lifetime* (Harper and Brothers, 1958).

³⁰ As Leffler notes, everyone seemed to be on board, even Taft. "Among top officials in the administration and Republican leaders, there was a consensus about the direction of U.S. policy. The views of Truman and Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, Byrnes and Vandenberg, and Forrestal and John Foster Dulles pretty much coincided.... The two parties, said Republican Senator Robert Taft, stood almost together on the question of foreign policy." Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 140.

³¹ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 105.

³² The principals also had become increasingly aware of and alarmed by the poor and deteriorating socio-economic conditions in non-communist countries, especially in Europe. This power vacuum represented the demand side of a troublesome equation. Ultimately, they believed, either the Soviet Union or the United States would provide the supply-side to fill it. Such views generated support for increasing American engagement and assistance and for programs like the Marshall Plan. For a more detailed discussion of some of the key players' views, their relationships, and the personal dynamics that helped shape American policies during this period, see Isaacson and Thomas, *The Wise Men*, especially pp. 253-348.

³³ Warren Cohen properly emphasizes this essential but negative dynamic in his account of the era. See Warren I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991* (Cambridge University Press, 1993) – hereafter referred to by the title of the volume, not the series.

the administration agreed: something had to be done.³⁴ Moreover, everyone seemed to agree that not only would Greece and Turkey fall if left to their own devices, but also that left unchecked Soviet behavior, driven by a revisionist and hostile ideology and a ruthless autocratic government, would present an increasingly formidable challenge. Over time, it would become more difficult for the United States to peacefully coexist with, to say nothing of interact or counter, the Soviets. If Greece or Turkey fell, so the argument went, then other states would become more vulnerable, with the contagion spreading uncontrollably and one state after another likely falling in the face of growing Soviet pressure.³⁵ A consensus thus emerged that the United States would have to stand

³⁴ At the critical cabinet meeting on March 7, all those present favored the offering of assistance to Greece and Turkey, including the Attorney General and the Secretaries of War, Treasury, Navy, Interior, Commerce, and Labor. Only one participant in the preceding high-level discussions – Army General James Crain – is on record opposing the move and arguing for a conservation of American resources for the “final trial of strength” with the Soviet Union. See *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. 5, p. 97 and p. 46, respectively.

The logic of the argument for action was relatively simple and obviously compelling. As Paul Nitze, who then was working in the State Department’s Office of International Trade Policy, explains: “Twice before in my memory we had sat back and let events take their course – first, in the 1920s, when we had let the German reparations question get out of hand, and again in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, when we had retreated into political and economic isolation. In both instances, the most disastrous consequences had ensued. We could not afford to be blind to the probable consequences of American inaction.” Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, p. 52.

³⁵ An early version of the “domino theory,” this geographically-oriented argument was made with great impact by Acheson in the first, pivotal meeting with the Congressional leadership on February 27: “In the past eighteen months... Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on Northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like rotten apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France....” Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 219. For more, see Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 279-284. As discussed below, the President offered a similar argument in his doctrinal address on March 12.

up to the Russians and contain the expansion of Soviet communism and totalitarianism.³⁶

The seeds of this basic balancing impulse were sewn over proceeding year or more, most emphatically by a series of reports, speeches, and papers presented by George Kennan and by a high-level internal report authored by Clark Clifford and George Elsey. In February 22, 1946, George Kennan sent his famous “Long Telegram” back to the State Department analyzing the source of Soviet behavior and providing an intellectual groundwork for much of the strategizing and policy-making to come.³⁷ Describing the Soviet state as a “police regime par excellence,” Kennan saw it as driven primarily by geography, Russian history, and Marxist ideology, tactically pragmatic, but inherently expansionist, with an inclination to apply “unceasing pressure” and exploit weakness while building its own strength and influence. The Soviet approach, in Kennan’s eyes, was “negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive

³⁶ The President seemed willing to make this stand earlier, in response to the first Turkish crisis in August 1946. As Forrestal recorded it, “The President replied that he was perfectly clear we should take a firm position both in this instance and in China; that we might as well find out whether the Russians were bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years.” This was music to Forrestal’s ears, as he already had been arguing for a stiffer line for over a year. For more, see Willis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* – quotation from p. 192.

³⁷ George Kennan, Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, “The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946, reprinted in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI* (US Government Printing Office), pp. 696-709. Kennan sent this telegram in response to a query from the Department: “We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these policies...” – in particular, those identified by Stalin in a campaign speech on February 9, which included language about two camps, the “better solution” provided by the obviously viable Soviet model, insurance against “all contingencies,” and, most provocatively, “in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country.” For more, see the text of Stalin’s speech, which is available at <http://www.marx2mao.org/Stalin/SS46.html>.

work can start only when Communist power is dominant.”³⁸ Believing that we faced a “political force committed fanatically to the belief that with U.S. there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*,” Kennan characterized the “problem of how to cope with this force” as “undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face.”³⁹ As daunting as this challenge might be, Kennan argued that “the problem is within our power to solve – and that without recourse to any general military conflict.”⁴⁰ The keys to success, according to Kennan, were “strong resistance,” maintaining “sufficient force” and an unmistakable “readiness to use it,” and the “degree of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which Western world can muster.”⁴¹

Kennan followed up this influential telegram, which allegedly made “the rounds” in policy-making circles,⁴² with a series of lectures and papers produced while he was in residence at the National War College, from the fall of 1946 until the summer of 1947, when he began his new assignment as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 706.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 706-707.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 707. This phraseology introduces Kennan’s larger notion of “measures short of war,” discussed at length below.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 707. Also important were a program of public education about the nature of the threat, a concerted counter-propaganda campaign, maintenance of the “health and vigor of our own society,” formulation of a “much more positive and constructive picture of the world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past,” and the “courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods of human society.” *Ibid.*, pp. 707-709.

⁴² As Kennan describes it, “To say the least, it went ‘the rounds.’ The President, I believe read it. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. James Forrestal, had it reproduced and evidently made it required reading for hundreds, if not thousands, of higher officers in the armed services. The Department of State, not at all disturbed by the reckless use of the telegraphic channel, responded with a message of commendation.” Kennan, *Memoirs*, pp. 294-295.

In short, this message put Kennan on the map and made his career. More important, however, was the “virtually unanimous acceptance of Kennan’s argument” among the top policy-makers in Washington, at least within the Executive branch, and its reflection in the subsequent Clifford-Elsey Report, discussed below. See Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, pp. 241-245.

at the Department of State.⁴³ In these works, Kennan makes a clear and convincing case for a grand strategy of containment, even more so, according to his official biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, than in the famous “X” article published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947.⁴⁴ While addressing different topics and audiences, the thrust of these lectures and papers was on the nature of Soviet conduct and how the United States should respond. Kennan invariably emphasized the domestic sources of Soviet behavior: geography, history, regime type, and ideology. In his analysis, these internal pressures, more than any external factors, were driving Soviet expansion. Only two options were available for the United States: confrontation or capitulation, meeting the challenge or giving in to it. Kennan was careful to point out, repeatedly, that confrontation need not lead to warfare between the two superpowers. In fact, Kennan argued for a multifaceted response to the Soviet challenge, one which had a firm military base but employed a wide range of economic and political means – what he termed “measures short of war.” Ideally, the United States and its allies should coordinate various policy instruments to maximize “counter-pressures” on Russia and encourage it, over time, to “alter its behavior.”⁴⁵ In this respect, Kennan explicitly called for the formulation and execution of a grand strategy: “We must select measures

⁴³ As noted above, these lectures and papers are available in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*.

⁴⁴ Gaddis cited in *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁵ Denying the “possibility of bringing about any sudden or radical change in the political personality of the Soviet regime,” Kennan believed that “our best chances are in trying to create a pattern of conditions in the world which will be so persuasive and so unmistakable in its implications for the foreign policy of Russia and behavior of Russia as a member of international society, that the logic of this pattern will eventually eat its way into the heart of the Soviet system, and will effect changes which will be in the interest of the security of this country and the security of the United Nations as a whole.” George F. Kennan, “Structure of Internal Power of the U.S.S.R.,” Lecture at the National War College, October 10, 1946, reproduced in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 38.

and use them not hit-or-miss as the moment may seem to demand, but in accordance with a pattern of grand strategy no less concrete and no less consistent than that which governs our actions in war."⁴⁶

As catalytic and instrumental as Kennan's work may have been, even more influential and representative was a report commissioned by President Truman and authored by Clark Clifford and George Elsey. This report, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, delivered to the President on September 24, 1946, captured the prevailing views of all of the Cabinet members, service chiefs, and other principal actors in the Executive branch.⁴⁷ As described by Clifford, it sounds much like a proto-grand strategy, laying the foundation for much of the foreign policy that was to follow, including the policies of balancing Russia and supporting non-communist states.⁴⁸

After analyzing Soviet foreign policy and relations with the United States and

⁴⁶ George F. Kennan, "Measures Short of War (Diplomatic)," Lecture at the National War College, September 16, 1946, reproduced in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 16.

⁴⁷ Written in response to the President's request for a "broad panorama of opinion from our senior men in Government about where we go from here with the Soviet Union," the report was presented with a cover letter from Clifford that notes both the "simultaneous definition by so many government officials of the problem" and the "remarkable agreement among the officials." Clark M. Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Council to the President*, September 24, 1946, reprinted as Appendix A in Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (Funk and Wagnalls), p. 419. First quote from Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, May 10, 1971, Washington, D.C., available at www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford4. For more on the document, its formulation and significance, as well as the "consensus" it represented, see Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, pp. 115-129.

⁴⁸ Consider, for example, how he described it to Jerry Hess in an interview in 1971: "I think the memorandum contained the seeds of the Marshall Plan, the seeds of NATO, and the basic principles upon which the President relied for the Truman Doctrine which ... he announced on March the 12th, 1947. That date was only six months after this memorandum was submitted. I think that the significance of the memorandum is that it contained the condensation and the thrust of the top thinking in the government at the time. It set the frame of mind and set the framework within which these great foreign policy decisions were made." Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, April 13, 1971, Washington, D.C., available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford2.htm>. In his memoirs, Clifford even suggests that had the document been publicized, like Kennan's article in *Foreign Affairs* the following summer, the doctrine might have been called "restraintment" instead of "containment." Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, p. 125.

thoroughly documenting repeated Soviet violations of agreements, the report concludes, “the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to *restrain the Soviet Union* and to *confine Soviet influence* to its present area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet penetration.”⁴⁹ If this was the general direction of policy, the implication for formulation and execution were no less clear or important: “In order to carry out an effective policy toward the Soviet Union, the United States government should coordinate its own activities” and “face up to it in whatever way that [it] could.”⁵⁰ More specifically, “it argued that as a matter of the highest national security the nation urgently needed to create an integrated and coherent strategy to resist the Soviet Union.”⁵¹ As Clifford put it later, “When you are faced with that kind of a crisis you come up with whatever weapons you have – political, military, economic, psychological, whatever they might be.”⁵² The bottom line was the report brought together top views on the “totality” of U.S.-Soviet relations, presented them in a “consistent form,” and helped provide “the general framework of the policy that we were going to have to pursue as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.”⁵³

⁴⁹ Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, p. 482. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁰ First quote from Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, p. 482; the second one from Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, April 13, 1971, Washington, D.C., available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford2.htm>.

⁵¹ Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, p. 124.

⁵² Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, April 13, 1971, Washington, D.C., available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford2.htm>.

⁵³ The first two quotations are from Elsey in an Oral History Interview with George M. Elsey, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, April 9, 1970, available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey6.htm>. The third one was from Clifford, in Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, conducted by Jerry N. Hess, April 13, 1971, Washington, D.C., available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford3.htm>.

While it is unclear exactly how much direct influence such documents may have had on President Truman and his cabinet as they deliberated how to respond to the British notes,⁵⁴ the argument he presented on March 12 is in complete accordance with them. Later describing the speech as “a declaration of general policy,” Truman states, “I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America’s answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny.”⁵⁵ While some differing interpretations about emphasis and operational preferences can be found,⁵⁶ the basic thrust of the President’s message and the associated doctrine was straightforward:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ While Kennan’s work was widely disseminated, the Clifford-Elsey Report, for example, not only was Top Secret but, after the President read it, all of the copies were placed in a White House safe to avoid additional alarmism about the emerging troubles with the Soviets. According to Clifford, the time was not yet ripe for a major change of course in foreign policy. Thus, after spending the night reading the report and calling it “powerful stuff” and “very valuable to me,” Truman ordered Clifford to deliver all twenty copies to him immediately: “if it leaked it would blow the roof off the White House, it would blow the roof off the Kremlin. We’d have the most serious situation on our hands that has yet occurred in my Administration.” Clifford did as instructed and the report, however influential to the President’s thinking and representative of the broad consensus among the top policy-makers in the administration, did not surface again until its publication in the Krock memoirs in 1968. For more, see Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, pp. 108-129, quotation from pp. 123-124.

⁵⁵ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952* (Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 105.

⁵⁶ For an elaboration along these lines, see Larson, *Origins of Containment*. For a discussion of the debate that took place within the State Department, see Messer, “Paths Not Taken.” For a detailed examination about the differing views on the appropriateness of politico-diplomatic versus military means, see Mayers, “Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy,” as well as Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*.

⁵⁷ President Harry S. Truman, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” Message of the President to Congress (March 12, 1947), Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947), p. 831 – hereafter referred to as Truman, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey.”

The primary objective was to stop the spread of Soviet communism; everything else was interpreted in this light.⁵⁸ In his message, to make it more palatable, the President emphasized the positive approach to the problem – namely, shoring up weak non-communist areas, both economically and politically. Underlying this assistance program was the deep-seated belief, as expressed in the Clifford-Elsey Report, that “this government must, as a first step toward world stabilization, seek to prevent additional Soviet aggression.”⁵⁹ More specifically, “this government should be prepared, while scrupulously avoiding any act which would be an excuse for the Soviets to begin a war, to resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the U.S.S.R. to expand into areas vital to American security.”⁶⁰ As the President later explained it: “Russia’s ambitions would not be halted by friendly reminders of promises made. The Russians would press wherever weakness showed – and we would have to meet that pressure, in a manner that Russia and the world would understand. When Communist pressure began to endanger Greece and Turkey, I moved to make this policy firm and clear.”⁶¹

Similar themes were raised publicly and privately over the next few months.

State Department officials Acheson and Clayton offered comparable interpretations in

⁵⁸ As Yergin puts it: “All questions of international relations had to be evaluated against the overriding issue of the Soviet threat.” Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, p. 244. While there still is much debate about how much of a threat the Soviets actually posed, the subjective impressions of the principals, however incomplete, biased, or incorrect they may be – ultimately matter far more in the policy-making process than the objective “facts” suggested by the also potentially incomplete, biased, and incorrect analyses of later observers. This cuts to the heart of the debate about the orthodox/traditional, revisionist, and post-revisionist debates about the causes of the Cold War. For an introduction to this debate, see Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War*, First and Second Editions (D. C. Heath and Co., 1970 and 1974, respectively). For a useful summary of the different positions and a pointed argument concerning communism in Asia that strongly supports the more traditional interpretation, see Douglas J. MacDonald, “Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No 3 (Winter 1995/96).

⁵⁹ Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, p. 477.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

⁶¹ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 96.

their Congressional testimony, again emphasizing mostly the positive side of the so-called “Truman Doctrine” – namely, “to promote stability in Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East generally” and “to help people who are struggling to maintain their independence and their right to democratic government.”⁶² At a meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April, President Truman reiterated the determination of his administration to “meet the situation straight on – head on.”⁶³ In May, Truman castigated the Russians for being untrustworthy and breaking all their agreements, and harkened back to one of the basic premises of Kennan’s Long Telegram and of the Clifford-Elsey Report: “I have got to use other methods. They understand one language, and that is the language they are going to get from me from this point.”⁶⁴ He went further in a news conference on June, clearly stating the underlying balancing rationale for the aid program and the larger foreign policy doctrine. Beyond humanitarian and economic concerns, the administration was trying,

⁶² Dean Acheson, Statement made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 24, 1947, reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A, p. 849 and p. 852, respectively. See also his testimony before the House and Clayton’s testimony before both bodies in the same volume.

⁶³ President Harry Truman, Remarks at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 17, 1947, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1947* (United States Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 74. Hereafter, the volume will be referred to as *Public Papers*.

⁶⁴ President Harry Truman, The President’s Special Conference with the Association of Radio News Analysts, May 13, 1947, in *Public Papers*, p. 90. As Kennan had written more than a year earlier, “impervious to the logic of reason, it [the Soviet regime] is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw – and usually does – when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.” Kennan, Moscow Embassy Telegram # 511, p. 707.

Or, as the Clifford-Elsey Report phrased it: “The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of weakness and they are encouraged by our ‘retreats’ to make new and greater demands.” Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, p. 477.

as he put it, “to help those nations which want to preserve their freedoms and to set up a *bulwark against totalitarian aggression*.”⁶⁵

These sentiments, publicly expressed by the President, reflected a groundswell of support – in the administration, Congress, and the public – for a toughening of America’s approach to the Soviet Union. While this movement in the administration, as noted above, began a year or more earlier, it received its official, high profile, and full-blown articulation in July of 1947 with the publication of George Kennan’s “anonymously” published article in *Foreign Affairs*.⁶⁶ Now Director of the recently created Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, Kennan earlier had written an analysis of Russian behavior for then-Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and submitted this essay, after proper clearances, for publication. This article, by most accounts, comes closest to capturing the essence and logic of the emerging strategy of “containment” that Truman’s doctrinal address had introduced. While Kennan later insisted that his intentions had been misinterpreted,⁶⁷ the language in this document and the lectures he was presenting at the National War College unmistakably argue for a grand strategy designed to balance Russian power and contain the expansion of Soviet communism. Insisting that Americans “regard the Soviet Union as a *rival*, not a partner,” Kennan clearly called for “a policy of *firm containment*, designed to *confront the Russians* with unalterable *counter-force* at every point where they show signs of

⁶⁵ Harry Truman, News Conference of June 5, 1947, in *Public Papers*, p. 107. (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁶ George F. Kennan, writing as X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947). For a pointed critique that was leveled immediately, see Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Harper and Brothers, 1947).

⁶⁷ Kennan, *Memoirs*, Chapter 15. For more on the evolution of his views, see also *American Diplomacy* and “‘X’ Plus 25,” *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 7 (Summer 1972).

encroaching upon the interests of a stable and peaceful world.”⁶⁸ Given its domestic roots but sensitivity to “contrary force,” Soviet foreign policy, Kennan argued, had specific policy implications for the United States – most importantly, a long-term grand strategy of containment – which he stated in this article loud and clear:

It [Soviet diplomacy] cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries – policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a *long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment* of Russian expansive tendencies.⁶⁹

In an earlier version of the paper, the one submitted to Forrestal, he phrased it similarly, again emphasizing the balancing of Soviet Russia: “The problem of *meeting* the Kremlin in international affairs therefore boils down to this: Its inherent expansive tendencies must be *firmly contained* at all times by *counter-pressure* which makes it constantly evident that attempts to break through this *containment* would be detrimental to Soviet interests.”⁷⁰ In a secret memo sent to Secretary of State Marshall in November, Kennan stated the point more succinctly: “All in all, our policy must be

⁶⁸ George Kennan, writing anonymously as X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), p. 581. (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁹ Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” p. 575. (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁰ George Kennan, “The Soviet Way of Thought and its Effect on Foreign Policy,” in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 128. (Emphasis added.)

directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia.”⁷¹ Additional top secret policy documents produced the following year, particularly NSC 20/1 and NSC 20/4, reiterate and reinforce this general strategic orientation of meeting the Soviet threat and containing the spread of communism.⁷²

The bottom line was that the March 12 speech was, as President Truman put it, “the turning point in America’s foreign policy.”⁷³ Moving well beyond hiding and isolationism, the United States was publicly committing itself to a policy of engagement

⁷¹ PPS 13, “Resume of World Situation,” November 6, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, p. 771. As Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff explain: “The world situation is still dominated by the effort undertaken by the Russians in the post-hostilities period to extend their virtual domination over all, or as much as possible, of the Eurasian land mass.” In order to “stop the Kremlin’s political advance,” the report argues, “it is urgently necessary for us to restore something of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by strengthening local forces of independence and by getting them to assume part of our burden. The Harvard speech approach [advocating the Marshall Plan] was highly effective from this standpoint.” As discussed below, this type of interpretation casts doubt on the categorization of the administration’s approach to security, including the appearance of more binding-oriented policies toward Western Europe, as anything other than balancing directed at the USSR.

⁷² In some respects the language in these internal documents goes further, hinting at more of a roll back policy. Consider, for example, identification of the “gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence” as one of America’s two central objectives in NSC 20/1 – the other being “the alteration of Russian concepts of international affairs.” Similarly, in NSC 20/4, Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff argued that, in order to “counter the threat to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR,” the United States must seek “to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat” and “to bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia.” Stating that “it is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet government,” Kennan and his staff point out that neither side wants war and that war is not inevitable. On the contrary, both documents acknowledge not only the possibility but also the desirability of pursuing such policies by “methods short of war.” As discussed below in more detail, both of these documents also articulate a clear underlying geopolitical logic to American policies. For more, see NSC 20/1, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia,” August 18, 1948; and NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948 – both reproduced in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*. For more on the subsequent statement, NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, authored by Paul Nitze and his Policy Planning Staff, which picked up and magnified these themes into a call for “preponderance,” as well as offensive military might, and which guided American foreign policy for at least the remainder of the Truman administration, see Ernest R. May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Bedford Books, 1993); Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, especially pp. 355-360; Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, pp. 93-100.

⁷³ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 106.

and of balancing the perceived threat posed by Soviet Russia.⁷⁴ The remarkable consensus that emerged over 1946-1947, at least among the top policy-makers, and shared views about the problem and the solutions, about the menace of Soviet communism and the need to prevent it from spreading, helped move the assistance package through Congress and usher in a new era of bipartisanship in United States foreign policy. While some disagreements may have arisen concerning applications of this larger containment strategy (e.g., universalized versus particularistic approaches), most policy-makers shared the same basic “operational code.”⁷⁵ Many of these assumptions and expectations were manifested in a largely coherent and consistent set of policy statements, public and private, that support the classification of the administration’s approach to the Soviet Union as a balancing grand strategy.

Disaggregating this grand strategy along the lines suggested in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapter 4 reinforces this interpretation and increases the number of dependent variables available for testing my geopolitical argument. More concretely, examining the motivational, cognitive, and operational elements of this approach, as well as its military, political, and economic dimensions, strongly supports the classification of the Truman Doctrine as a balancing grand strategy, one which fits the criteria in all six categories, even the economic. Let us examine these facets in more

⁷⁴ “Asking the nation to engage actively in international affairs in a manner we had never before attempted in peacetime,” Clifford notes, “the President intended the speech to mark a historic departure from traditional American foreign policy.” Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, p. 140.

⁷⁵ This term comes from Alexander George, “The ‘Operational Code’: The Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Decision-making,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XII (June 1969). Gaddis’s seminal work on containment employs this notion but refers to it as a “strategic” or “geopolitical” code. Focusing on assumptions and expectations about the ends and means of security – interests, threats, and policy tools – these are just different ways of describing “grand strategy.” See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. viii-ix.

detail, purposefully and sufficiently for testing my geopolitical hypotheses and for comparison with the Monroe case and, subsequently, with the Clinton case addressed in Chapter 6.

First, in terms of the motivational dimension, consider the ends of security, or national interests, identified by the Truman administration. By 1947, American national security interests extend far beyond the shores the United States, and far beyond those of South America as well.⁷⁶ Long departed were the days of simply protecting the territorial and political integrity of the United States. Likewise, the more expansive but still geographically limited notion of hemispheric defense also had come and gone, recently rejected theoretically by Spykman and others and practically by the experience of the 1930s.⁷⁷ A larger set of national security interests, one which was world-wide, had come to the fore. Part of the “turning point” that Truman referred to above concerned the enlarged scope of these interests, both geographically and topically: “*wherever* aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the security of the United States was involved.”⁷⁸ No longer simply “anxious and interested spectators” of Monroe’s era, the United States now was a full-fledged player. Moreover, it was the most important player, at least for the non-communist side. Thus, instead of wishing

⁷⁶ Ernest May makes a similar argument about the evolution and expansion of the American concept of “national security” – namely, that it has grown through four stages: (1) safe borders and union; (2) hemispheric independence and social order; (3) free world independence and prosperity at home; and (4) stability and economic growth. These seem to fit nicely with the evolution discussed herein, although recent trends, as discussed in Chapter 6, seem to encourage a more “global” perspective. For more, see Ernest R. May, “National Security in American History,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *Rethinking International Relations: Ernest R. May and the Study of World Affairs* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, [1992]1998).

⁷⁷ See, for example, Nicholas John Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1942).

⁷⁸ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 106. (Emphasis added.) This was precisely the type of universalist rhetoric that troubled more pragmatic particularists like Kennan. For more on this distinction, see Kennan, *Memoirs*, Chapter 13; PPS 23, “Review of Current Trends: US Foreign Policy,” February 24, 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, pp. 97-100; and Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Ch. 2.

Greek democrats well as they had in 1823, American policy-makers now seemed to believe that this region, still thousands of miles away, was more important to the United States and worth actively supporting.⁷⁹ As President Truman clearly stated in the second sentence of his doctrinal address: “The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.”⁸⁰ Increasingly, American policy-makers came to see the United States as the primary guarantor of security for the “free peoples of the world.”⁸¹

In terms of the threats to this expanded set of interests, one stood out. While internal weakness, economic stagnation, and social unrest in Western Europe were considered ominous and pressing, they mattered primarily because of the opportunistic expansionism of Soviet communism. The hostile ideology, formidable military, and belligerent behavior of Soviet Russia were the principal threats perceived by postwar policy-makers. The Soviet Union already had lowered the “Iron Curtain,” from Stettin

⁷⁹ Noting that “the contrast between 1823 and 1947 is marked,” Lawrence Kaplan explains the difference thus: “The reason may lie in the predominant sense of the nation that abstention from involvement in 1947, appealing though it was, carried excessive risks to the nation’s security, whereas intervention in 1823, popular as it was, similarly carried excessive risks to the nation’s security.” He continues, “The nation agreed in 1823 that political and military entanglement with Europe was unacceptable; in 1947, the nation agreed that entanglement with Greece – and ultimately with all of Western Europe – was unavoidable.” Kaplan “The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece,” p. 20.

⁸⁰ Truman, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” p. 829.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 832. This is not to suggest that everyone in the United States, or even all of the policy-makers accepted such a broad definition of America’s interests. A few people still clung to outdated isolationist assumptions about continental interests. A fair number thought in terms of a “North Atlantic community.” Such thinking, emphasizing both relative physical and attributional closeness, eventually acquired a critical mass and helped shape the relations of the United States with Western Europe -- economically, politically, and militarily. Even ignoring the location of Greece and Turkey, as well as Iran, Japan, and Korea and assuming a set of interests centered on the North Atlantic or Western Europe, as Kennan and others preferred, the fact remains that the concept of national interests in the 1940s was decidedly different and more expansive than that of the 1820s.

to Trieste,⁸² and, according to the analysis of Kennan and others, sought to expand into any void or area of weakness it could identify. For the most part, the importance of other areas were judged by American policy-makers according to how much they could contribute toward the effort to contain this threat and how vulnerable they were to it. One particularly relevant report issued by the Joint Chiefs in April 1947, offers a clear ranking of different of countries in terms of their importance to American national security, the urgency of their need, and even a combined index.⁸³ While Greece and Turkey are identified as most urgent, Western European countries top both of the other lists, including one through seven of the most important to security and one through four plus seven of the top ten in the combined index.⁸⁴ Noting, with some disdain, the contrast between the sweeping commitments and limitless capabilities suggested by the Clifford-Elsey Report and Truman's doctrinal address and the more pragmatic differentiation offered in the Joint Chiefs' report, Etzold and Gaddis conclude that this particularized list was a better "blueprint" of policy and "to a large extent established priorities for the programs of economic and military assistance implemented in the name of 'containment' during the next three years."⁸⁵ For the purpose of this project, however, what matters most is that both threats and opportunities were considered and

⁸² Winston Churchill made this argument in May 1946 in a powerful speech calling for an Anglo-American alliance to confront Soviet communism. Truman's introduction of Churchill and presence at the speech, which was delivered in his home state of Missouri, suggested at least the tacit support by the administration for Churchill's argument, which further antagonized the Russians, if they were not already hostile enough. Ultimately, like Walter Lippmann's "Cold War" expression, the term "Iron Curtain" became part of the American lexicon, suggesting an important, if implicit, influence in American thinking. For the text of this address, see Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of War," Address delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, MO, May 3, 1946, available at <http://www.hpol.org>.

⁸³ JCS 1769/1, "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security," April 29, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 734-750. Also reproduced in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 746 and p. 749, respectively.

⁸⁵ Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, p. 71.

categorized in geographic terms, with Soviet Russia clearly identified as the former, at least partially because of its size and location, and with the following regional prioritization for the latter: Western Europe, Middle East, Northwest Africa, Latin America, East Asia.⁸⁶

Just as there were some differences in how American policy-makers perceived the scope of American interests, so did views vary about the most appropriate means to protect and promote these interests. In neither instance, however, did the differences outweigh the consensus, especially on the most important issues or the general framework for American policy. In terms of threat perception, there was virtual unanimity focusing on Soviet Russia, and divergence only regarding the significance of the peripheral regions. Likewise, there was virtual unanimity concerning the operational dimension – at least in terms of agreeing on the need to employ a wide array of policy tools, to use all the means available, and to not rely exclusively on any one dimension. Political, economic, and military options all were to be considered, pursued, and, ideally, coordinated.⁸⁷ Not only is this what “national policy” – or grand strategy – is all about, but it also was one of the primary rationales behind the reorganization of the defense establishment. Recognizing the need for “more effectively meshing military planning with our foreign policy.” President Truman later wrote: “it was clear

⁸⁶ JCS 1769/1, in *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, p. 737.

⁸⁷ In a memo sent to Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson the day after the President’s doctrinal address, and then with their noted concurrence to the Acting Secretary Acheson, even the Joint Chiefs argued for such an integrated, multidimensional approach: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that effective assistance to Turkey is important to the security of the United States, but that this assistance involves political, economic, and psychological factors which are primary as compared to the military factor. All these factors are so intertwined that no one can be separated and viewed apart from the others.” Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, March 13, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. V, p. 114.

to me that a national defense program involved not just reorganization of the armed forces but *actual coordination of the entire military, economic, and political aspects of security and defense.*⁸⁸

In addition to this underlying consensus on using the full array of America's available policy tools, most policy-makers also expressed a preference for non-violent means, what Kennan referred to as "measures short of war." As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, non-military means clearly were favored. As President Truman stated in the address, "I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid." In his Senate testimony, Acheson offered a similar view, denying any significant military dimension in the initial assistance package.⁸⁹ The crux of the administration's early approach, captured not only in the aid program for Greece and Turkey but more dramatically in the Marshall Plan, was to shore up and reconstruct weak states economically, which would hopefully produce political stability and internal cohesion, making them less inviting targets and more capable of resisting Soviet expansion.⁹⁰

As essential as economic assistance was to prop up failing states around the world and promote order, it was not the only or even the most important foreign policy

⁸⁸ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, pp. 48-49. (Emphasis added.)

⁸⁹ As he put it, "The present proposals do not include our sending troops to Greece or Turkey. We have not been asked to do so. We do not foresee any need to do so. And we do not intend to do so. We have no understandings with either Greece or Turkey, oral or otherwise, in regard to the sending of troops to those countries. Our military missions to Greece and Turkey will be small ones, whose task will probably be to find out the local needs for military equipment and to see to it that the needed material is delivered and in the hands of the proper authorities." Acheson, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 24, 1947, p. 848.

⁹⁰ For more on the economic dimension, see Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, pp. 110-119; Ferrell, *George C. Marshall*, pp. 99-134; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 239-256; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 226-235; Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 185-191; and Michael J. Hogan, "The Search for 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1982).

tool the administration wielded versus its most pressing threat. On the contrary, the disutility of America's economic leverage vis-à-vis Russia had been demonstrated repeatedly, and was most emphatically illustrated with the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan. The baseline for dealing effectively with Russia, as Kennan had relayed in his "Long Telegram" and some of his early works, was the "logic of force," a strong policy backed by military might and the willingness to use it.⁹¹ He cautions against expecting too much from diplomacy when dealing with a regime not disposed toward reason or compromise: "It is quite evident the diplomatic channel, the machinery of regular diplomacy, is not the apparatus for directly influencing the conduct of the Soviet government."⁹² For all of his backtracking later, Kennan stated clearly in the famous "X" article that the United States must ground containment on a "counter-force" capability: "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence."⁹³

⁹¹ As he put it in his first lecture at the National War College, "All we really have to do is be strong and be ready to use that strength. We don't need to talk about it. We don't need to broadcast it. The mere fact is enough. Strength is only a question of having the courage of our convictions and of acting accordingly. There is nothing that can equal or replace strength in international relations. Strength overshadows any other measure short of war that anybody can take. We can have the best intelligence, the most brilliant strategy, but if we speak from weakness, from indecision, and from the hope and prayer that the other fellow won't force the issue, we just cannot expect to be successful." Kennan, "Measures Short of War (Diplomatic)," in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 15.

⁹² Kennan, "Soviet Diplomacy," October 6, 1947, in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 257.

⁹³ Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," p. 576.

To be fair, Kennan stated repeatedly, during those pivotal years and later, that military force alone was insufficient. The key, he pointed out in an “off-the-cuff” lecture at the National War College in October 1947, after he already had assumed his State Department duties, was to “marshal all the forces at our command, not only the military but the political.”⁹⁴ Like the economic dimension, however, political means were likely to be of limited utility, certainly not a panacea for the type of multifaceted and formidable challenge posed by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, diplomacy could be an effective tool for bringing together other states to help balance and contain the Soviet Union. Moreover, multilateral arrangements might be helpful to restrain the reemergence of other threats in important regions, particularly Germany in Europe.⁹⁵ In this respect, as in the economic sphere, the United States practiced bifurcated policies toward the “Soviet bloc” and the “free world.” A high degree of selectivity and differentiation guided both economic and political policies toward these two spheres. On one hand, the United States approach to the communist world involved balancing and heavy reliance on military means – not just potential, but actual strength, as well readiness and the willingness to use it. While deterrent in grand strategic terms, the operational posture of the United States military during this time was offensive, including trying to maintain American military preponderance, particularly vis-à-vis

⁹⁴ Emphasizing the primarily political nature of the Russian threat, he warns his audience “not to dismiss the political factors in thinking of how we are going to handle the Russians. Do not dismiss the possibility that we might defeat them by political means. It might be advisable to defeat them by political rather than military means if we can.” Kennan, “Soviet Diplomacy,” October 6, 1947, in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, pp. 259-260.

⁹⁵ This is the underlying logic that John Ikenberry and others have raised concerning the American approach to Western Europe after the war. But, to the extent that the postwar institutional arrangement the United States crafted with Western Europe was motivated by fear of Soviet communism rather than of a revanchist Germany, then the behavior is better categorized as external balancing than binding per se. For more on this line of argument, see Ikenberry, *After Victory*, Chapter 6.

Russia.⁹⁶ On the other hand, toward the struggling democracies in Europe, occupied Germany and Japan, and a handful of critical states situation on the periphery of the Soviet Union, the United States employed a wide-range of political and economic measures to strengthen those states and to link them more closely to each other and to the United States. Thus, politically, the United States favored unilateralism and bilateralism in its limited political dealings with the Soviet Union, but preferred multilateral internationalism when dealing with the non-threatening “free world.” Similarly, in the economic realm, the American approach toward Russia was restricted and mercantile, while its relations with the “West” were more commercial and liberal.⁹⁷

In spite of this bifurcation, however, it makes far less sense to talk of an American grand strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe or Japan than it does vis-à-vis Russia. The ultimate purpose of any security strategy is not just to promote one’s interests but to protect them in the face of threats – this is what distinguishes security policy from foreign policy. How the United States interacted with Canada and Mexico, for instance, is less interesting from the perspective of explaining grand strategy than analyzing a relationship characterized by a perception (or misperception) of insecurity. In other words, when investigating how and why actors solve problems, or deal with threats, it makes sense to start with such a challenge. Thus, while the European

⁹⁶ Beyond the service chiefs, even Kennan called for the United States to “keep up at all times a preponderance of strength in the world.” See Kennan, “Measures Short of War (Diplomacy),” in Harlow and Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War*, p. 14. As noted above, NSC 68 made the most powerful statement in this regard. See May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy*.

⁹⁷ Ikenberry describes these cross-Atlantic economic relations as “managed openness,” not quite free trade, but certainly not mercantile exploitation. Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 185-191. For more see G. John Ikenberry, “Creating Yesterday’s New World Order: Keynesian ‘New Thinking’ and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Cornell University Press, 1993).

settlement and American relations with its allies are intrinsically interesting,⁹⁸ these are more peripheral to the study at hand than the type of security strategy adopted by the United States to deal with the perceived threat posed by its major rival – Soviet Russia.⁹⁹ In this case, the focus should be on the grand strategy of containment introduced by President Truman on March 12, 1947 and elaborated in a related series of public and secret statements and documents. While debates raged (and continue) about the utility of area versus point defense, military versus non-military means, nuclear versus conventional deterrence, and counterforce versus countervalue targeting, the broad features of American security policy during this time – engagement and containment – as well as some of the more specific dimensional components like perimeter defense, selective interventionism, and preferential reconstructionism, clearly tag the Truman Doctrine as a strategy of balancing against the Soviet Union, not appeasing, bandwagoning, binding, or assimilating.

⁹⁸ To the extent that the United States did practice more of a binding strategy toward Western Europe, as Ikenberry and others suggest, this may actually offer support for my geopolitical argument -- particularly if American policy-makers perceived the United States as closer to Western Europe than the other areas. As discussed below, such perceptions of greater connectedness to Europe and the "North Atlantic Community" are reflected in at least some of the discourse and cartography of the era.

⁹⁹ Regardless of the shape of these ancillary policies, as Charles Bohlen explains, the primary strategic concern of the era was meeting the challenge posed by Soviet communism: "The logic of the situation is that the non-Soviet world through such measures as are open to it would draw closer together politically, economically, financially, and in the last analysis, militarily in order to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area. Only in this way can a free and non-Soviet world hope to survive in the face of the centralized and ruthless direction of the Soviet world. In these circumstances, all American policies should be related to this central fact." Memorandum by the Consul of the Department of State, August 30, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, p. 764.

Causal Connections: Mental Maps and Imagined Distance

In this case, as with the Monroe Doctrine, we see correlation between geopolitics and grand strategy. Here, moderate interaction capacity correlates with balancing, just as weak interaction capacity correlated with hiding in the 1820s. Here, too, there is no shortage of evidence suggesting causal connections between the two variables. Virtually all of the major policy statements associated with this strategy contain geopolitical language and emphasis. Most of the principals were thinking in geopolitical terms, imagining and referring to “the world” in more connected terms. Gone were most references to continents and hemispheres. No longer one fourth of the planet, a “quarter” had become a remote place where one sought safety or found reclusive, outlying views. The primary focus was the Eurasian “heartland” and the surrounding “rimlands,”¹⁰⁰ with the principals believing that the United States could no longer remain aloof. After the experiences of the 1930s, most policy-makers realized that distance no longer offered the same degree of protection it once did. Instead, in this “shrinking world” with its growing connections – economic, military, and political – the United States was going to be engaged, whether it wanted to or not. Such a perception of connectedness, of interests and ties to Europe and Asia, and a belief that the United States could not support or defend itself against a single, hostile Eurasian hegemon, because of its size and resources, helped drive American policy-makers to pursue a balancing strategy vis-à-vis its primary rival – the Soviet Union.

¹⁰⁰ For the original statements on these two central geopolitical concepts, see Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History,” *Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23 (1904); and Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1944), respectively.

Of course, these geopolitical concepts and beliefs did not suddenly appear with the delivery of the British notes in February 1947. While the notes did allude to the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey and potential ramifications for the larger region,¹⁰¹ the geopolitical views of American policy-makers had been evolving for some time and were primed to seize on such geopolitically significant developments. Twice in their lifetimes, the United States had been drawn into European conflicts, with powerful and convincing arguments leveled by prominent figures, including Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt, about the necessity of American engagement in Eurasia. By this point, American possessions and commitments spanned the continent and included far-flung territories across the Pacific and the Caribbean, as well as occupied Germany and Japan. All of the principals certainly were cognizant of the profound technological advances that had been taking place. Central policy-makers like Truman and Byrnes routinely referred to the current era as the “machine age” and the “atomic age.”¹⁰² As discussed above, advances in transportation – e.g., steam engines, railroads, aircraft, and rockets – dramatically reduced the effects of distance. Even more captivating were advances in communication: the telegraph, radio, telephone, and television allowed for much more rapid dissemination of information and the virtually instantaneous sharing of ideas across vast distances. Most revolutionary, though, were recent developments in destructive capacity – particularly, the advent of atomic power. While the United States

¹⁰¹ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, p. 5.

¹⁰² See, for example, President Truman, Remarks at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 17, 1947, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947* (United States Government Printing Office, 1963); and James Byrnes, Remarks to the Overseas Press Club, New York, February 28, 1946, in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 14, No. 349 (March 10, 1946).

enjoyed a monopoly on these weapons until 1949, American policy-makers were aware of the potential of these weapons and, like most prudent defense planners, worked on the worst-case assumption that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets acquired them. The bottom line was that when the British notes were delivered, American policy-makers already were thinking of the United States as increasingly connected and vulnerable and then proceeded with their strategic planning from this geopolitical mindset.

The abundant evidence of such geopolitical awareness and perceptions of connectedness is not hard to find.¹⁰³ Consider, for example, the first comprehensive report on a postwar military policy produced by the Joint Chiefs in September 1945.¹⁰⁴ This document, circulated among the State, War, and Navy departments, clearly acknowledged the profound impact of technological developments and the implications for American security: “The power, range, and prospective development of modern weapons are such as to favor an attack. As a result, there will be a marked reduction in the degree of invulnerability to ready attack that has been provided in the past by our geographical position.”¹⁰⁵ Recognizing that the United States “could not hope to escape being involved” in “any future conflict between major foreign powers,” the Chiefs

¹⁰³ Perhaps some analysts have ignored it because of the potentially negative stigma attached to the study of geopolitics after the experience with Haushofer and the Nazis. Others perhaps have feared facing charges of environmental determinism. It may be that, as a causal variable, geopolitics seems too obvious, or commonsensical. Maybe analysts have found it challenging to separate it from considerations of power or perceived threat or difficult to incorporate it into other existing theoretical frameworks. Whatever the reason, by ignoring this large body of evidence, most analysts of this period and others in the history of American foreign relations have missed a powerful and prominent source of causality for grand strategy formulation.

¹⁰⁴ SWNCC 282, “Basis for the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy,” September 19, 1945, *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. 1 – reproduced in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

called for, at a minimum, basic deterrent capabilities, or as they put it, “sufficient military power to make it unwise for any major aggressor nation to initiate a major war against the opposition of the United States.”¹⁰⁶ They also issue a clear call for a balancing strategy: “If the stability of the international structure is to be maintained, unbalanced power factors or stresses must be guarded against.”¹⁰⁷ This type of discursive evidence, provided in successive paragraphs of a critical defense planning document, offers strong support for my argument about conceptual and causal linkages between geopolitics and grand strategy.

In late February 1946, Kennan and Byrnes both offered important contributions to the debate about America’s policy toward the Soviet Union. First, on February 22, as noted above, Kennan sent his “Long Telegram,” which served as one of the key catalysts in the formulation of containment. In this communication, Kennan pointed out the geographic foundations of Russia’s historical sense of insecurity and emphasized the “strategic necessity” of certain “points” – notably Iran and Turkey – as well as the importance of other “points” and “countries” – like Germany, Argentina, and the Middle East – for the preservation of “Western centers of power.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁸ George Kennan, Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, “The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” February 22, 1946, Reprinted in *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VI, pp. 702-703.

Interesting is the use of the term “Western,” not only by Kennan, but by many people in the United States, then and now, when referring to Europe, or “Far East” (as opposed to “near west”) when referring to Asia. Like the anachronistic American map described in Chapter 4 that referred to the Atlantic Ocean as the “Western Ocean,” it becomes problematic for Americans looking eastward to talk about “western” issues. West of what?

Such phraseology tends to highlight the importance of language and ideas as independent variables, shaping the way policy-makers think, as these ideas are transplanted from another geopolitical reference point and then take on a life of their own in the minds and discourse of others. It also reveals the inherent social construction of such ideas. Terms like “Western world” or “Atlantic community” are as fancifully and intellectually created as notions like “Western hemisphere.”

Several days later, on February 28, in his first “get tough” speech on U.S.-Soviet relations, delivered to the Overseas Press Club in New York, Byrnes raised directly several geopolitical concerns, among them a desire not only to protect American security but also “to preserve the peace of the world.”¹⁰⁹ Like the Joint Chiefs, Byrnes saw the fate of the United States as tied to that of others, particularly to the great powers. In one passage, he clearly articulates a sense of interconnectedness and interdependence: “Americans alone cannot determine whether the world will live in peace or perish in war. Peace depends quite as much upon others as it does upon us. No nation is the complete master of its fate. We are all bound together for better or worse.”¹¹⁰ While perhaps overstating his case given the existing level of interaction capacity – particularly the inability of Soviet Russia to invade and defeat the United States – Byrnes nevertheless reveals a sense of connectedness to other states. Steadfastly denying an interest in “blocs or spheres of interest,” Byrnes openly embraced the alternative – a smaller, unified world – brought together not so much by shared values as recent technological developments: “In this atomic age we will not seek to divide a world which is one and indivisible.” In stark contrast to the views John Quincy Adams had expressed the previous century, Byrnes rejected the option of

One emerging school of thought in geopolitics – critical geopolitics – emphasizes such themes in their arguments, much like the constructivist literature in international relations. One particularly relevant line of argument emphasizes the “occidental” versus “oriental” nature of the geopolitical discourse concerning American national security policy during this era, among other provocative themes. For more, see Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics,” *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1990); and Gerard Toal and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (March 1992).

¹⁰⁹ James Byrnes, Remarks to the Overseas Press Club, New York, February 28, 1946, in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 14, No. 349 (March 10, 1946), p. 356.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

retreating into our own hemisphere (or quarter) and concluded that “we will not and cannot stand aloof...”¹¹¹

Later that year, the Clifford-Elsey Report, issued in September, conveyed a comparable appreciation for the recent developments in interaction capacity, but drew even more direct and provocative conclusions concerning their policy implications. Focusing on the growing Soviet threat to the “land mass of Eurasia” and their “ability to wage aggressive war in any area of the world,” the report emphasized how technological advances were increasing interaction capacity, especially our connectedness and vulnerability to growing Soviet offensive military might:

The most obvious threat to American security is the growing ability of the USSR to wage an offensive war against the United States. This has hitherto not been possible, in the absence of Soviet long-range strategic air power and an almost total lack of sea power. Now, however, the USSR is rapidly developing elements of her military strength which she hitherto lacked and which will give the Soviet Union great offensive capabilities.... Development of atomic weapons, guided missiles, materials for biologic warfare, a strategic air force, submarines of great cruising range, naval mines and mine craft, to name the most important, are extending the effective range of Soviet military power well into areas which the United States regards as vital to its security.¹¹²

For Clifford, Elsey, and most of principals who contributed to the Report, the central objective of American policy was “to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area.” To accomplish this end and “carry out an effective policy toward the Soviet Union,” they realized that “the United States should coordinate its own activities” and that “our policies must also be global in scope.”¹¹³ For them, the connections between technological changes, decreased distance, increased vulnerability, and a worldwide, balancing grand strategy were clear.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 358.

¹¹² Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, p. 468. Previous quote from p. 470.

¹¹³ Ibid. Quotations from pp. 482, 481, and 482, respectively.

President Truman was even more explicit in his actual address, not only highlighting the geographic significance of the countries and regions involved and their linkages to the larger world and to the United States, but also in describing how this perception of connectedness leads to the need for American action. Because the fall of Greece or Turkey could set off an uncontrollable chain of events, with the potential for world-wide implications, the United States had to act:

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey....¹¹⁴

All told, approximately eleven percent of the sentences and sixteen percent of the paragraphs of this doctrinal pronouncement concern geopolitical features, making it the third most important topic (behind power and regime type) in the speech. In the warm-up speech for this address, given at Baylor University on March 6, the President also hit geopolitical themes hard, with again over ten percent of the paragraphs so oriented (again third, but this time behind norms and regime type and ahead of power), including

¹¹⁴ President Truman, "Recommendations on Greece and Turkey," p. 831.

the following passage which captures his sense of “imagined distance” and the need for strategic adjustment, and engagement, in the face of technological change:

Many of our people, here in America, used to think that we could escape the troubles of the world by simply staying within our own borders. Two wars have shown us how wrong they were. We know today we cannot find security in isolation. If we are to live in peace, we must join with other nations in a continuing effort to organize the world for peace. Science and invention have left us no alternative.¹¹⁵

Several weeks after the doctrinal pronouncement, the President elaborated these themes, explicitly comparing the age of Jefferson and Monroe to the 1940s and noting the fundamental difference: “For the peril to man’s freedom that existed then exists now on a much smaller earth – an earth whose broad oceans have shrunk and whose natural protections have been taken away by new weapons of destruction.”¹¹⁶ No longer would hiding suffice. More effort, engagement, and even leadership would be required. Repeatedly referring to the “world” instead of simply the United States, the President held no illusions about the necessary but challenging path of strategic adjustment ahead: “The process of adapting ourselves to the new concept of our world responsibility is naturally a difficult and painful one.” Given the emergent landscape, though, there were no other rational choices.

Two weeks later, roughly one month after the doctrinal address, the President returned to this theme in his remarks at meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors and provided one of the clearest statements linking geopolitics with strategic preferences, technological advances with expanding interests, and imagined connectedness with the need for a new approach to national security. Relaying the story

¹¹⁵ President Harry Truman, “Peace, Freedom, and World Trade,” Address at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, March 6, 1947, Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 16, 1947, p. 481.

¹¹⁶ President Harry Truman, Address at Jefferson Day Dinner, April 5, 1947, in *Public Papers*, p. 68.

of the record-breaking, round-the-world-flight of Milton Reynolds and William Odom the day before, the President conveys vividly his own mental map of the “machine age”:

Our own welfare is mixed up in the welfare of the world as a whole. We no longer have all the distances, and the oceans, and things of that sort to guard us. I just had a gentleman in here this morning who had been around the world, I think it was in 78 hours elapsed time. I think the actual flying time was nearer a little over 68 hours.... I think the time is coming when we will probably go round the world in 24 hours. And we have got to be prepared to meet that situation.

... We must catch up morally and internationally with the machine age. We must catch up with it, and we must catch up with it in such a way as to create peace in the world, or it will destroy us and everybody else.¹¹⁷

Beyond the explicit references to the “machine age” and the mitigating effects of technology on distance, Truman uses the term “world” – not nation, continent, or hemisphere – in half of his sentences. As appropriate and effective as it may have been in its time, the relative isolation of Washington and Monroe was no longer appropriate. Conditions had changed and so, therefore, must American strategic policy. In his classic plain-spoken manner, the President later elaborated this view in a way that makes perfectly clear the connections between increasing interaction capacity, decreasing imagined distance, and the need for strategic adjustment and engagement in the face of these changing circumstances:

That was then, and this is now. We're no longer a small country that can't afford to get mixed up in foreign affairs; we're one of the great leaders of the free world, and that message of Washington doesn't work anymore because he was faced with an entirely different situation. That's one of the things we've always got to keep in mind: that we've always got to meet situations as they shape up now with present-day considerations and conditions, and not base decisions entirely on situations of the past, which may be entirely different from today's conditions. It goes without saying that the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are no longer defense barriers. You can cross either one of them now in less than three or four hours, and it's going to be that soon we'll cross them quicker. Communications is instantaneous. We can talk to London, Paris, Moscow, Peking, or anywhere else in the world, just like that. It doesn't take any longer than the snap of a finger to get hooked up to them, and we know instantly what goes

¹¹⁷ President Harry Truman, Remarks at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 17, 1947, in *Public Papers*, p. 74.

on in every section of the world. And that means that the size of the world has changed from a thirty-inch globe to globe the size of an orange, or maybe even a grape.¹¹⁸

These geopolitically-oriented and strategically-adaptive views were reflected in numerous other statements made by President Truman. Consider, for example, a sampling of the language taken from some of his other major addresses. In his First Annual Address, two years before the crisis, he stated: "In this shrinking world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical barriers."¹¹⁹ In the 1946 Annual Message, delivered "at a time when massive changes are occurring with lightning speed throughout the world," the President claimed that "the evolution of centuries has brought us to a new era in world history in which manifold relationships between nations must be formalized and developed in new and intricate ways."¹²⁰ In the following year's address, delivered on January 6, he pointed out, "This is an age when unforeseen attack could come with unprecedented speed" and clearly noted the multidimensional essence of national security: "National security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and an air force. It rests on a much broader basis."¹²¹ In the 1948 address, the first after issuing the Doctrine, Truman he refers to the "unsettled and changing state of the world, highlights the importance of a "healthy world economy," and clearly argues for engagement: "Twice within our generation, world wars have taught us that we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world." His subsequent

¹¹⁸ Harry S. Truman, "Isolationism: Our First Foreign Policy," in Margaret Truman, ed., *Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private Writings of Harry S. Truman* (Warner Books, 1989), p. 188.

¹¹⁹ President Harry S. Truman, First Annual Message, 1945, available online at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>.

¹²⁰ President Harry S. Truman, Second Annual Message, 1946, available online at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>.

¹²¹ President Harry S. Truman, Third Annual Message, 1947, available online at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>.

Annual Messages and his Inaugural Address place great emphasis on the idea of a “North Atlantic community,” the security ties between the United States and Western Europe, and the need to maintain a balance of power, prevent Soviet domination of the Eurasian landmass or conquest of its rimlands, and “meet the danger of aggression that has been turned loose on the world.”¹²² As he explained in detail during his 1951

Annual Message:

Our national safety would be gravely prejudiced if the Soviet Union were to succeed in harnessing to its war machine the resources and the manpower of the free nations on the borders of its empire.

If Western Europe were to fall to Soviet Russia, it would double the Soviet supply of coal and triple the Soviet supply of steel. If the free countries of Asia and Africa should fall to Soviet Russia, we would lose the sources of many of our most vital raw materials, including uranium, which is the basis of our atomic power. And Soviet command of the manpower of the free nations of Europe and Asia would confront us with military forces which we could never hope to equal.

In such a situation, the Soviet Union could impose its demands on the world, without resort to conflict, simply through the preponderance of its economic and military power. ... Therefore, even if we were craven enough ... to abandon our ideals, it would be disastrous for us to withdraw from the community of free nations.¹²³

In his eighth, and final, Annual Message, the President again discusses the central and advantageous position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia and specifically refers not only to the “atomic age,” repeatedly, but also, after recent thermonuclear tests, to “another stage in the world-shaking development of atomic energy.”¹²⁴ Noting that “the speed of our scientific and technical progress over the last seven years shows no signs of abating,” he considers these developments as signifying “a new era of destructive power,” which, at

¹²² All eight Annual Messages and his Inaugural Address of 1949 are available online at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>. The quotation comes from President Harry S. Truman, Sixth Annual Message (1951).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ President Harry S. Truman, Eighth Annual Message, January 7, 1953, available online at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>.

some point, will ultimately require strategic adjustment and “international agreement.”¹²⁵ Such remarks reveal clearly President Truman’s firm grasp on geography, technological developments, and the strategic implications of the connections between these two variables.

One of the forces encouraging this type of geopolitical thinking, especially the growing sense of connectedness, was the cartography of the era.¹²⁶ President Truman’s own perspective, for example, was no doubt influenced by his study of geography, his reference to maps, and the accessibility of numerous other geopolitical representations. (See Figure 5A for an example of an actual map of Greece used by the administration.) He often used maps as visual aids and, on more than one occasion, surprised and impressed those around him with his geographical knowledge. In August 1946, during the first Turkish crisis, for example, the President sat patiently through two rounds of briefings on the significance of the area, the second of which was insisted upon by General Eisenhower to ensure that the President “understood the gravity of the matter,” before demonstrating his mettle. As Joseph Jones relays the story:

When the second analysis was finished the President opened a convenient desk drawer and drew out a large map of the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. It was made in sections, covered for protection with transparent plastic, the sections held together with black tape permitting them to be folded and opened readily. The whole was well worn and had the air of frequent handling. Unfolding the map, Truman proceeded to give a ten- to fifteen-minute dissertation on the historical importance and present-day strategic significance of the area, which at least one person present later described as “masterful.” Concluding, he turned good-humoredly to Eisenhower and asked whether he was satisfied now that the situation was understood. Eisenhower joined in the general laughter and admitted that he was.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Two others were the ease of long-distance communication and travel. Talking to someone thousands of miles away or traveling there in a matter of hours or days instead of weeks or months can dramatically change one’s perspective of “distance.”

¹²⁷ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 63-64.




Figure 5A Map of Greece Sent by Marshall to Truman, July 16, 1947
 Attached to Memorandum on the Greek Situation
 Available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org>

In another instance, a few years later, the President, during a conversation with the Achesons about the Middle East and Central Asia, “became engrossed in the subject and, pushing back the coffee cups, drew with his spoon on the *tablecloth* outline maps to illustrate his points.”¹²⁸ By this point, as Jones notes, “Acheson was interested but not surprised by the President’s knowledge of the Middle East and Central Asia, for he had had several occasions in previous years to discover it for himself.”¹²⁹ The significance of this knowledge for the present case is clear: “When the problems of Iran, Turkey, and Greece came before President Truman for decision in 1946-47 he did not have to be convinced of the importance of action. He already knew.”¹³⁰

Beyond this area-specific knowledge, garnered through years of interested study, the President’s understanding of geopolitics and mental maps also is revealed by other visual and cartographic representations, especially those found in the Oval Office. A non-exhaustive survey of the wall-hangings and decorations in Truman’s Oval Office indicates a strong geopolitical bent.¹³¹ Consider, for example, that directly across from his desk hung a map of the early United States. Also on the wall were several images of interaction capacity at work, pictures and paintings of ships and planes, both contemporary and historical, which cast in stark relief some of the recent technological developments. Most revealing of all was that within the confines of the Oval Office,

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66. Acheson himself was reported to have some familiarity with geography and cartography, including using maps as “backdrops” for briefings and making frequent reference to the significance of specific geographic areas. In addition, consider, for example, how Isaacson and Thomas describe him during the first crisis with Turkey in 1946: “As he pored over his maps, he had no doubts what the Soviets were up to.” Isaacson and Thomas, *The Wise Men*, p. 369. (Emphasis added.)

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹³¹ The following information derives from the examination of an incomplete and non-representative sample of pictures of the Oval Office during Truman’s presidency, found in a multitude of sources, primary and secondary, textual and online.

the President had not one or two, but three globes. A small one (approximately four-inches in diameter) sat in the middle of his desk, a medium one (approximately sixteen-inches) sat directly behind him on a large table with a half-dozen or so family pictures, and an enormous one (approximately three-feet) was placed in front of the fireplace directly across the room, underneath a towering portrait of George Washington.¹³² (See Figures 5B and 5C.) No wonder President Truman thought in larger terms than his predecessors and focused on the “world” instead of continents or hemispheres.



Figure 5B President Truman's Oval Office, from desk
Source: David McCullough, *Truman* (Simon and Schuster, 1992)

¹³² Given the limited number and angle of the pictures analyzed, however, I cannot claim with certainty that all three globes were present in the office in March 1947 or even that all three were in the office at the same time. Two of them, the small one on the desk and the large one in front of the fireplace, definitely were both in the office at the same time, as were the wall hangings.



Figure 5C President Truman's Oval Office, toward desk
Source: www.trumanlibrary.org

Contemporaneous cartography outside of the Oval Office also reveals a changing perspective, one dramatically different from the 1820s. Most striking is the

rarity of hemispheric maps in the 1940s. Those maps that were divided into two parts were more likely to be centered on the North and South poles than on the Eastern and Western hemispheres. In fact, of the 63 world maps dated between 1944 and 1947 in the Library of Congress, only six percent are hemispheric, while fourteen percent employ polar projections, many emphasizing the more heavily landed and populated northern hemisphere.¹³³ (See 5D and 5E for examples of these polar projections.)




Figure 5D Richard Edes Harrison, "One World, One War"
Source: *The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1944)

¹³³ Of these sixty-three maps, forty-two were published in the United States from 1944 to 1947. The remaining twenty-one maps were published in other countries in 1946 and 1947, a smaller sample selected because of much duplication in the cartographers and publishers of the particular maps held in this collection. I examined and categorized this collection on November 27, 2002, in the Geography and Map Division Reading Room of the Library of Congress.




Figure 5E Richard Edes Harrison. "Great Circle Airways"
 Source: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy (Alfred A. Knopf, 1944)

Instead of dividing the world into parts, most maps of the era represent the world on a single map, usually employing a Robinson, Miller, Van Der Grinten, or, most often, Mercator projection. Over three-fourths of the maps are thus designed, but centered on different longitudes, many according to the location of their publisher. Nearly forty percent of the American maps of the world, for example, are centered on the United States (90° west longitude) with portions of Europe and Asia on either side.¹³⁴ (See, for example, Figures 5F and 5G.)




Figure 5F Geographic Map Co., "Standard Map of the World"
Source: lcweb2.loc.gov

¹³⁴ Interestingly, not one non-American map is centered on the United States. In contrast, all of the maps from 1947 produced by the American Geographic Society for the United States Department of State are centered on 0°, instead of the United States as one might expect. Perhaps this reflects more traditional training, ossified views, Eurocentrism, or simply coincidence. Adopting a different approach, the U.S. Army Map Service centered its 1944 and 1946 world maps on the Pacific Ocean (around 150° E), with the Eurasia, Africa, and Australia on the left and the Americas on the right. The Department of Commerce took yet another approach in their 1945 map, which was clearly centered on the United States (near Albuquerque) and had the Eurasian landmass (split through India) on both sides, as did some of the earlier State Department maps.





Figure 5G Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The World"
 Source: *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*
 (Princeton University Press, [1942] 1946)


Approximately one fourth of the American maps are centered on 0° (or Great Britain), as opposed to nearly half of the non-American maps. A smaller, but still significant, percentage of the American maps are centered on the Pacific (typically around 150° E). While it is unclear exactly how much these maps shape and reflect cartographic consciousness,¹³⁵ it is indisputable that cartographic trends had clearly shifted from bifurcated, hemispheric maps in the 1820s to a single map of the world by the 1940s, often centered on either the United States or Europe. (See Figures 5H and 5I for examples of two maps drawn along these lines, including Spykman's dueling geopolitical interpretations.)

¹³⁵ It is not a matter of one or the other. Maps both shape and reflect views, identities, and interests, much like language, laws, institutions, and other cultural and discursive artifacts.



THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE NEW WORLD

Figure 5H Richard Edes Harrison, "The Encirclement of the New World"
Source: Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*
(Harcourt Brace, 1942)



THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE OLD WORLD

Figure 5I Richard Edes Harrison, "The Encirclement of the Old World"
Source: Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*
(Harcourt Brace, 1942)

At the very least, with American maps tending to center on either the United States or the Atlantic Ocean, a correlation appears between the actual maps and the mental maps of American policy-makers, whose views concentrated on the “North Atlantic community” and the increasingly central role of the United States in the expanding game of world politics.¹³⁶

Beyond this cartographic evidence, numerous subsequent official statements provide much more evidence for a set of shared beliefs, perceptions, and expectations among the principals about this emergent landscape and, consequently, about the ends and means of security, to say nothing of confirming the fact that much of the analysis of this time was conducted with geopolitical factors in mind. Consider, for example, the critical report offered by Joint Chiefs on April 29, which explicitly examines and prioritizes different countries and regions according to their importance to American national security and to their needs.¹³⁷ As mentioned above, they rank Western Europe first, followed by the Middle East. Central and South America and Northwest Africa receive some attention, as does East Asia, but not as much. Off their mental maps almost entirely are South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs clearly are thinking in geographic terms, not simply in terms of power, regime type, ideology, or norms.

¹³⁶ As noted above, this notion of “North Atlantic Community” is socially constructed and geographically suspect. For all the talk of Lippmann and others about the Atlantic Ocean being an “inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history, and vital necessity,” the fact remained that the continents of North America and Europe were separated by thousands of miles of treacherous seas. To the extent that Americans imagined themselves closer to Europe than Central or South America, for example, attributional distance may be more significant than physical distance. Quotation from Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1943), p. 83. For more on the different types of distance, see Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy.”

¹³⁷ JCS 1769/1, “United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security,” April 29, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 734-750.

The two major NSC reports of 1948 offer more of the same basic geopolitical logic and language. NSC 20/1, for example, refers explicitly to two separate “spheres” of Soviet power and influence that radiate outward from the Russian core, “a center for the world communist movement.”¹³⁸ The closer of these spheres, the “satellite area,” is dominated by the core largely because of its “proximity” to Soviet power.¹³⁹ Noteworthy as well are numerous references to geographic terms like territory, borders, areas, and zones. Particularly revealing are the references to “western countries” and “the western world,” especially when one considers that American policy-makers were, once again, looking eastward at Europe.¹⁴⁰

While this type of language clearly indicates geographic orientation and the use of mental maps, the follow-up report, NSC 20/4, goes further and explicitly provides a geopolitical rationale for the United States to adopt a balancing strategy vis-à-vis Russia on the Eurasian landmass.¹⁴¹ Particularly important were the “perimeter areas,” running from “Continental Europe and the Near East, as far as Cairo,” to “continental points in the Far East.”¹⁴² As the report states, “Russian seizure of these areas would ultimately enhance Soviet war potential” and, if they were integrated into the Soviet sphere, “permit an eventual concentration of hostile power which would pose an unacceptable

¹³⁸ NSC 20/1, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia,” August 18, 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, p. 173.

¹³⁹ As the report states, “In this area, which is, as a whole geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or proximity of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.” NSC 20/1, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, p. 176.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, pp. 203-211.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 209 and p. 206, respectively.

threat to the United States.”¹⁴³ The authors of this report, which “remained the definitive statement of United States policy toward the Soviet Union until April 1950, when NSC 68 appeared,”¹⁴⁴ clearly grasped the significance of the technological developments currently underway. They realized that while the Soviets would have a hard time successfully invading the United States, they might be able to “overrun” these other areas, which would a tremendous danger to American security. As the document clearly states, “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.”¹⁴⁵ The policy implications were equally clear and followed logically from this proposition – namely, to prevent Soviet expansion into these areas by a combination of measures, including “military readiness,” economic vitality, and stronger political ties with non-communist states, with a view to placing the “maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”¹⁴⁶

In NSC 68, the final, major expression of the Truman administration’s strategic approach for dealing with the Soviet threat, Paul Nitze, as the new Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and his co-authors explicitly describe the “shrinking world” we live in and identify geopolitical motivations for containment: “Our position as the center of power in the free world places heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership.”¹⁴⁷ Moreover, because “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁴⁴ Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, p. 203.

¹⁴⁵ NSC 20/4, November 23, 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, p. 208.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 210.

¹⁴⁷ NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 7, 1950, in May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy*, p. 29 and p. 79, respectively.

... would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.” America should seek to “encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries....”¹⁴⁸ While the policy prescriptions that Nitze and his staff recommend extend beyond traditional definitions of balancing toward “preponderance,” NSC 68 nevertheless conveys an understanding and appreciation of the need both to consider geography and technology, in addition to power and ideology, and to craft a multifaceted approach to a multifaceted problem. In doing so, it highlights the causal connections between geopolitics and the formulation of grand strategy.

Thus, in general terms, the discourse and cartography of this era were considerably broader and more expansive than those during Monroe’s time: by the 1940s, they emphasized the “world” as a connected whole, not continents, hemispheres, or quarters.¹⁴⁹ Now centered on Eurasia, the Americas, or the Atlantic Ocean, most maps of the era reveal no dividing lines, other than longitude and latitude, especially between the United States and Eurasia, and globes offered an even more accurate picture. Times had, indeed, changed and so had the mental maps and strategic preferences of American decision-makers. Let us review this causal process in more detail.

First, the material world and basic geographic realities, like location and distance, had continued to exist regardless of policy-makers’ perceptions of them.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 77 and p. 78, respectively.

¹⁴⁹ In contrast to Monroe’s use of the term “continent” four times in his doctrinal address, the most prominent geographic reference in Truman’s address was “world,” which was used six times in 2,192 words. Noteworthy as well is the fact that neither President used the other’s most frequent word once.

Certainly, some objective changes had taken place, including the geographic expansion of the United States across the North American continent and the opening of the Panama and Suez canals. That technological developments – in transportation, communication, and destruction – increased interaction capacity during the preceding decades was obvious. Equally apparent, at this point, is that American policy-makers perceived these changes, at least in their broadest form, and realized that some form of strategic adjustment was necessary. Given the increasing connectedness, most embraced, not surprisingly, a policy of increased engagement. The actual form of this engagement – the balancing strategy of containment – was shaped not only by these macroscopic perceptions but also by a more sophisticated interpretation of the emergent landscape, one that largely accorded with the views of such geopolitical thinkers as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Homer Lea, and Nicholas John Spykman.¹⁵⁰ One scholar, Geoffrey Sloan, argues that this whole foreign policy orientation – ends and means – was solidly based on such geopolitical theories and ideas.¹⁵¹ Most important, in this regard, was the belief that in the hands of a single, hostile Eurasian hegemon, the combined resources of what Mackinder termed the “world island” would be enough to strangle and/or overwhelm the United States, even with its Western

¹⁵⁰ For a sampling of the works of these four, see Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23 (1904) and “The Round World and the Winning of Peace,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 21 (July 1943); Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783* (Dover, [1894] 1987), *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1898), and *The Interest of America in International Conditions* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1910); Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (Harper Brothers, 1909); and Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics and The Geography of the Peace*.

¹⁵¹ As he writes, “In the conduct of policy there existed a conjunction between the geopolitical theories of Mahan, Lea, and Mackinder and the perceptions and actions of policy-makers” (p. 145). It is important to note, however, that Sloan’s analysis is more concerned with how geopolitical ideas and theories (as opposed to the environment per se, or even perceptions of it) influenced American security policy. For more, see G. R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (Wheatsheaf Books, 1988).

hemispheric allies. Thus, the principle objective of American security policy, as practiced in its various forms during the Cold War, was to protect what Spykman termed the “rimlands” and Mackinder the “inner crescent,” the belt of states ringing the Soviet perimeter.¹⁵² Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Western Europe across the Mediterranean and the Middle East to East Asia, these states were important for their resources and their location. Not only could their resources help shift the “correlation of forces” for or against the Soviet Union, but also they could be used for further expansion or containment of Soviet communism. The coastal states of Western Europe and East Asia were particularly important in this sense, both to have as a staging ground for the reinsertion of American forces, should that be necessary, and to deny the Soviets a comparable staging platform for attacks against North America. Regardless of how much geopolitical theories per se may have influenced policy-makers or not, the Truman administration’s approach was undeniably shaped by its awareness of increasing interaction capacity and by its interpretation of the significance of such developments for particular areas around the world.

Of course, geopolitical considerations were by no means the only factor driving American strategic policy during the Truman administration. Multiple, interactive

¹⁵² Donald W. Meinig, “Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History,” *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 1956). As he explains, “Indeed, the American postwar foreign policy of ‘containment’ and the existent pattern of alliances is in general an implementation, whether conscious or unconscious I cannot say, of Spykman’s theory of the critical nature of the rimland” (p. 555). For more on these two central geopolitical concepts, see Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History,” and Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*.

causes can be found on numerous levels of analysis.¹⁵³ The policy-makers' personalities and psychological dynamics certainly played a role, in terms of threat perception, assigning the significance of certain developments and areas, and determining what type of approach best suited America's needs.¹⁵⁴ Defining such needs opened up another door to debate, as some discussion emerged about the nature of the American polity, its "mission" abroad, and the most appropriate tools.¹⁵⁵ Domestic economic and political pressures also played a powerful and direct role in limiting the scope and funding of American policy,¹⁵⁶ as well as encouraging commercial engagement and expansion.¹⁵⁷ Domestic norms and values also influenced the direction of American policy, its embrace of the "free world" and its reluctance to practice a more

¹⁵³ Despite her overemphasis on the differences between the principals, at the expense of conveying the largely shared conceptual framework, Larson makes this point convincingly as she presents a "multi-level explanation of the origins of the American Cold War policies, using variables on the international system, domestic politics, and individual policy-makers' cognitive processes." Larson, *Origins of Containment*, p. 22. (Emphasis in original.) For two other examples of arguments of multi-level causation, emphasizing the interaction of domestic and international factors, see Robert G. Kaufman, "A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1994); and Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

¹⁵⁴ Larson, *Origins of Containment*.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* For more examples of such debates, see also Messer, "Paths Not Taken," and Mayers, "Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy."

¹⁵⁶ See, for example, Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*; Fordham, "Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S Foreign Policy"; and Arthur A. Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy: The United States, 1938-1950," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁷ For examples of arguments along these lines, see the works of William Appleman Williams or Gabriel Kolko, including Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Second Revised and Enlarged Edition (Delta Books, 1972), Ch. 6, and "The Cold War Revisionists," *The Nation*, Vol. 205 (November 13, 1967); and Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Beacon Press, 1969) and with Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (Harper and Row, 1972).

naked policy of imperialism.¹⁵⁸ As noted above, such domestic influences are hardly surprising given the context of the decision-making process. At least as influential as these domestic concerns were considerations of power and perceptions of threat.¹⁵⁹ Regardless of whether the Soviet threat was accurately perceived, American security policies focused more on Soviet Russia, with its formidable and growing military capabilities, than any other country. While more massive than all of the other potential threats combined, the military power of the Soviet Union was viewed as particularly threatening because of the political structure and ideology of the regime and because of its perceived potential and likelihood to project that power to the detriment of what policy-makers were defining as American national interests. Autocratic, xenophobic, uncompromising, expansionist, and hostile, the Soviet regime was the only one that posed a potentially serious security threat to U.S. interests after World War II. American economic performance might have suffered over time if Europe and Asia continued to struggle or collapsed, just as it might if the flow of oil from the Middle East were cut off. But, neither of these were direct threats to the territorial integrity or political independence of the United States. They were, at most, peripheral economic concerns that would hurt, but not destroy our country and way of life. But, when viewed as potential feeding grounds and stepping stones for the expansion of Soviet

¹⁵⁸ Dueck makes this point convincingly in his recent neo-classical analysis of this period. As he explains, "cultural factors – in the form of liberal beliefs and assumptions – acted as a crucial filter on the American consideration of strategic alternatives in 1945-46, rendering a sphere of influence approach quite unacceptable." Dueck, "Realism, Culture, and Grand Strategy," p. 30. For the more on the role of culture and "ideology," see Michael J. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Yale University Press, 1987), especially pp. 150-170.

¹⁵⁹ This is the orthodox, or traditional, interpretation offered by most of the principals and a wide-range of scholars over the years. For a recent example, see Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War." For a revisionist critique of such an interpretation, see Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (Oxford University Press, 1988).

communism these regions took on added importance. When combined with geopolitical views that emphasized American connectedness to Eurasia and vulnerability to Russia's increasing interaction capacity, American policy-makers knew that it would be foolhardy to remain aloof. They could run, but they could not hide; ultimately, the expansion of communism would come back to haunt them. Thus, in stark contrast to the 1820s, policy-makers, believing that this imagined connectedness mandated engagement, embraced a balancing strategy against the expansionist tendencies of its major rival into geopolitically significant areas. While other factors certainly influenced the adoption and execution of this approach, considerations of geopolitics were an essential element of the causal chain, one that helped shape strategic preferences and guide the identification and prioritization of the ends and means of American national security policy. Only when considerations of geopolitics are added to the mix can one garner a full and accurate appreciation of the decision-making process that resulted in the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 and the adoption of a grand strategy of balancing the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ As noted below, some other individual variables also may correlate with this dependent variable and offer plausible explanations of this case. They do not, however, offer a complete, accurate, and sufficient account – nor do they adequately explain the variation in American grand strategies over time.

Landscape Fitness and Operational Effectiveness

The perception of connectedness and the balancing strategy it motivated persisted in the postwar world, but, for a variety of reasons, evolved over time and took various shapes and forms.¹⁶¹ When initially designed and articulated, this policy seemed well fit for the circumstances. American engagement was necessary and balancing an appropriate strategy. As practiced in its various manifestations for over forty years, the principal thrust of American security policy during the Cold War was preventing Soviet domination of Eurasia. Aid and advisers were provided, treaties signed, alliances formed, and wars fought all in the name of containing the expansion of communism and maintaining a favorable balance of power on the Eurasian landmass. At the very least, most of the major presidential foreign policy doctrines promulgated during this period had a clear geographic direction: Eisenhower on the Middle East, Johnson on Southeast Asia, Nixon on Asia, and Carter on the Persian Gulf.¹⁶² Geopolitics clearly influenced the formulation and direction of American security strategy.

Evaluating the success of containment, however, is considerably tougher than sifting through abundant documentary and discursive evidence that mental maps shaped strategic preferences and policies. As with the Monroe Doctrine, initial fitness to the landscape helped generate success, in the form of stability and security. Neither Greece

¹⁶¹ While beyond the scope of this project, which focuses primarily on formulation not evolution or execution, such reasons include a wide-range of domestic and international variables, economic and political, structural and normative, material and psychological, etc. For a detailed description, explanation, and evaluation of the different forms of containment, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*.

¹⁶² Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*.

nor Turkey fell. The Middle East, for all of its troubles today, was never overrun and never became communist. Oil continued to flow. Nor did the “Iron Curtain” move westward. Both Western Europe and Japan were rebuilt and recovered admirably. Some might claim that China was “lost,” but it is unclear how much more influence the United States had over the direction of internal developments in China than it did in Russia.¹⁶³ Most importantly, a third world war was avoided, as were any major direct military engagements with the other great powers, communist or not. Moreover, to the extent that the Soviet Union sought to spread its version of communism, this too was thwarted by American policy.¹⁶⁴ Besides China, no other great power fell into the communist camp, and even then, the camp was divided. Ultimately, the United States accomplished its primary security objectives, including the reduction of the Russian threat and the reorientation of Russian foreign policy – all by means short of war. Kennan, Clifford, Nitze, and all of the other architects and practitioners of

¹⁶³ For one take on the limits of American influence in China and East Asia, McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise*, especially his discussion of Homer Lea in China, pp. 490-500. See also, John K. Fairbank, “Our Chances in China,” in *China Perceived* (Vintage Books, [1946] 1974); and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “China and America: 1941-1991,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Winter 1991/1992). For the limits in the Russia case, see George F. Kennan, “America and the Russian Future,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1951).

¹⁶⁴ Of course, smaller countries, like Cuba, became communist, some even in the face of tremendous American efforts to the contrary (e.g., Vietnam). Cuba remains a thorn in the American side, a reminder of America’s limited influence, as well as of the extraordinary domestic political and economic pressures that are required to sustain the type of anachronistic policies the United States continues to practice against this island.

“containment” were, thus, over time, vindicated by the results of their policies.¹⁶⁵ In both the short-term and the long-term, the Truman Doctrine was a success.¹⁶⁶

Even with this near-term correlation between fitness and functionality and with the appearance of long-term vindication of the balancing approach, some qualifications about the operational cost-effectiveness of containment are in order. Most significantly from an international security perspective, a disjuncture arose in the interim between increasing interaction capacity and this balancing strategy that generated at least theoretical dysfunctionality. As the material context changed and interaction capacity grew from moderate to strong with the development of jet aircraft, rockets, telephones, satellites, and hydrogen bombs, balancing, too, increasingly became outdated.¹⁶⁷ While

¹⁶⁵ While such a statement might minimize important differences in the execution of American security policies during the Cold War, neither the later reorientation toward a more active, militaristic rollback posture nor the sources of variation are primary concerns in the study at hand – which concentrates on analyzing the sources of the original doctrinal pronouncement and, to a lesser extent, its fitness and functionality. Moreover, while there certainly were differences between Kennan and Nitze (e.g., point versus area defense, measures short of war versus military means, etc.), there also was some gray area between them, with overlapping views (e.g., about the USSR) and, more importantly, overlapping policies, at least in terms of the actual practice of “containment” versus the more aggressive rollback posture their documents advocated, albeit in the different forms that Gaddis details. For more on the different forms of containment, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*. For more on the domestic influences that might have meliorated some of these more aggressive tendencies, see Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*.

¹⁶⁶ For a more elaborate balance sheet, but one which affirms these basic indices of success, see Crabb, “The Truman Doctrine: Cold War and the Containment Strategy,” especially pp. 139-152.

¹⁶⁷ Albert Einstein and Bernard Brodie both captured this fundamental discontinuity with their famous statements about the nuclear revolution. As Einstein put it: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking....” Brodie’s line was no less powerful, and even more applicable to the realm of strategy: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” The Einstein quotation comes from Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden, eds., *Einstein on Peace* (Schocken, 1968) and is cited in Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, eds., *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions* (Rowman and Allanheld, 1986). Brodie’s line comes from Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 76.

Dan Deudney takes an even stronger stand, arguing that not only balancing but also states themselves are outdated, at least as security providers: “The state as a mode of protection is in contradiction with the contemporary nuclear forces of destruction” – in “Nuclear Realism and Republicanism” (University of Pennsylvania, 1994), p. 35. For more, see Daniel Deudney, “Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real-State,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 2 (Spring 1995).

the situation may have appeared stable at first glance, further analysis reveals a fundamental conceptual problem. Most importantly, strategic stability with the Soviet Union was purchased at the expense of genuine security, as the reality of mutual societal vulnerability – the total insecurity associated with MAD – replaced any chance of actual protection against a determined, nuclear-armed adversary.¹⁶⁸ Consider, as well, the human, economic, and social costs associated with the practice of containment, including tens of trillions of dollars spent on defense and tens of thousands of lives lost

¹⁶⁸ Here, it seems important to draw the distinction between stability and security. While perhaps lowering the risks of superpower conflict and offering a “robust” and “cost-effective” means of dissuading potential attacks against the United States, as Goldstein and others point out, the potential reality of MAD still poses conceptual problems. There is an inherent contradiction to any approach to “security” that is founded on total insecurity. “Stability” may be a more accurate and acceptable term for this condition. This should not, however, be confused with “security,” which (derived from the Latin *securus*) literally means free from care – and more generally means free from fear, anxiety, and worries, as well as not exposed to dangers or attack. Herein lies the problem: not exposed to danger from attack by being exposed to danger from attack? Nevertheless, to the extent that the fear of the costs and consequences of nuclear engagement serve to lower the risks of use, then this theoretical security dysfunction is less problematic.

For more on the problems associated American strategic doctrine and its persistent reliance on a potentially suicidal offensive posture, see Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1984); Richard Ned Lebow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Cornell University Press, 1987). For more on the history of the doctrinal development associated with nuclear weapons, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (St. Martin’s Press, 1981). And, for more on the stabilizing role of nuclear weapons, Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 2000); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell University Press, 1989); and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Reality,” *APSR*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990) and “More May be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (W.W. Norton, 1995).

in “limited” wars in the Eurasian rimlands, and some qualifications of “success” seem in order.¹⁶⁹

To the extent that these subsequent interpretations and applications of containment were dysfunctional, at least theoretically (i.e., considered successful only so long as they did not falter or require execution), then this offers more support for my operational hypotheses. One way or the other, the short-term fitness and functionality of the Truman administration’s balancing strategy offers clear confirming evidence that geopolitics influenced not only the formulation of grand strategy, but also correlates with its effectiveness. At the very least, we are left suspecting that the landscape fitness of America’s balancing strategy during the early stages of the Cold War may have helped ensure that Soviet communism, whatever its actual capabilities and intentions, which still are debated today, did not overrun the rimlands and allow the Soviets to dominate the Eurasian landmass. Of course, the thousands of nuclear warheads, both fission and fusion weapons, that were deliverable by bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles posed a far greater potential threat – at least in terms of consequences if not risks – for the security of the United States. Once the Soviets developed such capabilities, which, as discussed in the next chapter,

¹⁶⁹ In the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts alone, for example, the United States suffered over 250,000 casualties (and nearly 95,000 deaths). While less than world wars, the total of either conflict amounts to more than all of the previous century’s international wars combined. The economic costs were staggering, with both conflicts, individually costing more than World War I, and, again, more than all of the other wars (save World War II) combined. Significant also were the opportunity costs associated with this tremendous expenditure on defense. This is to say nothing about the societal costs associated with maintaining vigilance at home (with movements like McCarthyism) and abroad against the perceived (or exaggerated) threat of communism. The casualty statistics come from the U.S. Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (available at www.fedstats.gov) and the economic figures from the Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975).

represent yet another dramatic increase in destructive capacity, balancing became less suitable, given the potential consequences associated with its execution or the failure of deterrence.¹⁷⁰ At this point, it made functional strategic sense, even if it would not have been politically and economically popular, for the United States to adapt and adopt a different approach to security.

¹⁷⁰ At the same time, it is important to recognize the stability generated by the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. While an active policy of confronting and meeting every Soviet advance or foray posed excessive risks and made little sense, maintaining a basic strategic balance in superpower nuclear arsenals – particularly survivable, second-strike retaliatory capabilities – continued to make sense and generate stability at least until new more appropriate binding measures could help reduce the absolute level of insecurity that large numbers of deliverable nuclear weapons create.

Conclusion: Geopolitics and the Truman Doctrine

While more research and analysis are necessary to render conclusive judgments about the fitness and functionality of the Truman Doctrine, this case study offers at least suggestive evidence in this regard and strong supporting evidence for my formative hypotheses. For the latter, the evidence in this case, discursive and cartographic, is at least as strong as in the Monroe case. In both cases, interaction capacity correlates with grand strategy, weak with hiding and moderate with balancing, respectively. More importantly, in both cases, process tracing and discourse analysis reveals abundant and compelling evidence of conceptual and causal linkages between the underlying material substructures and strategic preferences. The thoughts, language, and behavior of American policy-makers suggest that they were aware of geopolitical circumstances and considered their degree of connectedness when crafting strategic policies. Moreover, in both instances, precipitated by diplomatic notes from British officials that “forced” the administrations to act, American policy-makers initially perceived accurately the level of interaction capacity, but failed to make adjustments over time as subsequent technological advances modified the geopolitical landscapes and rendered earlier strategic approaches and fitness levels obsolete. The resulting cognitive gaps, based on the disjuncture between these outdated mental maps and the emergent strategic landscape, created dysfunctional strategic policies that, once initiated, took on a life of their own, with associated organizational and bureaucratic interests, and proved difficult to dislodge. Nevertheless, the consequences and cataclysms associated with the crash of the Monroe Doctrine outweighed the costs of the Truman Doctrine’s misfit, which,

while substantive and onerous, could have been much worse given the awesome destructive capacity of nuclear weapons.

All told, then, my geopolitical hypotheses, on both sides of the causal chain, stand up well in this case. The historical evidence confirms all three metatheoretical hypotheses concerning formation: geopolitics mattered; it mattered significantly; and it mattered indirectly, with its profound influence mediated through policy-makers' perceptions of connectedness – through mental maps and imagined distance. The historical evidence also supports all seven variable-specific hypotheses. As interaction capacity increased from weak to moderate, policy-makers in the Truman administration made a clear and definitive move to a balancing strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the primary perceived threat. As part of this strategic reorientation, American "national interests" were redefined in broader terms and now were world-wide. For a variety of reasons, including its occupation of the "heartland" and the greatest deliverable destructive capacity, Russia was identified as the most pressing threat. Similarly, because of their location and resources, as well as other factors, certain areas – particularly Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia – were viewed as most important. In this instance, as with the Monroe Doctrine, attributional and physical distance seem to overlap and, thus, over determine American policies toward these

different areas.¹⁷¹ One way or the other, imagined distance directly influenced both the motivational and the cognitive dimension of the balancing grand strategy articulated by the Truman administration.

Awareness and appreciation of the awesome destructive capacity of total industrial war – especially one conducted with rapidly, accurately, and reliably deliverable weapons of mass destruction – also influenced operational preferences and policy choices. Most importantly, while recognizing the importance of maintaining military capabilities and readiness, not just potential, and a demonstrated willingness to employ them, American policy-makers also sought to protect and promote American security interests by “measures short of war.” Economic and political tools both were valuable for helping strengthen the “bulwark” against communist expansion, while simultaneously improving the relations and welfare among non-communist states. A

¹⁷¹ So, too, do other factors, like power, regime type, and ideology seem to all point in the same direction. While this may complicate the determination of the relative explanatory power of different causal variables and levels of analysis in this case alone, these other factors cannot explain sufficiently the evolution in American security across the three cases. Consider, for example, the limited explanatory power of regime type. While the United States, as a democracy, clearly practiced a different strategy toward other democracies in the “free world” than toward totalitarian states in the “communist bloc,” this factor remains essentially unchanged for the primary target of the two different types of strategies practiced by the Monroe and Truman administrations. While one could quibble about the superficial differences between tsarist Russia in the 1820s and communist Russia in the 1940s, neither were republican or democratic – both are more accurately considered as authoritarian, autocratic, or totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, the United States, which, itself, had essentially the same type of republican government in both eras, approached the same essential type of government differently – once with hiding and once with balancing – then some other factor which actually varied must explain the change. A similar argument could be made about Russian ideology (which was perceived as revisionist in both cases) and Russian power (which was perceived as formidable and threatening in both cases). More challenging are neorealist counter-arguments about shifts in polarity – from multipolarity in the 1820s, to bipolarity in the 1940s, to, perhaps, unipolarity in the 1990s. As discussed below, this shift still cannot explain why the United States embraced hiding in the 1820s and not internal or external balancing as neorealists might expect. Attempts to justify this deviant hiding strategy by reference to the relative weakness of the United States fall short – if not balancing, weakness should, according to more classical realist logic, encourage bandwagoning, especially with the strongest power (in the 1820s, Great Britain, which also happened to be the closest great power to the United States, in terms of both physical and attributional distance). However, neither path suggested by realists or neorealists was adopted. Similar theoretical gaps emerge between these two cases and the subject of the next chapter, the Clinton Doctrine.

clear differentiation between these two camps – between the multilateral engagement and liberal commerce among the “west” and the political and economic closure and isolation directed at the communist “bloc” – supports not only the categorization of the administration’s approach as balancing (what would later be called “selective engagement”) but also offers confirming evidence for my geopolitical hypotheses concerning operational choices. The distribution among military and non-military means, as well as the corresponding balance within the three different dimensions, all at least correlate with the moderate level of interaction capacity which characterized the era during which this grand strategy arose. Militarily, the United States was moderately engaged and adopted an offensive posture. Politically, the bifurcated policies of the United States toward the two blocs and the resulting categorization of these policies as “moderate” similarly meet with my geopolitical expectations. Even the economic dimension, the one outlier in the Monroe Case, fits in this case as the United States practiced neomercantile containment versus the Soviet Union and preferential reconstructionism toward other strategically important areas – particularly, Western Europe and Japan.

The evidence in the Truman case thus offers strong support for all ten of my formative hypotheses and limited support for my operational hypothesis. In this case, geopolitics clearly shaped the strategic approach adopted by the United States after World War II toward Soviet Russia.¹⁷² The balancing strategy announced by President Truman in his doctrinal address on March 12, 1947 continued, in various forms, to

¹⁷² While less germane to the argument at hand, it also influenced American policies toward Western Europe, the Middle East, and Japan.

guide American security policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. At that point, a similar “postwar” juncture was reached with new latitude and pressures for strategic adjustment. The question was, “What now?” Let us turn our attention to how the Clinton administration answered this question and analyze the suggested replacement – the binding strategy of “enlargement” espoused by the Clinton Doctrine.

GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY: FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Part II: The Empirical Evidence

Chapter 6: The 1990s, Closeness, Binding, and the Clinton Doctrine

While some American policy-makers acknowledged the functional security challenges posed by nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles and sought means of redress early on,¹ official policy and operational plans were dominated by traditional thinking about balancing and war-fighting.² Only in the last few decades did American decision-makers start to publicly admit that they recognized the evolving material context and make a concerted effort to craft policy accordingly.³ Most significant in this regard have been the various efforts to bind the Russians and others

¹ Consider, for example, the notion of placing nuclear weapons under international control as suggested by the Baruch Plan. While the actual proposal was fundamentally flawed (politically designed to ensure American supremacy at the expense of Soviet security, making it virtually impossible for them to accept), its genesis reflects awareness of the revolutionary changes that were to bedevil policy-makers from that point on. For more on the Baruch Plan, see Morris V. Rosenbaum, *Peace Through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a Blueprint for Security* (Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953); Bernard G. Beckhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Greenwood Press, 1975); John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship* (Praeger Publishers, 1962); Margaret L. Coit, *Mr. Baruch* (Riverside Press, 1957); Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (March 1974); and Bernard M. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).

² For more, see Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1984) and Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (St. Martin's Press, 1981).

³ While both Eisenhower's "new look" and McNamara's "assured destruction" policies were based on assessments of the enormous destructive (and deterrent) capability associated with nuclear weapons, neither seemed to grasp the illogic and irresponsibility of policies that threatened potential planetary suicide. As discussed in Chapter 5, this fundamental flaw – the inherent insecurity produced by these weapons, particularly when marshaled in an offensive or retaliatory posture – was the primary source of the dysfunctionality associated with the balancing of the Truman Doctrine.

with arms control agreements.⁴ Even more illustrative and fitting was the Clinton administration's declared successor to containment – what they called a “strategy of engagement and enlargement.”⁵

Announced in a series of high-profile speeches in the fall of 1993 and then elaborated in several official reports,⁶ this approach to security – termed the “Clinton Doctrine”⁷ – was based on explicit recognition of increasing connectedness, shrinking distances, mutual vulnerability, and shared interests. Instead of avoiding or balancing the potential threats posed by great powers, the Clinton administration purposefully sought to bring them closer. More specifically, and as discussed in depth below, they

⁴ In terms of nuclear restraint, the most important efforts include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), SALT I and the ABM Treaty (1972), SALT II (1979), the INF Agreement (1987), START I (1991), START II (1993), and the Comprehensive Test Ban (1996). For an account of how such security regimes contribute to stability and “learning,” see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987).

⁵ For the initial statement of this policy, see Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Address at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, September 21, 1993), Reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39.

⁶ In addition to Lake's defining speech, the President presented the official “doctrinal” address the following week at the United Nations: William J. Clinton, “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,” Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993. Rounding out the set, as discussed below, were speeches by Secretary Christopher at Columbia University on September 20, 1993, and by Ambassador Albright to the National War College on September 23, 1993. All four speeches were reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

The reports, also discussed at length below, were published by the White House and entitled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. The initial version, compiled by Anthony Lake and the NSC staff, was published in July 1994. It was reissued under the same title in 1995 and 1996. Subsequent reports issued under Sandy Berger's direction were revised and renamed as *National Security Strategy for a New Era* in 1997 and *National Security Strategy Report for a New Century* in 1998 and 1999. Some of these, along with reports on the military dimension of this strategy, are available at www.defenselink.mil. For more on the construction of these reports, including the twenty-one drafts of the 1994 version, see Don M. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 15, 1995.

⁷ See Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997); and Charles William Maynes, “A Workable Clinton Doctrine,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 93 (Winter 1993/94). As noted below, there are both differing interpretations of the security policies of the administration and alternative definitions of the “Clinton Doctrine” per se, which, while interesting, are not nearly as compelling, at least in terms of capturing the essence of the administration's strategic approach vis-à-vis great powers, as the case made by Lake and company, as well as by Brinkley and Maynes.

sought to bring Russia and, to a lesser extent, China into the fabric of the international community – militarily, politically, economically, and culturally – to mutually constrain capabilities and bind futures together through institutional and other means. Guiding this strategic approach was a clear awareness of the dramatic impact of recent technological changes, especially in the fields of communication, transportation, and information processing. As technologies advanced, distances shrank, with increased interaction capacity offering new opportunities and increased responsibilities for American foreign policy. As the official statement, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, phrases it: “In a more integrated and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests – political, military, and economic – without active engagement in world affairs. While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments.”⁸ In other words, as we entered the “global information age,” another layer of interconnectedness, if not interdependence, helped encourage American engagement and increasingly integrative policies toward its former and potential threats. No longer could the United States hide. Nor would balancing suffice. Instead, with their present and future already inextricably linked to others, American policy-makers opted for an

⁸ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (February 1995), p. 33. Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, all references to the official report are drawn from this edition and cited as *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*.

alternative grand strategy vis-à-vis the other great powers, one that can be best characterized as binding.⁹

Crafted with a clear view of the changing geopolitical environment and the strong and growing interaction capacity, as well as other factors, this binding approach fit well the great power strategic landscape and yielded considerable success, especially stability and peace with the other great powers.¹⁰ At the same time, this focus on great powers and, to a lesser extent, on rogue states, obfuscated the view of American policy-makers toward the emergence of non-state actors, many of whom had become increasingly powerful and connected with the development and diffusion of various interactive technologies, particularly weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Ultimately, this gap proved fatal as the terrorist network al-Qaeda perpetrated the worst national security breach since Pearl Harbor.

Before further pursuing this functional analysis, however, let us examine the first, formative leg of our causal chain – including the material context, the articulated

⁹ For a more elaborate description of and argument for this type of “binding” approach, see G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (May/June 1996); “America’s Liberal Hegemony,” *Current History* (January 1999); “Why Export Democracy?” *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1999); and *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War* (Princeton University Press, 2001), especially Chapters 7 and 8. See also his work with Dan Deudney, including “The Logic of the West,” *World Policy Journal* (Winter 1993/94); “After the Long War,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 94 (Spring 1994); and “Misjudging Clinton,” University of Pennsylvania, July 1994.

¹⁰ As with definitions of the doctrine and interpretations of the administration’s approach, there is a wide-range of opinions about its causes and its consequences. While I discuss all of these topics below, it may help to bear in mind the purpose, focus, and basic argument of the current study. At no point am I making a mono-causal argument that only geopolitics matters. Other factors and considerations – personal, domestic, and international – certainly come into play and help shape grand strategies and their outcomes. Nor am I trying to address the totality of the foreign policies that were actually carried out – or their results. Instead, the thrust of this study remains on the declared security policies of the United States toward other great powers, especially those that are perceived as posing a potential threat. In this instance, myriad influences shaped the stated strategy of “engagement and enlargement” with geopolitics among the most important. As suggested in previous chapters and elaborated in the conclusion, the significance of geopolitics, however, does increase when one considers its explanatory power across the cases examined in this study, particularly relative to some of the alternatives.

strategic doctrine, and the connections between the two variables. This chapter, thus, proceeds along the same lines as the preceding empirical case studies. The first section describes the underlying geopolitical foundation and classifies interaction capacity as strong. The second section analyzes the Clinton Doctrine, including its various elements and dimensions, and concludes that it can be considered a binding grand strategy, at least vis-à-vis the other great powers. The third section explores the causal connections between this material context and the administration's strategic doctrine, emphasizing global mental maps and imagined closeness. In this case, the principals' perceptions of increasing connectedness drove them to embrace not only engagement, but also mutually constrictive and integrative policies and programs. This analysis of the formulation of the Clinton Doctrine is complemented in the fourth section by an assessment of operational effectiveness and functionality. The evidence from both legs of the grand strategic causal chain – formative and operational – support my claims about the profound influence of geopolitics. The fifth and final section offers a brief summary and some case-specific conclusions about the roles and relationship of geopolitics and grand strategy during the Clinton administration.

The Independent Variable: Interaction Capacity and Material Separation

In 1993 – well into the nuclear, space, and information ages¹¹ – interaction capacity was taking off and the effects of distance shrinking dramatically. Monumental advances in communication and information processing technologies were changing how we live and interact, as well as how we think about ourselves and our planet. While perhaps not as recent, continued developments in transportation and destruction also had fundamentally altered the material context and its effects.¹² Interaction

¹¹ As discussed above, historical eras can be categorized and divided along different lines. In a recent article, Deudney classifies the current era as “nuclear”; in an earlier work, he pegged the period starting in 1945 as “late global.” Van Creveld considers this period as part of the “age of automation” (1945-present), Dupuy the “age of technological change” (1800-present). McDougall offers a useful complement to the nuclear base with his “space age” (c.1960-present). As suggested here, one new and obvious candidate for separate or overlapping classification is the “information age.”

For more on these other schemes and their constituent elements, see Daniel H. Deudney, “Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000) and “Global Geopolitics: A Reconstruction, Evaluation, and Interpretation of Materialist World Order Theories of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1989); Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*, Revised and Expanded Edition (Free Press, 1991); Trevor Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1980); and Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (Basic Books, 1985).

For more on the increasing importance of information-related technologies, see Martin Libicki, “The Emerging Primacy of Information,” *Orbis* (Spring 1996); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March-April 1996); Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March-April 1996); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5 (September-October 1998); Bill Owens, with Ed Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000); David J. Lonsdale, “Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension,” in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy* (Frank Cass, 1999); Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “Technology and the Transformation of Global Politics,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1999); and James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh, eds., *Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance* (SUNY Press, 2002).

¹² Applying a similar methodology, Deudney offers the same conclusion: “Working from the present to the past, there is a clear distinction between the *nuclear* technologies of the last half century and the *industrial* technologies which characterized the material context during the century between approximately 1850 and 1950.” Deudney, “Regrounding Realism,” p. 33. (Emphasis in original.)

capacity was moderate in 1947, as the Soviets sought but did not yet possess atomic weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles; but this was no longer the case when President Clinton came into office. Instead, technological advances and diffusion had dramatically reduced material separation and increased interaction capacity to at least the point of being “strong.”¹³

Most pressing and threatening were the continued development and deployment of the immense destructive potential associated with nuclear weapons. Releasing billions of calories per gram of radioactive element (as opposed to 800 for gunpowder and 1,600 for TNT), the thousands of existing nuclear weapons offered unprecedented and virtually unimaginable destructive density and lethality.¹⁴ The development and deployment of hydrogen bombs during the Cold War signaled yet another qualitative

As noted above, much of the general information presented in this case and the other two about interaction capacity, technological developments, and prevalent modes of transportation, communication, and destruction derives from multiple sources, including Daniel H. Deudney, “Global Geopolitics”; van Creveld, *Technology and War*; Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*; McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth*; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Knopf, 1993); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since 1000 AD* (University of Chicago Press, 1982); David Harding, ed., *Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD* (St. Martin’s Press, 1980); and Bryan Bunch and Alexander Hellemans, eds., *The Timetables of Technology* (Simon and Schuster, 1993).

¹³ Given the extraordinary density of nuclear weapons and the proximity associated with ballistic missiles, one could make an argument, as Deudney does, that the destructive interaction capacity was not just strong, but intense, at least among heavily-armed nuclear superpowers. While advances in communication and information-processing technologies certainly spiked upward non-destructive interaction capacity, non-destructive transportation technologies still lagged behind. To travel across the oceans, ideas and information took only seconds, missiles and warheads minutes, but people and goods took longer, sometimes hours, sometimes days, depending upon the load and the mode. In this respect, geography and distance still matter, at least for some forms of interaction. For this reason, the aggregate level of interaction capacity during the 1990s is best classified, according to the categorization offered in Chapter 2, as strong, not intense, recognizing variation among sectors and actors. For more on the argument for “intense” destructive interaction capacity, see Deudney, “Regrounding Realism,” especially pp. 33-38, as well as his “Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real-State,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 2 (Spring 1995).

¹⁴ Kosta Tsipis, *Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age* (Simon and Schuster, 1983). The gunpowder figure comes from the abstract of an article by August Darapsky, “The Salts of Hydrinitric Acid as Explosives” (University of Heidelberg, 1907), found by Judith Miller at the Chemistry Library of the University of Pennsylvania.

leap in human destructive capacity. Based on fusion instead of fission, such devices were roughly one thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁵ Also significant, if somewhat more constrained, were the stores and potential of chemical and biological weapons. Taken together, these three broad types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), almost by definition, herald the dawning of a non-conventional world and a potentially far more destructive age.

Compounding these changes and contributing to the Nuclear Revolution were the speed and reliability of the delivery means. Jet aircraft now could cross the oceans (or North Pole) in a matter of hours. Even more significant, rockets launched from silos and submarines flying at more than 15,000 mph could traverse continents and oceans in minutes and rendered every corner of the globe vulnerable to a nuclear attack.¹⁶ Moreover, beyond being essentially indefensible, an attack with such weapons could occur with negligible warning time, with the whole assault completed and campaign decided in less than one hour. Combined, such developments, even at early stages, led some observers to conclude that distance was becoming “illusory,” especially in terms of offering any hope of protection against attack.¹⁷ Improved guidance-systems and new stealth technologies, as well as terrain-following cruise missiles, have only

¹⁵ Tsipis, *Arsenal*.

¹⁶ For more on the evolution of rockets and missiles, see McDougall, *A Political History of the Space Age*; Tsipis, *Arsenal*; and David Baker, *The Rocket* (Crown Publishers, 1978).

¹⁷ See, for instance, Albert Wohlstetter, “Illusions of Distance,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1968). In addition to his argument about the increased range of potential adversaries, Wohlstetter also offers a compelling argument about how technological developments across the sectors tend to increase the scope and number of connections and interactions, as well as extending notions of identity and interests – which, as noted in Chapter 2, serves as one of the underlying geopolitical propositions of this study.

exacerbated this situation by increasing the accuracy and deliverability of advanced weapons.

But, as discussed in the previous chapter, this destructive interaction capacity had been developing for decades and had already posed serious theoretical and practical problems for hiding and balancing strategies. Even more immediate, profound, and influential at this point was the growth in information-processing and communication technologies. The advent and spread of microchips, computers, satellites, fiber-optic cables, cellular phones, wireless networks, and the Internet, to say nothing of television and various recording technologies, all helped erode distance and time even further, bringing people closer together and increasing the potential for interaction, especially for the exchange of information and ideas. Overseas phone calls, for instance, increased from 664,000 in 1947 to over three billion in 1993.¹⁸ The figures for computer and Internet use are even more startling and continue to grow rapidly.¹⁹ We clearly were entering the Information Age.

¹⁸ Data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975) and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years, all available at www.census.gov).

¹⁹ Consider, for example, the following statistics pertaining to the United States. In 1994, there were 298 computers per 1,000 people and 671 Internet users per 100,000 people. By 1999, over 40 percent of the households had at least one computer, and there were 11,315 Internet hosts per 100,000 people. Moreover, from 1998 to 2000, Internet access had risen from 26.2 percent of households to 41.5. Connectedness means even more in the Information Age. For more on this aspect of the emergent landscape, see William J. Mitchell, *City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn* (MIT Press, 1995). The statistics are drawn from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* and the United Nations, *World Development Report* and *Human Development Report* (both annuals, various years).

In the economic realm, the effects of these communication and transportation advances were felt directly and widely.²⁰ Multinational enterprises (MNEs), already powerhouses by the 1970s, were further empowered by these technologies, as well were many other non-state actors.²¹ Commerce, capital, and information were becoming increasingly mobile and tended to relocate to minimize costs and maximize productivity, with processes of production and currency flows less bound by territory or distance and vastly dispersed.²² Inter- and intra-firm networks and webs of global commerce were emerging as prevalent patterns of economic activity.²³ So profound were these economic shifts that some observers, like Robert Reich, who then was teaching at Harvard Business School and who would become Secretary of Labor in the

²⁰ As Aaron Friedberg explains: "As a result of the improvements in transportation and communication, countries at all levels of development are becoming increasingly tightly interconnected, not only through the traditional ties of trade but also by vast and rapid financial flows; exchanges of information, people, and technology; increases in all forms of foreign investment; the worldwide dispersion of production facilities by large corporations; and the formation of business alliances across national boundaries." Aaron Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship between Economic and National Security," in Henry Bienen, ed., *Power, Economics, and Security* (Westview Press, 1992), p. 138.

²¹ Nye and Keohane, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age"; and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997).

²² Many economists and political economists make this argument. For two interesting, if slightly exaggerated (in terms of the political implications) accounts of this dynamic, see Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring 1993); and Stephen J. Kobrin, "Electronic Cash and the End of National Markets," *Foreign Policy*, No. 107 (Summer 1997). Also see Kenichi Ohmae, "Managing in a Borderless World," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1989; and Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Geography of Money* (Cornell University Press, 1998).

²³ *Ibid.* Kobrin makes a similar argument in two other pieces: "Transnational Integration, National Markets, and Nation States," in Douglas Nigh and Brian Toyne, eds., *The State of International Business Inquiry* (Quorum Books, 1993); and "Beyond Geography: Inter-firm Networks and the Structural Integration of the Global Economy," The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, November 1993.

Clinton administration, were critiquing the “myth” of national identity and asking questions like “who is us?” and “who is them?”²⁴

In the military realm, the application of these high technologies to such activities as the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the targeting and guidance of munitions, battlefield command and control, and damage-assessment has inspired what some have described as a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).²⁵ Regardless of how one views the military impact of recent developments in communication and information processing, there is less room for debate about lethality and destructive potential associated with nuclear weapons: density and proximity both are high. Nor is there much solid ground to argue against the emergence of global networks and webs of economic activity. The Clinton administration came to Washington in the midst of a period of tremendous technological change and diffusion – of geopolitical dynamism –

²⁴ See, respectively, Robert Reich, “Multinational Corporations and the Myth of National Origin,” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer 1991); “Who is Us?” *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1990; and “Who is Them?” *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1991. Also see his *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for Twenty-First Century Capitalism* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

As he explains, “as almost every factor of production – money, technology, factories, and equipment – moves effortlessly across borders, the very idea of an American economy is becoming meaningless, as are the notions of American capital, American products, and American technology. A similar transformation is affecting every other nation....” Reich, *The Work of Nations*, p. 8.

One of the most useful examples Reich employs to illustrate this point is an examination of the composition of automobiles. Of the \$10,000 that (in 1991) went to GM for a Pontiac LeMans, \$3,000 went to South Korea for labor and assembly; \$1,800 to Japan for components such as engines, transaxles, and electronics; \$650 to West Germany for styling and design engineering; \$400 to Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan for small components; \$250 to Britain for advertising and marketing; and \$40 to Barbados and Ireland for data processing. With more than 60 percent going to other countries, Reich concludes that “by 1990 American consumers intent on improving the nation’s trade balance would have done better to buy a Honda than a Pontiac LeMans.” Reich, *The Work of Nations*, p. 134.

²⁵ For a comprehensive if critical review of the rich and abundant literature on this topic – including an assessment of sensors, computers, communications, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weaponry – see Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Brookings Institution Press, 2000). For an interesting account of ten previous “revolutions,” see Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *National Interest*, No. 37 (Fall 1994). For more on the sources of such developments, see Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Cornell University Press, 1991).

with a clear and significant shift in interaction capacity and material separation from previous eras. Weak in Monroe's era and moderate in Truman's time, interaction capacity now was strong and increasing. As discussed below, most American policy-makers seemed to recognize these technological developments and to consider their implications as they worked toward fashioning an appropriate post-Cold War foreign policy for the United States.

The Dependent Variable: Doctrinal Pronouncement and Strategic Orientation

Influenced by these changing conditions, as well as by a host of other factors (personal, domestic, and international, all of which are discussed in the next section), and required by law to submit an annual report on its national security strategy to Congress, the administration embraced the challenge of coming up with a new strategic vision by the middle of 1993, after several embarrassing foreign policy episodes.²⁶ According to Douglas Brinkley, President Clinton requested National Security Adviser Tony Lake to convene a study group to come up with a convenient, centralizing concept to replace containment that would be easily communicable and help rally public support, much as Kennan had done in the 1940s.²⁷ Lake, assisted by several National Security Council members (including Jeremy Rosner, Leon Fuerth, and Donald

²⁶ Beyond wrestling with and being distracted by issues like Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and “gays in the military,” the administration was challenged in May 1993 to respond to statements made by Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff about the limits of American resources and commitments and by Les Aspin and other Defense Department officials about the possibility of adopting a new “win-hold-win” strategy. Ultimately, both positions were publicly and repeatedly disavowed in favor of continued American engagement and “leadership” and the more traditional “base force” requirements of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts simultaneously.

For more on the President’s handling of some of the early foreign policy issues, see Thomas H. Henrikson, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and North Korea* (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1996); and Paul D. Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 1994).

²⁷ Brinkley offers a clear and useful account of this process in “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” especially pp. 111-116. For the views of two of the participants, see Rosner, *The New Tug of War*; and Talbott, *The Russia Hand*. Both Rosner and Talbott relay a story about the President’s criticism of early proposals for assisting Russia as “not bold enough” and his insistence that they “go back and think bigger.” Even more interesting and supportive of my geopolitical argument are the President’s laughing dismissal of critics like Kissinger for “thinking in yesterday’s terms” and his stated purpose for the exercise: “giving people reason to believe there’s something really new going on over there. We can’t just look like we’re on autopilot, truckin’ forward using the same old maps.” I discuss the new mental maps that were guiding the administration’s approach in more detail in the next section. Quotations from Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, pp. 58, 53, and 132, respectively.

Steinberg), settled upon the notion of “enlargement,” coined by Rosner, as the winner of what Brinkley and others refer to as the “Kennan sweepstakes.”²⁸

While glimpses of the administration’s strategic vision had been offered in several campaign speeches and early foreign policy addresses,²⁹ the central and defining statements of the Clinton administration’s grand strategy were offered in a series of four high-profile speeches given in late September by Lake, Secretary Christopher,

²⁸ Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.” Rosner also uses this term in *The New Tug of War*, p. 11. While calling for this bold, unifying concept, the President seemed to recognize the practical limitations and potential dangers associated with such simplification. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, pp. 132-134.

Others shared these reservations. Warren Christopher, for example, never liked the term “enlargement” and chose not to use it. As Christopher later explained: “No single word or phrase can explain U.S. policy in all its complexity, or predict the future with all of its possibilities. I continue to believe that a bumper-sticker slogan describing our foreign policy is neither possible nor desirable. In the absence of an all-encompassing threat like Soviet communism, we must take a nuanced, pragmatic approach, firmly rooted in fundamental American interests.” Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 547.

Even the father of containment himself, George Kennan, argued against the oversimplification of the administration’s foreign policy in one of his occasional meetings with Talbott and Christopher. After they told him about the President’s charge to come up with a successor to containment, as Talbott relates, “Kennan replied with some passion that we shouldn’t try. He was sorry he had tried to pack so much diagnosis and prescription into three syllables. He certainly regretted the consequences, since containment had led to ‘great and misleading oversimplification of analysis and policy.’ We would be better off, he said, if we did not follow his example and, instead, contented ourselves with a “thoughtful paragraph or more, rather than trying to come up with a bumper sticker.” Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 134. Even recognizing such limitations and risks, Clinton, as the consummate politician, shrugged off such advice and proceeded to endorse at least the notion of “enlargement.” Of course, as discussed below, this strategic vision and its guiding mental maps became blurred in practice over time.

²⁹ President Clinton made five major foreign policy speeches prior to the inauguration (Georgetown University on December 12, 1991; Foreign Policy Association in New York on April 1, 1992; Los Angeles World Affairs Council on August 13, 1992; Pabst Theatre in Milwaukee on October 1, 1992; and again at Georgetown University on January 18, 1993) and five as President before the actual articulation of the “Clinton Doctrine” in September 1993 (the Inaugural Address on January 21; American University on February 26; on the Theodore Roosevelt on March 12; at the United States Naval Academy on April 1 and at West Point on May 29). Foreign policy concerns also were addressed in brief and general terms in the campaign manifesto – Bill Clinton and Al Gore, *Putting People First: How We Can All Change America* (Times Books, 1992), especially in the chapters on arms control, defense conversion, environment, Israel and the Middle East, national security, space, and trade. There is, in fact, a remarkable consistency across all of these documents in terms of major themes, areas of interest, preferred means, etc., many of which are reflected in the doctrinal speeches and the official national security strategy reports.

Ambassador Albright, and President Clinton.³⁰ In his speech of September 21 at Johns Hopkins, Lake describes in detail this new approach to security: “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.” As he explains, “To be successful, a strategy of enlargement must provide distinctions and set priorities. It must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more traditional *geostrategic* interests. And it must suggest how best to expend our large but nonetheless limited national security resources: financial, diplomatic and military.”³¹ This is classic, grand strategic language, with a geo-twist.

Emphasizing global interests and non-military means, the essence of the approach, as Lake explains it, is reasonably straightforward:

During the Cold War, even children understood America’s security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the “blue areas” of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion, or repression.³²

As discussed at length below, such language clearly reveals cartographically-oriented thinking and suggests the kinds of mental maps Clinton officials might have been using. In terms of the strategy itself, Lake goes on to specify four “components” of this new doctrine of “enlargement”:

³⁰ All of these were reproduced as a package in the *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

³¹ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Address at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993). (Emphasis added.)

³² *Ibid.*

First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies -- including our own -- which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.

Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity.

Third, we must counter the aggression -- and support the liberalization -- of states hostile to democracy and markets.

Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.³³

Regardless of whether one agrees with these propositions or whether the Clinton administration actively and consistently executed such policies, the purposeful and public articulation of a strategy of enlargement is indisputable.

If Lake's address set the stage and defined the terms, much as John Quincy Adams and George Kennan had done for their Presidents in the two previous historical cases, the actual doctrinal address was delivered by President Clinton to the United Nations General Assembly the following week. As the President clearly states: "In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to the survival of nations. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under free institutions."³⁴ Two additional addresses -- focusing on the Middle East and the use of force -- round out the initial doctrinal

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ William J. Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World," Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

package.³⁵ While critics might not find palatable the positions or arguments put forward in these speeches, there is no questioning the administration's attempt to organize, categorize, and conceptualize the national security challenges facing the U.S. after the Cold War.³⁶ Taken together, these speeches represent an attempt to define the administration's foreign policy – the Clinton Doctrine – and to articulate a grand strategy of “democratic enlargement.”³⁷ As Lake adamantly told reporters in his White House office in late October of 1993, “We have laid out a vision and a strategy.”³⁸

A similar, but more elaborate presentation of the administration's approach was offered in the annual White House national security strategy report that is delivered to Congress as required by law (U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 15, Subchapter 1, Section 404a) and in a series of five related regional security reports published by the Department of Defense in 1995.³⁹ The overall report – *A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement* – clearly states the basic thrust of this grand strategy, along with its military, economic, and political dimensions:

³⁵ Warren Christopher, “Building Peace in the Middle East,” Address at Columbia University, New York City, September 20, 1993; and Madeleine K. Albright, “Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World,” Remarks to the National War College, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC, September 23, 1993 – both reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

³⁶ Charles William Maynes makes a similar claim, as does Brinkley. See Maynes, “A Workable Clinton Doctrine,” pp. 3-4; and Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.”

³⁷ Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.”

³⁸ Cited in Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton's Foreign Policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up,” *New York Times*, October 31, 1993, p. A8.

³⁹ As noted above, the initial version of *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* was published in 1994 and then reissued under the same title in 1995 and 1996. The complementary regional security strategies issued by the Department of Defense in 1995 covered East Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. Some of these, along with reports on the military dimension of this strategy, are available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/archive.html>.

Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests.... To that broad end, the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement are: (1) our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and employing effective diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures; (2) our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and (3) our promotion of democracy abroad. It also explains how we are pursuing these elements of our strategy in specific regions by adapting and constructing institutions that will help to provide security and increase economic growth throughout the world.⁴⁰

At the heart of this strategy is the notion of binding, of bringing potential adversaries closer and into a thickening web of relations, norms, and structures that help constrain their destructive capacity – or, as President Clinton phrased it in his Second Inaugural Address, “growing connections of commerce and culture” and “building bonds with nations that once were our adversaries.”⁴¹ For amplification, consider a sampling of the President’s language from his doctrinal address to the UN, where he talks about “working with” former rivals, instead of against them, and about taking new steps to “stem proliferation”; to “control the materials for nuclear weapons”; to “thwart the proliferation of ballistic missiles”; and to “enlist the support of our former adversaries in the battle against proliferation”:

Now the United States is working with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and others to take that sword down, to lock it away in a secure vault...

We simply have got to find ways to control these weapons and to reduce the number of states that possess them by supporting and strengthening the IAEA and by taking other necessary measures.

We intend to weave it [nonproliferation] more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships with the world’s nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for nonproliferation, but increasingly open trade and technology for those states that live by accepted international rules.⁴²

⁴⁰ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (1996).

⁴¹ William J. Clinton, Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, January 20, 1997, available online at <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/01>.

⁴² President Clinton, “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World.”

Taken together, such statements, the related speeches, subsequent briefings, testimonies, and official documents clearly profess a grand strategy for the post-Cold War world and establish the theoretical framework for binding.

Thus defined, the Clinton Doctrine represents a conceptual break from the balancing policies of the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War and certainly is distinguishable from the more aversive and hemispheric impulses of the Monroe Doctrine.⁴³ Based on a broader, global perspective, this binding strategy involved an array of related policies: most importantly, preventive defense, multilateral engagement, and fair trade. Emphasizing the economic dimension of national security and the use of non-military means wherever possible, the administration sought to bring potential great power rivals closer – especially through institutions, organizations, and regimes – engaging and integrating them into the fabric of the international system in order to

⁴³ Of course, not everyone agrees with this definition. Many analysts deride the Clinton administration for lacking a vision and doctrine altogether. Others argue for alternative definitions of the Clinton Doctrine, including humanitarian intervention, nonproliferation, economic bailouts, and rogue states. For examples of the former, see Richard Haass, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January/February 1995); Elliott Abrams, "Hapless Abroad: The Weakness of Clintonian Diplomacy," *National Review*, Vol. 51, No. 6 (April 5, 1999); John Hillen, "General Chaos: Intentions, Not Results, are the Leitmotif of the Clinton Doctrine," *National Review*, Vol. 48, No. 25 (December 31, 1996); Harvey Sicherman, "Winning the Peace," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 1994); Dimitri K. Simes, "Clinton's Innocence Abroad: How Naïve Paternalism Skews the Administration's Vision," *Washington Post, Outlook*, January 9, 1994, p. C1; Moises Naim, "Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Victim of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1997/98; Charles William Maynes, "Bottom-Up Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 104 (Fall 1996); and Leslie H. Gelb, "Can Clinton Deal with the World: His Passive Foreign Policy is Popular but Perilous," *Washington Post, Outlook*, March 6, 1994, p. C1. For examples of the latter, see Michael Klare, "The Clinton Doctrine," *The Nation*, Vol. 268, No. 14 (April 19, 1999); Kim R. Holmes, "Humanitarian Warriors: The Moral Follies of the Clinton Doctrine," Heritage Lecture, No. 671, July 11, 2000 (available at www.heritage.org/library/lecture/hl671.html); Bernard E. Trainor, "The Clinton Doctrine," *Newsweek*, Vol. 131, No. 9 (March 2, 1998); Robert A. Manning and Patrick Clawson, "The Clinton Doctrine," *Wall Street Journal*, December 29, 1997; and John Dumbrell, "Was There a Clinton Doctrine: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Reconsidered," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2002).

channel and constrain their capacity to threaten the United States.⁴⁴ As President Clinton put it in a speech to NATO leaders in 1994: “The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the former Communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation.”⁴⁵

While some might suggest that the policies introduced by the Clinton administration were merely rhetorical or politically motivated, this clearly was a new type of approach to security, especially toward former adversaries and potential

⁴⁴ This characterization and the following description and explanation of the Clinton Doctrine derive from a multitude of first- and second-hand sources. In addition to innumerable reports, speeches, briefings, testimonies, and other primary documents, the following books by the principals also shed light on the administration’s approach to foreign policy and decision-making, as well as the on the prevailing mental maps: Bill Clinton and Al Gore, *Putting People First: Bill Clinton, Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s Challenges for the 21st Century* (Times Books, 1996); Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (Little, Brown and Co., 2000); Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford University Press, 1998); Talbott, *The Russia Hand*; David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership, Nixon to Clinton* (Touchstone, 2000); Robert B. Reich, *Locked in the Cabinet* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); George Stephanopolous, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (Little, Brown and Co., 1999); and Rosner, *The New Tug of War*.

Also valuable are the following articles, published by prominent members of the administration while serving, indicating official endorsement of their views, including Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March-April 1994); Warren Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,” *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 98 (Spring 1995); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Case for Deep Engagement,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July-August 1995) and “Conflicts after the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No.1 (Winter 1996); Strobe Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November-December 1996); William J. Perry, “Defense in an Age of Hope,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November-December 1996); Madeline K. Albright, “The Testing of American Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998); and Samuel R. Berger, “A Foreign Policy for the Global Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November-December 2000).

Among the most useful, book-length, secondary accounts are Henriksen, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea*; William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Praeger, 1999); Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (Touchstone, 1994); and Bob Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (Simon and Schuster, 1994).

⁴⁵ William J. Clinton, Remarks to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, January 10, 1994, available at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/srchpaps.html>.

threats.⁴⁶ As the President explained in a speech to the Future Leaders of Europe: “The old security was based on the defense of our bloc against another bloc. The new security must be found in Europe's integration, an integration of security forces, of market economies, of national democracies. The purpose of my trip to Europe is to help lead the movement to that integration....”⁴⁷ The objective here was to integrate, to bring closer and together, not to contain, avoid, or in any way isolate. As Secretary Christopher expressed it, we needed to offer Russia “a hand of partnership” to secure our objective of “bringing Russia – one of history's most powerful nations – into the family of peaceful nations.”⁴⁸ In another speech, Christopher spoke of building “an alliance with Russian reform,” of the “need to assist Russia’s conversion to a market economy,” of a “full review of Cold War laws and regulations” with the objective of “increased interaction” and exchanges with Russia – not only commercial but human, including military personnel.⁴⁹ Times had changed, and so had American policies. No longer would the United States seek to balance Russia. Instead, “our new relationship with Russia gives us the chance to work together on the world’s problems, and to carry

⁴⁶ While certainly different from our Cold War strategy of containment, many of the professions of the Clinton administration sound remarkably similar to the national security strategy of “engagement and leadership” promulgated by the preceding Bush administration – especially the objectives of promoting “open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide” and “an open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.” See, The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (January 1993).

⁴⁷ William J. Clinton, Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels, January 9, 1994, available online at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/srchpaps.html>.

⁴⁸ Warren Christopher, “Securing U.S. Interests While Supporting Russian Reform,” Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Executives’ Club of Chicago, and the Mid-America Committee, Chicago, IL, March 22, 1993, in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (March 29, 1993).

⁴⁹ Warren Christopher, “U.S. Support for Russian Reform: An Investment in America’s Security,” Address at the Hubert A. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, May 27, 1993, in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 22 (May 31, 1993).

out preventive diplomacy and solve conflicts.”⁵⁰ Or as the Defense Department’s regional security strategy report summed it up:

Another key element in the new architecture is strengthening cooperation with Russia. Russia is preeminent by its size, geostrategic importance, and military potential among the states emerging from communist tyranny, and is sure to have a major influence on Europe’s security. An active and constructive security relationship with Russia is critical to building a stable European future. If the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the enduring strategic problem of integrating the former communist states, especially Russia, into a stable European security system.⁵¹

The same basic objective of engagement and integration seemed to motivate much of American policy toward the great powers of East Asia, particularly China, albeit belatedly and without as much fanfare.⁵² As President Clinton put it: “Will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of political and economic cooperation and contacts? I am persuaded that the best path for advancing freedom in China is for the United States to intensify and broaden its engagement with that nation.”⁵³ Hence, in 1994, the President moved not only to renew China’s MFN status but also to delink it from its human rights

⁵⁰ Ibid. For more on the substance and sources of the administration’s approach to Russia, including its evolution over time, see Talbott, *The Russia Hand*.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO* (Washington, August 1995).

⁵² For the official statement of administration policy, see the regional report published by the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, February 1995). Also see Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement.” Despite the rhetoric associated the administration’s call for a “New Pacific Community,” both of these official statements and other related reports indicate the retention of a more traditional balancing dimension to America’s East Asian policy, including a core of bilateral alliances, forward-based military deployments, and deterrent postures. As discussed below, while illustrating the unevenness with which the doctrine of “enlargement” was applied, this type of differentiation can be explained by differing perceptions of connectedness to various threats, even among great powers.

For two of the earliest statements of the administration’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region, see Winston Lord, “A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Policy,” Opening statement at Senate Confirmation Hearings, Washington, DC, March 31, 1993, available through Lexis-Nexis; and President Clinton, Remarks at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, July 7, 1993, available at www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html.

⁵³ William J. Clinton, News conference, May 26, 1994, available at www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html.

record and annual review. As he explained, "Extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead will permit us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with cultural, educational, and other contacts and with a continuing aggressive effort in human rights, an approach that I believe will make it more likely that China will play a responsible role, both at home and abroad."⁵⁴ These views were echoed in numerous other official speeches and reports.⁵⁵ In one particularly important speech on U.S.-Chinese relations, given on May 17, 1996 at the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Christopher argued that "we must seek to resolve our differences through engagement, not confrontation," and laid out the administration's approach, including "supporting Chinese integration into the international community, with all the responsibilities this entailed."⁵⁶

By disaggregating the administration's approach to security along the lines suggested in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapters 4 and 5, we increase significantly our N and find more supporting evidence for the categorization of the Clinton Doctrine as a binding grand strategy. Guiding this specification of constituent elements and

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Consider, for example, the characterization of administration policy toward China offered in the overall national security strategy report: "We are developing a broader engagement with the People's Republic of China that will encompass both our economic and strategic interests.... Given its growing economic potential and already sizable military force, it is essential that China not become a security threat to the [Asia-Pacific] region. To that end, we are strongly promoting China's participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbors and assuage its own security concerns. We also have broadened our bilateral security dialogue with the Chinese and are seeking to gain further cooperation from China in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 29.

⁵⁶ Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 429. Albright echoed these views during her confirmation hearing as she emphasized "the need to pursue a strategy aimed at Chinese integration, not isolation." Madeline K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 8, 1997, available on Lexis-Nexis.

dimensions is an interest in drawing comparisons across cases and testing geopolitical hypotheses against more dependent variables.⁵⁷

In terms of the motivation, for example, the administration defined its strategic ends and national interests in even broader terms than Truman and far beyond what the founding fathers imagined. No longer limited to the nation, continent, hemisphere, or “free world,” American national interests now were global. Across the board, American concerns – like peace and prosperity – were global in scope. Innumerable statements and documents refer to such features as “global security,” the “global economy,” and the “global environment,” as well as to more species-specific notions like “human rights” and “human security.” In this way, American policy-makers were defining the ends of security policy in far broader terms than their predecessors.

Not only were American interests defined in more global terms, so, too, were both threats and opportunities. Beyond the amorphous challenge of “global instability,” were other global threats like terrorism, protectionism, and environmental degradation. At the same time, given the increasing reach of technology, as well as increased power and the rising popularity of Western ideals, opportunities to promote American interests also were global in scope. In both areas, however, vestiges of more traditional notions of geopolitics helped shape American policies. The Eurasian landmass, especially the

⁵⁷ For this reason, as in the two previous chapters, I will offer only an abbreviated description and categorization, drawn from the numerous primary and secondary sources listed above, including major presidential addresses.

rimlands, still held a special place in American thinking.⁵⁸ So, too, were American policy-makers still most concerned with the countries that they considered themselves closest to, both in terms of physical and attributional distance.⁵⁹ At the top of the threatening list were Russia and China, with the former moving down and the latter moving up. The greatest opportunities, in contrast, were found in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. While important strategically and politically, the Middle East, with centrifugal forces still running rampant, did not hold the same type of immediate potential for “enlargement.” Even further down the ladder were Latin America, once the preoccupation of American strategy, and Africa.⁶⁰

In terms of operational preferences, there was a clear and unmistakable bent in the Clinton administration for non-military means. One of the early hallmarks of Clinton’s approach was the elevation of the economic dimension, both conceptually and bureaucratically. Beyond talking incessantly about the economic foundation of national security – with such memorable phrases as “it’s the economy, stupid” – President Clinton also oversaw the creation of a new National Economic Council to help

⁵⁸ The administration actually uses the term “Eurasia” and lists Europe and East Asia as its first two regional concerns in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Consider, as well, the numerous times Clinton officials repeated the argument that the United States was as much a Pacific power as an Atlantic power and as interested in Asia as Europe. (Of course, if everyone already believed this, then the administration probably would not have felt the need to state it as frequently.) Regardless of which coast of the “world island” mattered more, the continued emphasis on the Eurasian landmass was unmistakable, suggesting the entrenched influence of traditional geopolitical ideas.

⁵⁹ For more on the policies toward different regions, see both the “Integrated Regional Approaches” section of *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* and the related regional reports published by the Department of Defense.

⁶⁰ Notably absent was a regional report on South Asia. Despite housing the world’s largest functioning democracy and roughly one sixth of the world’s population, the region received only scant attention until India and Pakistan proceeded to test nuclear weapons in 1998. In this respect, India is an important anomaly, one that suggests greater importance for physical distance than attributional distance – or at least perceptions thereof. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why the U.S. would practice a largely aversive strategy toward a rising power with the same regime type, comparable former colonial experience, and overlapping languages.

coordinate activities in this sphere. Modeled on the National Security Council, this new bureaucratic apparatus helped the administration coordinate the numerous economic players (e.g., Treasury, Commerce, USTR, AID, Labor, etc.) and play the emerging geoeconomic game with greater efficiency and effectiveness.⁶¹ More specifically, in the economic sphere, the administration practiced a policy of managed and fair trade.⁶² Commercially active they were; perfect free traders they were not. Instead, like most of the rest of the world, the United States professed and practiced a form of "embedded liberalism."⁶³ Some sectors were purposefully protected and promoted in a way that invited criticism⁶⁴ and that, as discussed below, runs counter to the expectations of

⁶¹ For more on the increasing significance of the economic dimension of the game, see Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce," *The National Interest* (Summer 1990); Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (Basic Books, 1986); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald A. Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds., *Powernomics: Economics and Strategy After the Cold War* (Madison Books, 1991); Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America* (William Morrow and Co., 1992); Dennis Encarnation, *Rivals Beyond Trade: America versus Japan in Global Competition* (Cornell University Press, 1992); Wayne Sandholtz, et al., *The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System* (Oxford University Press, 1992); and Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship Between Economics and National Security."

⁶² For the views of two of the more activist members of the administration on this subject, see the works of Laura D'Andrea Tyson and Jeffrey Garten, including Laura Tyson, *Who's Bashing Whom: Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries* (Institute for International Economics, 1992); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "Managed Trade: Making the Best of the Second Best," in Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze, eds., *An American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s* (Brookings Institution, 1990); John Zysman and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, eds., *American Industry in International Competition* (Cornell University Press, 1983); Jeffrey E. Garten, *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy* (Times Books, 1992); and Jeffrey E. Garten, "Business and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May-June 1997).

⁶³ For more on this concept, see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982); and Thomas M. Callaghy, "Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Political Economy: Lessons From the Second and Third Worlds," in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schultz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

⁶⁴ For an elaborate critique of this type of approach to international trade, see the works of Jagdish Bhagwati, including *Protectionism* (MIT Press, 1989); *The World Trading System at Risk* (Princeton University Press, 1991); "The Diminished Giant Syndrome: How Declinism Drives Trade Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring 1993); and "Beyond NAFTA: Clinton's Trading Choices," *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993).

geopolitical theory.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, using a wide-range of different economic policies (e.g., industrial, trade, fiscal, and monetary) in various modes (unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral),⁶⁶ the Clinton administration elevated economics to new heights in the security enterprise and actively sought to protect and promote the interests of the United States with a combination of policies and postures that fall somewhere between the mercantile and liberal extremes on the X-axis on the policy grid discussed in Chapter 1.

The administration's preference for non-military means spilled over from the economic dimension into the political. Placing enormous emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" and multilateral institutions and organizations, the administration initially called for a policy of "assertive multilateralism."⁶⁷ Much like their backtracking after Tarnoff's remarks only weeks before, the administration ultimately moved away from such an officially declared position in the face of growing pressure from a skeptical and stingy Republican Congress. Avowedly assertive or not, the administration nevertheless had a decidedly internationalist bent and continued to favor diplomatic

⁶⁵ For more on the (mostly domestic) sources of American trade policy, see I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics* (International Institute for Economics, 1992); Kal J. Holsti, "Politics in Command: Foreign Trade as National Security Policy," *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986); Helen Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Challenge: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the US during the 1970s," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987); Helen Milner and David B. Yoffie, "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands," *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1989); Robert E. Baldwin and Anne O. Krueger, eds., *The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1984); and Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen, *Trade Policy for Troubled Industries* (Institute for International Economics, 1986).

⁶⁶ Elsewhere I have discussed at length the economic dimension of American national security during this time, including the motivational, cognitive, and operational elements. See A. C. Harth, "Trade, Economics, and U.S. Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War World," University of Pennsylvania, September 1993.

⁶⁷ Madeline K. Albright, Testimony before the International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, June 24, 1993, available through Lexis-Nexis.

solutions (especially to what they perceived as essentially political problems) and multilateral fora. The numerous agreements and arrangements they brokered and signed, even those that stalled in Congress, are testimony to the strength of their commitment to politico-diplomatic means.

This is not to suggest that policy-makers in the Clinton administration were unaware of the potential utility of military means or were unwilling to use them in a time of need.⁶⁸ On the contrary, many high-ranking officials – including Aspin, Perry, Cohen, Lake, Berger, Albright, Nye, and Holbrook, as well as both the President and the Vice President – had at least some sense of the importance of the military dimension. While overseeing a reduction in defense spending and readiness (not a fundamental restructuring or defense conversion), the administration did maintain at least “minimal” capabilities, which, even after considerable cutbacks, were still not only the largest and best equipped in the world, but far greater than the next several powers combined. In other words, the United States sought to maintain a “base” level of military capabilities and arrayed these capabilities, nuclear and conventional, into a flexible doctrine that emphasized a three-tiered approach to threats: to prevent, to deter, and to defeat.⁶⁹ Despite such descriptions, the policy defies clear categorization, falling between the extremes of degree and type of military means. It is important to recognize, for example, that the more compelling offensive posture ultimately adopted

⁶⁸ For more on administration’s official military strategy, see the following White House and Pentagon publications: *Report from the Bottom-Up Review* (1993); *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (1994, 1995, 1996); *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (1994); *National Military Strategy* (1995); *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (1997); *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* (1997); and the *Annual Defense Report* (various years). Also see Perry, “Defense in an Age of Hope.”

⁶⁹ Perry, “Defense in an Age of Hope.”

by the United States in former-Yugoslavia differed fundamentally from the military posture toward the former Soviet Union (FSU) and China, which tended to emphasize institutional exchanges, arms reduction, and “residual deterrence.”⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the administration’s general approach to the military relations with the great powers seems in accord with a binding strategy.

In short, ample empirical evidence supports the claim that the United States was trying to shift its grand strategy from balancing toward binding, at least vis-à-vis Russia and China.⁷¹ That the United States articulated such a binding strategy at least toward the capitalist-democratic “core” and the “transition states” is beyond doubt; that it actually practiced such a doctrine across the board is less obvious. In fact, while the United States had embraced and effectively executed such an approach toward Western Europe and Japan over the preceding forty years, the Clinton administration’s actual policies toward different countries and regions, as well as issues, were not uniform in their binding elements, or even in their rhetoric. Consider, for example, the explicit

⁷⁰ Serge Schwenninger uses this term in his examination and critique of Clinton’s foreign policy, an analysis that clearly highlights the gaps between the administration’s professions and its policies, between rhetoric and reality, and between the liberal language of integration and the more traditional practices of balancing. See Sherle R. Schwenninger, “World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 1999).

For more on the distinctions between compellence, deterrence, and defense, see Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 2000), Ch. 2. Also see Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1980); and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 1960) and *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

⁷¹ Writing during Clinton’s second term, John Ikenberry makes this point emphatically: “the United States has a different grand strategy now, and it is as intellectually serious and coherent as containment, if more messy in its implementation.” As he explains it: “the strategy is to engage actively dynamic and potentially unfriendly and unstable countries by integrating them into the U.S.-centered system of open markets, rule of law, accountable government, and multilateral institutions. This approach to taming and transforming the world’s trouble spots may or may not work – it invites serious debate – but it is a grand strategy.” G. John Ikenberry, “New Grand Strategy Uses Lofty and Material Desires,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 1998, p. M2, available on Lexis-Nexis.

balancing logic of the administration's approach toward "backlash states" – then identified as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Cuba – in what Tony Lake, following in Kennan's footsteps, referred to in a prominent *Foreign Affairs* article as "dual containment."⁷² Admitting that "we are not oblivious to the need for a balance of power," Lake expressly called for "a strategy to neutralize, contain, and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community."⁷³ Here, the primary thrust of American policy was neither aversion nor integration; instead, the United States would "seek to contain the influence of these states" and, as Lake put it in his defining speech the previous fall, "to counter the aggression" and "minimize the ability of states outside the circle and democracy of markets to threaten it."⁷⁴ Such language and logic are more characteristic of balancing than binding.

Such balancing tendencies toward "backlash states" were not the only deviation from binding in the Clinton administration. In the economic realm, the practice of managed trade, with its discriminatory pursuit of relative gains through unilateral, bilateral, and minilateral means, also can be seen as a form of balancing. Rhetorically, there also was a spiked interest and reference to primacy and dominating – "leadership" – especially in the wake of Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff's suggestion in mid-1993 that the United States might have to scale back some of its commitments to better

⁷² Lake, "Confronting Backlash States."

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Quotations from Ibid and Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

align them with available resources and priorities.⁷⁵ In stark contrast to this rhetorical embrace of “leadership,” what Posen and Ross refer to as a “dash of primacy,”⁷⁶ the administration also practiced, to some extent, a hiding strategy toward other states, regions, and problems. South America, in spite of its proximity to the United States, was, and still is, woefully neglected by American policy-makers. Once Apartheid was dismantled, Sub-Saharan Africa, for the most part, fell off the map; even with its nearly one billion people, systemic underdevelopment, chronic conflict, and the ravaging scourge of AIDS, policy-makers have taken scarcely paid more than lip service to this forsaken continent. As noted above, South Asia also was apparently hard to find, with the President finally visiting the world’s most populous democracy late in his second term, only after the region had gone nuclear. In other words, far from practicing a uniform strategy of binding toward every actor or potential threat, the Clinton administration actually executed a more differentiated approach (what some might call

⁷⁵ Christopher took the lead in correcting his deputy. In the first speech he gave after Tarnoff’s controversial “background” comments on May 25, 1993, for example, Christopher used the term “leadership” twenty-three times. Consider, as well, his response several days later on the McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: “To the extent that he [Tarnoff] was interpreted as indicating that the United States would play a less leading role than in the past, I simply disagree with that. The President disagrees with that. We’ll be playing a leading role to protect our vital interest, to protect our strategic interest. And second, to the extent that he indicated that we did not have the resources to carry out those vital interests, to protect our vital interests, I simply think that is wrong.” See, respectively, Christopher, “U.S. Support for Russian Reform,” and the transcript from the McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, No. 4640, June 1, 1993, available on Lexis/Nexis.

⁷⁶ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), p. 44.

nuanced and others ad hoc) to the range of issues confronting the United States in the 1990s.⁷⁷

Rather than get distracted by this operational variation, let us bear it in mind as we discuss the policy-makers' perceptions of connectedness and strategic preferences: as discussed in the conclusion, there are some interesting parallels that emerge, which tend to support the geopolitical interpretation. Moreover, for the sake of consistency and tractability let us retain our focus on great powers, as we have in the preceding two cases. While Western Europe and Japan certainly mattered, as they did in the 1940s, they were not considered inherently threatening or troublesome. Most pressing at this time was the challenge posed by the former Soviet Union (FSU) and, increasingly, China. Just as the Holy Alliance was the central target of the Monroe Doctrine and Soviet Russia the object of the Truman Doctrine, so was the FSU the principal concern of the administration in 1993, when the Clinton Doctrine first was articulated. The Cold War had just ended and another opportunity for strategic adjustment had arisen. Now that the Cold War was over, how would the United States deal with Russia? "Bring them in," said the Clinton administration.

The important question here is why, at this moment of opportunity, did the United States profess this grand strategy and not another?⁷⁸ Why not continue to

⁷⁷ Thus, Posen and Ross conclude that the Clinton administration's approach is a combination of selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. While they argue that "one cannot indiscriminately mix and match across strategies (as both post-Cold War administrations [Bush I and Clinton] have attempted to do) without running into trouble," other analysts suggest that such differentiation is exactly what is needed for the emergent environment. See, for example, Edward N. Luttwak, "The Need for an Incoherent Foreign Policy," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1998); and Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty-First Century* (Simon and Schuster, 2001). Quotation from Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 52.

balance Russia, for example, or try to avoid them? While the collapse of its largest and primary rival created enormous opportunities for American policy-makers, as realism suggests, it did not dictate which approach should follow containment. Instead, this structural change liberated their thinking from its bipolar shackles and its singular focus on preventing the expansion of Soviet communism. To be sure, there still were plenty of important states and threats to consider, but none as demanding or menacing as the “evil empire.” But, still the question remains: how should the United States deal with these threats and the challenges posed by other great powers? Why bind and not balance? Why integrate potential threats instead of containing or avoiding them? More concretely, why officially issue the doctrine of enlargement in the fall of 1993 and in subsequent policy statements and publications? The answer, as explained below, involves policy-makers’ perceptions of increased connectedness and imagined closeness.

⁷⁸ That alternatives existed, and still do, is readily apparent. Consider, for example, the four options offered by Posen and Ross (which correlate largely with the grand strategy typology offered above): (1) isolationism (hiding); (2) selective engagement (balancing); (3) cooperative security (binding); and (4) primacy (dominating). For more on these options, their proponents, their features, and their strengths and weaknesses, see Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.”

The Intervening Variable: Mental Maps and Imagined Distance

When deciphering the causes of the Clinton administration's binding strategy of enlargement (or any other grand strategy), analysts should avoid the rush to embrace quick-fix solutions or one-dimensional explanations, what John Ruggie and others refer to as "monocausal mania,"⁷⁹ as elegant and alluring as it may initially appear. Considered individually, many different levels of analysis and variables are potentially valuable, some necessary, but none sufficient. In this case, as in the preceding two, the major contending theories have weaknesses. Second-image explanations that emphasize the power of domestic structure and norms as forces shaping American strategic preferences, for example, cannot account for the variation in security policy from "containment" in the 1980s to "enlargement" in the 1990s. Allegedly, our domestic political structure and culture remained essentially the same.⁸⁰ A relative constant cannot explain profound change. Nor can second-image theories explain the

⁷⁹ John G. Ruggie cited in Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 50.

⁸⁰ If constructivists argue that American culture or identity changed, then the question remains: why? Is it really ideas "all the way down," or, at some point, do ideas, values, norms, and other socio-cultural constructs rest on a view, however construed or misconstrued, of the material world? In other words, it is entirely reasonable and appropriate to recognize the important role for ideas and norms; but, ideas and norms about what? What precedes them? What do they concern and focus on? The argument here points to the material world, the geopolitical environment, as the underlying foundation – but recognizes the importance of constructed notions of other factors as well, like power, anarchy, ideology, interests, etc. For more on this line of constructivist thinking, see Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Cornell University Press, 2002).

varied strategies practiced under this larger liberal rubric over the last decade.⁸¹ Moreover, if we assume a relatively uniform condition of anarchy (which constructivists might critique as problematic) and an essential equivalence of capabilities (among all of the great powers or even among only the “second-rank” powers, if one focuses only on the current asymmetry favoring the United States), then realism, too, has limited explanatory power. While more pointed arguments can be made about the diminution of Soviet power and, consequently, a potential structural transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity, multipolarity, or some combination thereof, the fact is that Russian capabilities still were formidable and threatening – more so than any other single country – and the United States purposefully and clearly articulated a different type of security strategy for dealing with this reduced but still pressing threat. As Waltz points out, while the Russians may have retrenched, they did not vanish, nor did the international structure change overnight.⁸² Thus, the explanation

⁸¹ Consider, for example, the varied strategic approaches practiced by the United States with regard to Great Britain (clearly binding); Russia (mostly binding with some vestiges of balancing and a dash of hiding); China (a mixture of balancing with binding); and India (mostly hiding with the rhetoric of binding). This is to say nothing, of course, about the more explicit balancing approach articulated and practiced against “rogue states” like Iraq and Iran, nor about the more aversive tendencies concerning Africa, South Asia, and even South America. The same domestic context simply cannot account for the variety of policies practiced. Nor can the same international structure, or the same set of international norms. Geopolitics, however, can explain this variation by referring to varying physical distances, varying interaction capacities, and varying perceptions of connectedness. Most readily apparent is the correspondence between the spectrum of strategies adopted toward the four great powers noted above (from pure binding through balancing to hiding) with the physical distance from Washington, DC, to their capitols (3,666 miles to London; 4,862 to Moscow; 6,925 to Beijing; and 7,464 miles to New Delhi), as well as their remarkably similar hierarchy of at least non-destructive interaction capacity (illustrated in Appendix 3). Mileage figures available at www.indo.com/distance/.

⁸² As he clearly stated in the fall of 1993, “bipolarity endures, but in an altered state. Bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and because no other great powers have yet emerged.” Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993).

for this change in policy from balancing to binding must be found elsewhere, somewhere with more variation than domestic or international structure, perhaps even among several interacting variables.

The most accurate and complete explanation involves multiple levels of analysis, with numerous factors – including geopolitics – contributing in various ways at different junctures. Perhaps the best way to understand the entire process is to conceptualize decision-makers and states as adaptive agents, crafting and adjusting their grand strategies through cybernetic feedback loops and other mechanisms, to better fit

Even if one rejects Waltz's argument and contends that polarity already had shifted, neither existing realist theories nor the empirical evidence in this case provides linkage between changing structures and strategies. A similar problem plagues attempted realist explanations of the Monroe Doctrine. While the international structure may have been multipolar and the United States relatively weaker (in terms of objective capabilities), there are theoretical and empirical gaps. First, while balancing and bandwagoning strategies are commonly suggested, realist theories rarely argue for either hiding or binding – with very few exceptions (e.g., Deudney), these options typically are not even considered. Second, beyond this theoretical gap lies an empirical problem – namely, the lack of discursive evidence suggesting that polarity mattered to decision-makers. While often voicing concern about the relative and absolute capabilities of the United States and other great powers, American policy-makers rarely, in these three cases, made explicit reference to the number of great powers or polarity per se. The absence of specific references, of course, cannot disprove that policy-makers considered such factors. But, when combined with the want of systematic theorizing about the relationship between polarity and the types of strategies adopted by the United States, it does at least leave room for some complementary explanatory factors, particularly in the Monroe and Clinton cases.

the emergent geopolitical landscape and produce successful outcomes – i.e., security.⁸³

In this case, the process of strategic adjustment in the United States was catalyzed by some objective international changes – namely, the deterioration and collapse of its nemesis, the Soviet Union. Without its vast scope, the “evil empire” was perceived as less threatening. In this way, third image change is filtered through the first image, as it must be to affect choices – people, of course, must perceive and act on changes, real or

⁸³ Here, I am suggesting the potential utility of conceptualizing and modeling of international relations as a complex adaptive system (CAS). As I have explained elsewhere, such systems are inherently dynamic, interactive, unpredictable, and capable of evolution, of progress based on learning and feedback loops. While certain patterns of behavior are evident (in the form of attractors), minor perturbations of the system can manifest dramatic changes over time. Given a large number of interactive variables, small changes in initial conditions can magnify over iterations to produce unrecognizable and unpredictable outcomes. The vast majority of changes take place in small, incremental steps over time causing the appearance of long eras of relative stasis. These eras are punctuated, or interrupted aperiodically by events, sometimes large and sometimes small, which cause changes in the system. The changes themselves can be large or small, progressive or regressive. The system then settles down again at a new “equilibrium,” one of many potential and not necessarily optimal intermediary stages where the interactive dynamic continues, until another critical point is reached and more profound changes occur. Point predictions of when or how such changes will take place are impossible. Never reaching a final endpoint, such systems are in a continual process of becoming – they are emergent. Change is continual, but the rate of change varies. Nevertheless, the duration, magnitude, and frequency of most changes in such systems follow the power law, with its exponential relationship between duration or size and frequency. (This description draws directly from my discussion of the cognitive dimension of grand strategy and assessment of the current environment in “Realistic Liberalism: A Middle Way for American Grand Strategy,” Harvard University, January 2003.)

For a readable definition of such systems and their features, see John Holland, *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Addison-Wesley, 1995). For more, see Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (Collier Books, 1992); Murray Gell-Mann, *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex* (W. H. Freeman, 1994); John L. Casti, *Complexification: Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of Surprise* (Harper Collins, 1994); Brian Goodwin, *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Per Bak, *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality* (Copernicus, 1996) and Mark Buchanan, *Ubiquity: The Science of History ... or Why the World is Simpler than We Think* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000).

For an early application of this type of thinking to political science, see John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton University Press, 1974). For more recent applications of this emergent paradigm to international relations, see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-93); Steven R. Mann, “Chaos, Criticality, and Strategic Thought,” in *Essays on Strategy*, Volume IX, edited by Thomas C. Gill (National Defense University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997); and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton University Press, 1997). Unlike Cederman, however, my use of this emergent paradigm, up to this point, is primarily conceptual and metaphorical, not formal or algorithmic.

imagined, in order for external developments to actually vary foreign policy behavior. Decision-makers perceived this monumental development in Eurasia and concluded that they now *could* pursue alternative policies. They no longer felt as pressured to balance this enormous, menacing socialist threat. But, if structural changes allowed decision-makers to perceive an opportunity to try something new (as they did when Great Britain ceded its global role to the United States in February 1947), they did not determine which approach to take. In this respect, structural realism falls short, expecting a balancing approach, even in the face of such dramatic changes.⁸⁴ Thus, even if structural changes serve as the permissive cause, they are not determinative. The actual direction that the administration moved was driven more by personalities, domestic politics, global norms, and geopolitics.

Thus, the third and first images play catalytic and instrumental roles, respectively, with opportunities to pursue a different grand strategy than containment generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ascendance of new leaders, a younger generation of “new democrats” in America, as well as in Russia. At the same time, policies were at least partially driven and constrained by the belief in the power of liberal ideas and structures abroad and by political and economic considerations at home. As important as all these factors were for understanding the formulation of the grand strategy of engagement and enlargement, they are not sufficient. Also necessary

⁸⁴ Offensive realism falls even shorter, as the United States should have tried to exert its relative strength in the face of Russian weakness and get all they could while the getting was good. While some critics might suggest this was America’s intent or even the consequence of some misapplied economic policies, I have found no evidence to suggest that the principals in the Clinton administration acted thus or were so motivated.

and fundamental were geopolitical considerations, particularly the perception of increasing connectedness and a shrinking planet.

While perhaps not as prominent, numerous, or extensively analyzed, geopolitical circumstances did weigh in on the decision-making process in substantive and significant ways. Virtually all of the principals recognized and publicly addressed the major technological changes underway, especially those involving communications, transportation, and information processing. In his first major foreign policy address, presented at Georgetown University on December 1991, then-Governor Clinton called for a “coherent strategy” – what he termed “a new covenant for American security” – for “a new dynamic era.”⁸⁵ Clinton identified “four key assumptions about the requirements of security in this new era”: (1) there were “a new set of threats and an even less stable world”; (2) “economic strength” was growing in importance and the dividing line between foreign and domestic policies disappearing; (3) “we live in an *information age* in which the irresistible power of ideas rule”; and (4) our definition of security must include *common threads to all the peoples of the globe*.⁸⁶ He continued, one sentence later, to spell out the policy implications of these assumptions, clearly linking his perceptions and beliefs about the world to strategic preferences, including the need for restructuring our forces and working with others, not against them. Even more significant for our purpose than his description of the military, political, and economic objectives is the critical transition phrase: “*Guided by these assumptions, it*

⁸⁵ Bill Clinton, “A New Covenant for American Security,” Address at Georgetown University, December 12, 1991, Reported by the Federal News Service, available online through Lexis-Nexis.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)

seems to me that we must pursue three clear objectives."⁸⁷ In broad terms, the objectives were to transform the military, promote democracy, and strengthen the economy – the same three objectives identified later in the official *National Security Strategy* and throughout his administration. The future President already was thinking about geopolitics and grand strategy and explicitly linking his perception of the world to strategic preferences.

In this regard, like Truman before him, Clinton certainly was aware of the changing circumstances and the need to adapt American policies accordingly. As he phrased it during the campaign:

I want to make one thing clear from the outset: the world is still rapidly changing. The world we look out on today is not the same world we will see tomorrow. We need to be ready to adjust our defense projections to meet threats that could be either heightened or reduced down the road.⁸⁸

During the Georgetown speech and others, Clinton referred expressly and repeatedly to the current era of change as the "information age." In a subsequent campaign speech where he used this term, to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Clinton called on America to "seize this moment in history," to "organize and lead a long-term Western strategy of engagement for democracy," and to capitalize on the "broader opportunity at the pivotal point in history to reinvent the institutions of collective security."⁸⁹ In addition to calling specifically for "a new strategy for American engagement," Clinton emphasized the need for multilateral cooperation to address new

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)

⁸⁸ Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Summer 1992), p. 27. (This was an article adopted from the Georgetown speech.)

⁸⁹ Bill Clinton, Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 1, 1992, Reported by the Federal News Service, available online through Lexis-Nexis.

global challenges, including ethnic conflict and terrorism, and continued, “together we must also tackle problems that transcend national borders, and there are others, such as threats to the earth’s environment, global population growth, world trade, and proliferation of weapons.”⁹⁰ Here, again, the language of the future President indicates that he was thinking about the changing circumstances and the most appropriate means of protecting and promoting American interests in this new environment.

In his Inaugural Address and the few major foreign policy speeches that he made in the first half of 1993, President Clinton raised similar themes and reiterated the same basic three three-tiered approach to national security strategy: military, political, and economic. In the Inaugural Address, he reveals clearly his perception of the emergent landscape and American closeness to the rest of the globe:

When George Washington first took the oath I have just sworn to uphold, news traveled slowly across the land by horseback, and across the ocean by boat. Now the sights and sounds of this ceremony are broadcast instantaneously to billions around the world. Communications and commerce are global. Investment is mobile. Technology is almost magical, and ambition for a better life is now universal. We earn our livelihood in America today in peaceful competition with people all across the Earth. Profound and powerful forces are shaking and remaking our world, and the urgent question of our time is whether we can make change our friend and not our enemy.⁹¹

The question was not whether the United States was connected with the rest of the world, but how closely, and what should be done about it. Regardless, this frank admission of increasing connectedness suggests that subsequent policy formulation was shaped by a worldview that saw domestic and international policies as inherently connected. As President Clinton put it, “There is no longer a clear division between

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ William J. Clinton, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1993, available at <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/01/>.

what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race: they affect us all.”⁹²

In the time between the Inaugural Address on January 21, 1993 and the doctrinal speech on September 27, 1993, the President made four major foreign policy addresses. In each of these addresses, given in February, March, April, and May, the President discussed his foreign policy vision, made geopolitical references, and provided glimpses of the mental maps that he was using to try to steer foreign policy.⁹³ In the first address, delivered at American University on February 26, for example, Clinton spoke again about the increasing pace and scope change, particularly technological change, and its effects not only on American foreign policy but on what he referred to as the “global village.”⁹⁴ In his introductory remarks he thanked one of his former mentors, Senator Fulbright, for teaching him “a lot about the importance of our connections to the rest of the world, and that even in our small land-locked state of Arkansas, we were bound up inextricably with the future, with the passions and the promise of people all across this globe.”⁹⁵ Speaking about economics shortly thereafter, and the fact that capital, services, and information all have become global, the President reiterated this view: “Now we are woven inextricably into the fabric of a global economy.... Whether we

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ As noted above, the President delivered these speeches at American University on February 26; on the Theodore Roosevelt on March 12; at the United States Naval Academy on April 1; and at West Point on May 29.

⁹⁴ President Clinton, Remarks at American University, Washington, DC, February 26, 1993. Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

see it or not, our daily lives are touched everywhere by the flows of commerce that cross national borders as inexorably as the weather.”⁹⁶

After some brief remarks on the military dimension of national security and the use of force to the crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt in March,⁹⁷ the President gave another major address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the United States Naval Academy on April 1.⁹⁸ While hitting some of the same themes he addressed at Georgetown and American universities, including repeated references to the seemingly ubiquitous “global” items (e.g., freedom, economy, environment, change, and village), the address focused on American relations with Russia. In his remarks, the President clearly conveys a sense of connectedness with Russia. “We are with you,” he states at one point to any Russian listeners or readers, emphasizing the shared bonds and similarities between the United States and Russia: “Now, as in the past, America’s future is tied in important ways to Russia’s.”⁹⁹ Regardless of domestic and international changes, Russia still was important strategically to the United States because of its size, location, and capabilities. Considering this continued and growing connectedness, as well as recent changes in the Russian regime type and foreign policy, the President argued that the United States should move “from having an adversary in foreign policy to having a partner in global problem-solving” and “act prudently but urgently to do all

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ President Clinton, Remarks by the President to the Crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt, The Hangar Bay, March 12, 1993, Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

⁹⁸ President Clinton, Remarks by the President to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dahlgren Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, April 1, 1993, Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

that we can to strike a strategic alliance with Russian reform” – a clear call for binding.¹⁰⁰

In other words, because of this growing connectedness, new policies had to be fashioned accordingly. No longer would it be possible or acceptable for the United States to try to divorce its foreign policies from others or to try to hide and isolate itself from the rest of the world. As the President explained in his doctrinal address at the UN, “isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.”¹⁰¹ Nor could the United States merely balance. Instead, there were strong, new pressures for binding:

From beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world towards integration.... But they also threaten to destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people feel more insecure.... They require all of us in this room to find new ways to work together more effectively in pursuit of our national interests and to think anew about whether our institutions of international cooperation are adequate to this moment.¹⁰²

This passage reveals clearly a powerful conceptual linkage, if not a direct causal connection, between changes in the material world, perceptions of them and their significance, and foreign policy preferences – specifically, strong and growing interaction capacity, imagined closeness, and a desire for multilateral engagement and cooperation, or binding.

Similar sentiments and connections are apparent in a broad range of documents and statements made by the Clinton administration. Consider, for example, the three other speeches presented as part of the doctrinal sequence during September of 1993.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ President Clinton, “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World.”

¹⁰² Ibid.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher delivered the opening address at Columbia University on September 20. Focusing on the Middle East, Christopher hit a range of geopolitical topics – along with other concerns like power, norms, regime type, and ideology – referring to America’s “enduring interests in this strategic and historic crossroads” and to the region as “a tinderbox, threatening to embroil us and the rest of the world in its deadly wars.”¹⁰³ Beyond confirming “America’s historic role and enduring strategic interest in the Middle East,” Christopher offered a loud and resounding endorsement of “engagement” and “internationalism” which clearly reveals geopolitical thinking and linkages between the material world and foreign policies.¹⁰⁴ Emphasizing the economic dimension in his analysis, he argues that the United States must remain engaged, most importantly, because “we live in a *technologically interconnected age*. Vast amounts of information and vast amounts of dollars can be transmitted around the world at the *speed of light*. *In such a world*, how will we enhance our prosperity if we do not work to open up and expand international markets?”¹⁰⁵ While Christopher never was comfortable with reducing the administration’s foreign policy to a single word or slogan (like “enlargement”),¹⁰⁶ his language and thinking here more than suggest conceptual and causal connections between his perceptions of the emergent landscape and his strategic preferences.

¹⁰³ Christopher, “Building Peace in the Middle East,” Address at Columbia University, co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, September 20, 1993, Reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (1993).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰⁶ Citing Richard Holbrooke’s comment that “Christopher just refused to use the ‘E’ word,” Brinkley explains that Christopher not only saw this “trade policy masquerading as foreign policy” as inapplicable and insufficient, but also considered it a “self-aggrandizing gimmick on the part of Lake.” Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” pp. 121-122.

Three days later Madeline Albright, then the Ambassador to the United Nations, focused on the military dimension in a speech at the National War College. While she, like Christopher, spoke more about norms, power, and regime type than geopolitics, Albright nevertheless raised some important geopolitical arguments, particularly concerning technological change and increased American vulnerability. Like Clinton, she drew parallels between the post-World War II period and the post-Cold War era, both of which offered opportunities for strategic adjustment in a “dramatically altered world.”¹⁰⁷ She also spoke of new and pressing threats, including those posed by weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, “destructive hatreds,” and terrorism. She presciently notes, “the terrorist threat is aggravated by advances in technology and the availability of weapons of every description. I know we remain vulnerable; and I know it can affect our most vital of interests.”¹⁰⁸ While more could and should have been done to address this threat, as discussed in the operational section below, Albright’s language suggests an awareness of the threat of subnational violence and its increasing closeness because of technological advances: “These disputes may be far removed from our borders, but in today’s global village, chaos is an infectious disease.”¹⁰⁹

In the defining speech on September 21, Lake hit numerous geopolitical themes, with only regime type emphasized more. He started the address by noting the outdated but still influential historical tendency: “Geography and history always have made Americans wary of foreign entanglements.”¹¹⁰ But, he pointed out, recent

¹⁰⁷ Albright, “Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World.”

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

developments were changing the picture and blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic policies: “What we do outside our borders has immediate and lasting consequences for all Americans. As the President often notes, the line between foreign and domestic policy has evaporated.” In making his case for the new doctrine of enlargement, Lake referred repeatedly to geographic features, places, and regions, as well as to recent dramatic technological advances that were transforming our planet into “a real-time world of change and information.”¹¹¹ As he explains, such technological change is one of the central features of the post-Cold War era and the United States must adjust its policies accordingly or risk be overrun by events:

The pulse of the planet has accelerated dramatically and, with it, the pace of change in human events. Computers, faxes, fiber-optic cables, and satellites all speed the flow of information. The measurement of wealth, and increasingly wealth itself, consists in bytes of data that move at the speed of light. The accelerated pace of events is neither good nor bad.... Ultimately, the world’s acceleration creates new and diverse ways for us to exert our influence if we choose to do so – but it increases the likelihood that if we do not, rapid events instantly reported may overwhelm us.¹¹²

As significant and transformational as recent technological developments may be, geography still was a critical guide for policy, as Lake notes repeatedly. When critiquing recent debates about when to use force, for example, Lake points out, “we have overlooked a prior strategic question – the question of ‘where’ – which sets the context for such military judgments.”¹¹³ Lake goes further and offers more explicit geopolitical rationale for paying special attention not only to “our vital bond of transatlantic and European security” but to “other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference.” As he clearly states:

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

“We must target our effort to assist states that affect our strategic interests, such as those with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons, or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies.”¹¹⁴ The most important such state was Russia. Also significant were other states in Eastern Europe and the “Asian Pacific,” especially, “given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe” and the stated belief that “our ties across the Pacific are no less important than those across the Atlantic,” respectively.¹¹⁵ Lake even notes the greater interest in “our emerging Western Hemisphere community of democracies” and the potential of states like South Africa and Nigeria to serve as catalysts, or tipping points, for socio-economic and political development in sub-Saharan Africa.

In a policy speech given the following year, Lake further revealed his mental maps and geopolitical perspective when praising Teddy Roosevelt for his understanding of how technological advances had reduced the protection afforded by geography and made a policy of international engagement imperative: “He understood that technology was weakening the insulating effect of the oceans.”¹¹⁶ In making his case for “principled pragmatism,” he goes on to praise Wilson as well, not only for his recognition of the importance of principles, but for his understanding of the connections between domestic and foreign policies and between countries, which are growing even faster today:

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Anthony Lake, “The Need for Engagement,” *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 49 (1994).

Especially in today's global and economic free-for-all in which ideas, information, money, and people crisscross the planet at near warp speed, 19th-century realpolitik is dangerously outdated. Every day, we use products conceived in one country, manufactured in another, from parts made in a third, and marketed all over the world. Every night, we channel-surf through images of distant conflicts and catastrophes that play on our emotions and our intellects. We are engaged whether we like it or not.¹¹⁷

This type of explicit statement about the strategic implications of the integrative tendencies of recent technological advances can be found in numerous primary sources and clearly reveals conceptual and causal linkages between geopolitics and grand strategy.

The President himself gave scores of speeches that specifically addressed the topic of “globalization” and hit similar themes in most of his major policy addresses, including his two inaugural addresses, his eight annual messages, and his farewell address. Consider, for example, the following description of the “global economy,” which clearly reveals an awareness of the changes underway and the need to adjust our thinking and policies accordingly:

To realize the full possibilities of this economy, we must reach beyond our own borders, to shape the revolution that is tearing down barriers and building new networks among nations and individuals, and economies and cultures: globalization. It's the central reality of our time.

Of course, change this profound is both liberating and threatening to people. But, there's no turning back. And our open, creative society stands to benefit more than any other – if we understand, and act on, the realities of interdependence. We have to be at the center of every vital global network, as a good neighbor and a good partner. We have to recognize that we cannot build our future without helping others to build theirs.¹¹⁸

Revealing is his perception of the United States as the “center” of this activity, now so close as to be “neighbors” and “partners” to all. In addition, in this same address, beyond recognizing the “inexorable march of technology” and identifying the range of

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ President William Jefferson Clinton, Annual Message, 2000.

challenges posed to “our planet” and “humanity,” Clinton issued a clear call to action: “Our purpose must be to bring the world together” and to “continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China,” to chose the right path, to “support” them, “help” them, and bring them into the fold.¹¹⁹

He expressed similar sentiments in his Farewell Address, and explicitly connects perceptions of changing geopolitical conditions with the need for American engagement and leadership: “Because the world is more connected everyday, in every way, America’s security and prosperity require us to continue to lead in the world.”¹²⁰ While questions might arise about how conditions can “require” anything, especially leadership, which may be influenced by a perception of America’s relative power as well as position, the basic geopolitical perspective, logic, and implications were clear. As the President clearly states: “In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson warned of entangling alliances. But in our times, America cannot, and must not, disentangle itself from the world. If we want the world to embody our shared values, then we must assume a shared responsibility.”¹²¹ In other words, because of this perception of increasing connections and closeness, engagement and binding were the most appropriate policy options.

Similar sentiments and this same approach were more formally codified in the series of national security reports issued by the White House. In his preface to the 1995 version of *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, for instance,

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ President Clinton, Farewell Address, The White House, January 19, 2001, available at www.theamericanpresidency.net.

¹²¹ Ibid.

President Clinton notes that while “the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed American security imperatives,” the United States now faced an array of global threats and challenges – ethnic, political, military, environmental, demographic, and economic – that precluded hiding and mandated engagement: “Our nation can only address this era’s dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs.”¹²² To Clinton, the lessons of the past were clear: “As our nation learned after World War I, we can find no security for America in isolation nor prosperity in protectionism.”¹²³ Instead, the President committed himself to “forging a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad in pursuit of our most cherished goal – a more secure world where democracy and free markets know no borders” and stated the purpose of the document as such.¹²⁴ After discussing in more detail, although in much the same language, the vision offered by Clinton and Lake in their earlier doctrinal addresses, this report concludes: “In a more integrated and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests – political, military, and economic – without active engagement in world affairs. While Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments.”¹²⁵

While some of this commitment to engagement, and especially to leadership, stems from policy-makers’ perceptions of increased American power and influence, also essential are the concomitant perceptions of increased American connectedness to the rest of the world. Many policy-makers and analysts alike shared the vision of an

¹²² *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. i.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

increasingly borderless world with multiple layers of vast webs and networks of interconnections and interactions. While stretching the fabric of reality a bit, such visions did reflect much of the activity in the economic sphere, and, to a growing extent, the demographic, environmental, and military spheres as well. Even the *National Military Strategy* issued in February 1995 expressed explicit concern with “transnational dangers” and the need to approach them differently:

Increasing global interdependence has made every nation more vulnerable to growing transnational threats. Spreading diseases, fleeing refugees, international crime syndicates, and drug lords are several of the more serious transnational threats that bleed across our own and other nations’ borders. What gives these threats unique character is that combating them lies beyond the reach of any single government.¹²⁶

Issued in conjunction with *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the *National Military Strategy* proceeds to offer a “strategy of flexible and selective engagement,” emphasizing the need for both “overseas presence” and “power projection” in order to “promote stability” and “thwart aggression” – the two primary national military objectives of the United States.¹²⁷

Beyond this ample evidence gleaned from discursive analysis, consider the more quantitative content analysis of the actual doctrinal statements. While not the only theme addressed, geopolitical references appear in all the sources and are one of the top four cited themes (along with regime type, power, and norms). In President Clinton’s 4,790-word speech, for instance, there are approximately 75 references to geopolitics, including 44 of 223 sentences (20%) and 22 of 75 paragraphs (29%), decidedly more than to power or regime type, but fewer than to norms. Lake’s speech breaks down

¹²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: 1995 – A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (United States Government Printing Office, February 1995), p. 3.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

similarly, with geopolitics, power, and norms all capturing 9 or 10 out of 76 paragraphs (12-13%), but, this time, with regime type leading the way.

Moreover, not only are decision-makers considering and talking about geopolitics, but their perceptions and language reveal a reasonably accurate view of the changes taking place and their implications. Most significantly, technological advances were dramatically shrinking distance and time, especially for communication, bringing the world closer together and encouraging more integrative foreign policies. Rare by this point were references to “quarters” or “hemispheres.” While an occasional reference was made to hemispheric economic “blocs” such use typically was derogatory, insinuating closure, exclusivism, and mercantilism instead of the openness, inclusivism, and liberalization associated with more global enterprises like GATT.¹²⁸ Continents still are mentioned, but proportionally less, and usually for a specific locational context. Still popular with some scholars and policy-makers were references to the “West” or the “Atlantic Community.”¹²⁹ Beyond these vestiges of regionalism, however, were the most prevalent and powerful source of geographic identification – the globe. Up dramatically during this time are references to the “world,” the “globe,” and the “planet.” In his doctrinal address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, for example, the President refers to the “globe” 10 times, to the “world” 53

¹²⁸ As long as they are trade promoting and non-exclusionary, in accordance with Article 24 of GATT, regional arrangements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) are permitted, but still considered intermediate stepping stones (perhaps even necessary, unilateral steps to help overcome collective action problems) to the larger and more lucrative evolving global game.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry, “The Logic of the West.” As noted above, the administration repeatedly sought to balance such geographic leanings by calling for the creation of a “New Pacific Community” and actively supporting the development of regional arrangements like APEC and ASEAN.

times, and to “our” 77 times – which is particularly significant given the diversity of the audience.

Even more compelling is the statistical evidence compiled by Aubrey Jewett and Marc Turetzky. In 1998, they published a comprehensive content analysis of all the public statements made by President Clinton during his first term as recorded and indexed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.¹³⁰ Using twelve general issue categories and eight general actor categories, they trace the evolution of the President’s views and beliefs – or at least his attention – from 1993 through 1996. Most stunning is the fact that “global institutions” are the dominant actor every year, the focus of between 31 and 45 percent of the President’s public statements. Second-tier regional concerns fluctuated, with only one (the Middle East) breaking 20 percent in the four years. (See Figure 6A for a summary of the data.)




Figure 6A Actors Perceived by President Clinton -- data from Jewett and Turetzky (1998).

¹³⁰ Aubrey W. Jewett and Marc D. Turetzky, “Stability and Change in President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1993-96,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 1998).

Even combinations of regions, like Western Europe and Asia/Pacific or Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia, do not add up to the emphasis on “global institutions. Latin America, the closest region to the United States, peaked at 15 percent in 1994, but was under 10 percent in the other three. Separated from Eastern Europe, even Russia was under 10 percent, as were Western Europe and Africa. Eastern Europe and Asia/Pacific both hovered around 10 percent, with the Middle East averaging slightly more and pulling in second behind “global” concerns.¹³¹

So, too, do contemporary maps and other visual evidence point toward a more “global” and holistic perspective of the planet. Most revealing and powerful are pictures taken from the air and space that capture a more life-like image, one that lacks any clear dividing lines, save natural geographic features. During the Clinton administration, such photographic images were increasingly prevalent, even more so than maps. Consider, for example, that three major White House publications concerning national security published in the first two years of the administration – the *CIA World Factbook*, *National Military Strategy*, and *National Security Science and Technology Strategy* – all had covers based on such imagery. (See Figures 6B, 6C, and 6D, respectively.) While the CIA also was producing a wide-range of more traditional maps, including world maps centered on the Atlantic Ocean (see Figure 6E), the *National Security Science and Technology Strategy* contains no maps but, instead, eight fuzzy-bordered images of Earth viewed from space.¹³² (See Figures 6F and 6G.)

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² The White House, *The National Security Science and Technology Strategy* (September 1995).




Figure 6B 1993 Cover of CIA *World Factbook*




Figure 6C 1995 Cover of *National Military Strategy*

National Security
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Strategy



Figure 6D 1995 Cover of *National Security Science and Technology Strategy*




Figure 6E 1995 World Map. CIA




Figure 6F 1995 Illustration from *National Security Science and Technology Strategy*

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Figure 6G 1995 Illustration from *National Security Science and Technology Strategy*

The ability to remove oneself from the planet, to see the spherical shape of the globe and not simply some two-dimensional projection, has, in all likelihood, contributed to the evolution of a broader perspective, more comprehensive mental maps, more expansive views of interests and identity, and, consequently, greater incentives to shift strategic preferences and policies from hiding and balancing toward binding. While it is impossible to know for certain how much seeing such pictures of the earth affected policy-makers' strategic choices, the choice of such imagery for the covers of national security documents clearly reflects their geopolitical orientation and highlights the evolution of their mental maps.

Nor are the official White House publications the only sources of such imagery. In his 1992 book, *Earth in the Balance*, then-Senator Gore has several images of the Earth based on the Apollo pictures, of varying clarity, including one on the front cover (reproduced as Figure 6H).¹³³ Over the course of the book, as Gore makes his case, the view of the Earth becomes clearer. (See Figure 6I for the series.)





Figure 6H 1992 Cover of *Earth in the Balance* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992)

¹³³ Al Gore, *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992).


PART I

BALANCE AT RISK



PART II

THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE



PART III

STRIKING THE BALANCE




Figure 61 Pictures of Earth from Al Gore, *Earth in the Balance*
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992), pp. 17, 165, 267, and 299

While emphasizing environmental issues in this work, Gore raises a host of geopolitical concerns – including the effects of “the still-accelerating scientific and technological revolution,” the dynamics of the “information age,” and how much “nuclear weapons have dramatically changed our perception of war”¹³⁴ – and concludes with an elaborate argument for a “Global Marshall Plan.”¹³⁵ Clearly acknowledging “the fundamental differences between the later 1940s and today” and the fact the “the scope and complexity of this plan will far exceed those of the original,” Gore calls for a range of strategic measures to address pressing economic, demographic, and environmental problems, including “*binding commitments* by the industrial nations.”¹³⁶ Between his subject, argument, language, and illustrations, the future-Vice President’s mental maps are perfectly clear, as are the linkages between his perceptions of a shrinking, fragile planet – our “Blue Marble” – and his call for particular strategic policies.¹³⁷

Gore and Clinton were not the only members of the administration to come to Washington with such global, integrative views.¹³⁸ Most of the principals shared this perspective, which was reflected in their earlier works, their official statements while in

¹³⁴ Ibid, pp. 204-205.

¹³⁵ Ibid., Ch. 15.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 297.

¹³⁷ Particularly revealing was the Vice President’s proposal for Triana – derisively called by some “Gorecam” or “Goresat” – a satellite placed in space, roughly one million miles from earth, that would provide live images of the earth on the Internet twenty-four hours a day. As the Vice President explained it to the first National Innovation Summit at MIT in March 1998: “This new satellite ... will awaken a new generation to the environment and educate millions of children around the globe” and could have “the same impact the first images of earth that came back from space had in shaping people’s understanding that we all share a very fragile earth and that we need to care for it.” Cited in Ronald Rosenberg, “A National Call to Innovate,” *Boston Globe*, March 14, 1998, p. F1.

¹³⁸ They did, however, come to Washington as a package, having campaigned together, jointly authoring *Putting People First*, and sharing many views. The Vice President actually played an active and important role in the construction, articulation, and execution of various aspects of the administration’s foreign policy, including those concerning the environment, space, arms control, and relations with Russia. For more, see Paul Kengor, “The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 1997).

office, and their subsequent works after leaving office. Consider, for example, the cover, the title, and the content of the 1992 publication of the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World: *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World*.¹³⁹ As Figure 6J reveals, a similarly fuzzy-bordered picture of the earth from space graces the cover.



Figure 6J 1992 Cover for Carnegie Commission's *Changing Our Ways*

Inside, once one gets through the glitzy presentation, one hears calls for “sustaining the liberal multilateral system,” for “protecting a shared environment,” for “strengthening international organizations,” and for “strengthening collective security” (on both regional and global levels).¹⁴⁰ The Commission members, many of whom went on to serve in the Clinton administration, also call for increased efforts to promote

¹³⁹ Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World: *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 38, 52, and 64, respectively.

democracy, to reduce conventional arms, and to “constrain weapons of mass destruction.”¹⁴¹ Beyond the revealing cover and this early endorsement of a binding strategy, consider the title itself, particularly the second part – *America and the New World*. Centuries away from the usage of Monroe and Adams, the “new world” in this context refers to the post-Cold War global information age – which required the United States to “change our ways.”

Consider, as well, the work of Robert Reich, who, before his appointment as Secretary of Labor, was asking questions in his work on globalization like “Who is Us?” and “Who is Them?”¹⁴² While others in the administration (like Tyson and Garten) saw more competitive pressures on the economic horizon and argued for playing the geoeconomic game accordingly, most of the principals were aware of the distinctive pressures of recent technological advances and the dramatic reductions in the distance and time separating the United States from other actors. On the basis of such perceptions, in the military and political realms as well as the economic, some of the other future Clinton officials also explicitly called for new approaches to “cooperative security.”¹⁴³

While such a perspective seems to have been widely shared, some views matter more than others, especially in processes like formulating the national security strategy reports and drafting doctrinal speeches, which are tightly controlled by the White

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 79, 71, and 73, respectively. Among the members were Winston Lord (Chairman), Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., John Deutch, Henry Cisneros, David R. Gergen, Richard Holbrooke, and Alice M. Rivlin.

¹⁴² See fn. 24.

¹⁴³ See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner. *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Occasional Paper (Brookings Institution, 1992).

House. Consider, in this regard, how Anthony Lake, one of the principal authors and advocates of the doctrine, characterizes contemporary security challenges in a recent book.¹⁴⁴ Noting the absence of “computer-generated maps” in the White House Situation Room, Lake argues that we still are “thinking too much along traditional lines in our national security discussions” and are “embarking on the new century with the mental furnishings of the century past.”¹⁴⁵ He repeatedly emphasizes that “we live in a revolutionary time,” in a “global age” and a “world grown closer,” and “face a number of new threats...that challenge the clarity of our thinking as much as our ability to act.”¹⁴⁶ The underlying source of most of these threats, he notes, is “the new reality of ‘globalization.’”¹⁴⁷ The most appropriate approach to security in such an era is binding: “the best way to stay strong within [our] borders is to band with countries beyond them.”¹⁴⁸ Calling on the United States to “work to draw weak economies and weak nations into the global community and global economy,” Lake points out “the dangerous effects of globalization...can only be addressed in concert with other nations.”¹⁴⁹ In one notable passage attacking isolationism and unilateralism, he offers a more elaborate explication of this view, one which animated the Clinton Doctrine and which clearly reveals the linkages between technological developments, perceptions of inherent closeness to new global trends and threats, and a strategic preference for binding:

¹⁴⁴ Lake, *Six Nightmares*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. ix and p. xi, respectively.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. x-xii.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 231 and p. 282, respectively.

Those obsessed with saving America's sovereignty from the clutches of international institutions are missing the fundamental point about the *new world*. America's sovereignty is being lost. To some degree, it is lost to the UN and other international bodies. But to a far greater degree, America's sovereignty is lost to the *forces of globalization*. The unilateralists can try to build all the walls and barriers they want. They can insist that America act alone or not at all. But many of the threats we face today, such as currency crises, international crime, drug flows, terrorism, AIDS, and pollution, *cannot be defeated single-handedly or shut out at the border*. Turning our backs will not turn back the clock. It will only leave us *more vulnerable*.

If we want to protect the safety and well-being of our people – the ultimate test of any nation's sovereignty – *the wisest course is to join our strength with others who share our goals*. For the simple truth is this: If we don't *give up some of our sovereignty through positive cooperation with others*, we will give up far more to the unregulated global forces that are already eroding our borders and shaping our lives.¹⁵⁰

This type of language and explicit linkage between variables provides strong supporting evidence for my formative hypotheses.

At the same time, it would be inaccurate to assert that geopolitics alone was responsible for the strategic (or at least rhetorical) shift from balancing to binding under the Clinton administration. Other important causal factors certainly were at work and are a necessary, if insufficient, part of the complete explanation.¹⁵¹ More specifically, as noted above, significant roles were played by individual players and personalities, by

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 283. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁵¹ Consider, for example, the "four conflicting sets of pressures" Posen and Ross identify as most responsible for shaping Clinton's grand strategy: (1) the "ambitious purposes" of the administration; (2) the "current realities of international politics"; (3) the interests of the "U.S. political elite, in particular congressional Republicans"; and (4) the disinterest of the "general public." Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 49.

Josef Joffe offers an alternative set of sources for what he sees as "America's failure to define a grand strategy in the post-Cold War world" that is drawn along the lines suggested by Kenneth N. Waltz in *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1954) – what Joffe terms, "the man, the society, and the system" (p. 95). While the underlying assumption is flawed and the two options he offers – "Bismarck" or "Britain" – unnecessarily restrict the larger spectrum of strategic alternatives identified above, the analytical framework fits nicely and, as suggested above, with two additions – process and geopolitics – will be applied herein. Another potentially confusing aspect of Joffe's analysis is his use of both "bandwagoning" and "pactomania" to describe Bismarck's approach, which, as Paul Schroeder notes, was a form of binding. See Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'?: Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995); and Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University of Kansas Press, 1976).

domestic political and economic constraints, and by considerations of international structural and normative variables – perhaps most importantly, the decline of the Soviet Union and its bankrupt ideology and the triumphant emergence of the United States and its liberal, democratic ideals. Even a brief review of these factors suggests that they are too important to ignore or subsume – although many of their proponents have committed just such errors of omission and commission toward geopolitics. Let us consider them in line with the notion of images suggested by Waltz and elaborated above.

First, as always, people ultimately make decisions and execute policies. Everything must be filtered through the prism that is human perceptions, values, and interests. To understand which policies are crafted and chosen, one must, by definition, deal with decision-makers, as well as with the range of external factors which influence their perception of the situation. Agency is vital.¹⁵² In no uncertain terms, it was indispensable for the formulation of enlargement and for the conduct of America's foreign policy.¹⁵³ Beyond being the source of perceptions and actions, individuals also were important because of the predominant domestic orientation of most administration members. Clinton's personal disposition to focus on domestic politics was critical. Clinton came into office riding a wave of domestic concerns and, throughout his career,

¹⁵² As Arnold Wolfers writes, "It is undeniable that men [sic] alone, and not states, are capable of desires and intentions, preferences and feelings of friendship or hatred; men, not states can be tempted or provoked, can overestimate or underestimate their own country's power relative to the power of other states, and can establish goals of national policy and sacrifices consistent with national security." Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 8.

¹⁵³ In his account of American relations with Russia during this time, Strobe Talbott, for example, emphasizes both the traits of individuals and the relationships that people forge with each other as essential parts of the story. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*.

had maintained only minimal interest in foreign affairs. In his case, it was less an issue of knowledge and awareness than of interest and priorities.¹⁵⁴

The administration's policies, however, were not the product of any person, certainly not of Clinton alone. Clinton largely delegated responsibility for foreign policy to his subordinates, especially early in his first term when he was preoccupied with the pursuit of his domestic agenda. Issues, options, and recommendations all were debated by the principals – Lake, Christopher, Aspin, and Berger – ahead of time, with a final suggestion presented to the President for his approval.¹⁵⁵ Morning briefings with Lake and Wednesday lunches with Lake, Christopher, and Aspin were where most decisions were made. Moreover, these were made with a view dominated by domestic concerns. Clinton came to power promising to focus on “people first” and on the economy in particular. His concern was primarily about how foreign policy would play at home, at how it would affect people and the economy.¹⁵⁶

To the extent that Clinton did have presuppositions concerning foreign policy, they were largely liberal in orientation, much like those of most of his first-term appointees. A fair number of the foreign policy-makers had experience in the Carter administration and adopted many of its liberal predispositions. They emphasized the

¹⁵⁴ As one critic points out, “a final part of the explanation lies in the extraordinarily low status that Clinton accorded international affairs. It is instructive to look at how the president chose to use the bully pulpit during his term in office. Of some 300 Saturday morning radio addresses he has delivered, perhaps 35 – less than 12 percent – were devoted to matters of foreign policy and national security. His inaugural and State of the Union addresses display a similar lack of emphasis on foreign policy, as do the administration's efforts at congressional relations.” Haass, “The Squandered Presidency.”

¹⁵⁵ Thomas Friedman, “Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy on Back Burner,” *New York Times*, February 8, 1993, A9.

¹⁵⁶ The most important question to President Clinton, as one aide noted, was, “How will it change things on the ground?” Cited in Thomas Friedman with Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton and Foreign Issues: Spasms of Attention,” *New York Times*, March 22, 1993, A3.

importance of institutions and organizations and of multilateralism more generally. Their earlier experiences, many of them shared, including the trials and tribulations of Vietnam and the Carter years, helped shape their views and drive decisions during the Clinton administration.¹⁵⁷

But, as important as these idiosyncratic, personal factors may be, they do not exist in a vacuum. To paraphrase Marx, people make history, but not entirely in the circumstances of their choosing. As necessary and immediate as agency might be, it is not sufficient. As Wolfers explains, “although nothing can happen in the world arena unless something happens inside the minds and hearts of scores of men [and women], psychological events are not the whole stuff out of which international events is formed.”¹⁵⁸ Instead, policy-makers in this case, much like those in the previous two, faced both normative and structural constraints and pressures on the domestic and international fronts that often weighed heavily on the decision-making process.

Let us start with domestic considerations. If first-image explanations are the most immediate cause of foreign policy, then domestic variables – second-image explanations – are the next closest and always important. All foreign and defense policies are made in a domestic context. They are constructed by individuals who operate under a multitude of sometimes divergent influences beyond personal dispositions, including party politics, interest groups, legislative pressure, the media,

¹⁵⁷ For more on the background, characteristics, and views of Clinton’s foreign policy-making team, see Hyland, *Clinton’s World*, Ch. 2; and Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, *Beyond the Water’s Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy* (St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 123-128.

¹⁵⁸ Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 8.

popular opinion, and a host of other domestic variables.¹⁵⁹ One of the most important, according to many analysts, is the domestic political context – both structural and normative. Beyond regime type per se, values and cultural mores also weigh in, especially in democracies, although in ways that are difficult to measure reliably. Consider, for example, then-Governor Clinton’s statements that “United States foreign policy simply cannot be divorced from the moral principles we believe in” and that an “American foreign policy of engagement for democracy will unite our interests and our values.”¹⁶⁰ As noted above, administration officials repeatedly referred to the blurring

¹⁵⁹ For first-hand accounts from the Clinton administration that emphasize such factors, see Rosner, *The New Tug of War*; Gergen, *Eyewitness to History*; Garten, “Business and Foreign Policy”; Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*; Reich, *Locked in the Cabinet*; and Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds* (Renaissance Books, 1999).

See also David Gergen, “Adapting U.S. Foreign Policy-Making to Changing Domestic Circumstances,” in Daniel Yankelovich and I. M. Destler, eds., *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy* (W. W. Norton, 1995); Linda S. Jamison, “Executive-Legislative Relations after the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1993); Robert J. Lieber, “Eagle Without a Cause: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat,” in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* (Longman, 1997); William Schneider, “The New Isolationism,” in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* (Longman, 1997).

For more general works on the domestic sources of foreign policy, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980); Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, The Congress, and Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution, 1990); James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (Dorsey Press, 1962); Barry B Hughes, *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy* (W.H. Freeman and Co., 1978); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy* (Yale University Press, 1984); Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1990); Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, Second Edition (Prentice Hall, 1990); David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Howard J. Wiarda, *American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes* (Harper Collins, 1996); Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, Second Edition (St. Martin’s Press, 1994); and Karl von Vorys, *American Foreign Policy: Consensus at Home, Leadership Abroad* (Praeger, 1997), especially Chapters 1 and 2.

¹⁶⁰ William J. Clinton, “A New Covenant for American Security,” Address at Georgetown University, December 21, 1991, as reported by the Federal News Service and made available on Lexis/Nexis.

lines between foreign and domestic policies – that “foreign and domestic policies are inseparable in today’s world.”¹⁶¹

More concretely, hostile Republicans in Congress, budget deficits, and growing isolationist sentiments in the American electorate all helped shape, or, more accurately, limit, the direction and scope of American foreign policy.¹⁶² As a shrewd and astute politician, President Clinton was always sensitive, if not entirely responsive, to the electorate's interests. He was acutely aware of the media, of their sentiments and those that dominated public discourse. Continually informed by pollsters (like Stan Greenberg) and advised by political operatives (like Dick Morris), Clinton occasionally acted like a weathervane, reassessing and shifting positions, trying to find that happy middle ground that pleased most people, antagonized few important constituencies, and left the greatest latitude for future shifts. Unlike some of his Republican predecessors, Clinton tended to follow the polls, not to try to drive or direct them.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. As Clinton noted later in that same speech: “We can no longer afford to have separate foreign and domestic policies. We must devise and pursue national policies that serve the needs of our people by uniting us at home and restoring our greatness in the world. To lead abroad, a President of the United States must first lead at home.”

¹⁶² As Haass writes, “many of Clinton's major foreign policy decisions can be traced to domestic politics. The fear of domestic political backlash led to the ignominious pullout from Somalia and the refusal to commit ground forces to Kosovo or forces of any sort to Rwanda; a desire to placate organized labor led to the increasing embrace of protectionism; the hope of attracting support from Americans of eastern European descent was a crucial factor behind NATO enlargement; harsh economic sanctions were introduced against Haiti partly to assuage prominent African-American critics of U.S. policy; and U.S. troops were dispatched there when the sanctions contributed to a massive and unpopular influx of refugees into Florida.” Haass, “The Squandered Presidency.” For two additional examples of the many available accounts that emphasize the role of domestic pressures on President Clinton and his foreign policy, see Henrikson, *Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea*; and Schwenniger, “World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World.”

In terms of grand strategy, domestic factors played a largely constrictive role, occasionally guiding but more often holding back the administration's hand.¹⁶³ So, while one can see some reflectivity as American foreign policy mirrors its domestic structure and norms, what is more apparent is how domestic actors have come to the fore and challenged the administration on a number of fronts. Particularly powerful were the Republican Party in Congress and economic interest groups. At different points, both of these sets of domestic actors exerted significant, even decisive, pressure on Clinton: the Republicans toward more of a hiding posture and the economic interest groups toward more balancing in commercial policies. Most noteworthy for the grand strategy as a whole was their meager allotment of funds to support the internationalist activism espoused by Lake et al in their doctrine of engagement and enlargement. Thus, instead of getting fully involved and integrating potential threats, the U.S. often took a more standoffish approach, engaging only when necessary and disengaging as soon as possible. In other words, instead of "multilateralism when possible and unilateralism when necessary," the actual policy over time looked more like "unilateralism and hiding when possible, multilateralism and engagement when necessary" – with engagement comprising an assortment of balancing, binding, and

¹⁶³ For more on the influence of domestic constraints on the historical evolution of American grand strategy, see Arthur A. Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy: The United States, 1938-1950," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1993); Aaron Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 2000); Samuel P. Huntington, *American Military Strategy*, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 28 (Institute of International Studies, University of California – Berkeley, 1986); and Kevin Narizny, "The Political Economy of Grand Strategy" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2001).

dominating tendencies.¹⁶⁴ Regardless, the most important point is that domestic political and economic considerations greatly restricted and constrained the execution of American foreign policy, bringing it closer in line with domestic priorities and policies. As Lake notes, this phenomenon is pervasive and not at all unique to the U.S. as many democracies face similar pressures to turn inward in the wake of the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the previous *raison d'être* of most countries' engagement:

Yet, new domestic pressures in the U.S. and elsewhere resist our engagement on such problems. Without the geostrategic rationale that the Cold War once cast over the Third World, many Americans now see these nations only in terms of the problems they seem to generate: narcotics from Latin America, terrorism from militant states, immigrants from Haiti, U.S. casualties in Somalia, job competition from the Asian dragons. The onset of a global recession has fueled a turning inward within virtually all major nations. From the U.S. to Germany to Japan, more attention is going to domestic needs, as it must; but that often leaves tight budgets for international efforts. And in many leading powers, there is a disquieting rise in nativist, protectionist, and isolationist voices – those I have called the Neo-Know-Nothings.¹⁶⁵

While it is unfair to label all critics of the administration's many foreign policy gambits as "Neo-Know-Nothings," such domestic pressures exerted strong and undeniable influence on Clinton's foreign policy. But, as important as personal and domestic variables may have been, they were not the only causal factors at work.

International variables, both structural and normative, also were necessary parts of the causal chain. Most important were the fundamental power shifts associated with the collapse of the USSR, the rise of China, and the emergence of the U.S. as the preeminent superpower. Also significant were the growing economic power of Europe

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy."

¹⁶⁵ Anthony Lake, "A Strategy of Enlargement and the Developing World," Address to the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, October 13, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 25, 1993.

and Japan and the diffusion of power to many other actors.¹⁶⁶ Such structural shifts present new challenges, opportunities, and constraints for policy-makers. More specifically, in this case, these changes seem to have influenced how the Clinton administration viewed potential threats and, consequently, how they oriented and prioritized American security policies.¹⁶⁷

Of all the structural influences, none was more important than the collapse of the Soviet Union. The recession of the most prominent and pressing threat to the U.S. opened new doors for the Clinton administration. For the first time in forty years, the United States was not confronted with a great power hell-bent on ideological and geopolitical rivalry. The recession and diminution of the perceived threat posed by Russia,¹⁶⁸ however formidable its retained capabilities might have been, allowed the

¹⁶⁶ Writing as Assistant Secretary of Defense during the first Clinton administration, Joseph Nye described these “power shifts” as spelling the end of bipolarity and generating a “complex three-dimensional pattern”: military unipolarity, with the U.S. unquestionably on top; economic tripolarity; and a more general power “dispersion” among transnational actors. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Conflicts After the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1995).

¹⁶⁷ For more on the administration’s perceptions of three different kinds of wars – great power, regional, and internal – see *Ibid.* Noteworthy is the inverse relationship between importance and likelihood, between potential costs and risks.

¹⁶⁸ This shift in threat perception suggests a pivotal role for ideology and/or regime type, both of which change contemporaneously with power during this period. While the size of the Russian empire shrunk, its military capabilities, as noted above, were not so significantly diminished as to justify a fundamental shift in American policy. But, when combined with the rejection of communism and Marxist-Leninism; the disavowal of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the adoption of the “Sinatra doctrine” (of allowing Eastern Europe to go its own way); and the processes of glasnost, perestroika, and democratization in Russia, the power shifts, however subtle, helped catalyze a reassessment of the Russian threat. Thus, in this overdetermined instance, power shifts were a necessary, but insufficient cause of changes in threat perception – just as reduced threat perceptions are a necessary but insufficient cause of the larger process of strategic adjustment from balancing to binding.

United States to think about other options beyond balancing – a remarkable turn of events unto itself. As the Clinton administration so clearly recognized: “The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America’s security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century – the threat of communist expansion – is gone.”¹⁶⁹ This change presented the United States with new opportunities, a chance to explore other strategies for pursuing security. As then-Governor Clinton put it in one of his campaign speeches: “Now, we face our own moment of change and challenge and opportunity. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire pose an unprecedented opportunity to make our future more prosperous and more secure.”¹⁷⁰

For a sampling of the debate about the ideational and structural causes of the end of the Cold War, a topic which is beyond the scope of this study, see John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93); John Mueller, “The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy,” in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994); Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994); Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996); William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01); Robert D. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002); and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002).

¹⁶⁹ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995, p. i.

¹⁷⁰ William J. Clinton, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 1, 1992, as published by the Federal News Service and found on Lexis/Nexis.

The facts that Russia had declined and the United States ascended seem irrefutable.¹⁷¹ With such power, the United States could do almost anything; but, as Peter Tarnoff so accurately pointed out, it could not do everything. Nor did the amount of relative power or even the number of powers dictate what the United States should do or not do. Structural changes thus opened opportunities but did not determine paths and policies. No longer was the United States pressured to respond formulaically to a menacing communist threat. With the recession of structural imperatives, American policy-makers felt free to pursue other options. As Lake explains, now we “have the opportunity to pursue new forms of global problem solving – through re-invigorated multilateral institutions, and through new partnerships that the Cold War had made impossible.”¹⁷² The array of strategic choices broadened as the threats, at least those posed by the great powers, diminished. Thus, rather than simply balancing the menacing threat posed by a hostile superpower, the United States had the latitude to adopt a different approach to security. For the first time in decades, America could, as Lake expressed it, “lead on the basis of opportunity more than fear.”¹⁷³

Part of this interest in pursuing new opportunities and policies arose from the principals’ perceptions of international norms, as well as from policy-makers’ predispositions toward liberalism and from domestic tendencies toward missionary, if

¹⁷¹ As Lake explained in his defining speech at Johns Hopkins, one of the central features of the post-Cold War era is that “we are its dominant power. Those who say otherwise sell America short. The fact is, we have the world’s strongest military, its largest economy, and its most dynamic, multiethnic society. We are setting a global example in our efforts to reinvent our democratic and market institutions. Our leadership is sought and respected in every corner of the world.... Around the world, America’s power, authority and example provide unparalleled opportunities to lead.” Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

¹⁷² Anthony Lake, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon, Washington, DC, May 3, 1993.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

not messianic, impulses abroad – what Walter McDougall refers to as “Wilsonianism” and “global meliorism.”¹⁷⁴ In the formulation of the Clinton strategy, there was an important and apparent role for ideas and norms, especially those of liberal governance. In particular, the administration saw the triumph of America’s core concepts – democracy and market economics – as one of the central features of the new era. As Lake explains:

There has been a wave of market and democratic reform, from the former Soviet Union to Africa to Latin America. That wave filled the conceptual void left by the collapse of Marxist illusions – illusions that were dispelled in part by the Soviet Union's collapse but even more by the abject practical failure of efforts to manage economies through stultifying bureaucracies. As a result, the ideas of democracy and market economics may not be triumphant, but they are certainly ascendant.¹⁷⁵

Thus, the Clinton administration sought to get on the “right” side of history and ride this liberal wave to even greater heights. The triumph of these ideals, at least in the “West,” allowed, or encouraged, the administration to focus their international agenda on expanding their coverage and effects and to help expand the group of liberal capitalist

¹⁷⁴ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 203. As he defines the latter term, “Global Meliorism is simply the socio-economic and political cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place. It is based on the assumption that the United States can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the American dream” (p. 173). For more on these two traditions in American foreign policy and their role in the Clinton era, see, respectively, Chapters 6, 8, and 9.

¹⁷⁵ Anthony Lake, “A Strategy of Enlargement and the Developing World,” Address to the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, October 13, 1993, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 25, 1993.

democracies.¹⁷⁶ As Lake noted in his Johns Hopkins speech, “Culture does shape politics and economics. But the idea of freedom has universal appeal. Thus, we have arrived at neither the end of history nor a clash of civilizations, but a moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity. We must not waste it.”¹⁷⁷ This administration, thus, wanted to capitalize on the moment, to capitalize on this momentum, to feed on the flow of history, “to take advantage of the democratic tide running in the world.”¹⁷⁸ In one of his few campaign speeches dedicated to foreign policy, Clinton emphasized the democratic “revolution” taking place that was helping to shape his vision of America’s role in the world: “our ideas have been embraced around the world and the world is ...rushing to embrace our way of life.”¹⁷⁹ The United States, according to this line of thinking, needed to recognize the power of this wave and capitalize on it: “It’s part of a worldwide march toward democracy whose outcome will shape the next century.”¹⁸⁰ Thus, America had not only an opportunity, but an obligation to help support these movements, to help consolidate the gains made by

¹⁷⁶ The extent to which such ideals are universally palatable and applicable and, thus, represent the “end of history” is still a matter of debate. While some socio-political liberalization does appear to be a necessary accompaniment of the later states of economic development and liberalization, especially in the information age, there are still wide swaths of the planet unconverted and more than a few obstinate hold-outs. Even in the so-called “West,” there appear fissures which raise questions about whether even the ideological game is really over. For the two original volleys in this debate, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *National Interest* (Summer 1989); and Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993). See also Deudney and Ikenberry, “The Logic of the West”; the responses to their article by Bruce Cumings, Richard Falk, Stephen M. Walt, and Michael C. Desch in *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1994); and the exposition of an Asian alternative in Kishore Mahbubani, “Go East, Young Man,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1994).

¹⁷⁷ Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

¹⁷⁸ Anthony Lake, cited in Thomas Friedman, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up,” *New York Times*, October 31, 1993, A8.

¹⁷⁹ William J. Clinton, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 1, 1992, as published by the Federal News Service and available on Lexis/Nexis.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

fellow democrats around the globe, especially considering the “irresistible power of ideas.”¹⁸¹

Such a conceptualization likely would resonate well with the normative arguments posed by constructivists and other critical theorists – namely, that ideas drive history as they shape our thinking about events, in a multitude of ways. So, too, might the structural arguments sit well with realists, the domestic pressures with liberals, and the individual characteristics with behavioralists. To some extent, all of these arguments offer a facet of the “truth.” All are supported by at least some of the evidence. But, as the powerful and extensive discursive and cartographic evidence reveals, the principal national security policy-makers in the Clinton administration were thinking not only about international norms and power, nor only about domestic pressures and personal convictions, but also about the emergent landscape. More specifically, they were clearly cognizant of the technological revolutions underway and thinking about the dramatic reductions in distance and time these technological advances were producing. The planet seemed to be shrinking, with threats and opportunities alike getting closer. American policy-makers believed that best way to approach security, to protect and promote the interests of the United States in the face of the prevailing geopolitical, domestic, and international trends was to shift from the balancing strategy of containment to the binding strategy of enlargement – at least vis-à-vis the other great powers and transitional states. In this way, the formulation of the Clinton Doctrine provides strong evidence not only for geopolitics, but also for other important causes, which, depending upon one’s purpose, can be integrated into a more

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

complex explanation involving multiple variables and levels of analysis, an option I return to in the Conclusion. First, let us examine the second side of the causal chain and assess the relationship between the landscape fitness of this binding strategy and its operational effectiveness.

Landscape Fitness and Operational Effectiveness

Given this awareness of the geopolitical, domestic, and international factors and the apparent connections between decision-makers' perceptions and strategic choices, it is not surprising that the articulated doctrine of enlargement initially had a high level of landscape fitness. Crafted with the post-Cold War environment in mind, this binding strategy seemed well suited for the conditions, especially for relations among great powers. As hypothesized, these high fitness levels bred success in the form of relatively peaceful and stable relations among great powers. There were no great power wars. Nor were any American deaths or attacks on American assets or interests attributable to any of the great powers.¹⁸² Economically, the rising tide of the 1990s lifted all boats, although some more than others, and certainly made choices easier and sacrifices smaller. The American economy, for example, grew enormously under the Clinton administration, with GDP increasing 32 percent (in real terms) between 1993 and 2000 at an average annual rate of 4 percent. In terms of providing prosperity, this type of

¹⁸² For all the criticism of the administration's foreign policy as "feckless" and "reckless," a total of only 170 Americans lost their lives to hostile military or terrorist activities during the eight years Clinton was in office – none of them at the hands of any great power. Even if we consider the additional 259 military deaths classified as "pending/undetermined," this figure still is about the same as the number of American children under the age of four or between five and fourteen who are murdered in one year. The one disturbing trend, as discussed below, is the apparent rise in the number of terrorist attacks against the United States. Statistics drawn from U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism* (various years), U.S. Department of Defense, *Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel* (various years), and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (2002) – available online at www.state.gov and www.census.gov. For two critiques of that employ these terms, see Steve Forbes, "Feckless Foreign Policy," *Forbes* (December 14, 1998); and Schwenninger, "World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World."

performance is hard to beat.¹⁸³ While the United States still was spending several hundred billion dollars on defense and maintained the largest and most capable military by far, these expenditures were less than 20 percent of the budget and only about 3 percent of GDP, a long way from the burdens of the Cold War, as Figure 6K illustrates.¹⁸⁴




Figure 6K Defense Outlays, 1940-2000

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (2002) and *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975).

¹⁸³ Even the Reagan years do not match this (with 24 percent real total growth between 1981 and 1988 at an average annual rate of 3.2 percent). This, of course, says nothing about budget deficits, which were eliminated under Clinton and ballooned under Reagan. Statistics drawn from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (2002), available at www.census.gov.

¹⁸⁴ As Figure 6K illustrates, defense spending under Clinton was the lowest it had been since before World War II, both as a percentage of federal outlays and as a percentage of GDP. Data compiled from *Ibid* and from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975).

Balancing the budget and cutting defense expenditures while maintaining peace and prosperity, the administration was, as some observers noted, trying to buy security “on the cheap” – and, by many objective measures, seemed to do so, especially in terms of its relations with the other great powers.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ As Stephen Walt puts it in one of the most favorable commentaries on the administration’s performance: “Perhaps Clinton’s greatest achievement is that he has done so well at so modest a cost to the United States. Clinton’s strategy is hegemony on the cheap, because that is the only strategy the American people are likely to support.” Stephen M. Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (March-April 2000). For a direct rebuttal, see Haass, “The Squandered Presidency.”

While there are more polemic critiques, these two articles represent the two broad schools of thought about the overall Clinton record. Many supporters claim that he did not do a bad job, and point to the avoidance of a major war, relative stability with the great powers, and impressive economic performance (both at home and abroad) to support this favorable assessment. Lamenting inconsistency over time and across issues, distraction by peripheral concerns, and lost opportunities, most critics of the administration’s foreign policy have more problems with what Clinton did not do than with what he did do. Looking at the military, economic, and political situations at home and abroad, it is hard to argue that Clinton’s grand strategy – or, more specifically, his binding approach to the great powers – failed, particularly, within the eight years he was in office. Whether one classifies this record as “successful” and offers one cheer or two largely depends upon more subjective definitions of security, assessments of threats and opportunities, and expectations for outcomes. As discussed below, when one considers the fits and starts of the policies across the full range of issues the administration actually addressed, the picture becomes murkier and the evidence more ambiguous.

For a sampling of the many critiques available, see Abrams, “Hapless Abroad: The Weakness of Clintonian Diplomacy”; Henriksen, *Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea*; Hillen, “General Chaos: Intentions, Not Results, are the Leitmotif of the Clinton Doctrine”; Simes, “Clinton’s Innocence Abroad: How Naïve Paternalism Skews the Administration’s Vision”; Naim, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Victim of Globalization”; Maynes, “Bottom-Up Foreign Policy”; Gelb, “Can Clinton Deal with the World: His Passive Foreign Policy is Popular but Perilous”; Schwenninger, “World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World”; Steve Forbes, “Fleckless Foreign Policy”; James Chace, “Pernicious Abstractions and Large Strategies,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1994); William G. Hyland, “A Mediocre Record,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 101 (Winter 1995/96); Lawrence J. Korb, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy Woes: A Way Out,” *Brookings Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1994); Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* (Longman, 1997); Sebastian Mallaby, “The Bullied Pulpit: A Weak Chief Executive Makes Worse Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (January-February 2000); Michael J. Mazarr, “Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P.” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1998); John McCain, “Imagery or Purpose? The Choice in November,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 103 (Summer 1996); Benjamin Schwarz, “The Vision Thing: Sustaining the Unsustainable,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1994); George Szamuely, “Clinton’s Clumsy Encounter with the World,” *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1994); Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996); and Richard Rose, “The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The World Moves Away from the White House,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Fall 1998).

Even in the face of increasing economic competition, the Clinton administration maintained solid relations with both Western Europe and Japan. More significantly, in terms of security (again, defined primarily as protection against threats), the administration's binding approach seems to have worked reasonably well with both Russia and China – the two largest potential threats, or, as they were also termed at different times, strategic rivals, challengers, and partners.¹⁸⁶ Both Russia and China experienced modernization, some degree of liberalization, and at least partial integration into the “family of peaceful nations.” Consider, for example, Russia's inclusion in the Group of Eight (G-8) or China's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), neither of which happened overnight, but both of which signify the administration's attempt to engage and integrate these potential threats. Consider, as well, the numerous arms, trade, and aid agreements, military exchanges, state visits, and summits held between these states, especially between the United States and Russia. From 1993 to 1997, for instance, there were twelve meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

While criticizing the occasional lack of attention and “ad hocism,” David Gergen, who Clinton brought on board to help right the ship of state in the summer 1993, identifies a long list of foreign policy successes: the avoidance of war; the unification of Europe and expansion of NATO; moved peace forward in the Middle East; stopped genocide in the Balkans; defused economic crises; and kept the world economy on track. (He also notes efforts toward South Asia and Africa, which, while more extensive than those of Clinton's predecessors, were not, in my view, so absolutely strong and effective as to define them clearly as “successful.”) See Gergen, *Eyewitness to History*, p. 340.

The administration touts its own accomplishments online at <http://clinton5.nara.gov/WH/>. Outside of the administration, one must look harder for positive assessments. Perhaps the most favorable account is Deudney and Ikenberry, “Misjudging Clinton.” See also Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos” and “America's Liberal Hegemony”; Richard H. Ullman, “A Late Recovery,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 101 (Winter 1995); Jurek Martin, “Clinton Abroad,” *Washington Monthly*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (March 1999); Llewellyn D. Howell, “Clinton's Foreign Policy: Solid and Consistent,” *USA Today* (Magazine), Vol. 127, No. 2638 (July 1998). Charles Kupchan also seems to endorse at least the approach (if not the administration) in “After Pax America: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998). Even Gideon Rose offers a positive twist, contrasting Clinton's record with the alternatives, especially those offered by Republicans, in “Present Laughter or Utopian Bliss,” *National Interest* (Winter 1999).

¹⁸⁶ Here, again, it is important to note the differences between the specific policies adopted and practiced toward these two different types of states and the security challenges they posed.

and seven full-blown bilateral summits, as well as regular semi-annual meetings between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, from 1992 to 1996, Russia and the United States signed 97 formal agreements, a startling number compared with the total of 101 signed between 1933 and 1985, or even the 78 signed between 1986 and 1991.¹⁸⁸ This type of “pactomania” helped stabilize American relations with Russia and, to some extent, contributed to the peace and prosperity that the United States enjoyed during the 1990s.¹⁸⁹

While similarly motivated and oriented toward binding, American efforts to engage and integrate China were more gradual, informal, and uneven.¹⁹⁰ While the Clinton administration granted China conditional most-favored nation (MFN) status in 1993 and delinked its annual renewal from human rights concerns in 1994, China was not formally admitted to the WTO (with permanent MFN status) until Clinton’s last

¹⁸⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, “The United States and the New Russia: The First Five Years,” *Current History*, Vol. 96, No. 612 (October 1997), p. 307.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Joffe and Brinkley both use this term. See Joffe, “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity”; and Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine.”

From the Russian perspective, this relationship and its results might not have been regarded so favorably. The transition from a planned economy, closed society, and authoritarian political system was long, challenging, and, at times, painful. Conflicting American impulses and messages, however, may not have been as well as received as they were intended. Talbot speaks about this at length in *The Russia Hand*. For an example of this alternative view, see Anatol Lieven, “Ham-Fisted Hegemon: The Clinton Administration and Russia,” *Current History*, Vol. 98, No. 630 (October 1999).

To the extent that these policies generated resentment that comes back to bite the United States at some point in the future, President Clinton and his administration should be held at least partially accountable. For now, however, Russia poses less of a threat to the United States, its allies, and its interests, than it did before Clinton’s presidency. Perhaps the most pointed and accurate criticism of the administration is not that its policies did not work but that they did not do enough, especially given the opportunities. For more on this line of argument, see Haass, “The Squandered Presidency.”

¹⁹⁰ Consider the fact that President Clinton only visited China once (in the summer of 1998), in contrast to his five official visits to Russia. Christopher’s record is similar with only two trips to China (in March 1994 and November 1996) but six trips to Russia, and even more telling when one recalls how poorly his first visit went. While the attention paid to China was better than that to India (where Christopher never ventured), it pales in comparison to the attention Christopher lavished on the Middle East, including more than 20 trips to Syria in only four years. Our closest neighbor, Mexico only received two visits and our closest ally, Britain, only 7. The travel history of both the President and the Secretary of State are available online at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/.

year in office – the same year the President traveled to India, the world’s most populous democracy and another rising power. As noted above, some vestiges of balancing remained in the American approach, which resulted in at least some turmoil in the relationship. Nevertheless, even with occasional troubles boiling up over issues like trade, human rights, and particularly Taiwan (as in the Straits in 1996), the United States and China managed to avoid any open hostilities and significant conflicts during the Clinton administration.

As many critics have pointed out, the same claims of success cannot be made for all issues, areas, and actors. From the beginning, the administration faced challenges in defense and foreign policy, stumbling out of the gate with more peripheral but pressing concerns in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, and Haiti, along with a range of domestic distractions.¹⁹¹ Some initial political successes later turned sour, including unraveling peace efforts in both the Middle East and Northern Ireland. The greatest accomplishments came in the economic dimension, both in terms of domestic performance and the management of the global economy. Beyond the successful bailout and stabilization of two separate international economic crises (starting in Mexico in 1995 and Thailand in 1997), the administration also successfully expanded regional and global trading arrangements with regimes like NAFTA, APEC, and GATT/WTO. A case also can be made for the effective use of international regimes in the military dimension, with the indefinite extension of the NPT and the Chemical

¹⁹¹ Perhaps most troublesome among the early domestic distractions was the ruckus raised over “gays in the military,” which, while an important civil rights issue, had nothing but negative effects for Clinton in terms of his relations with the defense establishment and public relations. In short, it was a less than ideal issue to initiate the administration’s handling of security, especially at the same time Aspin and Tarnoff were advocating military and political retrenchment.

Weapons Convention standing out as highlights. Less clear-cut were the effects of the administration's efforts concerning START (II and III), the ABM agreements, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999). For all the attention paid to balancing and containing rogue states, the fact that both North Korea and Iraq continued to try to develop WMD suggests that such policies were at least not entirely successful, if not abject failures.

Even more troubling and noticeable now is the absence of any concerted effort to address the growing threat posed by non-state actors, particularly terrorist networks like al Qaeda. While certainly aware of the risks of the diffusion of power and interaction capacity associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, the Clinton administration's policies still fell short. By any standard or measurement of security, 9.11 represents a failure or crash. While the actual cataclysm happened on President George W. Bush's watch, the Clinton administration certainly bears some responsibility, especially given all of the warnings and events of the preceding decade. Here, a disjuncture arose between the perceptions of the environment and reality, resulting in policies that were either undirected or misdirected at these new threats. Focusing almost exclusively on states, both administrations underestimated the growing capabilities, hostility, and significance of an entire class of actor – sub-national terrorist networks, which had become increasingly powerful and connected. The global web of terrorist networks runs far, wide, and deep, but was hardly a blip on either administration's radar screen prior to 9.11, even after events like the USS Cole, the embassy bombings in Africa, the

bombing in Saudi Arabia, or any other of the 841 total terrorist attacks against the interests of the United States between 1994 and 2000.¹⁹² Instead, both the Clinton and Bush administrations remained preoccupied with the threats posed by states, especially those run by tyrants, like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea – what Bush referred to as the “axis of evil” in his First Annual Address.¹⁹³ But, these states, regardless of how distasteful or annoying they might be, were not the only, nor even the most important threats facing the United States. The resulting misfit between the security strategy (or absence thereof) and the emergent landscape produced dysfunction and cataclysm, resulting in nearly 3,000 dead U.S. citizens, the worst day for American security since Pearl Harbor.

The resulting rush to reassess our strategies and our approach to security, as well as the obvious intelligence failures, illustrates how these mental maps can change, and change dramatically. A comparable effort to reorient American thinking was undertaken at the turn of the last century by people like Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan, as well as after World War I by Woodrow Wilson and others; in neither case, however, were the entrenched views dislocated. Only after Pearl Harbor and World War II were the isolationist sentiments overcome. Similarly, while a series of terrorist attacks against American assets around the world in the 1990s suggested the need to expand our definitions of threats and craft appropriate responses, the United States was slow to respond and paid a dear price.

¹⁹² This statistic is derived from the U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism (1994-2001)*.

¹⁹³ George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002, available at <http://www.americanpresidency.org/>.

Terrorist Attacks vs. US Interests (1994-2000)




Figure 6L – Data from U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism* (1994-2001).

Terrorist Attacks vs. US Interests (1996-2001)




Figure 6M – Data from U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism* (1994-2001).

As Figures 6L and 6M indicate, the number of terrorist attacks against the interests of the United States are on the rise and not necessarily in the regions one might expect.¹⁹⁴

One can only hope that the current adjustment process will help us prepare for, if not prevent, comparable incidents in the future. To the extent that the current administration loses sight of the nebulous and nefarious networks of terrorists, scattered and driven underground by American military prowess, and shifts its focus back onto more visible and targetable rogue states like Iraq, it risks falling back into that same ill-fitting mindset and falling short of addressing the more pressing threat posed by terrorists to American security. While beyond the scope of this study, an assessment of the emergent landscape suggests an inverse ordering of priority according to size – increasing from great powers through rogue states to terrorist networks. Policies should be crafted with capabilities and intentions in mind and with a concerted effort to eliminate, reduce, or otherwise constrain the most potent destructive capabilities of the most hostile actors. If we falter in this effort or get distracted by lesser concerns, the results could be horrific, especially if WMD are involved.

¹⁹⁴ Nearly 80 percent of the 895 attacks that took place between 1996 and 2001 occurred in our own “neighborhood” – Latin America. Contrast this with only 4 percent in the Middle East, 3 percent in Asia, and 8 percent in Western Europe. Data compiled from the U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism* (1994-2001).

Conclusions: Geopolitics and the Clinton Doctrine

This case, like the previous two, offers strong supporting evidence for the claim that geopolitics influences both the formation and the functionality of grand strategies. In the formative stage, policy-makers in the Clinton administration clearly were aware of their circumstances and explicitly considered connectedness to other actors as they fashioned security policies. Their perception of increasing closeness to the Russia and, to a lesser extent, China encouraged a strategic shift from balancing toward binding. While unevenly and inconsistently applied, the binding strategy articulated by the administration and encapsulated in the “Clinton Doctrine” was far better suited to the emergent landscape than either hiding or balancing strategies might have been – at least as far as relations among great powers were concerned. This high fitness level helped produce functional operational outcomes, including reasonably stable and peaceful relations with both Russia and China, to say nothing of the increasingly deep and broad ties with Western Europe and Japan. At the same time, while a comparable level of fitness may have characterized the balancing strategy aimed at rogue states, less attention and effort were paid to the emerging networks of global terrorists. Empowered by technological advances, the interaction capacity of such non-state actors rose dramatically. Unfortunately, despite occasional lip service about the growing risks of terrorism, the thrust of American policy, guided by outdated mental maps, largely overlooked this emerging but potent threat to American national security. This cognitive oversight yielded a dysfunctional policy, at least concerning terrorism, and resulted in the single worst security crash since Pearl Harbor – the attacks of 9.11.

In this respect, both sets of hypotheses – formative and functional – are strongly supported by the historical evidence. More specifically, in the formative dimension, all three metatheoretical hypotheses are confirmed: geopolitics mattered; its influence was essential and profound; and this influence was mediated by human perceptions and actions, particularly by mental maps and imagined closeness, which encouraged certain strategic preferences – mostly those associated with binding. Thus, the evidence confirms the first and broadest variable-specific hypothesis – a correlation between the independent variable (strong interaction capacity), the intervening variable (mental maps emphasizing closeness), and the dependent variable (a binding grand strategy). Disaggregating this dependent variable along the three elements (motivational, cognitive, and operational) and along the three operational dimensions (military, political, and economic) offers even more support for the geopolitical explanation, as all but one of these six are in line with my hypotheses. The interests and ends of the Clinton administration were, generally speaking, expansive and global in orientation, with some geographic differentiation. The same holds for the administration’s assessment of threat and opportunities; both were conceived in largely global terms, but put into practice in a much more circumscribed and geographically differentiated manner. The administration’s operational preference for non-military means fits well with the binding strategy and the perception of closeness in an environment characterized by strong interaction capacity – thus supporting the general operational hypothesis. So, too, did the administration’s preference for such policies as “preventive defense,” “deep engagement,” and “assertive multilateralism” directly and strongly

support both the categorization of the Clinton Doctrine as a binding strategy and the military and political operational expectations of my geopolitical theory. As with the Monroe Doctrine, only one outlier emerges and, it happens, not coincidentally, to be the same one – the economic dimension.

In this case, as with the Monroe Doctrine, the economic dimension falls off of the largely linear set of expectations concerning the direct (if mediated), functionally-driven relationship between interaction capacity and strategic engagement and integration. In the Monroe case, the United States practiced commercial opportunism, a more active and open approach than the relatively remote position of the United States might lead us to assume. In the Clinton case, the United States practiced “fair trade,” an active but more neo-mercantile approach than we might expect on the basis of strong interaction capacity alone. In both of these cases, the apparently anomalous practices in the economic realm can be best accounted for by domestic political and economic pressures. While incomplete or inaccurate mental maps may be partially responsible, a more compelling case can be made by including domestic factors. More specifically, variations in openness derive largely from pressures associated with the business cycle and sectoral shifts, with tough times and losing sectors increasing domestic pressures for closure. Nevertheless, because of America’s remarkable economic growth over the two centuries, an ideological commitment to notions like the “open door” and at least “fair” trade, and clear channels for the expression of economic interests in the American policy-making process, the United States has maintained a large degree of continuity in the way it plays the commercial game. In short, American strategic behavior in the

economic dimension confirms the importance of the domestic context and the potential utility of second-image arguments. As discussed in the conclusion, this suggests the need to consider and perhaps include other variables and levels of analysis into a more comprehensive and complex model of decision-making and of international relations more generally, depending, of course, upon one's subject and purpose.

For the purpose of this project, it suffices to note that geopolitics was not the only causal factor at work. While geopolitics exerted a profound influence on both the formulation and the functionality of the Clinton Doctrine, as with the Monroe and Truman Doctrines before it, other considerations and variables also came into play. While the geopolitics may set the stage, myriad factors influence how and why security policy is made and whether or not it works, including power, domestic politics, economics, norms, political culture, and, of course, individual leaders' personalities and dispositions. These other factors tend to receive the bulk of attention from political scientists, who often overlook the significant causal influence of geopolitics. Instead of ignoring or subsuming such a fundamental feature, this study has sought to focus attention on the explanatory power of geopolitics in its own right. The Clinton case, like the other two empirical studies, offers clear and incontrovertible evidence that policy-makers were at least thinking about geopolitics and were doing so largely along the lines I hypothesized. Given the opportunity for strategic adjustment presented by the end of the Cold War, their recognition that technological advances were shrinking distance and bringing actors closer strongly encouraged them to embrace a strategy of binding – not balancing or hiding – to deal with the potential threats posed by Russia

and China, as well as a host of other transnational issues like the global economy, the global environment, and global crime and terrorism. Unfortunately, less consistent application of appropriate strategies toward some of these other issues, areas, and actors, resulted in the appearance of more of a loose assortment of ad hoc policies than a coherent grand strategy per se. While the binding orientation of the Clinton Doctrine helped generate a period of relative peace and prosperity among the great powers, such policies and results have not been uniform. Many other challenges persist, and it is unclear whether the United States has adjusted its mental maps and security policies appropriately. It would be far more cost-effective, though perhaps cognitively difficult, to shift our views and strategies to best fit the emergent landscape before dysfunctional gaps result in an even worse security crash.

**GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGY:
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions

This study began with a series of empirical observations and theoretical puzzles. First, I observed that the United States, like other great powers, had not pursued security uniformly throughout its history. A range of strategies toward other great powers was evident in the historical record, including hiding in Monroe's era, balancing in Truman's, and binding in Clinton's. This struck me as problematic, given both the relative constancy in the domestic structure of the United States and the essential equivalence among great powers. While the policy-makers themselves had changed, as had some normative and structural features, no existing theory, cast on any level of analysis, offered a satisfactory explanation of this strategic variation. More specifically, while liberal theories emphasizing state characteristics could explain some of the variation, particularly the hiding and binding orientations, they tend to fall flat on balancing in the Truman case, as well as on the intrinsic variation, including balancing, during the Clinton administration.¹ As stated above, a relative constant – like the republican structure of the American government – cannot explain change.

¹ They fall even shorter of providing an adequate explanation of the current Bush administration's approach toward threats, which is oriented toward the dominating/eliminating end of my strategic spectrum. While the ultimate ends identified by the Bush administration may reflect domestic values and structures, their preferred means (e.g., unilateral militarism, nuclear preemption, intercontinental ballistic missiles strikes, etc.) certainly do not. This approach, as discussed below, has interesting potential for future study as a deviant case. For the administration's official statement, see *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, September 2002). For a positive commentary, see John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy*, No. 133 (November/December 2002). For a more critical review, see "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002).

Likewise, realist theories emphasizing the essentially unchanged anarchic ordering principle or the functional undifferentiation of states cannot explain strategic variation either. More plausible is the possibility of polarity changing over time – from multipolarity to bipolarity to unipolarity – which, in turn, exerted different structural pressures and encouraged strategic adjustment. Most realists and neorealists, however, do not address strategic options like hiding or binding. These often are lumped together into a non-balancing category, usually termed “bandwagoning.”² But, as Schroeder and others argue and as this study confirms, these alternative modes of protection are real and have been practiced.³ Most intellectually interesting was the fact that the same state – the United States in this instance – practiced at least three different strategies, all in

² See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison Wesley, 1979), especially pp. 125-126; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987); and Josef Joffe, “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995). For one of the best expositions of the range of options available, see Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97).

³ See, for example, Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994); Daniel Deudney, “Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in the Philadelphia System,” in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *Constructing Sovereignty* (Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Robert G. Kaufman, “‘To Balance or To Bandwagon?’ Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992).

the same anarchic arena and against other great powers of essentially equivalent status and power.⁴

With theories cast at the two most prominent levels of analysis falling short of adequate explanation of American strategic variation, I began to consider alternatives, like people, process, and geopolitics. The biggest problem with focusing on the policy-makers themselves, who obviously had changed, was the idiographic nature of such an enterprise – there were no generalizable conclusions or potential applications to other cases. This is what I was looking for, especially given comparable variation in the historical experience of other great powers. Over the last two centuries, Germany, Britain, Russia, and Japan, for example, all appeared to have practiced different grand strategies, and not just balancing and bandwagoning. Hiding, binding, and dominating all are evident in the historical record, and even practiced by the same state in the same domestic and international structures against other great powers of essentially equivalent capabilities. What could explain this variation in grand strategies?

⁴ Even if one accepts shifting polarity over time, it is less clear that nuclear weapons do not play the role of a “power neutralizer.” The fact the United States possesses thousands of nuclear weapons while China, Britain, and France only possess hundreds does not, unto itself, put the U.S. into another category of “hyperpower” per se. Questions of overkill and fungibility immediately arise and suggest that while there are some gradations among great powers, they all are not only functionally undifferentiated but also essentially equivalent in terms of usable power and the potential threat they pose to each other – at least as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. See Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell University Press, 1989); and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (Cambridge University Press, 1981). For more on the potential stabilizing effects of the spread of such weapons, see Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-First Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford University Press, 2000) and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Reality,” *APSR*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990) and “More May be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (W.W. Norton, 1995).

After extensive preliminary research, I grew increasingly convinced that much of the variation – although perhaps not all of it – could be explained by a relatively simple, apparently commonsensical variable than many analysts and policy-makers alike seemed to take for granted: geopolitics. Focusing on how technological advances in destruction, transportation, and communication (and increasingly information processing) were fundamentally modifying the effects of geography and the larger “ecological” context,⁵ I concluded that the obvious was being overlooked, at least by most analysts and theorists. Thus, I set out to probe the plausibility of geopolitics as an explanatory variable and potential level of analysis. Instead of explicitly pitting geopolitics against the alternatives in tough tests, I purposefully selected crucial, or “most likely,” cases, in which the dependent variable actually varied while most of favored explanatory variables of the contending theories were held reasonably constant.⁶ Research revealed that not only did the security strategies espoused by the Monroe, Truman, and Clinton administrations vary, but so did the underlying material

⁵ Among the most influential works on geopolitics I encountered at this early stage were Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions* (Little, Brown, and Co., 1910); Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1942), *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1944), and his two series in *APSR* (Vol. 32 and 33, 1933 and 1934); Harold Sprout, “Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective,” *World Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (January 1963); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Daniel Deudney, “Global Geopolitics: A Reconstruction, Evaluation, and Interpretation of Materialist World Order Theories of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1989) and “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Greenhouse” (University of Pennsylvania, 1993), which was revised and published as “Bring Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era,” Ch. 2 in Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew, eds., *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (SUNY Press, 1999). The term “ecological” was introduced to the field in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton University Press, 1965), perhaps the single most important source for this particular study. For a more complete listing of important works by these authors and others, see my Selected Working Bibliography on Geopolitics.

⁶ For more on the definition and utility of such cases, Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (University of California, 1992), pp. 152-163.

base – the geopolitical foundation. Three different strategies thus seemed to correlate with three different material contexts. But, why? What linked these two apparently correlating variables? Mental maps and imagined distance were the missing causal connector for these two variables.⁷ Of course, the environment cannot determine or dictate a particular strategic preference or policy choice.⁸ Instead, policy-makers first have to perceive the environment and interpret its potential effects in language and concepts that they already understand.⁹ The mental maps they form in their heads about their circumstances help translate the material context into strategic doctrines and, thus, bridge the gap between my independent and dependent variables. While such mental maps have interesting properties in their own right and are worthy of further examination,¹⁰ the primary role they play in this study is as the pivotal cognitive link that connects the two ends of this strand of my causal chain: geopolitics and grand

⁷ In this respect, the missing piece of the puzzle was provided by Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁸ Ignored or misinterpreted, it can, however, wreak havoc on otherwise well designed approaches, which is the essence of the functional argument about landscape fitness and the operational milieu. See the Sprouts, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*; and Daniel Deudney, "Geopolitics and Change," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Westview Press, 1997).

⁹ In this respect, ideas do seem ontologically antecedent, but only to the mental maps – not to the material base itself, which, along with other factors like earlier perceptions, helps shape the language and concepts. Although there are more than a few feedback loops associated with the complex causal chain, it is important to recognize the *a priori* existence of the material context relative to human interpretations and representations of it.

¹⁰ Among the interesting questions about mental maps are their correlation and deviance from actual maps. How much, in other words, do people's perceptions of the environment differ from reality – both cartographic and material? A second interesting aspect is why do they differ? What are the various sources of these mental maps? In what way do language, culture, and norms, as well as psychological and material factors, help generate these mental maps? A third aspect worthy of more research concerns the stickiness of these maps, their hysteretic nature; once established and accepted, they, like other cognitive constructs, are hard to dislodge, even when the initial circumstances that gave rise to them have long since disappeared. For more on the lumpiness of the process of territorial change, including the role of perceptions and language, see Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, and Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Cornell University Press, 1993).

strategies. Of course, once strategies are adopted and become operational, they must be played out on that same field that was just perceived. At this point, the earlier, subjective process of considering and interpreting the environment gives way to the more objective influence of geopolitical environment on the effectiveness of the selected grand strategy. In this respect, the influence of geopolitics extends beyond possibilism in formulation, to probabilism in execution.¹¹ More specifically, in the first leg, the geopolitical environment serves as an independent variable, mediated by policy-makers' perceptions and mental maps, and combined with other considerations, before being translated into strategic preferences, which, when integrated and coordinated, form grand strategies. In the second causal leg, the geopolitical environment serves as an intervening variable between the grand strategy, which shifts to the independent variable, and the new dependent variable and ultimate end of this whole process – the provision of security.

In the three historical cases examined above, policy-makers implicitly and explicitly considered geopolitics when formulating security policies. Imagined distance and perceptions of connectedness accompanied concerns about regime type, ideology, and relative power and helped shape strategic preferences as expressed in articulated doctrines. The bottom line is that geopolitics mattered, and mattered significantly.¹² The evidence in these three cases confirms not just correlations but also cognitive and causal connections between geopolitics and grand strategies. In each case, American

¹¹ Sprouts, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*.

¹² For more on the persistent importance of geography, see Doreen Massey and John Allen, eds., *Geography Matters! A Reader* (Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Colin Gray, "The Continued Primacy of Geography," *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 2. (1996) and "Inescapable Geography," in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy* (Frank Cass, 1999).

policy-makers considered geopolitical factors, among others, as they constructed security policies and then had to practice these policies in that same geopolitical context. Strategies that fit the landscape and were suited to the material circumstances were successful and provided security; while those with low levels of fitness were more dysfunctional and costly. In this respect, the evidence gathered supports both sets of geopolitical hypotheses – those about the psycho-milieu and about the operational milieu, although the former far more extensively than the latter.¹³

More specifically, in terms of the first leg of the causal chain, concerning policy formulation, a clear and unmistakable correlation is evident between increasing interaction capacity and increasing engaged and integrative grand strategies. As the data in Appendix 2 and Figure 7A illustrate, the increase in various elements comprising interaction capacity over the 170 years between Monroe and Clinton is not just linear and significant – it is exponential and revolutionary.

¹³ While confirming the plausibility of the general functional relationship between landscape fitness and operational effectiveness, more theorizing, research, and analysis are needed on the operational dimension before drawing firm and steadfast conclusions. For the most robust results, more detailed hypotheses should be specified, other potential contributing variables identified and controlled, and tough tests conducted. As an intermediate step, as I suggest below, one could test the external validity of the general propositions against the historical record of other great powers over the two centuries – more specifically, over three strata of interaction capacity (weak, moderate, and strong) to ascertain correlations in both types of grand strategies adopted and their effectiveness.

Expanding Interaction Capacity




Figure 7A Expanding Interaction Capacity
See Appendix 2 for data and sources

Many of the technological advances concerned orders of magnitude – fundamental differences in kind that shaped new eras, not just increasing the capacity to do the same old things.¹⁴ Over time, this fundamentally different capacity to interact influenced policy-makers’ perceptions, preferences, and priorities. As interaction capacity grew, so did policy-makers’ definitions of national interests and national security – from the narrow definitions in the early nineteenth century centered on the eastern seaboard of North America and the larger notion of the “Western hemisphere,” through the broader notion in the mid-twentieth century of the “free world,” to the even more extensive

¹⁴ Consider, for example, the impact the advances in terms of destruction (high explosives, fission, and fusion), transportation (steam engines, internal combustion, aircraft, jets, and rockets), and communication (telegraph, radio, telephone, television, computers, and the Internet). Technologies, of course, continue to evolve and are likely to continue changing the significance of such factors as geography and distance.

global interpretations of the 1990s.¹⁵ So, too, did perceptions and definitions of both threats and opportunities expand as interaction capacity took off. No longer were they defined in local or even regional terms. What once was accepted wisdom, became anachronistic and potentially dangerous thinking. By the 1940s, hemispheric defense was rejected as unrealistic.¹⁶ Threats and opportunities both were growing and extending their reach, calling to the United States from the heartland and rimlands in Eurasia. “Enlightened and impartial observers”¹⁷ in three eras were, thus, perceiving differently the same essential geographic base in North America differently. Why?

¹⁵ Cf. Ernest R. May, “National Security in American History,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *Rethinking International Relations: Ernest R. May and the Study of World Affairs* (Imprint Publications, [1992] 1998). While not explicitly identifying geopolitics or technological advances as the driving force behind this evolution, May identifies four clear stages in how American policy-makers defined these subjects, as expressed by Presidents in their annual messages to Congress: (1) safe borders and union (1790-1870); (2) hemispheric independence and social order (1880s-1930s); (3) free world independence and prosperity at home (1940s-1960s); and (4) stability and economic growth (1960s-1990s). These correspond almost directly with my more explicitly geopolitical interpretation. While the dividing lines were not always clear, the evidence above strongly supports the argument that American policy-makers defined interests and threats in starkly different geographical terms during the Monroe, Truman, and Clinton eras – particularly in terms of the continent and hemisphere; the rimlands and “free world”; and the globe, respectively.

¹⁶ Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*; and Eugene Staley, “The Myth of the Continents,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1941).

¹⁷ James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message, December 2, 1823, in James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. II (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1896).

Geography itself holds only part of the answer.¹⁸ While the size and shape of the United States had changed, the distance between Washington, D.C., and the capitals of the other great powers had not.¹⁹ The Atlantic Ocean still was roughly 4,000 miles across, the Pacific roughly 6,000. Nor had Greece grown any closer to the United States – in physical or attributional distance.²⁰ But, American security policy toward these areas certainly had changed. After nearly a century of abstention, hiding finally gave way to balancing which, after nearly half a century, yielded, at least partially, to binding. Consider, for example, the specific treatment of three different states. Toward Russia, the central threat identified in all three grand strategies examined in this study, the United States first practiced an aversive strategy with the Monroe Doctrine, then adopted a balancing strategy with containment, and then attempted binding with activities like arms control, the Partnership for Peace, expanding the G-7 to the G-8, and much more. Toward Great Britain, the strongest power of Monroe's period, the United

¹⁸ Of course, the geography of the United States had changed since its founding as well. Particularly significant were the increase in size and the expansion across the continent to the Pacific Ocean. As important as these changes may have been, the most relevant feature for this study is the evolving sense of connectedness or closeness to other states, which is more a product of changes in technology in the American case than of changes in geography per se (with the possible exception of the United States becoming more of a Pacific power). For more on the role of geography, including its evolution, over the course of American history, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1920) and *The Significance of Sections in American History* (Peter Smith, 1959); Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (Houghton Mifflin, 1903); and D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 1, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800* (Yale University Press, 1986), *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 2, *Continental America, 1800-1867* (Yale University Press, 1993), and *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Volume 3, *Transcontinental America, 1850-1915* (Yale University Press, 1998).

¹⁹ Beyond continental expansion and overseas possessions, the other major geographic change was the construction of the Panama Canal, which dramatically cut distance and time from the journey from the East Coast to Asia and helped make the United States more of a Pacific power. For more on the construction and role of the canal, see Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (Basic Books, 1993), especially pp. 431-436 and 503-506.

²⁰ For more on these different notions of distance, see Alan K. Henrikson, "Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2002).

States explicitly rejected bandwagoning in favor of a unilateral declaration of hemispheric hegemony. By the 1940s, after two major wars together, policy-makers in the United States saw Britain as an important counter-weight to the greater threat posed by Russia and coordinated their policies in an effort to balance Russia. By the 1990s, relations between the United States and the United Kingdom hardly could have been closer. Finally, even though Greece is not a “great power” per se, American policy toward it reflects remarkably similar contours, evolving from a rejection of Greek pleas for assistance and muted offers of rhetorical support in the 1820s, to providing substantial aid to Greece and resisting communist pressures in the 1940s, to having formal multilateral and bilateral ties with Greece in the 1990s, including collective security arrangements through NATO and a mutual defense cooperation agreement.

The common, underlying causal factor driving this evolution of strategic doctrine was technological development, especially in terms of transportation, communication, and destruction. Across the board, density and proximity increased dramatically.²¹ To most policy-makers in the United States, the world seemed to be shrinking, distance evaporating, and constructed notions like quarters and hemispheres

²¹ Cf. Deudney, “Regrounding Realism,” pp. 35-36. In making his case for an “intense” classification and the resulting necessity for global republican structures, Deudney goes so far as to claim “universal immediacy” and “universal saturation.” Beyond the conceptual confusion associated with using the term “saturated” (along with “thick” and “thin”) to describe density (which concerns mass or quantity per volume), as noted above, this claim is not entirely supported by the empirical evidence as some non-violent sectors have lagged behind. My assessment of the three major branches of technology – destruction, communication, and transportation – suggests both varying levels of proximity and density among dyads and an aggregate level (encompassing both violent and non-violent dimensions) of strong, not intense. To be fair, Deudney’s concern is the overall level of “violence interaction capacity” in the system, which is, to some extent “variegated,” he later admits (pp. 38-40), along what Henrikson would term “topographical” and “gravitational” lines. This assessment, his emphasis on functionality, and his more restrictive interpretation about how geopolitics influences the formation of grand strategies are three major differences in our work – which, while sharing numerous concerns, also differ empirically, methodologically, and metatheoretically. For more on these other two notions of distance and their influence on foreign policy, see Henrikson, “Distance and Foreign Policy,” pp. 444-457.

becoming less useful guides to policy. While the geographic features themselves had changed only little, policy-makers' perceptions of the earth and their place in it had been fundamentally transformed by technological change.²² Moreover, these perceptions of increasing interaction capacity and growing closeness helped shape policy-makers' preferences about the ends and means of security.

In terms of means, the operational dimension of grand strategy, policy-makers clearly shifted from a hiding strategy under Monroe to a balancing strategy under Truman to more of a binding strategy under Clinton. Given the classification of the interaction capacity during these three eras as weak, moderate, and strong, a direct correlation appears between the independent and dependent variables, as hypothesized and as illustrated in Figure 7B.

²² In this respect, material and ideational factors interact and evolve together. To make matters even more complex, directed public policy can influence both the material and the ideational factors through such devices as research and development programs in science, capital projects for the environment, naming of certain areas, and reinforcing beliefs through the distribution of various cultural artifacts, like money, flags, anthems, or maps that purposefully convey certain images. For more on the generation of national identities, as well as perceived legitimacy and loyalty, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Revised Edition (Verso, 1991).

Basic Formative Argument

(Independent variable, dependent variable, and historical cases)

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| INTERACTION CAPACITY | Strong | | | Clinton Doctrine |
| | Moderate | | Truman Doctrine | |
| | Weak | Monroe Doctrine | | |
| | | Hide | Balance | Bind |
| | | GRAND STRATEGIES | | |

Figure 7B Basic Formative Argument

By disaggregating these grand strategic orientations into their constituent elements and dimensions, I found even more support for geopolitical explanations. (For summary tables of the hypotheses, variables, and evidence, see Figures 7C and 7D.) While rarely pure in composition, the selections of means in the three administrations matches the hypotheses in ten of twelve subcategories, including the preferred mode across all three cases (which evolves from political to military to economic); the military posture in all three cases (which evolves from defensive to offensive to deterrent); the level of political engagement (which evolves from limited to selective to deep); and the differentiated economic orientation of the Truman administration.

Summary Table of Geopolitical Hypotheses across Cases

| | <i>Monroe</i> | <i>Truman</i> | <i>Clinton</i> |
|---|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Formative -- The Psycho-Milieu | | | |
| Metatheoretical | | | |
| Existential (Does it matter?) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Quantitative (How much?) | Profound | Profound | Profound |
| Procedural (In what way?) | Mediated | Mediated | Mediated |
| Variable-Specific | | | |
| General Grand Strategy | Hide | Balance | Bind |
| Motivational | Hemispheric | Free World | Global |
| Cognitive | Distant | Connected | Global |
| Operational | Political | Military | Economic |
| Military | Defensive | Offensive | Deterrent |
| Political | Limited | Selective | Deep |
| Economic | Opportunistic | Differentiated | Managed |
| Functional -- The Operation Milieu | | | |
| Positive: Fitness Yields Security | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Negative: Unsuitability Causes Crash | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Figure 7C Summary Table of Geopolitical Hypotheses across Cases

Summary Table of Variables across Cases

Geopolitics and the Formation of Grand Strategy

| <u>Case</u> | <u>Independent Variable</u> Level of Interaction Capacity | <u>Intervening Variable</u> Imagined Distance | <u>Dependent Variable</u> Grand Strategy Type |
|-------------|--|--|--|
| Monroe | Weak | Remote | Hide |
| Truman | Moderate | Connected | Balance |
| Clinton | Strong | Close | Bind |

Geopolitics and the Functionality of Grand Strategy

| <u>Case</u> | <u>Independent Variable</u> Grand Strategy | <u>Intervening Variable</u> Landscape Fitness | <u>Dependent Variable</u> Provision of Security |
|-------------|---|--|--|
| Monroe | Hide | High, then deteriorates | Yes, then crash (WWI and WWII) |
| Truman | Balance | High, then problematic | Yes, but costly (Korea, Vietnam, \$) |
| Clinton | Bind | High, but incomplete | Yes, then crash (9/11) |

Figure 7D Summary Table of Variables across Cases

The only two outliers (noted in gray in Figure 7C) are in the economic dimension: in the Monroe case, the United States practiced more commercial activism than one would have expected on the basis of geopolitics alone; and, in the Clinton case, the United States practiced more neo-mercantilism and protectionism than one would expect in the age of globalization.²³ These two outliers and potential concerns about coding notwithstanding, it still is safe to claim a high degree of corroborating evidence for the geopolitical explanation. If we consider the unambiguous evidence supporting the metatheoretical hypotheses, the strong evidence supporting the variable-specific hypotheses, and the suggestive evidence supporting the functional hypotheses, then 34 of 36 observations across the three cases are confirmatory. While these “most likely” cases were selected expressly because my geopolitical theory had to work here if it was to hold up anywhere, they nevertheless confirm the plausibility of theoretical explanations of American grand strategy based on geopolitics. More specifically and emphatically, the evidence points to a necessary and profound role for geopolitics in the formulation of these three security doctrines. Future analysts of grand strategic decision-making would be wise to give geopolitics at least the same amount of consideration as do policy-makers.

²³ As I have explained above, both of these outliers are the product of a range of causal factors, most importantly, domestic economic and political pressures. Also noteworthy is the possibility that the apparent fit of the differentiated (or “discriminating”) economic approach of the Cold War era (active and open with allies, closed and autarkic versus adversaries), may have been more the product of the security dilemma and policy-makers’ aversion to sharing any potential security externalities associated with economic growth and development with their perceived adversaries than due to different levels of imagined connectedness. Here, as elsewhere, problems of overdetermination run rampant, with multiple theories pointing in the same direction. In subsequent studies more expressly designed to test the relative explanatory power of contending explanations, more control on these co-varying and overlapping would be necessary. That is not, however, the purpose of this project, which, instead, seeks only to claim a place at the table for geopolitics in the formative process of grand strategy, not to displace all of the others. For more on the role of the security dilemma and Cold War trade policies, see Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

As essential as geopolitical factors were in these three historical episodes, especially for explaining the variation of American strategic doctrine across and within the cases (which other theories cannot), they are not the only causal variable that matters, nor even the most important. Other factors – domestic and international, structural and normative – matter as well, for both the formation and the functionality of grand strategies. In this respect, several different theoretical schools can make positive contributions to our understanding of grand strategy and offer useful and necessary explanatory elements. In the Clinton case, for example, structural realism identifies the permissive conditions and highlights the perceived need to balance threats (if not power per se) in the still competitive and dangerous global arena.²⁴ Structural liberalism and constructivism, in contrast, help illuminate where and how policy is made and accurately identify important domestic and normative influences in the decision-making

²⁴ My findings tend to support much of Stephen Walt's analysis of the "origins of alliances." Three major differences between our analyses stand out, however. First, as noted in the Introduction, Walt, like other neorealists, unnecessarily limits the range of his dependent variable. There are more strategic approaches to threats than simply balancing or bandwagoning. Second, by including perceived intentions, geographic proximity, and ideology along with power into his notion of "threat," Walt loses sight of the significant role played by geopolitics. While he is not as dismissive as Barry Posen about the prospect of theorizing about the role of geographic and technological factors on grand strategy, they still tend to get lost and overlooked in his analysis. Third, and finally, to the extent that he does focus on geographic proximity, his analysis is underdeveloped and incomplete. Most significantly, and this pertains less to his universe of cases (non-great powers in the Middle East during the Cold War) than to relations among nuclear armed great powers in the Information Age, there is a point at which increases in interaction capacity render balancing less effective, if not dysfunctional. This renders them less appealing and encourages consideration of more suitable strategies – like binding – which leads us back to the first point above. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987) and Barry P. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1984).

process.²⁵ But while structural liberalism's hypothesized return to binding does take place on a macro-scale, balancing remained a central foreign policy tool of the Clinton administration, especially against the threat posed by rogue states. This is where geopolitics enters; it helps explain why the policies vary, both in content and effectiveness.²⁶ More specifically, geopolitics explains why the Clinton administration had a multifaceted strategy that included binding, balancing, and hiding; how and why those strategies were applied to different states, regions, and issues; and why some policies fared better than others. To obtain the most complete and accurate picture, one ultimately must incorporate the insights of multiple schools of thought; transcend apparent dichotomies between agency and structure, and between domestic and

²⁵ This study, thus, tends to confirm many of the propositions concerning the importance domestic variables – structural and normative, political and economic – for both legs of my causal equation. As I acknowledged in the introduction, this is hardly surprising given the loci of decision-making and the inescapable filtering of all information, about ideas as well as the material world, though psychological prisms that are primed by personal and domestic influences. For more on the role of domestic factors, see Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 1993).

²⁶ Just as the same domestic context cannot explain strategic variation, nor can the same set of international norms. While the normative context may have changed across the cases, it is difficult to make a generalizable argument about how the same wave of democratization and “ascendance” of liberal ideas drove the United States to practice different strategies toward different states, especially toward the same types of states – like India. This is to say nothing, of course, of the problems posed to this line of thinking, as well domestic arguments, by the current Bush administration's preference for preempting, preponderating, and prevailing – all of which increases the promise of this case for future research.

international influences; and adopt a systemic synthesis that captures all of these features and models international relations as a complex adaptive system.²⁷

This potential utility of the emergent paradigm of complexity to integrate multiple, interacting variables – including agency, structure, norms, strategies, and the material world – into a larger, “systemic” framework has continued to percolate in this study and is one of the additional theoretical conclusions of this project.²⁸ While focusing on one factor or level may be a useful and necessary step to understanding causal dynamics, it is rarely sufficient and always artificial.²⁹ Instead, the inherent complexity of human behavior, as ubiquitous in our affairs as in the rest of nature,

²⁷ For a definition of such systems and their features, see John Holland, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 121, No. 1 (Winter 1992) and *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995). For applications of this emergent paradigm to international relations, see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-93); Steven R. Mann, “Chaos, Criticality, and Strategic Thought,” in *Essays on Strategy*, Volume IX, edited by Thomas C. Gill (National Defense University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton University Press, 1997); and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton University Press, 1997) and “Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles,” *APSR*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (March 2003). Unlike Cederman, however, my use of this emergent paradigm, up to this point, is primarily conceptual and metaphorical, not formal or algorithmic. For more information on the subject, see my Selected Working Bibliography on Chaos and Complexity.

²⁸ This holistic notion of a “system” (as distinguished from structure) derives from numerous sources, including Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, Revised Edition (George Braziller, 1968); and David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Prentice Hall, 1965). For examples of structural analysis applied to patterns of behavior on the international and domestic levels, see, respectively, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Avery Goldstein, *From Bandwagon to Balance of Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978* (Stanford University Press, 1991).

²⁹ Of course, necessity and sufficiency are largely determined by one’s subject and purpose. Generally speaking, political scientists should avoid prejudging theories and methods and, instead, adopt and employ those approaches that can shed the most light on the problem under investigation. To do otherwise is to engage in self-defeating behavior and will likely result greater effort expended for fewer useful results. Pragmatism, not dogmatism, should be one’s guide.

seems to call for more sophisticated analytical concepts and tools.³⁰ The question is not just whether individual geopolitical factors – like size, location, topography, and connectedness – matter. Of course, they do, as do a host of other demographic, psychological, cultural, sociological, political, economic, and military factors, on both legs of our causal chain – formative and functional. In terms of theories, neither leg is zero-sum. Instead of simply posing either-or questions about which variable matters, we might inquire how much they matter and in what way. We also might ask about how the variables are connected and what emergent properties result from their interaction and the dynamics of the system. Future studies could, therefore, explore multiple levels of analysis and their causal connections, and generate and test hypotheses about the central variables in such a system, their interrelationships, and their influence on grand strategy and international relations. Exploring such causal

³⁰ Consider, for example, the wide range of phenomena that exhibit tendencies toward the power law, the footprint of self-organized criticality (SOC), with its logarithmic relationship between duration or size and frequency: earthquakes, tree branches, traffic jams, forest fires, sedimentary deposits, black holes, grasshopper outbreaks, cotton prices, solar flares, cloud size, heartbeats per minute, firm size, word frequency, stock market fluctuations, bird populations, scientific citations, rivers, avalanches, disease outbreaks, and extinctions. Note how many of these phenomena concern the emergence of potentially problematic circumstances that confront actors with the challenge of adjustment. In the realm of political science and international relations, similar patterns seem to appear in cities, states, international organizations, revolutions, civil wars, and interstate wars. In this respect, cities, states, and international organizations can be thought of as different modes of organization, sources of identity, or types of security providers, as well as adaptive agents, each with its own traits, strategies, and fitness landscapes, interacting with each other and with other variables, generating the emergent patterns of complexity we see in international affairs. Although not yet formally developed, this conceptualization jibes with the work of Hendrik Spruyt, Ian Lustick, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Robert Jervis, and Lars-Erik Cederman. For more see, Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton University Press, 1994); Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, and Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Cornell University Press, 1993); Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, "On the Magnitude, Extent, and Duration of an Iraq-UN War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 1991); Jervis, *System Effects*; and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: "National Systems Change and its Geopolitical Consequences."* Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001; and "Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpiles." For more on the dynamics and prevalence of such patterns in nature, see Per Bak, *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality* (Copernicus, 1996); and Mark Buchanan, *Ubiquity: The Science of History ... or Why the World is Simpler than We Think* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000).

complexity makes sense both for the variables themselves and for the limited links of the causal chain examined in this study, which are but artificial constructs, purposefully conceived and divided to facilitate theorizing, research, and analysis in earlier stages.³¹ In reality, of course, these two parts are causally interdependent, connected to each other and to a thick web of other interacting variables, and, thus, not easily dissected and compartmentalized along such rigid lines.³²

In the meantime, we can continue to advance our understanding of the sources of grand strategy and national security by following the advice of Harry Eckstein and trying to pursue “middle range” explanations and the “heaping up of tested theoretical findings.”³³ While limited in range and power, such an approach offers discrete,

³¹ As noted above, this two-tiered framework owes much to the Sprouts and their notions of “psychomilieu” and “operational milieu,” presented in *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs*. Also influential has been Putnam’s notion of a “two-level game,” played on the domestic and international levels. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988).

³² Emphasizing the “complexities of European stabilization after 1918, in which foreign and domestic politics and economics were intertwined” and the resistance of international history to “inflexible modes of explanation,” Walter McDougall makes a related point in his study of early twentieth-century French diplomacy: “Whatever his [or her] predilections, the diplomatic historian searches in practice for the restraints and imperatives operating on policy-makers. In doing so, he [or she] is in the best position to perceive that the statesman exists in an interface between two systems – the international polity and the domestic polity, each with its own patterns of development and response, each with its social, economic, and technical imperatives. When foreign policy and its effects are viewed as the product of this interface, the assertion of a ‘primacy’ – foreign, domestic, economic, or ideological – is revealed as artificial.” Thus, much like the complex, multivariate findings in this study, the evidence in the French case leads McDougall to reject a one-dimensional approach: “Even as I understood the complex interaction of all military, political, and economic issues affecting postwar Europe, I also concluded that no approach stressing the primacy of one factor yielded a satisfactory approximation of French policy-making and the pattern of international relations. Yet all approaches offered insights....” Walter A. McDougall, *France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. xi-xii.

For two examples of grand strategy analysis that at least consider both the domestic and international levels and their interaction (but not geopolitics per se), see Robert G. Kaufman, “A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 1994); and Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton University Press, 1996).

³³ Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (University of California, 1992), quotations from p. 109 and p. 112, respectively.

convenient, and necessary stepping-stones to the larger, synthetic studies suggested above. When tackling a tough puzzle, getting the pieces together and placing them right side up can be a helpful first step.³⁴ It is in this manner, by building up knowledge about the constituent elements of the international system, that this paper seeks to contribute to the field. By purposefully limiting the scope of this study, I have tried to highlight the nature and direction of the causal influence of geopolitics on grand strategy, not to ascertain specifically its relative explanatory power vis-à-vis contending liberal, realist, institutionalist, or constructivist theories. While pitting these theories against each other in tough historical tests – with varying regime types, ideologies, political structures, capabilities, strategies, and geopolitical circumstances across different eras and regions – could provide valuable theoretical and practical insights,³⁵ certain constraints have “necessitated” a more discriminate and manageable first cut.

Thus motivated, this paper has focused expressly on elaborating and testing two basic hypotheses about the geopolitical environment, an important but underdeveloped analytic variable, long neglected and shorn for more structural and normative

³⁴ Here, I am drawn to the Chinese expression about stepping on stones to cross the river, particularly when the river is wide and the currents are raging. In the quest for “multicausal, even multiparadigmatic synthesis,” what Legro and Moravcsik call “the future of international relations theory,” such interim steps are necessary. As they explain: “The unavoidable first step, however, is to develop a set of well-constructed first-order theories. Multicausality without a rigorous underlying structure only muddies the waters, encouraging ad hoc argumentation and obscuring the results of empirical tests.” Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 50.

³⁵ Such a research agenda could start along similar theoretical and methodological lines and investigate first other great powers, then other states, and then other non-state actors. Not only would such comparative research buttress our scientific findings, but also it could provide critical insights as to how other actors pursue security and how they might be addressed most efficaciously. The first steps, however, are exploratory – determining if geopolitics matters, how much, and in what way. In this respect, this study is designed to serve as a plausibility probe and heuristic, generating useful questions and alternative hypotheses, as well as testing some initial hypotheses concerning the relationship between geopolitics and grand strategies in three crucial cases.

approaches cast at both the national and international levels. Rather than continuing to subsume geography and technology into inappropriate levels of analysis, let us start considering these factors as potential sources of causality in their own right. In the three historical cases examined above, geopolitics is indispensable for providing an explanation about the selection and the evolution of grand strategies. American decision-makers clearly considered the geopolitical context, with the associated mental maps influencing their beliefs, preferences, and policy choices. Moreover, the landscape fitness of the grand strategies they adopted – how well they suited the given environment – also appears to play an important role in shaping and constraining outcomes. While more theorizing, research, and analysis are required in this second area, the evidence gathered thus far supports both sets of geopolitical hypotheses, formative and functional. Most striking here is the need to start considering geopolitics as an important source of causation – on both levels of the causal chain.

As necessary as more research on the operational dimension might be, and as interesting and important as either pitting contending explanations up against each other or integrating them into a systemic approach (or both) might be, the most useful next step would be to test the core findings of this study. I elsewhere have proposed two additional research components that are designed to test both the internal and the external validity of this geopolitical model. First, to test internal validity, I suggest conducting mini-case studies on the security doctrines of Presidents Wilson, Hoover, and George W. Bush. Their strategies seem to deviate from the linear, increasingly integrative relationship suggested above. Why, and with what result? In addition to

offering an opportunity to examine alternative explanations in tougher tests, these “deviant cases” also offer an opportunity to explore further the operational dimension of the two-level geopolitical model.³⁶ If the strategy adopted does not fit with the emergent geopolitical landscape, then one or two circumstances should arise: (1) some type of security dysfunction should appear, captured in a range of military, political, and economic indices (e.g., armed conflict and casualties, protests and condemnations, and percentage of GDP spent on defense); and/or (2) after recognizing the unsuitability of their approach, decision-makers should realign their policies to improve landscape fitness or eventually bear increased costs. If neither costs nor adjustment is evident, then the hypotheses must be revised.

The multi-method approach used to analyze these cases should involve the same type of process-tracing employed in the this project, including content and discursive analysis; cartographic analysis; unobtrusive observation; and comparative analysis.³⁷ I would suggest focusing, again, primarily on explaining official doctrinal statements and trying to analyze the relative significance and sequence of various causes – material and ideational, domestic and international, constraints and opportunities. Preliminary analysis of the two historical cases suggests that even these deviant cases support the model. First, Wilson’s attempted strategic internationalist and institutionalist leap of binding beyond moderate interaction capacity failed to garner the necessary support and

³⁶ For more on the nature and utility of “deviant cases,” see Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” *APSR*, Vol. 65 (September 1971), pp. 692-693.

³⁷ As noted above, if they are feasible, interviews and survey research can usefully complement the content and discursive analysis and offer even more information about a particular grand strategy and its causes. For more on what this dimension of the research could entail, see A. C. Harth, “A Method of Grand Strategy Analysis” (University of Pennsylvania, 1993).

was quickly adjusted, but perhaps too much. Second, and related to this, the hiding approach of the unilateral non-recognition and non-entanglement of the Hoover/Stimson Doctrine failed to meet the growing threat and produced catastrophic consequences. Still unclear is how the new Bush Doctrine will play out. To the extent that it is out of alignment with the underlying geopolitical reality, however, we should expect either strategic adjustment or dysfunctional outcomes.

To complement these three deviant-case studies, a second promising avenue for further research involves a quantitative correlation analysis of a larger number of cases. Intended primarily to test the external validity of my geopolitical hypotheses and their applicability to other great powers, this statistical study would require at least four steps: (1) coding interaction capacity; (2) coding grand strategies; (3) coding operational effectiveness; and (4) analyzing the relationship between these variables. For the next step, I suggest examining the grand strategies (operationalized, again, primarily as doctrines) of six great powers – Russia, England, France, Germany, Japan, and China – across three strata of interaction capacity – weak, moderate, and strong. If the historical record indicates a correlation between these grand strategies, levels of interaction capacity, and operational effectiveness, then my geopolitical argument would be strengthened and its potential applicability extended, perhaps suggesting the need for more intensive investigation of these cases, as well as for similar statistical studies to probe the theory's applicability to smaller states and non-state actors – both of

which are increasing in number, power, and importance.³⁸ If no correlation appears, then the hypotheses must be revised or restricted.

Additional studies could confirm that geopolitical factors matter across time, culture, regime type, and power. In fact, one might find that geopolitics is foundational not only for American national security, but for foreign policy and international relations more generally. If so, the potential practical contribution of this research goes far beyond confirming that specific geopolitical features, mental maps, and landscape fitness matter. In addition to obtaining a sounder understanding of the playing field and its influence, one also can garner a better appreciation of how the game is going to be played and by whom, of what issues and risks are likely to arise, of what actors and agents are likely to survive and succeed, of what ends are likely to be pursued and means adopted, and, most importantly, of what strategic approaches are likely to generate the most security.³⁹ Such information could be invaluable for security analysts

³⁸ See Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997); and Alan K. Henrikson, "A Coming 'Magnesian' Age? Small States, the Global System, and the International Community," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2001).

³⁹ For an example of a policy-oriented argument cast along these lines, emphasizing the need for strategic adjustment to deal with new transnational challenges like drugs, arms, intellectual property rights, people, and money – all "wars" we appear to be losing – see Moses Naim, "The Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 134 (January/February 2003). For a more elaborate treatment of the migration issue, see Jagdish Bhagwati, "Borders Beyond Control," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January/February 2003). For an example of a sociological interpretation and an argument for "multifaceted strategies of insurance" to "contribute to the management of risks in an emerging world risk society," see Mathias Albert, "From Defending Borders toward Managing Geographical Risks? Security in a Globalized World," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 2000).

and policy-makers alike. In particular, the significance of varying levels of interaction capacity and degrees of material separation that currently characterize relations between the United States and different actors (state and non-state alike), produced by varying geopolitical circumstances – like location, topography, distance, and technological development – should be considered by policy-makers as the United States crafts new security policies. One size does not fit all. Instead, American security policies should be nuanced and reflect this range of connectedness, as well as consideration of other variables, with different strategies crafted for different types of threats.⁴⁰

In this regard, prudence might suggest reexamination of some of the propositions and policies put forward in the recent national security strategy report

In addition to the challenges posed by globalization and the emergence of powerful non-state actors, one of the other interesting policy implications of my research concerns the rising importance of economics. As advances in destructive potential render military means excessively (if not prohibitively) costly, at least for relations among great powers, other policy tools become more suitable and will generate higher fitness levels and, consequently, greater “security.” In the current environment, political and economic means, in particular, seem more efficacious for the pursuit and protection of great power interests vis-à-vis other great powers. Advances in communication and transportation technology can exacerbate this trend by increasing the potential for information flows and for non-violent interactions, as well as potentially heating up competition for relative gains, albeit in an embedded normative framework. For a sampling of views on increasing significance of the economic dimension of the game, see Edward Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” *The National Interest* (Summer 1990); Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (Basic Books, 1986); Laura D’Andrea Tyson, *Who’s Bashing Whom: Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries* (Institute for International Economics, 1992); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald A. Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds., *Powernomics: Economics and Strategy After the Cold War* (Madison Books, 1991); Jeffrey Garten, *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy* (Times Books, 1992); Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America* (William Morrow and Co., 1992); Dennis Encarnation, *Rivals Beyond Trade: America versus Japan in Global Competition* (Cornell University Press, 1992); and Wayne Sandholtz, et al., *The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁴⁰ When discussing his increasingly differentiated approach to what he once termed the “axis of evil,” President Bush made the same point in his 2003 Annual Message to Congress: “Different threats require different strategies.” This statement of principle seemed warmly received on both sides of the aisle and, for good reason – it makes strategic sense, particularly if applied to fundamentally different types of threats (which one could question about North Korea and Iraq). The text of the address is available at www.whitehouse.gov.

published by the Bush administration. While there are some geographic references, primarily concerning specific locations and economics, there is little evidence of an awareness of varying levels of interaction capacity or connectedness per se.⁴¹ While it may be easier to deal with some threats preemptively and preventively, before they develop an even greater destructive capacity that could limit both current fitness and future options, the United States should be wary of using a shotgun approach. Such preponderant unilateral militarism may be appropriate and useful for dealing with marginal threats with weak or even moderate interaction capacity, but not for every state or every issue – certainly not for nuclear-armed great powers.⁴² Where connections are thicker and interaction capacity strong other approaches are more

⁴¹ There is one paragraph, however, the third from last, that addresses the growing vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, both because of its openness and because of technological diffusion, and reveals recognition of this important aspect of the emergent landscape and of the need to make strategic adjustments: “Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them. Our society must be open to people, ideas, and goods from across the globe. The characteristics we most cherish – our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life – are vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks. As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets, and squadrons. This is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive – in spite of it.” The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (September 2002), p. 34.

⁴² For a recent critique of the administration’s new non-proliferation policy, see George Petrovich, “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Non-Proliferation,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2 (March/April 2003). For the official statement of policy, see *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (The White House, Washington, DC, December 2002), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>. For more on the insufficiency of such an approach, see Michael Mandelbaum, “The Inadequacy of American Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002).


appropriate and more likely to yield successful outcomes.⁴³ When dealing with transnational realms like the environment, economics, and terrorism or with nuclear states like Russia and China, it makes little sense to apply strategies that misfit the emergent landscape and, consequently, could produce greater insecurity. Instead, decision-makers should try to accurately perceive the world in which they live and must act and attempt to craft security policies with these features in mind⁴⁴ – in other words, to make their mental maps as accurate as possible and to optimize the fitness of their strategies.⁴⁵ In the current age, no less than the outcome and the nature of the game are at stake, as on going technological advances and diffusion continue to increase and spread interaction capacity and fundamentally alter the landscape. Actors that fail to recognize these changes and adjust their strategies accordingly do so at their own peril.

⁴³ As Joseph Nye explains: “Globalization – the growth of networks of worldwide interdependence – is putting new items on our national and international agenda whether we like it or not. Many of these issues we cannot resolve by ourselves. International financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but we need the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change, too, will affect Americans’ quality of life, but we cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, we are forced to work with other countries behind their borders and inside ours. To rephrase the title of my earlier book, we are not only bound to lead, but bound to cooperate.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. xiii-xiv.

⁴⁴ As the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, recently explained: “A wide array of threats exists today and others are developing over time. Collectively, these challenges present a formidable barrier to our vision of a secure and prosperous international order. Against this backdrop, the old defense intelligence threat paradigm, which focused primarily on the military capabilities of a small set of potential adversary states, no longer addresses the entire threat spectrum. More importantly, the emerging threats cannot be dismissed as ‘lesser included cases.’ In this environment, traditional concepts of security, threat, deterrence, intelligence, warning, and military superiority are not adequate. We must adapt and respond to these new conditions just as our enemies pursue new ways to diminish our overwhelming power.” Lowell E. Jacoby, “Global Threat,” Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003, available at www.dia.gov.

⁴⁵ For more on the specific approach to grand strategy I recommend for the United States in the current circumstances – one that synthesizes and integrates the most meritorious elements of realism and liberalism and involves extending horizons, emergent landscapes, and comprehensive adaptation – see A. C. Harth, “Realistic Liberalism: A Middle Way for American Grand Strategy” (Harvard University, January 2003).

Appendix 1
International Relations as a Complex Adaptive System



Appendix 2

Interaction Capabilities by Era*

| | <u>Early Modern (c. 1820s)</u> | <u>Industrial (c. 1940s)</u> | <u>Space/Nuclear (c. 1990s)</u> |
|---|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Destruction | | | |
| Most Combustible Element | Gunpowder | TNT | Uranium |
| Calories released per gram | 800 | 1,600 | 22,000,000,000 |
| Most Lethal Weapon | | | |
| Most destructive weapon (confronting US) | Cannon | V-2 | 1 MT Airburst |
| Theoretical Lethality Index (from Dupuy) | 1,000 | 3,400,000 | 695,385,000 |
| Transportation | | | |
| Most Efficient Medium | Sea | Air | Space |
| Most Common Mode | | | |
| Average speed (knots) | 4 | 200 | 15,000 |
| Approximate time to cross Atlantic: | 20 days | 20 hours | 20 minutes |
| Sea | | | |
| Source of power | Sail | Internal Combustion | Nuclear |
| Days to cross Atlantic | 40 | 4 | 3 |
| Net tonnage of vessels entered and cleared | 1,826,000 | 190,956,000 | 1,034,000,000 |
| Air | | | |
| Source of propulsion | NA | Propellers | Jets |
| Hours to cross Atlantic | NA | 20 | 6 |
| Approximate Cruising Speed (mph) | 0 | 200 | 600 |
| International Passengers | 0 | 1,428,000 | 45,348,000 |
| International Passengers-Miles | 0 | 1,814,000,000 | 135,508,000,000 |
| International Express and Freight (ton-miles) | 0 | 32,904,000 | 6,486,000,000 |
| Communication | | | |
| Primary mode | Naval | Radio-Telegraph | Postal |
| Time to communicate | weeks-months | minutes-hours | minutes-seconds |
| Amount of Receiving Equipment (US) | | | |
| Radios | 0 | 35,900,000 | 540,952,000 |
| Telephone (main lines) | 0 | 34,547,600 | 144,305,000 |
| TVs | 0 | 14,600 | 296,157,000 |
| Computers | 0 | 0 | 78,970,000 |
| Internet Users | 0 | 0 | 1,778,680 |
| Amount of Activity (US) | | | |
| Overseas Phone Calls | 0 | 664,000 | 3,095,000,000 |
| Total number of pieces of mail handled | 3,747,000,000 | 37,427,706,000 | 171,220,000,000 |
| Population | | | |
| Annual Estimate (US) | 10,596,000 | 144,126,000 | 257,900,000 |
| Area | | | |
| Square Miles (US) | 1,749,462 | 2,977,128 | 3,526,378 |


*General information pertains to great powers in a given era, most specific data pertain to the United States, either as source or target, with time and distances based crossing Atlantic Ocean.

Compiled by A. C. Harth from a number of different sources, including the following:


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Appendix 3 – Connectedness to Other Great Powers

Distance between Washington and Other Capitols



Interaction Capacity of Other Great Powers



Sources: Mileage available at www.indo.com/distance/.

Other data from 1996-97, compiled from World Bank, *World Development Report* (1999-2000).

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